This article was originally publish in the Royal New Zealand Air Force Journal 2022. This and recent editions of the RNZAF Journal are found on KEA under the Service Journal tab on the top navigation bar.
NOMONHAN 1939: THE UNDECLARED WAR THAT PRECEDED WORLD WAR TWO
By Mr J. Phillips
Introduction
Immediately prior to World War Two a brief and brutal territorial war occurred between Russia and Japan over a four month period that resulted in nearly 50,000 casualties.[1] Initial air battles between Russian and Japanese air arms on the Manchukuo border resulted in significant Japanese victories.[2] However, a few months later, and in sharp contrast to previous reports, news emerged that Japan had lost a ‘war’ with Russia in the remote region of Nomonhan.[3] Japanese forces became encircled and overwhelmed by a Russian shock force of massed air power, artillery, and armour, supported by an immense logistic chain.[4] Japanese air power was highly regarded at the time and their military commanders believed Russian aviation was too weakened by Stalin’s purges and too far away to be of any consequence. Ultimately, Japan lost the war in the air and the war on the ground, with Goldman summing up the Nomonhan Incident as the ‘most important World War Two battle that most people have never heard of.’[5]
A confluence of interests characterises the political situation of how two great expansionist powers clashed over a remote border line leading to the Nomonhan Incident. Both were competing for influence in East Asia with China and Mongolia as the significant prizes. Russia supported the independence of China and Outer Mongolia, while Japan wanted control of China and to unite Inner and Outer Mongolia within its expansionist strategy. It is found that Japan’s Kwantung Army based in Manchukuo ignored their government’s intent to not initiate a war with Russia, and they vastly underestimated Russian resolve to win at any cost. Concluding agreements formalised the Nomonhan border, ratified a non-aggression pact with Russia; and several years later, preservation of Outer Mongolia as an independent state.[6] While the Nomonhan Incident is mostly a ground war, the history and activities of both air arms will be described to understand how Japan, with the sixth most powerful air arm in the world, failed to neutralise Russia’s air arm and forces.[7]
Early Japanese Army Aviation
Early Japanese aviation was under military control and development from its beginnings, with officers travelling to France and Germany to learn to fly and returning with aircraft to demonstrate the advantages of military aviation. Being keen to test aircraft in battle, they deployed to China during 1914 to carry out air attacks against German and Austrian troops at Tsingtao.[8]
Japan’s belief in air power rose steadily with the formation of its first Air Battalion, consisting of three squadrons. Keen to design and build their own military aircraft, their initial attempts were less than satisfactory. Undeterred, they built aircraft under licence using foreign designers to help establish their indigenous aircraft industry. Likewise, their military flying skills were found wanting during a combat deployment to South-East Siberia from 1918 to 1921.[9] To improve combat effectiveness, French aviation instructors were brought-in to teach gunnery, reconnaissance, and bombing techniques.[10]
By the late 1920s, Army commanders considered that aircraft were best used in the battlefield support role. Development of long-range bombing aircraft and strategic bombing techniques were not pursued, as their primary focus was supporting the occupation of China. Chinese air power was insignificant at the time, which limited the requirement to develop military aviation beyond the needs of that theatre. Although Russia was seen as a significant threat, they thought it highly unlikely that Russia could move significant aircraft numbers to their Eastern border regions.[11] That mistake would prove costly during the Nomonhan Incident.
By 1935, foreign estimates of Japanese front line aircraft strength were between 1200 and 1800 aircraft and their pilots were evaluated as being well trained and disciplined in the face of the enemy[12]; Japan also managing to build a viable indigenous military aircraft manufacturing capability by this time.[13]
Early Russian Military Aviation
Louis Blériot’s 1909 flight across the English Channel inspired Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich to exclaim: “the country that first possesses an aerial fleet will be victorious in any future war”.[14] That flight inspired Russia to build aircraft factories and establish aviation schools. While most factories produced licenced copies of foreign aircraft, Igor Sikorsky pioneered the design of large aircraft types including his Ilya Muromets, which were capable of flying over 1600 miles.
During World War One, Russia fielded several bombers, reconnaissance planes, and fighters in Europe. However, the general lack of maintenance skills and the hodgepodge of designs made them virtually unsupportable in the field, which spiralled further downwards during the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. By the 1930s, Russia’s military and civil aviation sector had improved considerably, and their primary focus was national defence, by using its bomber fleet to conduct strategic air attacks including attacking staging areas of any invading army.[15]
In response to Japan occupying Manchuria in 1932, Russia dispatched officers to the Far Eastern Army Air Force Headquarters to advise on building facilities to support three brigades of TB-3 bomber aircraft.[16] At the same time, Russia provided the Chinese air arm with fighter aircraft, including the provision of training and support in their struggle against Japanese occupation. Russia was steadily increasing its military presence in its eastern territory in response to Japanese expansion.
During the Spanish Civil War, Russia supported the Republican side where they gained valuable air operations experience. Their aircraft had the flight attributes to dominate opposing air forces at the start of the war until Germany improved the aircraft they supplied to the nationalists, giving them a slight air superiority advantage.[17] Lessons of the Spanish Civil War would be used to prioritise military industrial capacity in the late 1930s.
Shockwaves were sent through the Russian military in 1937 when Stalin ordered the purge of many senior officers and aircraft designers, especially of those who were actively developing Russia’s air power strategies and capabilities, including Tupolev, one of their main designers of heavy aircraft at the time.[18] To prepare for the coming war, Stalin prioritised industrial capacity by eliminating capabilities deemed less necessary; heavy bombers were out, fighters and ground attack aircraft were in. Japan saw the purge as a significant vulnerability for Russia as crucial personnel with experience, vision, and leadership were removed en-masse, leaving junior personnel to command and lead many of their air arms.
Land Warfare Doctrine
It is useful to consider land warfare doctrine of the combatants as both Russian and Japanese air arms were organic within their land force structures. Air power was largely conducted in the land warfare context and tactical in its application.
Japan was an early adopter of armoured vehicles during the 1920s, heralding a modernisation programme to reduce infantry divisions to free up resources for the army air arm and tank corps. Although the new tank companies were ill-suited or trained to undertake urban warfare in China, Lieutenant General Yoshikazu Nishi realised that tanks could quicken manoeuvre of the battle group, using them to outflank retreating Chinese forces in Inner Mongolia.[19] They proved their worth in open ground as they increased the tempo of warfare at a faster rate than an infantry force. However, Japanese traditionalists failed to be convinced and reverted to a more familiar infantry-centric doctrine. The debate centred on whether to follow the British theory of using a combined-arms force centred on tanks or the French theory of subordinating armoured vehicles to an infantry centred force. The Japanese Army favoured the French approach but reduced the armoured component to a semi-motorised force. Aircraft, naval ships, and supporting infantry operations in China were prioritised to fit within budgetary allocations.[20] Bravery in the face of the enemy would have to compensate for the lack of armour in the field.
Japanese forces were well trained, fought with valour, and believed in their spiritual superiority.[21] The samurai ethic of Bushido, a romanticised form of feudal militarism, called on the guiding hand of warring ancestors to fuel combat nerve and fighting spirit.[22] While Bushido invoked valour in action, it blinded Japan’s commanders to the reality of mechanised warfare in a theatre that favoured tank warfare.
On the Russian side, Vladimir Triandafillov developed the concept of ‘deep-operations theory’ that called for a massed shock army to carry out continuous operations to overcome enemy resistance. He theorised that concurrent attacks on all operational positions would lead to the fastest possible rupture of the enemy front, followed by encirclement and destruction of enemy forces.[23] Georgii Isserson took these ideas further as he recognised the potential of mechanised forces and air power to be decisive in battle. He too believed that only overwhelming force could be decisive within a strategy of annihilation.[24] To Isserson, deep operations are a series of uninterrupted operational actions that merge into a single operation. In effect, he shifted Russian military thinking of an operation being one activity at one location to a range of operations conducted as a unified strategy.[25]
Undertaking such a strategy involves massive forces supported by a vast logistic chain. Isserson calculated the minimum size shock force as 350,000 men divided into infantry and cavalry divisions, artillery brigades, mechanised brigades, and an air group of bombers, fighters, and reconnaissance aircraft. The massive logistics support required to maintain a force of this size was estimated to be 36 trains a day, half of which was for ammunition alone.[26] The Russians used this doctrine to great effect as they sustained a force of 100,000 soldiers by rail and road during the Nomonhan Incident.
Tensions Rise in the East
Japanese agriculture and infrastructure investments flowed into Manchuria after they won the Russo-Japanese War of 1904/5. However, as a result of rising Chinese nationalism, the Japanese within Manchuria were becoming a political and social target, and to protect their financial interests they occupied Manchuria – declaring it ‘Manchukuo’ in 1932.[27] Japan, through her newly occupied territory, now had a long land border with Mongolia and Russia. Russia too was expanding its interests towards China, desiring to protect its territorial gains of Outer Manchuria north of the Amur River and Haishenwei, which became Vladivostok.[28]
The jewel in Japan’s crown was the Manchurian railway system, which was key to monopolising Japanese trade with Europe. Ultimately, the railway network was, in the words of Goto Shinpei during 1906, ‘military preparedness in civil garb’.[29] Russia responded to the implied threat of Japanese railway construction through Manchukuo by building new railways in Siberia and double-tracking the Trans-Siberian railway.[30] Military strength of the Soviet Far East Army grew to 16 divisions supported by 1,200 tanks and 1,200 aircraft.[31]
Political relations with Russia soured when Japan signed the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany in 1936; formed in response to the Soviet-Chinese non-aggression treaty, and subsequent weapons transfers to China.[32] Joseph Stalin, the Secretary-General of the Communist Party, also entered into a mutual assistance agreement with Outer Mongolia in defence of its territory.[33] Japan, for its part, desired to re-unite Inner and Outer Mongolia to block China from Russian influence, and seize resources, such as oil, from Siberia.[34]
Japan held 20 divisions in reserve for its Go North strategy; however, Japan sent most of this force to occupy China, and by 1938, over 1.6 million men were bogged down in the country.[35] This left the Kwantung Army, Japan’s garrison army of Manchuria, solely responsible for territorial security.
Coox characterised the Kwantung Army as belligerent and often disobedient to the central authority.[36] For example, Major Tsuji Masanobu’s policy on settling territorial disputes was to encourage the annihilation of any Russian forces who crossed the border. This policy clashed with orders from the General Staff Headquarters requiring permission to engage in large-scale offensives and to not start a war with Russia, breaking Clausewitz’s dictum that the political and military objective must be aligned.[37]
Border skirmishes were frequent and in July 1938 Russian troops occupied border territory at Changkufeng. The Kwantung Army attacked taking a tactically significant hill, looking to advance towards Vladivostok. But the Russians counterattacked in strength, pushing the Kwangtung Army back across the disputed border.[38] While the Russians used around 100 aircraft to support their attack, Japanese leaders refused to authorise the use of aircraft to prevent escalation of the conflict. The Japanese Government called for a ceasefire, which the Russians agreed to as they were concerned about the emerging German threat.[39] The Nomonhan Incident occurred in the following year, and the use of aircraft would play a major role in the conflict.
Figure 1: General area of Nomonhan Incident (Credit: Author)
The Nomonhan Incident Begins
Nomonhan, or Kalkhin Gol to the Russians, is located on a remote Asian steppe bordering Manchukuo (Manchuria) and Outer Mongolia, as shown in figure 1.[40] It is a remote grassy plain dissected by a border, which according to the Kwantung Army, followed the Halha River, whereas the Mongolians marked the border more eastward to intersect with Nomonhan. The disputed border covers an area of approximately 130 x 25kms, and is depicted in Figure 2.
Figure 2: General battle area (Google Maps with author’s overlay)
The Nomonhan Incident started when Mongolian cavalrymen entered the disputed border area on 11 May 1939 and were driven out back across the Halha River by the Manchukuoan cavalry. The Mongolians returned two days later and managed to hold their ground, prompting the Kwantung Army to dispatch an infantry regiment to seize the disputed area. In support, Kwantung Headquarters transferred four squadrons of reconnaissance, light bomber and fighter aircraft to Nomonhan.
Japanese pilots enjoyed air superiority by flying relatively fast type 97 fighters against their Russian counterparts, who were flying early versions of I-15 and I-16 types. Japanese pilots were better trained as they undertook about 200 flying hours per year, contrasting Russian pilots who flew about 50-60 hours with little time spent on combat training.[41]
Japanese reconnaissance pilots were soon to discover large fleets appearing at airfields in Mongolia, prompting two additional squadrons of fighters to be brought forward to Nomonhan.[42] Russia was building its forces while biding its time and a hint of the expansion came on May 25th when Russian aircraft pounded Japanese positions with a loss of 42 aircraft.[43] On the 28th of May, after an intense battle, the Kwantung regiment would be encircled and annihilated. Surprised by the scale and force of the attack, the Kwantung Army sent its entire 2nd Joint Air Group forward, bolstering aircraft numbers to around 120.
Stunned by the high attrition rate, Russia disengaged from combat to evaluate their tactics and await reinforcements. As the Russian build-up continued apace, they conducted a long-range bombing attack inside Manchukuo, which so alarmed the Kwantung Army they arranged for a large-scale retaliatory attack.[44] At the political level, both the Japanese and Russian governments lodged protests, desiring to settle the dispute via diplomacy. However, the speed and scale of the fighting made diplomatic negotiations challenging to initiate.[45]
While ground forces were staging, the air arms were kept busy harassing each other’s positions. On June 22nd, 100 Russian aircraft crossed the Halha River, with 25 being downed during aerial combat to Japan’s loss of five. Kwantung Army reconnaissance aircraft noted the continual build-up of Russian aircraft and ordered a strategic strike on Mongolian air bases, an action denied by Army General Headquarters in Tokyo. However, the order was ignored and the attack went ahead with over 100 aircraft flying 300 kilometres into Mongolia, destroying over 200 Russian aircraft.[46]
At that time Japanese aircraft had the advantage in speed, range and manoeuvrability, albeit at the cost of armour and fuel-tank protection. Their aircraft were fitted with oxygen tanks allowing a higher altitude to be flown, and two-way radios for communication between flight commanders, and receivers for junior pilots. In contrast, early Russian aircraft were slow, primitive and lacked stability in flight. Radios and oxygen equipment were not fitted, limiting altitude and communications.
Japan’s Phase Two
Japan took the initiative with Lieutenant General Komatsubara mobilising two infantry regiments to seize the high-ground north of the Holsten River on July 1st. Concurrently, two Kwantung Army tank regiments accompanied by the 2nd battalion attacked Russian positions on the eastern side of the Halha.[47] The air arm provided close air support to the advancing forces while fending off Russian air attacks. Using experience gained during the Spanish Civil War, the Russians staggered their sorties to provide a persistent presence over the battle front forcing the Japanese into a fatiguing air battle by flying a much higher sortie rate.
General Zhukov fought with mass, firepower and tempo by committing a motorised armoured brigade and a motorised rifle regiment to the fight; a force of 452 vehicles against the Kwantung Army’s 74. In response, the Joint Air Group attacked Russian vehicles and artillery positions to compensate for the lack of Japanese heavy artillery, while the Kwantung Army managed to destroy 120 Russian vehicles. Unfortunately for the Japanese air arm, Russian formations kept increasing in size, and by early July, daily Russian air patrols numbered between 100 and 200 aircraft.[48]
Russian aerial reconnaissance was bolstered by creating a specialist squadron, which was located close to the front to maximise time over enemy territory, to the point of being within range of the Japanese light artillery, with a mandate to identify Japanese tactical and operational reserves up to 100km behind the front line. The squadron was equipped with Tupolev SB-2 reconnaissance aircraft and Polikarpov I-16 tip 10 fighters.[49] Attacking Japanese reserves and logistic support elements became a focus of Russian air attacks.
Meanwhile, Japanese tank regiments on the east bank of the Halha lost half their vehicles and failed to break the Russian lines. Both the Russian and Japanese forces reinforced their artillery units within the disputed area in preparation for further offensive action. Kwantung forces remained outgunned on the ground, and increasingly outnumbered in the air by a ratio of two to one. The intense fighting quickly became a war of attrition with Japan suffering over 5,000 soldiers killed or wounded during the incident to date.[50] In the air, the Japanese were winning the fight, but losses on both sides were mounting. Japanese aircraft dropped over 170 tonnes of bombs, and by mid-June they had lost around 160 aircraft to Russia’s loss of around 400.[51] Ultimately, Kwantung forces were overwhelmed and forced to retreat, resulting in a pause in fighting with both sides taking time to consolidate and regroup.
The Russian logistic machine was now in full swing, moving over 55,000 tons of war materiel from the railhead at Borzya. Over 4000 trucks were used to ferry material day and night over the 1500km round-trip, including 1000 fuel trucks to keep vehicles moving.[52] Aircraft deficiencies were rectified with the delivery of higher specification
I-15 and I-16 types sent in quantity to the front, including the arrival of more ‘Heroes of the Soviet Union’ – who were experienced pilots from the Spanish Civil War.[53] New aircraft models arrived with improved speed, altitude, manoeuvrability, and armament. Russia used the Nomonhan Incident as a proving ground for new designs and tactics, including the use of aerial rockets to attack close formations of aircraft and for ground attacks. The sheer quantity of aircraft available soon exceeded the number required to support the area of operations.
Japanese intelligence vastly underestimated the scale of the build-up; and even if they could report on it, the Kwangtung Army was incapable of conceptualising it. To them, it was an incomprehensible effort to move such a quantity of materiel so quickly over such a long distance.[54] In contrast, the Kwantung Army had difficulties maintaining its logistic lines; food, water, ammunition and artillery all being in short supply. Discipline and morale declined during their routing and they received little political support as the Japanese Government was focussed on operations in China, and negotiating a settlement to end the conflict.
To make matters worse for the Kwantung Army, general Zhukov engaged in disinformatsiya – a concurrent information warfare campaign of deception. Reinforcements were moved at night; false radio messages were transmitted, false leaflets showing incorrect defensive layouts were distributed, and nightly soundings of tank and aircraft engines were blasted over loudspeakers towards Japanese lines.[55] Two weeks of nightly simulated engine noises worked well, as Japanese soldiers did not recognise actual movements of Russian forces when they manoeuvred across the Halha River on August 19th. Disinformatsiya included the siting of false airfields and model aircraft, but to off-set regular reconnoitring by the high-speed Mitsubishi Ki-15 aerial reconnaissance aircraft, the false airfields had to be regularly re-sited.[56]
The Final Offensive
The Japanese Army General Staff tried to encourage the Kwantung Army Commander General Ueda to withdraw his forces behind the Russian claimed border so the matter could be solved diplomatically. The message was written in a manner for Ueda to save face, but he was incensed and ignored the message.[57]
During the final massed offensive of August, Zhukov committed three infantry divisions (45,000 soldiers), around 500 tanks, 300 armoured cars, artillery brigades, and 200 aircraft against Komatsubara’s 30,000 soldiers and remnants of his armoured battalions.[58]
Figure 3: Russian plan to encircle Japanese forces 20 Aug 39, (Credit: Moses[59])
Zhukov carried out his double envelopment strategy over eleven days, starting on August 20th; refer to figure 3 for his battle plan depicting the planned movement of forces. It shows a Central Force consisting of a motorised infantry division, an infantry division, and an infantry machine gun brigade positioned to fix the Japanese infantry in place. Artillery positions are behind the fixing force. Zhukov’s Northern Force, consisting of a Mongolian cavalry division, an infantry regiment, an armoured brigade, two tank brigades, an artillery regiment, and an anti-tank brigade, is positioned on the northern area of the Halha River. Zhukov’s Southern Force is postured with a Mongolian cavalry division, an infantry division, an armoured brigade, two tank brigades, an artillery regiment, and an anti-tank brigade.[60]
The motorised brigades dispatched to the left and right flanks crushed Japanese positions and cut off reinforcements as they sped towards Nomonhan, thus completing the envelopment. Fighting was brutal, often leading to hand-to-hand combat. By August 23rd, Japanese morale had dropped to its lowest ebb due to the relentless onslaught of shelling, air attacks, and ground assaults. Zhukov timed artillery bombardments to occur after bombing attacks, allowing time for aircraft to be rearmed and return to the front. The relentless pounding continued for days, whereupon a Japanese medical officer lamented the lack of air and ground support: “I can’t see the shape of a single friendly tank or plane”.[61] Japanese flanks were split from the main force cutting off a potential retreat, and their reinforcements were interdicted by the Russian air arm preventing them from getting to the front. Russian SB-2 bombers maintained a constant presence over the battlefield making Japanese efforts to help ground forces almost impossible.
Japan lacked the resources to fight a war of attrition on this scale, their pilots became exhausted and aircraft losses mounted. Russian aircraft were now more numerous by a ratio of four to one. In the face of the overwhelming quantity of Russian aircraft and ability to generate sorties, on some days with over 700 sorties flown and twenty dogfights taking place, Japanese pilots still managed to stay engaged in the fight.
Further compounding Japan’s woes was news on the 24th of August that Germany and Russia had signed a non-aggression pact. The reports sent shockwaves through Japan and stunned the Kwantung Army as it now faced the potential for an all-out attack on Manchukuo.[62] This pact gave Stalin breathing space to initiate the main offensive against Kwantung Army forces.[63] Stalin rightly feared a two-front war against both Germany and Japan, as pointed out by Major General Khabarovtsev, who stated: “If the Japanese enter the war on Hitler’s side … our cause is hopeless.”[64] This imperative ensured both the political and military aims were matched – the Japanese had to be crushed convincingly as a deterrent for future military actions.
Fighting concluded on August 31st with Zhukov declaring the disputed area clear of enemy forces. Japanese forces were annihilated, with only a small body of troops managing to retreat. As Goldman points out, the Kwantung Army acquitted themselves well against overwhelming odds despite their losses.[65] While the Kwantung Army regrouped and awaited further orders, a ceasefire agreement went into effect on the 16th of September.
Subsequent Diplomacy Post Fighting
Colonel Doi, Japan’s military attaché in Moscow, sent a message to Tokyo and the Kwantung Army on the 3rd of September stating the intention to conclude a non-aggression pact with Russia. He noted that World War Two had started and that Russia might contest Manchuria; suggesting that the Kwantung Army retain their resolve and fortify positions near the Nomonhan border as a deterrent. Colonel Doi suggested that if Japan yielded too easily to Russian demands, then it would impair Japanese national prestige and invite Russian contempt, which may inspire them to increase support to China. Japan had to maintain a position of strength in order to negotiate a favourable non-aggression pact. Doi warned that Russia should not be underestimated or antagonised, lest they become ‘intolerable’. [66] A formal declaration of the cessation of hostilities over Nomonhan was agreed to on 16th of September. Further agreements would be concluded for the establishment of a border demarcation commission during November, and Togo and Molotov signed a formal agreement marking the Nomonhan border on 9th of June 1940.[67]
Russia’s rise to great power status during World War Two allowed Stalin to subsequently negotiate the fate of Outer Mongolia through the Yalta agreement of 1945, preserving the status of Outer Mongolia as an independent country.[68]
Conclusion
Two expansionist powers were competing for influence and territory in East Asia, and both were preparing for an eventual large scale attack during the early 1930s. As time progressed, neither side desired war as Japan was bogged down in China, and Russia had its eye on the looming European catastrophe. Neither side reckoned on the belligerent Kwantung Army, who ignored the political objectives of the Japanese Government as much as Russia’s resolve to defend their borders and those of its allies.
Japan retained a traditional infantry-centric doctrine, whereas Russia on the other hand, developed a new doctrine to assemble, support, and command a massive armour-centric mechanised shock-force. The air doctrine of both sides focussed on supporting ground forces and the air-to-air battle. Japan’s aircraft and pilots were superior to those of Russia in the early phases of Nomonhan, but the tables turned as Japan’s pilots became fatigued and overwhelmed by Russia’s preponderance of air power. Japanese air power in turn became increasingly ineffective in the face of enhanced Russian tactics, better aircraft, and the rapidly improving skills of the Russian aircrew gained through experience. Zhukov’s use of disinformatsiya confused and confounded the Kwantung Army to great effect. Ultimately, Japan’s Air Group could not maintain air superiority over Nomonhan, and the Kwantung Army could not withstand the overwhelming force massed against it on the ground.
Clausewitz observed that war is politics by other means and his dictum of aligning political and military objectives was maintained by Russia, and broken by the Kwantung Army. Stalin had Hitler approaching his doorstep and he needed breathing space to resolve Nomonhan with overwhelming force. He knew that Russia could not fight a two-front war and signing a non-aggression pact with Germany would destabilise Japan’s Anti-Comintern relationship. In the end, the Kwantung Army were outmanoeuvred both politically and militarily.
Footnotes
[1] Approximately 23,000 Japanese and 26,000 Russian casualties, Stuart Goldman, Nomonhan 1939: The Red Army’s Victory that Shaped World War II, Naval Institute Press, 2012, p136.
[2] Japan had occupied Manchuria, declaring it ‘Manchukuo’ in 1932. The Auckland Star published reports on Japan’s advances in China, and Russia’s bombing within Manchukuo, https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/AS19390624.2.42.2, dated 24 Jun 1939.
[3] The Christchurch Press described how Japan was forced to fight a desperate rear guard action against Soviet/Mongolian forces https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/CHP19391124.2.44 dated 24 Nov 1939.
[4] Laurie Barber and Ken Henshall, The Last War of Empires: Japan and the Pacific War 1941-1945, David Bateman, 1999, p67.
[5] Goldman, Nomonhan 1939: The Red Army’s Victory that Shaped World War II, Naval Institute Press, 2012, p5.
[6] Text of the Japanese Constitution, https://ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c04.html.
[7] Hammerton (ed), Aerial Wonders of our Time: Sky Fighters of the East, Amalgamated Press, 1935, p770.
[8] Note: Japan was allied with Britain during World War One against Germany. Sekigawa, Pictorial, pp10-11.
[9] Eiichiro Sekigawa, Pictorial history of Japanese military aviation, Ian Allen, 1974, pp11-12.
[10] Sekigawa, Pictorial, p16.
[11] Sekigawa, Pictorial, p28.
[12] Hammerton (ed), Aerial Wonders of our Time: War in the Air, Amalgamated Press, 1935, p769.
[13] Justin Pyke, Blinded by the Sun? American Intelligence Assessment of Japanese Air Power, 1920-41, part 2 – 1930-37, From Balloons to Drones, 29 Aug 2017, https://balloonstodrones.com/2017/08/29/blinded-by-the-rising-sun-american-intelligence-assessments-of-japanese-air-power-1920-41-part-2-1930-1937/.
[14] Miller, The Soviet Air Force, Time Life Books, 1983, p17-18
[15] Mason and Taylor, Aircraft, Strategy, and Operations of the Soviet Air Force, Butler and Tanner, 1986, p127.
[16] T stands for Tyazhely (heavy), B stands for Bombardirovshchik (bomber).
[17] C. Rougeron, Summary of “Les Enseignements Aeriene de la Guerre D’Espagna”, Royal Air Force Quarterly number 10, 1940, pp411-412.
[18] Mason, Aircraft, p127.
[19] Jiaxin Du, Pride Before the Fall: Why Japan Failed Tank Warfare, World War II Magazine, March/April 2017, https://www.historynet.com/why-japan-armored-warfare-failed.htm.
[20] Edward Drea, Nomonhan: Japanese-Soviet Tactical Combat, 1939, Combat Studies Institute, 1981, p90.
[21] Goldman, Nomonhan 1939, p121.
[22] Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: the theory of politics of civil-military relations, Belknap Press, 1985, p127, and Inazo Nitobe, Bushido: the soul of Japan, Project Gutenberg EBook, 2004/1908, p51.
[23] Richard W. Harrison, Architect of Soviet Victory in World War II: The Life and Theories of G.S. Isserson, McFarland and Co, 2010, Kindle Edition, locations 2460 to 2481.
[24] Brigade Commander Georgii Samoilovich Isserson, The Evolution of Operational Art, translated by Bruce Menning, Combat Studies Institute Press, 2013, p-xviii.
[25] Georgii Isserson, The Evolution of Operational Art, p48.
[26] Richard W. Harrison, Architect of Soviet Victory, Kindle Edition, locations 2554-2561.
[27] The Japanese Monographs, number 144, Political Strategy Prior to the Outbreak of War, Military History Section, Headquarters, US Army Forces Far East, 1951, chap 1. http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/monos/144/144chap1.html, accessed 4 Aug 2020.
[28] These historical treaties are still reverberating today with the rise of Chinese nationalism and economic power, https://www.msn.com/en-in/news/india/explained-why-160-year-old-vladivostok-has-a-chinese-connection/ar-BB16pkRA.
[29] William Summers, The Great Manchurian Plague of 1910-1911: the geopolitics of an epidemic disease, Yale, 2012, p44-45.
[30] Hoyt, Japan’s War: the great Pacific conflict 1853-1952, Guild Publishing, 1986, chap 17.
[31] Goldman, Nomonhan 1939, p28.
[32] The Anti-Comintern Pact (Comintern – Communist International), www.britannica.com/event/Anti-Comintern-Pact, accessed 28 Jul 2020.
[33] Drea, Nomonhan, p1, and Asiaticus, Soviet Relations with Japan, Pacific Affairs, Vol 14 No 3, 1941, p272.
[34] Larry Moses, Khalkin Gol, pp65-66, and Owen Lattimore, Pacific Affairs, volume 10, number 4, 1937, p421.
[35] Hoyt, Japan’s War, chap 17.
[36] Alvin Coox, Nomonhan: Japan against Russia, 1939, Stanford University Press, 1985, pp1075-1076.
[37] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret translation, Princeton University Press, 1984, p81.
[38] Michael Peck, The Almost War of 1938-1939: Russia and Japan’s Nearly Forgotten Battle, National Interest, 29 Sep 2015, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-almost-war-1938-1939-russia-japans-nearly-forgotten-13956.
[39] Sekigawa, Pictorial, p75.
[40] For ease of reading, the spelling of Nomonhan and Khalkhin Gol will be used. References cited may use spellings such as: Homonhon, Nomonghan, Nomon-Han-Burd-Obo, Nuomenhan; Halha River, Kalkha River, Khalkh River, Khalkh Gol, and Kharkhin Gol.
[41] Sekigawa, Pictorial, p79, and Dimitar Nedialkov, In the Skies of Nomonhan: Japan Versus Russia May-September 1939, Crecy Publishing, 2011, p48.
[42] Georgy Zhukov, Marshal of Victory, Pen and Sword, 2013, Kindle edition, location 3860 of 16526.
[43] Sekigawa, Pictorial, pp75-6.
[44] Alvin Coox, High Command and Field Army: The Kwantung Army and the Nomonhan Incident, 1939, Military Affairs, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Oct., 1969), p304.
[45] Ota Saburo, Affidavit to the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Defense Document Number 1581, 16 May 1947, p1.
[46] Note: Aircraft losses were often inflated for propaganda purposes. Sekigawa, Pictorial, pp77-8.
[47] Drea, Nomonhan, p4.
[48] Sekigawa, Pictorial, p78.
[49] Nedialkov, In the Skies of Nomonhan, p94.
[50] Drea, Nomonhan, p7.
[51] Nedialkov, In the Skies of Nomonhan, p75.
[52] Goldman, Nomonhan 1939, p132-133.
[53] Zhukov, Victory, Kindle location 3860 of 16526.
[54] Drea, Nomonhan, pp71-72, and Christopher D. Bellamy & Joseph S. Lahnstein, The New Soviet Defense Policy: KHALKHIN GOL 1939 as Case Study, Parameters 20, no. 1 (1990), p25.
[55] Goldman, Nomonhan 1939, p135.
[56] Nedialkov, In the Skies of Nomonhan, p94.
[57] Goldman, Nomonhan 1939, pp130-1.
[58] Office of the Chief of Military History United States Army, Small Wars and Border Problems: The Nomonhan Incident, Japanese Studies in Manchuria, Vol XI, Part 3, Book B, 1956, p186, Drea, Nomonhan, pp 9 & 75.
[59] N.F. Kuz’man, Na straze mirnogo truda, reproduced in Larry Moses, Khalkin Gol, p80.
[60] Goldman, Nomonhan 1939, pp137-8.
[61] Drea, Nomonhan, p76.
[62] Moses, Khalkin Gol, p82.
[63] Note, Germany invaded Poland on the 1st of September 1939.
[64] Coox, Nomonhan, p1079.
[65] Goldman, Nomonhan 1939, pp148-9.
[66] Office of the Chief of Military History United States Army, Small Wars and Border Problems: The Nomonhan Incident, Japanese Studies in Manchuria, Vol XI, Part 3, Book C, 1956, pp447-450.
[67] Ota Saburo, Affidavit, p3.
[68] Text of the Japanese Constitution, https://ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c04.html.
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