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## THE ARMY'S PUBLIC RELATIONS CHALLENGE ON PUBLIC PERCEPTION

BY

MAJOR J.A. GARNETT, BA (MIL) RNZA

*God and the soldier we adore  
In time of danger not before  
The danger past and all things righted  
God is forgotten and the soldier slighted*

*Rudyard Kipling*

Major Garnett graduated from RMC Duntroon in 1978. After completing his young officer training he held a number of regimental appointments before being posted to the Royal School of Artillery, Larkhill, UK in 1983. He spent the first year at the school with field artillery and the second year cross training to air defence. In 1985 Major Garnett was posted to Army General Staff as the Air Defence Project Officer. In 1986 he had a five month attachment as the administration officer for the Defence Committee of Enquiry. In September of that year he took up his present appointment, that of Chief Instructor, School of Artillery.

### INTRODUCTION

In the last few decades public perception of the Armed Forces has drastically affected the way in which we have been permitted to operate and the circumstances in which we would be committed. The public, once motivated, are not prepared simply to allow the Government to spend one billion dollars on defence without having a say. This trend, combined with vocal peace movement activities, makes the Armed Forces more accountable than ever before for their actions and at times even their existence.

The rapid growth of the Peace movement and the ability of a comparative few to sway the majority, was clearly illustrated with the Vietnam conflict. It was public pressure and their perception of the conflict, that was one of the major factors that led to the American and Allied Forces being withdrawn. With television, we were faced with a form of technology that had the potential not only to inform but also change the course of events.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Mitchell Maj M.C.

Television and the Vietnam War'. Naval War  
College Review, No 37 (3), May/June 1984 p 42

Since the early 1970s there has been very little informed debate on Defence. The public, many of whom are now of generations untouched by war, are questioning more the need to maintain a defence force in time of peace, especially when even Defence Reviews cannot identify a tangible threat in the near future. Certain minority groups are beginning to question more and seek the answer to the question 'What does the public get for its defence dollar?' These groups, although perhaps not representing the majority, receive a disproportionate amount of media coverage and thus have the potential of influencing the generally apathetic Mr Citizen.

Our public relations programme is designed to encourage support for the Army and to discourage both public apathy and doubt about our roles and our ability to carry them out. It is also designed to help foster high morale within the Army.<sup>2</sup> Apart from the external public relations problems which must be countered, there is also a public relations problem within the Army. With the change of government came the problem of ANZUS and the requirement for yet another defence review. The operational role of the Armed Forces is vague and appears to lack any real direction in the absence of any foreseeable threat. The problem is further exacerbated with the present economic situation and government expenditure cuts.

The ability to arrest the problems outlined above, in the main, is a function of public relations, of projecting the correct image to both the soldiers and the general public.

This paper seeks to determine a Public Relations Policy, Image and Organisation that will meet the challenge of the Army's survival in today's peacetime environment.

### THE PROBLEM

The Army presently exists and trains in a period of low strategic threat. This factor influences public opinion and presents us with a public relations challenge which calls for positive action, 'pro-action' as opposed to 'reaction'. The problem is that we do not have the resources to achieve a pro-action public relations policy and therefore are not able to fully meet the challenge. The present public relations organisation for Army is based on one Public Relations Officer, PRO(Army), located in Wellington. The PRO(Army) does have two special list commission officers on his staff, but even with these personnel the organisation is grossly under-staffed. The army public relations organisation does not have a financial allocation and thus is extremely limited in its ability to actively promote the necessary policies and images. In addition, each unit in the Army supposedly has an information officer. Very few units, if any, have one appointed. If they do, there are no terms of reference to use as a comprehensive guide. The limited guidance given does not compensate for the detailed training, dedicated staffing, and media rapport necessary for good public relations. Without detailed terms of reference or any qualified PR personnel to closely supervise them, these untrained information officers are of debatable value.

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<sup>2</sup> NZP9, The Army's Public Relations Plan!, Part 6, p 6-1.

### Present Public Relations Policy

The present public relations policy aims to present the Army as an integral, essential and useful element of New Zealand society; and to facilitate communication within the Army in order to maintain the morale of soldiers and their dependants.<sup>3</sup> To achieve this aim the Army divides Public Relations into two broad areas; external, which is aimed at the general public, and internal, which is aimed primarily at the soldier and their dependants. Both external and internal public relations policies try to enhance or develop the image by which the Army is perceived.

### The Defence Dilemma and Public Perception

Public perception of the Armed Forces has changed drastically since the turn of the century. The adage 'for Queen and Country' means little to a large number of the younger generation. Hence the glory and prestige of serving the colours is not held in the same high esteem as it once was. In addition the public today face a defence dilemma; they know they want defence because history tells them they may need it, but they are not exactly sure for what purpose and in what form. How then do the people of New Zealand perceive the Army in Post-ANZUS New Zealand? For any public relations programme to work, it must ascertain the perceived image the public have, before formulating a campaign that will successfully portray the image we desire. An analysis, of the public opinion poll commissioned by the Defence Committee of Enquiry, is the most up to date statistical base to help determine the present public perception of Defence. The common view was that New Zealanders should aim:

- a. To secure the territorial integrity, political independence and economic well-being of New Zealand.
- b. To promote the security and well-being of our region.
- c. To make a contribution to achieving global security, arms control and disarmament.<sup>4</sup>

Of the 1600 people questioned in the poll only 11% were worried about an armed invasion on New Zealand.<sup>5</sup> There were only two instances where the majority of New Zealanders felt we should use our Armed Forces outside New Zealand; an attack on Australia (63%), and an attack on Britain (54%). Situations in which the public were most loath to use armed force, and most inclined to either stay out of the dispute or negotiate a peaceful solution, were internal disorder in various countries, conventional war in Europe, and conflicts concerning

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<sup>3</sup> NZP9, p 6-2.

<sup>4</sup> Defence Committee of Enquiry, Defence and Security: What New Zealanders Want!. Govt Print 1986. Wellington NZ, p 60.

<sup>5</sup> Defence Committee of Enquiry, p 40.

South-East Asia.<sup>6</sup> In essence then the public perceives the Armed Forces primary role as our own national security, even though very few perceive any threat, followed by armed assistance to Australia and Britain. The dilemma is that the majority of the public believe that these roles can only be achieved if New Zealand is part of an alliance and yet the Government's present policies remove us from any realistic alliance. The majority of the public do not believe that defence resting solely with New Zealand's own Armed Forces, or with the Armed Forces as the core of a citizen Army, would work or be strong enough.<sup>7</sup> Even with this dilemma the public are reconciled that the Army has a primary role of Defence. The majority even want the Battalion to remain in Singapore for training and PR purposes.<sup>8</sup>

A number of people would argue that there is no real need to promote an image because the number of people wanting to join the Army is testimony that public perception of the Army is satisfactory. This recruiting influx, however, is probably more a function of the economic situation than testimony to public perception. If the Army does not promote the correct image now, there is the risk that the public's perception will not be sufficient to counter the persistently vocal anti-military groups. In peacetime, therefore, it is the Army's secondary role and the image associated with that role that we should be concentrating on. The public has well entrenched the perception that the Armed Forces should be utilized to assist in Civil Defence activities. There is also a majority of New Zealanders (82%) who would like New Zealand to continue to play an active role in peacekeeping in various countries.<sup>9</sup> Such activity through the United Nations would not only be publicly acceptable but would also give a real purpose to the training and utilization of the Army. This would also help improve morale within the Army and, if done on a larger scale than at present, could off-set any potential morale problem that may be associated with the return of 1 RNZIR in 1989.

The following are the roles that over 90% of those polled believed were peacetime roles for the Armed Forces; assisting Civil Defence (99%), assisting after disasters in South Pacific Island Countries if requested (96%), countering terrorist acts in New Zealand (90%), search and rescue in and around New Zealand (90%), and training civilians in survival skills (90%). Given the fairly rare occurrence of natural disasters, the Army's existence solely to have a secondary role as a back up civil defence force both nationally and internationally, is hard to justify. The recent cyclone in the Cook Islands emphasizes the limited extent to which we capitalise on PR opportunities. The final contribution by the Armed Forces in this emergency, given the political constraints, was quite significant. The PR mileage however was lost. A large showing by the French stole the spot-light, and by the time New Zealand did anything significant, it was almost old news. Such a showing does not aid our

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<sup>6</sup> Defence Committee of Enquiry, p 39.


<sup>7</sup> Defence Committee of Enquiry, p 43.

<sup>8</sup> Defence Committee of Enquiry, Annex A, p 51.

<sup>9</sup> Defence Committee of Enquiry, p 47.



public relations image when over 96% of the public believes one of our peacetime roles should be assisting after disasters in the South Pacific region.



# N.Z. Army

## Part of your community

Army News - Number 11, Feb 87.

### Image

The Army must determine what image it wishes to portray to society. The recruiters have embarked on a campaign to depict the Army as a mentally and physically challenging organisation. This image is satisfactory for recruiting purposes but, the image the man in the street has of the Army as an organisation should be more than that. At present Army PR is locked into the recruiting image because neither the manpower or the finance to develop and maintain a more suitable image is available. The only finance available for image making is with recruiting.

The Army's PR policy is supposedly designed to project the Army as part of the community. Most New Zealanders accept that the Army has a primary role of preparing for war and that in peacetime we are occasionally called upon to assist the community, normally during times of natural disasters. The public generally do not think of us in any other light. It is probable that

within the community at large the apathetic individual is in the majority.<sup>10</sup> Unless the Army actively promotes the correct image, the apathetic majority could be swayed by the often incorrect and totally emotive views of such movements as peace groups, or those who wish to drastically reduce defence spending. In times of protracted peace, we need to go further than simply say "we were there during time of natural disaster". This alone does not justify our existence or fully realise the image we could portray.

### Corporate Image

An expert civilian PR organisation would find a number of suitable images, worthy of the Army associating with. One possible image could be a corporate image. It should be stressed at the beginning that in this case a corporate image is not meant to imply financial self sufficiency, or even charging for services, but merely the professional image. The armed services are seen by some as a suitable institution to provide training in greater self-reliance, job skills, self-discipline, as well as cooperative and defence capabilities. This function can also provide the Services with a positive role and image.<sup>11</sup> To capitalise on this the Army must start to promote a peacetime image along the lines of a highly professional corporation and relate it to the public in the terminology that they understand. Such a radical deviation from the old PR policy would not compromise our primary role but would enhance our peacetime image. One only has to talk with civilians to realise that they generally think of the Army as that group of people with guns and tanks simply training for war and occasionally assisting in civil defence tasks. They do not perceive us as personnel managers, resource managers, project managers, leaders, and the like.

The public are often surprised to learn the extent that the Army relies on computers, modern training methods and sophisticated, highly technical equipment. The way Army personnel portray themselves to the public, can also have a dramatic influence on public perception. For example within the Army most of us would understand the full implications of the appointment of troop commander of a transport platoon. The public have little, if any, perception of what being a troop commander involves. They are unaware that the 19-24 year old is responsible for the management of up to 61 personnel, the equipment management of up to 28 vehicles with a capital value of \$3.2 million, and must be capable of acting as an independent area manager if required to by the operational location of his troop. If the Army was portrayed to the public along these lines and using that sort of terminology, public perception of the Army, and therefore our image, would greatly improve.

In essence, it is time the Army accepted that we have to justify our peacetime existence and promote the positive aspects of the Army in terms that the public at large can relate to. Our secondary role of assisting during time of natural disaster, is almost taken for granted. The Army must develop an image of being a sophisticated training and operational corporation that not only provides community services on an ongoing basis but also releases back to the community highly trained and extremely competent personnel to be absorbed into the civil work force.

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<sup>10</sup> NZP9, p 6-2.

<sup>11</sup> Defence Committee of Enquiry, p 52.

For pay purposes the Army has correlated itself at various levels to a number of private sector trades and professions. This factor could be used to assist with the corporate image. If the public were aware that certain levels in the Army equated to certain professional levels in the private sector it would not only help our public image but also increase the esteem a soldier had of himself in relation to civilian friends.

The Army could also utilize the corporate image approach for its internal PR policy. There are a large number of personnel who have some doubts as to what their peacetime role is. This becomes even more critical in time of minimal threat and during periods of economic restraint that directly affects the Army. Certainly the problem of morale and purpose will increase with the return to New Zealand of 1 RNZIR and the subsequent loss of the major overseas posting opportunity.

In conjunction with a new PR image, the Army should also actively promote our presence in the community. Although this was emphasised in the 1978 Defence Review 'with the use of Defence capabilities to assist the community to be encouraged, so long as the primary purpose of the Armed Forces was not detrimentally affected',<sup>12</sup> it has had little success. It has had varying support from commanders but more importantly, there has been no suitable PR organisation to coordinate it or even be involved in it to ensure it got the necessary PR mileage. Areas which could have been and could still be exploited are:

- a. greater active involvement of the territorials in community assistance,
- b. greater participation in the Civil Defence activities, (eg more training in New Zealand and aid overseas (Cook Islands));
- c. greater support for search and rescue activities; and
- d. planned participation in community projects.<sup>13</sup>

### The Media

The media is one of the most powerful instruments available to influence the minds of the public. If used constructively, and with the correct guidance, it can create an image in the public mind that will be remembered for a long time. However, what we read in the press and see on television about the military and the government is only as good as the reporters who send the messages.<sup>14</sup> The New Zealand Army has done very little to ensure the correct message.

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<sup>12</sup> Defence Review 1978.

<sup>13</sup> Hyde Maj J.F. Civil-Military Relations in New Zealand. Commandant's Papers, RNZAF Staff College 1981, p 6.

<sup>14</sup> Secretary, The Military and The Media, Article in Proceedings, Jun 1986. USA p 10.

Australia has taken measures to not only develop good media-military rapport but also to educate journalists. In 1984 Australia developed the Australian Defence Correspondents Association, which is designed to give reporters with special defence interests much greater access to the sort of information they need to write credibly on military matters.<sup>15</sup> Whilst New Zealand probably does not have the dedicated number of 'Defence Reporters' to warrant such an organisation, Defence can certainly do a number of things to ensure the correct image and information is given to the media. Great rapport could be developed if defence reporters and editors of local gazettes, television, radio, and large newspapers were to be given a comprehensive insight into the Army. One way this could be done is by holding regular seminars, which would include visits to camps to see training and also by comprehensive briefs on various aspects of the Army.



Army News - Number 11, Feb 87.

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<sup>15</sup> Warner D. How to avoid PR Nightmare, Pacific Defence Reporter, November 1984, p 35.

To cultivate media interest when our everyday existence does not provide activities that are headline sensations, the Army needs to be prepared to pamper the media more. Members of Parliament, local councillors, and prominent citizens are all well represented at various Army functions, but important members of the media are conspicuous by their absence. To improve the military-media relations, Australia is looking closely at the recommendations of the Sidle Panel (Maj Gen Winant Sidle, US Army), who made the following points:

- a. Top military public affairs representatives should meet with news organisation leadership, to include meetings with individual news organisations, on a regular basis to discuss mutual problems, including relationships with the media during military operations and exercises.
- b. Enlarge programmes already underway to improve military understanding of the media via public affairs instruction to service schools and colleges, to include media participation where possible.
- c. Seek improved media understanding of the military through visits by commanders and line officers to news organisations.<sup>16</sup>

#### Required Organisation

Stephen Hess, an American studying government media relations states:

"If an organisational chart were being designed for a new government agency, it would probably include one box labelled press or news media. This unit would be responsible for all those duties that involve contacts with journalists - answering their enquiries, setting up interviews and briefings for them with the senior officials of the agency, writing news releases and fact sheets, and advising the agency head on press relations. ...If this didn't keep them fully employed the unit is renamed communications and takes on the responsibility for all the other ways the agency tells the public about itself".<sup>17</sup>

Unless the New Zealand Army is prepared to establish a proper public relations (communications) organisation with the correct staff, training, resources, and financial delegation, it will not be able to meet the challenge of promoting any image. It is not suggested that New Zealand should go to the extent that the USA has, with a large PR organisation as part of the State Department, but to expect the present staff of two to promote the correct public relations image for the Army is unrealistic.

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<sup>16</sup> Warner D. p 35.

<sup>17</sup> Hess S. The Government/Press Connection, The Brookings Institute, Washington, D.C. 1984, p 7.

To ensure the coordination of the Army PR policy within the overall Defence policy there is still the requirement for the PRO(Army) to be located in Wellington as the Army representative in the Defence PR organisation. One man at such a high level, however, cannot carry out the vast list of duties required let alone focus on developing and actively portraying the Army corporate image. The PRO (Army) is too divorced from the units to be able to ensure that the full PR potential of unit training activities is realised.

Public relations is a function of command. Unit and Regional Commanders are responsible for the public relations in their respective areas. Whilst the Commanders are always conscious of safeguarding the Army's image, and try to ensure there is no adverse publicity, the demands of their own duties means that coordinating and actively promoting PR is given a low priority. Apart from lost PR opportunities, there are also limited opportunities for the development of media-military rapport to develop at regional levels. What is required therefore, is for some element of the Army PR organisation to be established at regional level. This element would be responsible to the regional commander for all PR aspects in his region, thus fulfilling the need for active PR at least down to regional level. The regional PRO could also physically encourage and guide the unit information officers, thus expanding the sphere of influence of both internal and external PR down to unit level. By having PR personnel at regional level it ensures the following:

- a. Timely and well coordinated PR for unit activities.
- b. The ability to establish and foster military-media rapport in regions.
- c. PR supervision and training for unit information officers.
- d. Timely response during adverse publicity situations.
- e. The reduction in the work load for the PRO (Army), thus enabling him to concentrate more on pro-active means to promote the Army's image on a national scale.

### CONCLUSIONS

Whilst the Army's primary role, that of defence, is not in question, it is the secondary role and the overall peacetime image that requires attention. Society's attitudes and values are changing, thus requiring the Army to update its image. To be perceived as more than warmongers or a civil defence auxillary, the Army must portray the image of a highly professional and well-trained corporation. This image would also allow soldiers to more readily identify their peacetime role and relate it to their civilian counterparts. Unless the public perception of the Army is updated and improved, there is the real risk that vocal minority groups will incorrectly sway the opinions of the apathetic majority and thus the politicians. In a time of minimal threat and of economic cuts, the Army must portray its secondary role as more than just assisting in the occasional natural disaster. The image of the Army being a sophisticated training corporation that provides community services, and releases back to the private sector highly trained and disciplined personnel, would vastly improve public perception.

To portray an image it is necessary to have the proper PR organisation. One man based in Wellington is not enough. Whilst the PRO (Army) must remain collocated with the Defence PR organisation, it is vital that regional PROs be established on regional headquarters. This would at least ensure timely and coordinated PR at regional level. Without regional PROs the unit information officer is of limited value and most PR is referred back to the PRO(Army) who then has to try to implement rather than supervise and coordinate. In addition to an increased PR organisation the Army must allocate finance to PR. Without a financial vote the PR organisation is merely reactionary, countering any adverse PR the Army receives. With finance it becomes pro-active and is able to effectively promote the Army's image.

The most powerful and wide reaching PR agency is the media. The Army must improve its military-media relations. By running educational seminars and visits for the media, their knowledge of the Army will improve and therefore the media will be in a better position to relay the correct message to the public. Both in peacetime and war the Army must accept that the media can be an extremely beneficial and influential ally. It is therefore vital that the Army's rapport with the media is improved; after all we need them, they do not need us.

In essence to improve public perception of the Army in the post-ANZUS era, the Army must develop an image the public can relate to and accept as worthwhile. Without the proper PR organisation and media rapport the image can not be effectively portrayed. With society's values changing, especially the younger generation's, the Army must improve its image to move with the times. If the Army does not meet this challenge, public perception will continually be eroded by vocal peace groups and groups wanting to reduce defence expenditure. A good image, and the establishing of an organisation to promote that image, will not only meet the challenge but enhance both external and internal perception.

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## ETHICS AND THE OFFICER CORPS

By

CAPTAIN A.W. GOODWIN, RNZA

*'It may be a significant commentary on our society that there appears to be no particular correlation between a man's ethics and morals and his power to attract followers.'*

Alex Bavelas <sup>1</sup>

Captain Goodwin graduated from OCS Portsea in 1973. He served with 161 Bty and 4 (G) Mdm Bty RNZA until 1976 when he resigned from the Regular Force. He served in the Territorial Force with 4 (G) Mdm Bty until 1983 when he re-joined the RF and held a number of appointments in 16 Fd Regt. Captain Goodwin is currently an Instructor-in-Gunnery at the School of Artillery, Waiouru.

### ETHICS AND BEING ETHICAL

Ethics are a set of principles of morals or rules of conduct. <sup>2</sup> As a branch of philosophy, ethics is concerned with what is morally good or bad, right or wrong. Ethics and ethical are often used synonymously with morals, or morality and moral, as when reference is made to the ethical or moral virtues or qualities of a person or group. Ethics and morals are derived from Greek and Latin words respectively, both meaning habits or customs, however, the ethics or morality of persons or groups goes beyond what they habitually or customarily do, it encompasses what they think is fitting, right, or obligatory to do. Men's actions are often, but not always, a sign of what they believe: actions may differ from beliefs, and both actions and beliefs may differ from what men say they ought to do or believe.

Ethics are ideals pertaining to our behaviour and the way in which we interact with other people. The ethics of a profession reflect those qualities

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<sup>1</sup> Bavelas, Alex. Leadership: Man and Function. Leavitt H.J. and Pondy L.R. (ed). 'Readings in Managerial Psychology.' (Second Edition), University of Chicago Press, 1973, p 375.

<sup>2</sup> The Concise Oxford Dictionary (Seventh Edition), Oxford, 1982, p 331.

which are perceived as being desirable or considered important to achieve and maintain professional standards and preserve the collective reputation: qualities on which members' behaviour needs to be based. In most cases they are qualities which history has shown were demonstrated or present in acknowledged leaders or respected members of the profession.

Traditionally professional groups, notably the medical and legal professions, have established organisations for the purpose of maintaining professional standards and a degree of conformity to moral principles by their members, ie. compliance with a code of 'professional ethics'. Essentially they are guardians of their profession and its reputation. It is the requirement of professional competency and conformity to moral principles that is a hallmark of a profession. Competency alone is insufficient.

Professionalism and ethical behaviour are relative but not necessarily dependent as there are other aspects involved which will not be dealt with here. Ethical behaviour is one of the more important facets of professionalism. It is the basis of our perception of ourselves and how we are perceived by others: the foundation of our reputation. The New Zealand Army officer corps does not have a Code of Ethics. Two questions arise from this fact: what are our ethics, and is the lack of a code conducive to maintaining a satisfactory standard of ethical behaviour?

Officers are the leaders within the profession of arms. The ethics of officers are therefore concerned with leadership. Leadership is not a function that one is called on to perform at various intervals. It is a continuous function that involves numerous interactions, each contributing to the immediate feel or climate. Success as a leader is very much dependent on these interactions; that is, on our behaviour and how we are perceived by those with whom we interact. We propagate those qualities that history has shown were present in varying degrees in acknowledged great military leaders. We generally accept that our ethics embody those qualities. How often and to what extent do our actions coincide with our ethics? This essay will examine the level of ethical behaviour practised within our officer corps and the need for a code of ethics.

### THE LEVEL OF ETHICAL BEHAVIOUR

There is a tendency in us all to generalize. Our perception of a group is often formed by what we see or hear of individuals from the group. Generalizations are typically drawn from the worst aspects of behaviour and are mainly derogatory. In all professions there are individuals whose behaviour on occasions is less than desirable. In assessing the ethics of a group, the level is set by what the majority do or believe most of the time. Aberrance by a minority does not constitute the norm. There is no exact measurement of ethical behaviour. Ethics are ideals that we strive to achieve and maintain. Invariably as individuals we fall short of the ideal at least part of the time if not all the time. Invariably we are unable to maintain all our ideals at the same time. The level of ethical behaviour is nebulous and try as we might to be objective, any assessment is subjective and of questionable validity.

At the time of attestation we all swear, or affirm, our faithfulness, true allegiance, loyalty and obedience. Essentially these qualities are encompassed by loyalty. The oath of allegiance binds all who subscribe to it 'to serve in accordance with the tenor of the oath'.<sup>3</sup> The parchment commission begins, '... reposing especial Trust and Confidence in your Loyalty, Courage and Good Conduct...', reinforcing the Loyalty we promised in the oath of allegiance and introduces the ideals of Courage and Good Conduct. Unless we reject the commission, we accept the ideals stated therein. Loyalty, Courage and Good Conduct embody those qualities which we acknowledge are necessary in a leader, and we generally accept as being our ethics.

### Loyalty

Loyalty is the acceptance of duty or obligation. It is a personal commitment that will at times subjugate the rights or self-interests of the individual. Our loyalty is primarily to the service, however, loyalty to superiors, peers and subordinates is accepted as being an integral part of that loyalty. If we are all loyal to the service, theoretically, there should not be any conflict of loyalties. On a personal level, our profession and its purpose may require that our own interests are transgressed or we are required to infringe upon those of our subordinates. That requirement may go as far as the ultimate sacrifice. The manner in which we acquit ourselves when faced with such situations is the measure of our loyalty.

Loyalty in a peace-time army is rarely tested to the same extreme as in war when the consequences of failing to 'measure up' may be tragic. In war the conflict between operational requirements and our own interests, while being of greater immediate significance, are likely to be less frequent than during peace-time. This arises from the combat environment. Personnel are more likely to accept operational exigencies when they are remote from the distractions of home. A 'business hours only' attitude is common-place in all non-operational armies. The opportunity is available to venture into commercial interests, to compete alongside the rest of society in pursuit of material gains. Our family life revolves around generally regular hours. The demands and needs of the family are more apparent. Future activities can be planned with a reasonable degree of certainty. When service requirements conflict with any of these interests our loyalty is tested. If we are totally ethical, we should place the service's demands above our own. The purist view is that the service's needs must always take priority. The reality is that few of us can claim such purity. At best our loyalty is pragmatic. In any situation the direction in which our loyalty lies is determined by the practical significance or immediate importance of the issue at hand. For the individual it is a compromise according to perceived priorities.

### The Two Faces of Courage

Courage has two aspects, physical courage and moral courage. The latter is harder to define and achieve, yet it is an essential ingredient of leadership. There is a plain connection between moral courage and integrity. It

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<sup>3</sup> The Defence Act 1971, Section 38.

is the courage to act in accordance with one's moral principles; to do what one believes it is right to do. Physical and moral courage are also inter-related. Whereas the possessor of moral courage will invariably not be found wanting in physical courage, the converse is not by any means so assured. If the 'right thing to do' is to face up to a situation demanding physical courage, moral courage may manifest itself as the former.

Physical courage, like loyalty, is rarely tested in peacetime. The same is not true of moral courage. In our daily lives as officers small acts of moral courage are constantly demanded of us: in the administration of discipline, in making decisions which though known to be right, will probably prove unpopular, and in the acceptance of responsibility; especially when things have gone wrong. Everytime we turn a blind eye to actions or behaviour that we know to be wrong, such as minor breaches of discipline, or we make the 'easy' decision, or we attempt to avoid a duty or responsibility that is clearly our own, we are showing a lack of moral courage. If we lack moral courage in peace we will probably be found wanting in war.

Moral acts are invariably unselfish acts, with due regard to the rights and interests of others. There will be occasions when service and individual needs must be weighed in accordance to practical significance and immediate importance. There will be circumstances when the individuals needs should take precedence. We may be confronted with a conflict of moral obligations as well as a conflict of loyalties. Considerable moral courage may be required to resolve the situation selflessly. Moral courage is similar to loyalty in its demand for the subordination of personal interests, and in practice we are equally pragmatic.

### Good Conduct

Loyalty, Courage and Good Conduct inter-relate. Whilst minor shortfalls in our Loyalty and Courage may go undetected, this is not so of Good Conduct. Our conduct is open to close scrutiny and is the quality on which we are most likely to be judged. Good Conduct goes beyond adherence to written law, or custom, it incorporates the manner in which we relate to others. It is behaviour that reflects our moral values. Good Conduct demands proper consideration of, and sensitivity to the feelings and rights of others, and like Loyalty and Courage may require self-denial.

The subject of what constitutes Good Conduct is the source of much conflict within our own ranks. We are products of our social background. Our values are drawn from that tempered by age, education, and experience. Whilst the selection process maintains a degree of conformity, we are all individuals and our behaviour reflects our values. The conflict is a clash of values. People will not change their behaviour unless there is sufficient pressure to do so. We are dogmatic in this aspect. We question the validity of values that we do not readily accept as our own. We question the right to have those values imposed upon us and in some cases may reject them outright. Our values are as diverse as the society we come from, yet we tend towards conservatism, both collectively as a profession and individually relative to our civilian 'peers'. Few complete initial officer training without both attitude and behavioural changes occurring. It is this training which begins the moulding process: the bending of individuals to the standard.

The first great exposition of the ethical basis of medicine was the Hippocratic oath. Many of the precepts of that oath express noble ideals, yet such is the difficulty of laying down criteria to cover any eventuality that in practice exceptions have to be made. Few would insist that in no circumstances should a woman procure an abortion, or that on no occasion should a doctor disclose a patient's secrets to others. Similarly, we the officer corps generally hold to noble ideals and at times encounter situations that require the compromise of our ethics. In the everyday practice of our profession, we spend little time in considering the ethical basis of our work. We simply take for granted a few moral principles and our actions more often than not, are guided by direction from superiors, experience or common sense.

### THE NEED FOR A CODE OF ETHICS

The accepted notion of 'leadership as a personal quality' views leadership in terms of a special combination of personal characteristics; the qualities and abilities of individuals. In management psychology the idea of 'leadership as an organisational function' is also recognized. Here leadership is viewed in terms of the distribution throughout an organisation of decision-making powers; the pattern of power and authority.<sup>4</sup> We can see organisational leadership in our hierarchical structure. Real authority to act or make decisions is relative to rank and appointment. Power and authority is at the top of the pyramid and the doctrine, policy and direction flow from there. This has the effect at the lower levels of the command chain of reducing the decision making process to a matter of choice within comprehensive rules and regulations, and policy. To a certain extent this enforces compliance with the ethics of our profession and obviates the needs to ponder them in the normal course of duty.

Our profession is self-regulated. In many respects the military appears to be 'one of the more advanced forms of social institution'.<sup>5</sup> To a large extent the ordered and efficient functioning of it relies on self-discipline. In the absence of self-discipline, discipline sanctions can be invoked. There is provision for both formal and informal means of dealing with breaches of discipline and ethics. Maintenance of professional ethics is clearly the responsibility of the officer corps. The wording in the body of the parchment commission is testimony to this, '... you are at all times to exercise and well discipline in their duties both the inferior Officers and other ranks serving under you, and use your best endeavours to keep them in good Order and Discipline...'. Military discipline plays an essential part in the maintenance of standards.

Military discipline encompasses civil law as well as military law with the associated values of each. In a more broad sense it includes those numerous regulations and standing orders, and other procedures that are concerned with

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<sup>4</sup> Bavelas, p 373.

<sup>5</sup> Hackett, General Sir John. The Profession of Arms. Sidgwick and Jackson, London, 1984, p 140.

performance and behaviour. Included in the latter are annual and special reports, course reports and even promotion boards. These have a special significance and are unique to the military. The personnel reporting procedures require formal counselling of the individual as to his overall performance: be it good or bad. Together they permit frequent monitoring of the individual. At any time his employment and retention can be reviewed. The system relies on the integrity of reporting officers to make honest and impartial assessments. It has to be accepted that this does not always prove to be the case. Progression through the system to a large extent is dependent on conformity. Military discipline, in the broad sense, is founded on accepted standards and values and is instrumental in their perpetuation.

A code is a collection of statutes or laws arranged systematically to avoid inconsistency and overlapping.<sup>6</sup> What system would be used to arrange our ethics? Do we extract them from the present volumes and produce a new tome listing them in some arbitrary sequence? Assuming that we do produce such a code, will we all be required to swear our obedience to it? Will there be punitive measures incorporated to deal with ethical breaches? Consider the size of the Manual of Armed Forces Law; its contents, and necessarily so, for the administration of discipline. Could we impartially administer a code of ethics with anything less? If we cannot enforce the code, can we improve? Regardless of what form it takes and how it is administered, any code will duplicate what already exists.

With the exception of conduct, at best, we are pragmatic in the practice of our ethics. Our perception of priorities and conduct reflect our values which are the product of who we are and where we came from. Whether we compromise our ethics for selfish or unselfish reasons is immaterial in determining the need for a code of ethics. Our attitudes and behaviour will essentially remain unchanged in the absence of substantial pressure. That pressure must be exerted consistently throughout the officer corps: from the top, at all levels downward and by peers.

A code of ethics could not possibly cover every eventuality. It would be subject to exception and compromise at least to the same extent that occurs now. It will not change the level of ethical behaviour. We all know the qualities considered essential to being a leader. In varying degrees we accept and strive to achieve them according to who we are. We will continue to go about our duty very much as we do now. Our actions may be at variance with our ethics. We are capable of rectifying this situation by accepting and exercising our full responsibilities as leaders, not by the production of a code of ethics.

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<sup>6</sup> The Concise Oxford Dictionary, p 180.

MAORI MILITARY ENGINEERS:  
LEIF ERIKSSONS OF TRENCH WARFARE?

BY

CAPTAIN G.S. CLAYTON, MA(HONS), AMANZ, RNZAEC


Captain Clayton is a graduate of the University of Waikato and Hamilton Teachers College. He joined the TF in 1976 and served as a Platoon Commander with 6 Hau prior to transferring to the RF in 1982. He has held appointments at the Army Museum and Defence Headquarters and is presently holding the position of GSO3 Education at Army General Staff.

Recent revisionist studies of the New Zealand Wars have concluded that trench warfare was discovered by the Maori. Such studies argue that Europeans had never experienced the type of earthworks the Maori built.<sup>1</sup> The only point at which they diverge is whether the Maori system of entrenchments was transferred to Europe. At one extreme is the accurate assertion that Maori engineering was carefully examined and the results transmitted to Britain for study.<sup>2</sup> At the other extreme is the mistaken belief that there was no transference of knowledge with the British all too soon forgetting the lessons they had learnt.<sup>3</sup> While this divergence of views is interesting it only helps to obscure the fact that the very underlying premise of the revisionists' view is fallacious. While the Maori did develop sophisticated field-works nothing they produced was novel.<sup>4</sup>

Maori military engineers confronted with changes brought about by the introduction of new military technology proved extremely adaptable. In the space of just a few decades they developed a system of field-works capable of utilizing, and to a large extent neutralising, muskets and heavy ordnance. Prior

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- 1 Simmons D.                    Settlement of the Maori in New Zealand in J. Seirs and J. Henderson (ed) The New Zealanders. (Wellington, 1975) p 211.
- The New Zealand Wars. (Auckland, 1986) p 297.
- 2 Simmons D.                    (1975) p 211.
- 3 Belich J.                        (1986) p 297.
- 4 Clayton G.S.                 Trenches the Maori Contribution to Modern Warfare?  
in Queen Elizabeth II Army Memorial Museum News.  
Vol 3, Nos 3 and 4 Jul/Oct 85.

to the introduction of muskets Maori defensive positions generally consisted of a series of ramparts and trenches surmounted by a stockade with an over-topping fighting stage. As a rule they were as inaccessible as possible, built on hills, spurs and islands. Such works were ideally suited to pre-European technology. Attackers were forced to combat natural obstacles before reaching the defenders. Then they faced an enemy with the important height advantage ready to rain down missiles on the unwary.<sup>5</sup>



Defences of a Pa. Illustrating method of defence by means of rampart, fosse, scarp and stockade.

Drawing by J. McDonald

One significant problem encountered by defenders of the old style inaccessible pa was the difficulty of withstanding a lengthy siege. (Siege operations being an obvious method of reducing any ill-supplied defensive position).<sup>6</sup> With the introduction and rapid acquisition of muskets the old advantage of height in fortifications was outweighed by the new problem of exposure. Coupled with the necessity to overcome these problems was the need to maximise the new weapon of war. As a result Maori engineers moved their fortifications to lowland areas. These new lowland pas had distinct advantages over the old style inaccessible ones. They provided better fields of fire and in

<sup>5</sup> Vayda A.P. Maori Warfare. (Wellington, 1960), p 10.

Groube L.M. Settlement Pattern in Prehistoric New Zealand. (Unpublished, MA Thesis Auckland 1964) p 172.

<sup>6</sup> L.M. Groube (1964), p 215.




addition they were much closer to food and water supplies making offensive seige operations more difficult to conduct. <sup>7</sup> Physical modifications were also made to the pa as a result of the musket. The ditch between the outer palisades were converted into a rifle trench. Flanking angles were introduced into the entrenchments to allow for crossfire, which enhanced all round defence through mutual support. A later modification was the weaving of bundles of green flax into the outer palisade. The flax not only concealed the trenches it also absorbed the velocity of musket rounds, rendering large numbers of them impotent. <sup>8</sup>

Almost immediately after developing the new and highly successful lowland musket pa the Maori engineers were confronted by new problems. The British Army in its campaigns in New Zealand introduced heavy ordnance as well as their stockade breaching method. Their breaching method consisted of a concentrated bombardment, the construction of a sap to within easy striking distance of the objective culminating with the infantry's determined charge to take the position. In response the Maori developed another new fortification, the bomb-proof pa. For this pa they developed a totally new palisade. Made of light wood and bound by supple-jack this new palisade was virtually indestructible as it simply flexed when anything, including artillery rounds, was forced through it. At the same time the Maori engineers developed overhead cover for their rifle pits and entrenchments along with bomb-proof shelters. <sup>9</sup> To counter British sapping and determined charges the Maori developed new defensive tactics. Aggressive fighting patrols were despatched from pas with the intention of destroying both the saps and the sappers. <sup>10</sup> In front of the entrenchments the Maori engineers constructed obstacles designed to slow down and channel assaulting troops enabling defenders to defeat them in detail. <sup>11</sup>

The effectiveness of the bomb-proof pas can be judged from the results of the battles of Ohaeawai and Gate Pa. At Ohaeawai on 1 July 1845 over 600 British troops supported by artillery were unable to dislodge 100 defenders. The success of the defence is highlighted when it is realised the British bombardment

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- 7 Welch J.W.F. The Maori as a Military Engineer in The Volunteer.  
Vol 8, No 4, March 1982, p 11.
- Best E. The Pa Maori. (Wellington, 1975) pp 336-367.
- 8 Simmons D. (1975), p 211.
- 9 Welch J.W.F. (1982) p 11.
- 10 Mould J.R. Engineering Operations During the New Zealand War.  
(London, 1862) p 67.
- 11 Journals of the Deputy Quartermaster General in New Zealand. (London, 1864) p 112.

lasted a week.<sup>12</sup> A similar result occurred at Gate Pa on 29 April 1864. There the British artillery and mortar fired on the Maori position for over eight hours prior to the launching of an assault of over 300 men. The Maori defenders first halted the attack and then with a well co-ordinated counter attack forced the British to retreat.<sup>13</sup>



The Gate Pa. Illustrating the adoption of European usages.

From sketch by Maj Gen G. Robley

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- <sup>12</sup> Ryan J, & Parham B. The Colonial New Zealand Wars. (Wellington, 1986) p 24.  
 Belich J (1986) p 47.
- <sup>13</sup> Mould J.R. Military Proceedings in New Zealand. (London, (1861) p 29.  
 Belich J. (1986) pp 178-188.  
 Ryan J & Parham B. (1986) pp 99-103.

So effective was the Maori as a defensive engineer that the British military authorities took every opportunity to examine their fortifications. Detailed reports and models were made for appraisal and study, copies of which were sent to the Imperial Staff College.<sup>14</sup> In Britain mock Pas were constructed from these reports by the Royal Engineers endeavouring to discover the best method of breaching them.<sup>15</sup> While in New Zealand similar experiments were carried out by the Royal Artillery.<sup>16</sup> Maori engineers meanwhile made their own simpler models out of fern sticks, to disseminate the new developments in pa construction.<sup>17</sup>

Interest generated by the Maori fortifications should not be taken as proof that they had discovered or developed something original. Simultaneous discoveries were made in South East Asia by the Burmese when threatened by the same British foe.<sup>18</sup> While in Europe military engineers had discovered all the features displayed in Maori and Burmese fortifications two centuries previously. Vauban, the French military engineer, had in the late seventeenth century welded fortification theories into a coherent system of military engineering.<sup>19</sup> He instituted the construction of ramparts of earth rather than of stone to absorb the velocity of shot. To provide cross-fire he introduced angled positions into the entrenchments; to slow down assaulting troops he multiplied obstacles in front of the defensive positions. As a master of offensive siege craft he improved the sap into a parallel trench system which zig-zagged to its objective, providing obstacle protection and cover against counterattacks.<sup>20</sup> Vauban's theories on fortifications were so comprehensive that they became the chief engineering subjects studied at Sandhurst during the nineteenth century.<sup>21</sup>

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- 14 Simmons D. (1975) p 211.  
 Mould J. (1862) passim  
 Mould J.R. (1862) passim New Zealand Spectator,  
 4 January 1851.
- 15 New Zealand Spectator. 6 February 1847.
- 16 Wellington Independent. 17 January 1863.
- 17 Buick J.L. New Zealand's First War, or The Rebellion of Hone Heke. (Wellington, 1926) p 224.
- 18 Fortescue J.W. A History of the British Army. (London, 1927)  
 Vol XII p 419.
- 19 Hogg I.V. Fortress: A History of Warfare. (London, 1975),  
 pp 49.
- 20 Montgomery B.L. A History of Warfare. (London, 1968) pp 293-295.
- 21 Harfield A.G. Narrative of Major General Frederick Hardy, CB, 84th Regiment in Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research. Vol LXI No 248  
 Winter 1983/84, p 229.

The most recent of the revisionists, Belich, in his work on the New Zealand Wars concedes that entrenchment was as old as gunpowder in Europe. But he still asserts that the Maori engineers were the 'Leif Erikssons' of trench warfare. In an attempt to justify his assertion Belich argues that before the Russo-Turkish War in 1878 European entrenchments were not only primitive but easier to deal with than traditional forts.<sup>22</sup> In this as in other matters of detail Belich is completely mistaken. The evidence denies any validity to his line of argument.

One of the 'primitive earthworks' constructed in Europe, long before the Russo-Turkish War in 1878, was Wellington's 'Lines of Torres Vedras' in Portugal. Built in great secrecy in 1810 by 10,000 labourers the celebrated Lines consisted of three separate defensive systems stretching some 29 miles from the sea to the Tagus River. This sophisticated example of extempore fieldworks comprised hundreds of redoubts, gun emplacements and connecting trenches. In front of the position brushwood was laid out, much as barbed wire entanglements are used today. Reinforcing this remarkable man-made barrier were impassable ravines and dammed streams.<sup>23</sup> The whole position was so formidable that Massena, who commanded a force of 100,000 men, declined to attack it.<sup>24</sup>

Even primitive European earthworks were not easy to deal with. During the Crimean War the Russian garrison at Sebastopol produced a formidable defensive position. The work consisted of earth ramparts, simple rifle pits and communication trenches complete with overhead cover. In front of the position the Russians laid out numerous obstacles and, to make life more uncomfortable for the besiegers, instituted a system of fighting patrols. While formidable, Sebastopol's earthworks never took on a sophisticated appearance, for example the Russians did not even develop much needed bomb-proof shelters. Yet the Russian garrison held out for nearly a year.<sup>25</sup>

Maori developments in defensive fieldworks, compared with what the Russians produced at Sebastopol, show how highly developed their military engineering skills were. The British officers who undertook minute examinations of their fieldworks were also impressed. This does not mean, however, that the Maoris were the Leif Erikssons of trench warfare. European developments in fortification theory meant that the British examinations did not teach, they merely reinforced. Maori developments were more in the nature of rediscovery rather than discovery.

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- 22 Belich J. (1986), pp 294-297.
- 23 Humble R. Napoleon's Peninsular Marshals. (London, 1973), p 138.
- Read J. War in the Peninsular. (London, 1977), p 186.
- 24 Hogg I.V. (1975), p 73.
- 25 Hogg I.V. (1975), p 79.
- Ropp T War in the Modern World. (Duke University Press, 1899), p 148.
- Judd D. The Crimean War. (London, 1975), pp 135-138.

THE NCO INSTRUCTOR

By

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AND

SERGEANT S.M.F. HUNTER, RNZIR

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Staff Sergeant Hays joined the NZ Army in 1972. He has served with 161 Bty, 1 RNZIR and held the appointment of Instructor RNZA at the School of Artillery for 4 years. He is currently instructing in the Systems Cell of the School of Regimental Training where he instructs on Advanced Instructor and Training Development Courses.

Sergeant Hunter joined the NZ Army in 1976. He has served with 2/1 RNZIR, 1 RNZIR and the NZSAS GP. He is currently instructing in the Systems Cell of the School of Regimental Training.

The present army trade of 'instructor' is a misnomer because the role is now catered for in the prescription for all NCOs on the present promotion courses. All NCOs are thus instructors but unfortunately this has led to the mistaken belief that all NCOs are effective instructors. Although the idea that every NCO is capable of instruction is valid, their effectiveness is very much related to their Corps related training and backgrounds. The demise of the specialist instructor courses as mandatory trade qualifications has in fact been paralleled by a general decline in instructor standards and this development surely warrants examination if we are to be at all concerned about the quality of training being conducted today.

Considerable discussion is generated whenever the subject of instructor standards is raised. Opinion ranges from the contention that the 'old' instructor was better prepared for his role and concern that today's NCO is not similarly equipped, to the belief that the current provisions for this facet of the NCOs role are adequate and that today's NCOs are better suited to imparting today's learning requirements because of their better all round preparation on formal courses.

Currently, however, those personnel identified as having instructor potential can only progress in the trade after completing Corps and promotion courses to the rank of Sergeant. The means for this development is the Advanced Instructors Course which in turn is not mandatory for trade progression. The precourse requirement for attendance on this course is that an individual must have first qualified on a Senior NCO course.

This progression is considered by many to be too late in the instructor's career because much of the grass roots teaching conducted in our Army is left to the junior NCO who has to survive on the introduction to methods of instruction he received on his junior NCO course.

This deficiency in instructor skills is most apparent in junior NCOs posted to instructor orientated units such as the regional training wings and WTD. Considerable time and effort is required in these units to develop the junior NCO as an effective instructor. Warrant Officers and senior NCOs supervising these fledgling instructors must bear in mind that the junior NCO course only teaches basic, rudimentary skills and that their subordinates are likely to require considerable on-the-job training and evaluation if they are to develop as effective instructors.

This period of an NCOs development must not be wasted but used constructively to coach and guide the junior instructor along a path that ensures that he can build upon the groundwork laid by the junior NCO course.

It is a commonly held belief that the junior NCO today is not as proficient as an instructor as was his earlier counterpart. This is because the 'old' instructor was taught by repetition over 14 weeks of formal training and through constant practice and exposure to instruction. He was assured of high retention of basic instructor skills. This 'learn by rote' was successful but on the other hand it could be argued that today's instructor has a far better understanding of instructional techniques. Unfortunately this is only effectively enhanced where an individual has also attended an Advanced Instructors Course.

Since the development of the current NCO promotion courses, studies and validation have shown that most current training needs are being met despite the change in emphasis from instructor oriented training. However, there has been some decline in the standard of the full time junior instructor who has in his hands the training of our most valuable asset: the soldier of tomorrow. Perhaps it is time to reconsider our approach and examine whether or not it might be prudent to recognise the specialist training needs of the instructor trade in addition to the basic instructor skills required by all NCOs.

COURAGE AND NUMBERS DO NOT  
ALONE ENSURE VICTORY  
ONLY SKILL AND DISCIPLINE  
WILL ENSURE IT.

THE ART OF COARSEMANSHIP  
(WITH APOLOGIES TO 'SUSTAINER')

BY  
MILE IGNOTUS

Introduction

Every officer will become painfully aware of the certain inevitabilities which will accompany his career. These include events that will impose themselves between you and the just enjoyment of life. Dramas such as being the Supervising Officer of the Corporals Club, Regional Director of the Army Museum Fundraising Committee and being tagged to do Summaries of Evidence are enough to make the most sanguine cringe. One must include amongst this nausea the requirement to attend courses. Once you have been hoisted on the wheel of military fate (which, unlike the Buddhist variety, does not revolve for an eternity - it only feels that way), you will be faced with a succession of courses that will stretch in front of you like the Labours of Hercules. The purpose of this dissertation is twofold, firstly to attempt to provide some sorely needed levity (and reality), to the Army Journal and secondly to pass on a few pearls to those who have to follow in our footsteps. You young eager aspirants should consider yourselves well blessed, for by profiting from our experiences you will be certain that the skids under your careers will be well greased to ensure the easiest of transitions from subaltern to superannuitant.

It would be timely now to advise, no.....better warn, those amongst our readers who have a predilection for taking themselves and life very seriously indeed, they will gain little benefit by straining their optics on this epistle. Your cause will be better served by more constructive activity such as learning by rote the Musorian Order of Battle or dashing off a quick 3000 words on the impact of the Boot GP on the upper decking of the Medium Girder Bridge.

Now that shower has departed we can press on; the subject will be dealt with in a series of easily digestible sub-headings best accompanied by a reasonable port, not Artillery - please try to show some imagination! There is no intention to dwell on Corps courses.....that is "Janet and John" stuff; if you can't cope with learning the Corps mumbo jumbo then you are obviously wasting everybody's time and better you transfer to 717 Battery. No - we are going to concentrate on the "biggies", the Grades II and III. With a little forethought and a lot of cunning, these can be made almost enjoyable. Armed with the knowledge we are about to give you there will be every chance that while those around you swear, sweat and curse you will float on by with a benign smile.

The Facts of Life

Reach into the top righthand desk drawer. In amongst the debris of prurient literature will be your well-thumbed copy of the "Stud Book". Open it

and note the presence of 204 lieutenants, 124 captains and a mob of majors (at least 80 on the 'G' List and another team lurking on the Special List). Also note there is but one CGS.....look around you, the competition to be Managing Director is most formidable. FACT OF LIFE NO. 1 - there are many who may want to get to the top but very few are going to make it. Some (most) will have to settle for less. Examine your conscience, have you got what it takes to soar with the eagles? If you have, then the advice given to the drones in paragraph 2 is equally applicable. Cease wasting your time with this drivel and get on with doing something that will really help your career, you are going to need all the time you can get.

### Know the Enemy - the DS

Attending a course is similar to any other military operation, time spent in recon is seldom wasted, so a little Int acquisition prior to plunging off to ATG is in order. The DS are there, firstly because they are smart and know what they are talking about, and secondly because after a year of indolence at Queenscliffe or Camberley the machine has got them back to pay their dues. This means two years of arduous labour in Waiouru being assaulted by a blizzard of ungrammatical paperwork and incoherent presentations by regiments of quaking students whose sole tactical knowledge would appear to be founded on a study of the first day of the Somme.

Quite obviously any attempt to ingratiate yourself with this battle-hardened team will be smartly rebuffed, fawning around the DS at happy hour, buying pints or saving them savouries at smoko, will only leave you out of pocket and hungry. What you need to know are the more subtle aspects of the DS's characters to project yourself and your work so that the DS feel comfortable with you. There are fine lines between stimulation and provocation, and between camaraderie and grovelling. The submission of a brilliantly erudite staff paper that once and for all condemns the Armoured Corps to disbandment with their assets being hocked off to the 'Truckies' will be futile if the CI (who will be marking) happens to wander around wearing spurs and thwacking a riding crop on his well filled twill breeches. All the time you spend on determining the DS's recreational, political and personal habits will be handsomely repaid when grades are awarded.

### Obstruction to Progress - Fellow Students

Comradeship (as Kipling and others are want to tell us) is important, equally important is ensuring that the friends you keep are not the dunderheads that will drag you down with them. There is no more unsettling feeling, guaranteed to shift a bagged lunch, than to be syndicated and in the cockpit with some clown determinedly heading towards his own personal Erebus. Amongst the course will be those who will succeed and those who will underachieve<sup>1</sup>. It will be important for your own academic health that you quickly sort out the wheat from the chaff as far as the other course members are concerned, to become identified as being a fellow traveller with the also rans is not good form.

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<sup>1</sup> It is currently regarded as being reactionary to use words that cause mental trauma, such as "fail".



Within the average course several groupings will emerge, your task will be to find the team that you can develop an empathy with. We have all met 'Thrusters'; chaps with maniacal energy who blunder about treating every hurdle as part of the front parapet of a trench in Passchendale. These blokes are going to the top by going over the top, easily identified as they have a tendency to bellow when asked to talk - this is their principal method of forcing their opinions onto people. These Gentry will have spent thousands of man hours in pre-course preparation (to the detriment of their unit) and their wives will be claiming ACC due to the onset of RSI through having to type and retype endless drafts of their staff paper. Beware as you may become one of their stepping stones to the top, it is hopeless to be syndicated with them because if they are not appointed the leader they won't work for anyone else. Even when in charge they spend so much time organizing everybody they never have time to consider the problem. If the chance does arrive that you can poke a stick through the spokes on their wheelbarrows, then don't fail to take it.



Another sub species are the "Harried Herbets". From the time they start the course they will be in a state of panic, excessive adrenalin production, coupled with a constant anxiety state, will mean they will spend their hours locked in their rooms feeding their ulcers. Well known for their habit of sinking and dragging down all who happen to be in the vicinity - steer well clear. Apart from their pale, sweaty complexion they will cart around piles of reference material in cases, their rooms will be set up with every possible piece of kit so it looks like one of the offices at Army GS from whence they probably came. In the field they tend to wilt.

Thirdly, the "Children of God". They look right, sound right and are right. Rather like Martin Crowe, they seem to have oodles of time to play every stroke without any apparent visible effort. Get to know them, be friendly,

some day they will be telling you what to do. Well aware that there is little competition around they are especially useful and generous with their skills. The bulk of these chaps probably attended the slow learners course at ACT and will spend much of their efforts on the blower to their Stock Brokers. Early recognition can be made as they tend to wear 'Herbie Js' and British Winter Warms - beware of those who try to ape them, easily identified as they will not have a Gold Card in their possession.

The Men of Spirit (MOS) will be present in healthy numbers, you will quickly identify them as being the chaps standing in the bar to welcome you the day the course marches in. Their intentions are honourable, they will help you with their specialist knowledge and tell you when they can't. Individually they may not be the brightest stars in the firmament, but collectively they can achieve most things. It is critical that the MOS are welded together early on the course; the DS achieve their greatest successes when the course team spirit breaks down and the rabble of individuals results.

Virtually every course is seasoned by the presence of a specialist officer. In the past they were required to round out the course photo and provide some lateral thinking. They regarded the sojourn as an interesting diversion from their normal role of raising the literacy standards of the Army. A good chance for them to observe the panic, despair and confusion of their 'G' List compatriots when confronted with ex Paperhanger or worse. There is, however, another breed of specialist officer the Specialist Officer with Burning Ambition (SOB) - these chaps are not satisfied with their natural place in the scheme of things. With their tactical skills honed up by five years membership of the Military History Bookclub and a few well thumbed copies of Soldier of Fortune, they can be utterly ruthless when they have got their boot across your throat. Do not turn your back on them, they have considerable strengths when it comes to the number crunching nausea of staff tables and road movement orders. They can make sound No. 2 men in syndicates since they should have the necessary skills with knocking out the graphics. However, if granted any latitude they will adopt airs well above their station - keep them in check and if they get out of hand a smart one liner such as "The only Battle Honour the RAEC ever won was the 1945 General Election" is a useful reminder of their place.

Flying in the face of the Libertarians we will also consider the presence of female students. Treat them with the same circumspection as the SOBs. The women will produce better staff work than you and they will slog away to try and get to grips with the tactics. Again they make good No. 2s as they will be neater and tidier, also they will have less tendency to argue with your solution which will save all the time spent on getting a 'Thruster' or SOB into line. Be helpful in class, if they do better than you then you had better accept the fact it was not because they made eyes at the DS or there is a different grading scale for the opposite sex, the reason is simply that they are better than you - tough is it not! Having mentioned the magic word SEX, learn to forget about it - for the duration of the course at least.

### Pre Course Assignments - Better Do Them NOW!

The first destabilizing salvo you will receive from the DS will be a small hamper of bumpf which will include a number of assignments requiring all manner of effort, the piece de resistance will be the dreaded staff paper. Also included will be a cheery "Hail dear fellow, well met" note from the CI which,

on the one hand, will bid you a solicitous Merry Christmas (the package will inevitably arrive on 23 December). The postscript will include a fond desire to see you and your pitiful offerings early in the New Year. For the wise there is only one good course of action - do the bloody things and get them posted straight back for marking, at the very least the DS will appreciate your efforts to get the work in early. Even if your submissions are of indifferent quality this will serve your long term game plan for passing the whole course.

### The Staff Paper - There is Little Comfort Available

Some people are born with the gift so that at any time (but preferably after knocking over 15 - 20 pints) they can demonstrate the capacity to churn out the necessary few thousand words of edification. Us mere mortals have to struggle. REMEMBER: copying one person's work is plagiarism, copying two or more people's efforts is research. Again, the sooner your twaddle is submitted the better off you will be, it is a cardinal sin to hand the staff paper in late and this error will tax even the best damage-control measures. As advised, select your topic carefully. Re-define the subject so that it relates to an area that you know something about. There is here an advantage for those members of the less fashionable Corps, eg, MPs or Medics. By writing about your parent organisation's philosophies there is every chance the DS will not have the knowledge to see through the drivel you have presented. After all no-one else in the Army appears to know what the plods or zambucks do and the DS will probably be equally nescient.

### Presentations - Economy of Effort

There is a current fashion for students to devote inordinate amounts of time to presentations. As Hugo Fanning<sup>2</sup> once said "Time spent in preparation is invariably wasted". Syndicates have been known to mobilize all resources for what they fondly hope will be a Steven Spielberg spectacular. Many a tyro has been seduced by thoughts of his histrionic talents only to find that on the day it all turns to clag. This is particularly true when you decide to support your bombast with all the hi-tech appliances available. FACT OF LIFE NO. 2 is the reiteration of Murphy's Law - the more hi-tech the more chance of failure. It is of course rather droll to watch a syndicate desperately trying to get the damage control in place when the video jams or the hand carved model of Casino starts to melt under the spotlights. This is known as the "Challenger Syndrome" although the crew of that chariot only had to endure the embarrassment of their technical failures for 70 odd seconds. When your presentation falls over the snickers will last much longer. Really, if you have got something worthwhile to say then go on and get the message across in the simplest possible terms. Two advantages of this are that, firstly, the audience has a better chance of getting some glimmering as to what you are rabbitting on about and, secondly, you will require less effort to get the desired passing grade.

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<sup>2</sup> Hugo Fanning was a legend in his time and the terror of the DS at any school whose door he darkened. A sort of latter day remittance man, he drifted through his years of service rather like Dr Who sliding from one time warp to another. He was always bemused by the frenetic energy demonstrated by his fellow officers and was a keen observer of their frantic convulsions as they attempted to get to grips with the workload.

### Socialization - Retaining Sanity

Despite the current insidious campaign to restrict the consumption of the "Demon Rum" within the Service, the odd tincture can be of assistance to the MOS when required. Heavy bouts of thinking such as required for the Appreciation or the Opord, necessitates an early lavage of neurones by the amber fluid. A good course will have early on appointed an "Escape Committee" whose task it will be to maximize the social opportunities. A good indication of course spirit can be gauged by the numbers that are present at happy hour with maximum attendance at 2300 hours being a positive sign.

### Fantasy versus Reality

We have alluded to the fact that it is undesirable to attempt to go against the grain of the Party Line. Teachings are based firmly on the principles as contained in the various manuals. In these circumstances real time experience can prove to be a handicap. Fortunately the numbers of gnarly veterans with fading memories of "The Horse Shoe" or R and R in Kuching has diminished markedly. This has left the field wide open for the Thrusters and SOBs to demonstrate their grasp of the Musorian tactics as well as their mastering of Godzone's "Hell on Paper" - the redoubtable 4 NZ Div. In this environment, if you happen to be in possession of some long forgotten campaign ribbon, keep your head down. Don't forget the DS these days tend to also be unperverted by any form of operational experience; swallow your doubts and don't fight the white. Remember, as Fanning so succinctly put it! "Dead fish do not swim upstream".

### Enough is Enough

Well by now even the most hardened MOS will have read enough. This first bulletin was intended to provide you with the knowledge to be able to trek off to the wastes of Waiouru full of confidence in your capacity to knock the sucker over. There will be (if the Editor continues his "publish and be damned" policy) a second salvo to follow. This will devote itself to the noble art of the Tactical Exercise Without Troops, so restrain yourselves until our next chapter appears "The Noble Art of Tewting" or "The Ngawhiotaketake Chainsaw Massacre".

Pip! Pip!

Mile Ignatus

THEORY FACT OR FICTION  
A CHINESE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

BY

BY CAPTAIN R.S. CAMPBELL, RNZIR

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INTRODUCTION

Cheng Ho, a Chinese soldier, diplomat and statesman. Although an obscure figure in our history and culture his achievements as a strategist, tactician and logistician are truly remarkable and worthy of our recognition.


I submit this purely for interest and to stimulate the imagination. Imagine the command and control problems associated with moving an army of 28,000 men under sail from the coasts of China to Africa. Our most recent efforts to move a much smaller force to the Cook Islands pall by comparison; but comparison can be made on both a military and diplomatic level. Today's political environment requires the military to be conscious of the sensitivities of our Pacific neighbours, especially when considering the deployment of the RRF or IEF to these areas. Will we achieve the same degree of diplomatic success in our future endeavours in the Pacific as the 15th century Chinese eunuch Cheng Ho? More importantly, examination of Cheng Ho's voyages reveals that the 'umbrella theory' is not new and that peace can exist and prosper through a balance of diplomacy and military force.

CHENG HO'S VOYAGES OF DISCOVERY

1405 - 1433

Undeniably some of the most astounding maritime operations of all time were those conducted by Cheng Ho, in the early 15th century. In all consisting of some seven voyages, Cheng Ho's naval fleets dominated the western seas from Indonesia to the east coast of Africa, on a scale unprecedented by European naval power until the 20th century.

The performance and achievements of Cheng Ho's maritime operations of the early 15th century can be compared to similar voyages of exploration conducted over the whole of the 15th century by the Portuguese. In comparing the two ventures it is important to recall the question of scale. Cheng Ho's first voyage, for example, 'comprised three hundred and seventeen ships, including sixty two 'treasurer ships', and the number of (subaltern) officers, soldiers of the flag army, braves, civilians, buyers and clerks amounted to twenty seven thousand eight hundred and seventy men'.<sup>1</sup> Whereas Vasco Da Gama's epic voyage to India in 1498 consisted of 4 ships and 170 men. Such comparison can be made in many areas. However, this essay is limited to the assessment of the following areas; maritime, military, diplomatic and commercial performance.



Map of the Ming maritime expeditions under Cheng Ho (1405-1433) and the Portuguese voyages round Africa to India.

Milstan G. A Short History of China.

<sup>1</sup> Mills J.V. (ed) Ma Huan Overall Survey of the Ocean's Shores (1433) p 10.

Portugal's intentions were simple and clear cut; establish a sea route to India and the Spice Islands. However, China's motives for exploration are not so clear. Historians such as J.V. Mills, G.B. Sansom, C.P. Fitzgerald and Sir Joseph Needham have all speculated on the reasons for the abrupt Ming maritime expansion which began in 1405 and its discontinuance in 1433. Although debated by such historians it is generally believed that the Emperor Yung Lo had 'a desire to enhance his own personal prestige by a flattery of might, which would result in a throng of foreign ambassadors seeking audience at court. He probably wished to reestablish the renown of China as a leading political and cultural state and secure its own hegemony over the western world by a manifestation of its own power and wealth'.<sup>2</sup> Whatever the motives for this sudden expansion the resulting voyages are truly remarkable feats of maritime exploration.

The voyages were remarkable for many reasons. Not the least the sheer presence of the man. Cheng Ho, a Chinese Muslim holding the office of grand eunuch 'was a man of remarkable character and appearance, and of great height and strength; in addition, he proved himself a great courtier, a most capable diplomat, an able organiser, a fearless commander and a daring strategist. As a sea-adventurer the Chinese have not produced his like'.<sup>3</sup> This was the man who masterminded the seven voyages which were to leave a lasting imprint on SE Asia for more than a century.

When assessing the maritime achievements of Cheng Ho's voyages it must be realised that at the beginning of the 15th century China had reached a high point in ship design. The junks used for the exploration were nothing radical but the result of evolution over the centuries into 1500 ton plus giants capable of lengthy and rugged sea journeys. Throughout the voyages the Ming fleets were not only able to navigate with surprising accuracy but remain together as large convoys. It is even more astounding when it is considered that the fleets were able to move under full sail at night. The command and control aspects which allowed for the manoeuvring of the convoys without colliding, running aground or simply getting lost, especially at night, is nothing short of incredible. The Chinese did make best use of such navigational aids as a maritime compass; printed sailing charts indicating routes, tides, and currents (indeed in unfamiliar regions they produced new charts) starlight and local pilots. They were also able to calculate latitude and were constantly sounding using lead and line.

It would seem that the Chinese were able to overcome a number of inherent problems associated with European maritime travel during this period. The Chinese, for example, do not appear to have suffered from diseases such as scurvy.<sup>4</sup> This could be attributed to experience and/or good planning. Crews

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<sup>2</sup> Mills J.V. p 1.

<sup>3</sup> Mills J.V. p 7.

<sup>4</sup> Information on whether the Chinese knew about the vitamin C deficient disease scurvy during this period is scarce. As there are no reports stating that the Chinese suffered from scurvy (the European experience has been vividly recorded both by Europeans and Asians) one could deduce one of the following:

must have received adequate diets in order not to catch scurvy. It is also apparent that feeding a fleet of 28,000 men is no small task. The fleets did make frequent stops en route. Surely such frequent destinations as Siam, Malacca and Calicut were not only to receive tribute but to resupply as well. Thus, could local merchants have had a warm welcome for Cheng Ho's fleets?

The health of the fleets was attended to by a large number of doctors who sailed with each expedition. Theirs was not only to serve in an in-house capacity but to gather research material as well. Throughout the 13th and 14th centuries China had been swept by at least eleven recorded plagues, including bubonic, pneumonic and black death. It is likely that one of the motives for sending doctors on the voyages was to discover any new drugs which might cure such diseases. As a result of maintaining healthy crews, morale was high which in turn may reflect the resounding military performances achieved by Cheng Ho. Therefore, it could be concluded that good health played a major role in the success of the seven voyages.

The Portuguese on the other hand suffered from scurvy, congestion, and morale which at times led to death and mutiny. Portuguese ships were smaller (the largest being 300 tons), of poor construction, and less responsive to sailing conditions due to inadequate sail design. The Portuguese lines of communication were stretched beyond the limit through a lack of intermediate bases.

Cheng Ho's military forces had to show their mettle on three occasions during the seven voyages. Each time his troops proved 'second to none' During the first voyage on the return journey at Palembang 'Cheng Ho's forces defeated the bands of the pirate chief Ch'en Tsu-i, killing over five thousand men, burning or taking seventeen ships, and capturing Ch'en Tsu-i, who was later presented to the emperor and decapitated at the capital, Nanking'.<sup>5</sup> The second occasion, occurred on the return voyage in 1411, when a violent conflict took place between the forces of Cheng Ho and those of the Sinhalese 'King' Ya-lieh-k'u-nai-erh, defacto ruler of the Rayigama Kingdom, near Colombo; after several battles Cheng Ho won a complete victory'.<sup>6</sup> Cheng Ho's last major conflict took place during the fourth expedition when 'Cheng Ho received: imperial instructions on his voyage to lead his forces against a usurper named Sekandar, who had snatched the throne of Semudera from Sultan Zain Al-'Abidin, and restore to the rightful king. Cheng Ho defeated the usurper's forces comprising several thousand men'.<sup>7</sup>

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- a. the Chinese knew about scurvy and had found a cure in vitamin C, rich foods, eg citrus fruit, or
  - b. the Chinese had never caught scurvy simply because their diet consisted of vitamin C rich foods anyway. Citrus fruit is common in SE Asia and it is known that the Chinese traded with such fruit as oranges, lemons and mangoes. (Harvard Journal - Asian Studies, article by Laurence G. Thompson).

<sup>5</sup> Mills J.V. pp 10-11

<sup>6</sup> Mills J.V. p 12.

<sup>7</sup> Mills J.V. p 13.



Unlike the Portuguese, whose military and diplomatic policy amounted to terrorist tactics, the Chinese adopted an essentially diplomatic approach towards the kingdoms they visited. After all China was the hub of world civilization not the barbarian. Cheng Ho became renowned for his diplomacy and tact. His presitge was such that 'later envoys used his name to impress peoples of the South Seas'.<sup>8</sup> The subtleness and sensitivity of Cheng Ho's diplomacy is best illustrated in the translation of a steele excavated in Ceylon in 1911. Written in three languages, Chinese, Tamil and Persian, the steele commemorated 'one of the visits of the Ming Navy under Cheng Ho and took the form of an address accompanying religious gifts'.<sup>9</sup> Although the list of gifts is almost identical each of the residing religions in Ceylon is honoured as if it were unique. This is not only an extremely enlightened view of religion but the treatment of each as if unique, shows that Cheng Ho's diplomacy was aimed at offending no one.

During the period of the voyages China ruled the oceans from China to the coast of Africa. Under the safe umbrella of the Chinese fleets foreign maritime commerce flourished. The treasure ships which accompanied each of the voyages tended to cater for the commercial luxury trade. China was a very much self reliant nation and cared little for foreign goods unless they were of the exotic variety. So the treasure ships were laden with rare jewels and drugs; animals such as ostriches, zebras and the 'auspicious giraffes'<sup>10</sup> and goods such as camphor, coral, ivory, pearls, sugar and rhinoceros horns. From China the 'world' received products such as silk, porcelain, lacquer ware and art objects. Also returning with the fleets were foreign kings and ambassadors who went to China to pay tribute and homage to the emperor.

Undoubtedly Cheng Ho's voyages were remarkable feats, not only of seamanship but also in the strategic and diplomatic consideration which brought an unprecedented stability to the region for over a century. Although he returned to China with previously unheard of wealth the voyages have slipped into historical obscurity. Why? Because unlike the European efforts, which were minute in comparison, these efforts were not sustained. China in 1433 reverted to an isolationist policy whereas the Europeans, spearheaded by Portugal, just kept on keeping on. In the words of J.V. Mills, 'Cheng Ho's expeditions, in part diplomatic, in part commercial, constituted a major event in Chinese history. In conducting huge fleets of organised naval forces, the greatest vessels then afloat, from China to Africa, he performed unprecedented large scale feats of navigation. He efficiently handled, at sea and ashore, a force of thirty thousand marines and gunners who, though their duties were primarily ceremonial, gave a good account of themselves when it was necessary to take punitive action in Palembang Semudera and Ceylon'.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Mills J.V. p 25.

<sup>9</sup> Needham, Sir Joseph Science - Civilization of China, p 522.

<sup>10</sup> Sansom G.B. The Western World and Japan, p 142.

<sup>11</sup> Mills J.V. p 33.

On reflection and especially in light of New Zealand's stand on the nuclear issue, I believe that there is clear historical evidence to show that the sheer dominance of a force can bring both peace and prosperity. The umbrella effect of Chen Ho's forces throughout coastal SE Asia, Indonesia and the Indian Ocean effectively eliminated piracy, stabilized both trade and diplomatic relations not just with China but also between countries living under the protection of the fleet.

There are many today who propound the argument that the nuclear umbrella has been the stabilising influence which has prevented a Third World War this century. Whether this is true or not only history will tell; but it is interesting to note that once the influence of Cheng Ho's fleets was removed not only did piracy quickly resurface but also war between traditional foes erupted resulting in the disintegration of trade and diplomatic relations established by the presence of Cheng Ho. One could also argue that the lifting of the umbrella allowed a 'minor' European power to gain an influence in the 'Spice Islands' out of all proportion to the actual size of the force involved.

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## THE CONCEPT OF AUFTRAGSTAKTIK

By

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### INTRODUCTION

The German Army has established a proud record of tactical and operational success, from the routing of the Italians at Caporetto in 1917, through the spectacular Western Front offensives of 1918, to the blitzkrieg era of 1939-41. Auftragstaktik is one of the cornerstones of Germany military thought and was a key element of facilitating these dramatic successes. (That the Germans eventually lost both world wars was the fault of a national leadership, which twice became embattled against almost the whole world. The achievements of the German Army at the tactical and operational levels, are nevertheless, examples to be extolled).

This essay examines the concept of Auftragstaktik in four stages:

- a. Auftragstaktik and its British/Australasian equivalent are defined.
- b. The historical context of Auftragstaktik is set, and its application in the 1980's outlined.
- c. The advantages and disadvantages are outlined.
- d. The case for Auftragstaktik in the New Zealand Army is discussed.

### THE CONCEPT OF AUFTRAGSTAKTIK

#### Definition - Auftragstaktik (Mission-Oriented Tactics)

Translated literally, auftrag means 'assignment' or 'mission', and taktik means 'tactics' or 'tactical', however, English speaking countries generally refer to Auftragstaktik as "mission-oriented tactics". Auftragstaktik is a principle of

leadership and command used in the German Army. It allows commanders at brigade level and below, the greatest possible freedom to carry out a mission within the framework of the goal. In its simplest form it could be outlined as follows:

- a. A commander determines his overall goal.
- b. The commander then assigns his subordinate commanders missions, and allocates resources to them, to accomplish his goal.
- c. The subsequent execution of the missions is entirely up to the subordinate commanders.

In summary, commanders would give their subordinates only general guidance as to the ultimate objective of an operation. It was left up to the subordinate to determine the means of obtaining this objective. The subordinate was expected to understand not merely the letter of his orders but the overall spirit of what his superior wanted to achieve. If changing circumstances required, the subordinate was expected to have the good judgement and moral courage to disobey the letter of the orders, so as to attain the ultimate objective toward which the orders had been directed. This decentralization of tactical control was undertaken down to the lowest level of command.<sup>1</sup>

#### Befehlstaktik (Command Tactics)

'Command Tactics' is that system of command that New Zealand and most other western armies follow. It involves the detailed passage of orders through all levels of command (SMEAC), and by its nature is much more rigid than mission oriented tactics. Brigadier General Graf Kielmansegg described command tactics as follows:

'Befehlstaktik (command tactics) tries to force the natural chaos of war into order, to make the maelstrom of battle comply with ones own system. This can succeed as long as the course of the battle is static and adheres to our rules, or when we have a significant superiority. However that is the exception ... the unexpected is the rule'.<sup>2</sup>

#### Historical Background

The decentralization of tactics concept used by the German Army, dates as far back as the war against Austria in 1866. The concept of Auftragstaktik during that war made it the responsibility of every officer, NCO

<sup>1</sup> Storbeck, Siegfried

'Mental Flexibility, - from Europaeische Wehrkunde No 11, Nov 85, p 1.

<sup>2</sup> Kielmansegg, Graf

'A Plea for Operational Command', - from Europaeische Wehrkunde No 11, Nov 85, p 6.

and soldier, to do without question or doubt whatever the situation required as he personally saw it. Omission and inactivity were considered worse than a wrong choice of expedient. Even disobedience of orders was not inconsistent with this philosophy.<sup>3</sup>

By World War Two the principles of action, surprise and initiative were firmly cemented in German military doctrine. In addition, intellectualism, and independent decision-making ability throughout all ranks, was widely expounded. Strong emphasis was placed on the training of section commanders. Not only was it recognised that the performance of a section depended largely on the example of its commander, but that mission oriented tactics, demanded a higher standard of leadership from subordinate commanders. It is not unreasonable to suggest that the German section commander was taught to think like an officer.

German criticism of British tactical performance in WWII illustrates their variance in fundamental military thought. British failures in the offence were attributed to an "unweildy and rigidly methodical technique of command... and an over-systematic issuing of orders, down to the last detail, leaving little latitude to the junior commander."<sup>4</sup> Though commending the courage and toughness of individual soldiers, one official German manual stated that:

The British ... had not yet succeeded in casting off their congenitally schematic methods of working, and the clumsiness thereby entailed. This clumsiness continues down the scale of command, by reason of the method of issuing orders, which go into the smallest detail.<sup>5</sup>

These criticisms highlight the inflexible nature, and potential clumsiness of 'command tactics', structure when compared with 'mission-oriented tactics'.

### Mission-oriented Tactics in the 1980's

There has been a relentless decentralization of tactical control on the battlefield, necessitated by the increased range and lethality of modern weapons. Whereas in 1800 roughly 20,000 men were required to hold a mile of battle front, this figure progressively dropped to 2,500 by 1917, and to less than 1,000 today.<sup>6</sup> The trend for the future is toward an ever greater dispersion and independence of minor units, and hence, the command and control framework from within which these units operate, is of ever increasing importance.

As units become more dispersed and independent, so the precise control of these units becomes more difficult, and consequently mission-oriented tactics

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<sup>3</sup> English, John A                    'A Perspective on Infantry' p 95

<sup>4</sup> Ibid                                    p 158

<sup>5</sup> Ibid                                    p 158

<sup>6</sup> Ibid                                    p XVIII

becomes more practical. This practicality is further enhanced as mobility increases. For example; high tempo manoeuvre operations (characteristic of armoured warfare) with situations changing by the minute, are virtually impossible to control in detail. Only through simple mission-oriented orders, and a reliance on strong, independent leadership at junior levels of command can confusion be minimized.<sup>7</sup>

The greatest asset of mission oriented tactics is that it gives the subordinate commander the freedom to think and act for himself. It enables him to exploit the chaos and unpredictable nature of war, and it has been recognised that leaders must be trained accordingly: 'Our leaders must be brought up and trained not only to accept and live with chaos, but to create it for the enemy. Knowing that they themselves are free to act in uncertainty in the sense of the mission'.<sup>8</sup>



In Europe this is of particular relevance as units operating on a mission guided basis could be expected to continue should crippling damage befall higher echelons to the rear. There is also the possibility of an electronics communication vacuum and leaders trained to take the initiative will do so, while others, perhaps more familiar with comprehensive instructions might hesitate.

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<sup>7</sup> Holshek, Chris

The New German Army, p 106

<sup>8</sup> Kielmansegg, Graf

'A Plea for Operational Command' - from Europäische Wehrkunde No 11, Nov 85, p 6.

In Europe this is of particular relevance as units operating on a mission guided basis could be expected to continue should crippling damage befall higher echelons to the rear. There is also the possibility of an electronics communication vacuum and leaders trained to take the initiative will do so, while others, perhaps more familiar with comprehensive instructions might hesitate.

While fostering initiative and independent leadership, one of the weaknesses of mission oriented tactics is that it places higher demands on both the commander and subordinate. Certain characteristics must be developed in order to successfully carry out mission-oriented tactics. These include trust from the leader and loyalty from the led. A commander must be honest in assessing his own capabilities, and must know his subordinates well to avoid any conflict in expectations. Finally, a high standard of obedience and integrity is required; those qualities which enable the subordinate commander to comprehend the key element of a mission, and thus act in the intended sense then the situation changes.

### A Comparison of Command and Control Systems

<u>Mission Oriented Tactics</u>	<u>Command Tactics</u>
<u>Advantages</u>	<u>Advantages</u>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Simple, flexible system achieving a goal.</li> <li>b. Avoids standard, routine patterns that promote rigidity and staleness</li> <li>c. Fosters initiative and develops leadership all levels.</li> <li>d. Exploits chaotic nature of war to advantage.</li> <li>e. Quick.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Clear, detailed orders ensure all personnel thoroughly understand the mission and their role in it.</li> <li>b. Relatively easy to plan logistics and administrative support.</li> <li>c. Simple to practise in peacetime.</li> </ul>
<u>Disadvantages</u>	<u>Disadvantages</u>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Has potential for misuse ie, can be used to avoid giving clear orders, or to cover up a disproportion between mission and resources, thereby passing responsibility downward.</li> <li>b. Logistic and combat support can require considerable co-ordination.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Inflexible, impossible to cover all options or situation changes.</li> <li>b. Too much detail can obscure the principle aim.</li> </ul>

- c. Serious consequences may result if junior leadership skills are not of a consistently high standard.
- d. Difficult to simulate in peacetime.
- c. Time consuming to write, collate and pass, and consequent slow reaction time.
- d. Stifles initiative, and discourages independent leadership skills.
- e. Tries to impose order on an essentially unpredictable battle. Many opportunities of exploitation may be lost.

### The Case for Mission Oriented Tactics in the NZ Army

In terms of defence New Zealand is inextricably linked with Australia, and both countries practice the 'command tactics' structure which was originally inherited from Britain. Colonel Hellyer, the Australian Defence Attache in Bonn, commented on the relevance of mission oriented tactics to the Australian Army as follows:

'It is a pity that the post-war generations of professional officer have been inculcated with the necessity for order and control - which would appear to be contrary to the

Unlike West Germany, New Zealand does not have a distinct threat on which to base its defence policy, however our immediate sphere of influence is dominated by the south-west Pacific. A conflict in this area could possibly involve the deployment of the RRF or IEF, and subsequent fighting in a tropical jungle environment.

While this is a far cry from the high tempo armoured warfare of Europe, it would still involve a fairly large dispersal, and independence of sub-units, whether as patrols, observation posts, protection elements, or peacekeepers. Mission oriented tactics would certainly simplify the command and control structure, and allow subordinate commanders great flexibility. However, in a low intensity conflict with strict rules of engagement, and a desire to reimpose order, unless very careful orders are given, too much flexibility might only add fuel to a conflict. Indeed 'Command Tactics is probably preferable in a situation where one is trying to establish order, rather than systematically defeat and destroy an enemy.

The concept of mission-oriented tactics developed on the battlefields of Europe, is not as applicable to the small scale conflicts New Zealand might become involved in. However the distinct merits of mission-oriented have been proven in war, and there is much we can learn from the concept. There would

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<sup>9</sup> Hellyer, G



be difficulty in changing any command and control structure quickly, indeed it took the German Army several decades to refine their system. In the past the New Zealand soldier has been recognised for his common sense and initiative, so mission-oriented tactics may well appeal to the character of our junior leaders. It is certainly worthy of further study and assessment on our part.

### CONCLUSION

Mission-oriented tactics is a simple, flexible method of command and control, that allows the subordinate commander the greatest possible freedom. It is particularly suited to fluid battles where units are well dispersed and have a degree of independence. It requires a high standard of leadership skills, especially at junior levels.

Auftragstaktik has been well proven by the German Army, but is not easily adapted to other armies. Rather than a few simple principles, it ascribes a completely new attitude to tactical thought, and would take many years to develop properly. It is not as relevant to New Zealand in our current defence posture, but there are many benefits that could merit introduction into our army.

#### Note:

Further reading on the concept of Auftragstaktik may be found in an article by LtCol P. Bergemann, RACT in the Australian Defence Force Journal, No. 63 March/April 1987.

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## THE OPERATIONAL EDGE: A SOUTHERN REJOINDER

Given the abundance of riches in the South many Mainlanders find the 'drift to the North' difficult to comprehend. Regrettably, however, that drift appears to continue. Sadly now too it seems from "The Operational Edge" (Army Journal Dec 86) that the phenomenon has spread to the Army for reasons which appear to defy the realities.

For "Unity of Command" is not just a product of line diagrams and organizations. The reality is about the extent of a commander's authority - the prerogatives he has to direct the 'G', 'A', 'Q', welfare, works and finance functions which, only when exercised collectively with training, can confer a real operational capability. Read W.G. Stevens on "Problems in 2 NZEF"; his final paragraph says it all. Or ask those who wore two hats, looked in three directions and otherwise experienced the disunity and duplication of the Field Force/Home Command arrangement. The answer is not to divide but to devolve.

And the IEF is not just about training. The fundamental requirement is to be able to form and field the Force. And the practical reality is that to put the Force on the ground, let alone train it, demands a maximum contribution from all Army units RF and TF, North Island and South. So much then for "minimizing" our contribution to it...

Nor is training just about brigade and battalion live firing activities. The reality is about individual skills, small-group cohesion and the battle inoculation of sub-unit teams. Unit effectiveness and all Corps co-operation at lower levels are also part of the training equation. Brigade exercises are required but not at the expense of these components from which formation competence is largely derived.

"The Operational Edge" provides much to respond to - which may well have been its intent. Suffice to observe that it is somewhat disconcerting to find our attempts to shed the Confederate image of the South apparently being paralleled by the advent of a Union mentality in the North. As the earlier protagonists found, separation did not work; real strength lay in unity. It still does.

A.L. BIRKS  
Colonel

