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UNDERSTANDING TERRORISM

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL P.D. LEIGH, RNZIR

'Tell me please, what are we being killed for?'

Captain Richard Carey
TWA Flight 355

Lt Col Leigh graduated from Mons Officer Cadet School (UK) in 1967. He served five tours in Northern Ireland with 2nd Bn Royal Regiment of Fusiliers. His appointments have included OC Recce Pl, Coy 2IC in a mechanized battalion, Staff Captain Equipment Management HQ 1 Br Corps, SI Tac, School of Infantry, SO2 Ops ATG, Visits and Protocol Officer Multinational Force and Observers, Sinai and 2IC 1 RNZIR. Lt Col Leigh is currently the Director of Personnel (Army). He is a graduate of the Australian Staff College, Queenscliff.

This article was first published in the Australian Defence Force Journal in December 1984.

Introduction

Most studies of the urban guerrilla have concentrated on the methods of combating the problem, rather than attempting to understand the reasons why a young man or woman embarks upon a career of violence and destruction: a career that statistically is likely to prove short-lived and which will probably end in either imprisonment or a violent death.

It is remarkable that professional soldiers have made so little effort to try to understand the forces that motivate the urban guerrilla and make him apparently willing to die for his cause. No professional soldier would consider planning or undertaking a conventional military operation without first studying

his enemy - not just his tactics and methods of operation, but also his ideology, and his social and political history. An understanding of all these factors helps commanders to develop tactics to counter the enemy threat. However, in the case of the urban guerrilla or terrorist, the military mind seems all too willing to class them as lunatics and therefore unworthy of serious study. And so volumes are written on countering terrorism, but little on the causes.

There are two distinct types of group engaged in terrorist activity: those fighting for definite political goals, and those whose dissent is ideological or emotional in nature. The first type, minority groups, exist in nearly every country in the world. The Euzkadi ta Azkatsuna (ETA) in Spain, and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Ulster and Eire are examples. The second type of terrorist group includes those which have few if any clearly defined political aims. Groups of this type are often closely described as the New Left[1] and it is this group upon which this paper will concentrate.

Aim

The aim of this paper is to examine urban terrorists, with particular emphasis on those groups that have few if any apparent political aims, with a view to developing a better understanding of their motivation. The paper will discuss the reasons why such organisations exist in liberal democracies and then examine the background of the terrorist in order to determine if there are any common factors. The philosophy and aims of these various terrorist groups will then be examined. This paper is intended to help professional soldiers understand the "why" of terrorism, rather than recommending methods of countering it.

Definition

Throughout this paper the terms urban guerrilla and urban terrorist will be used. These descriptions are variously used according to the viewpoint of the person using the terms. The opponent of a regime, for instance, considers himself to be fighting for freedom and will therefore refer to himself as a guerrilla. The establishment that he opposes will on the other hand regard him as a terrorist. In this paper the two terms are synonymous.

Terrorism in Liberal Democracies

It is notable that New Left terrorist movements are confined to the liberal democratic societies, societies in which there would appear to be little justification for violent action in order to effect political change. The 'bread and butter' issues that preoccupied the 'Old Left'[2] have to a large extent been

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[1]Moss R. Urban Guerrillas. London, 1974, p 17.

[2]Burton A. Urban Terrorism. London, 1975, p 105. The movement which came to be known as the 'New Left' is usually held to have begun as an attempt

met by the higher standards of living and social security found in these societies. Thus the causes of violent dissent have largely been removed. However, the very fact that they are liberal democracies and therefore tolerate dissent enables political extremists to operate to an extent that would be impossible in a totalitarian state.

Totalitarian states, with their secret police are better able to detect and suppress the first stirrings of revolt. They are also helped by state control of the news media and in particular the education system, where the teachers and professors are selected not only for their academic qualifications, but also for their loyalty to the state. In the west the education system and in particular the universities, takes pride in a freedom from governmental control. The academic atmosphere encourages free thought and expression by both staff and students. This freedom is lacking in repressive regimes.

However, this still does not explain why, in a free society, where political change can be effected through elections, the New Left resort to terror tactics. The problem facing the New Left is that their ideology has limited appeal to the masses whom they claim to represent. They feel unable to change the system through the ballot box. Terrorism is therefore the weapon of the weak extremist groups that have despaired of engaging popular support through conventional political means. 'It is tempting to take advantage of the vulnerability of the modern city to win cheap publicity in pursuit of a distant cause'.[3] The New Left have rejected the traditional values of western societies and the general faith in parliamentary means of political change. They have also rejected the idea that the government enjoys monopoly of legitimate violence.

The question remains, how and why do individuals become involved in these extremists groups, who use terror to pursue their ideological ends? Is it because they are sadists or lunatics? To find the answers the start point must be to look at the terrorists themselves and try to identify any commonality among them.

The Urban Terrorist

A study of the New Left terrorist groups reveals one common thread. Almost all the leaders, and in many cases the rank and file, come from similar backgrounds; the alienated middle class youth, the bourgeois intellectual. Of the 17 hard core members of the Baader Meinhof group, who called themselves the Red Army Faction, most were students from respectable middle class families, but

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to infuse a new intellectual radicalism into the general Social Democratic traditions of the parliamentary Left. It was not until the mid-sixties that a more violent dimension was added.

[3]Moss R. op cit p 22.

the group also included two lawyers, a medical assistant, two journalists, a woman hairdresser and a woman photographer. Only one member of the group, Karl Ruhland, came from a working class background, and he later complained that he was treated like a second class revolutionary. Almost every other group associated with the New Left protest movement draws its membership and much of its popular support from this stratum of society. The Japanese Red Army, The Italian Red Brigade, the German 2nd June Movement and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) (which although it is a nationalistic movement is also committed to a fundamental Marxist-Leninist revolution throughout the Arab world), are but a few examples. There are remarkable similarities between Dr George Habash, leader of the PFLP, and Ulrike Meinhof. Habash trained in his youth to become a priest in the Greek Orthodox Church. He left to become a doctor and at one time ran a children's clinic with Dr Wadi Hadad who now ranks second in the PFLP. Ulrike Meinhof as a child aged fourteen had wanted to become a nun; as a student she turned to poetry and the pleasures of intellectual life. Both these leaders of particularly violent terrorist organizations had in their youth been deeply religious and imbued with a social conscience.

It would therefore seem that, far from being sadists or violent, many of the people drawn towards the New Left are sincere, idealistic and apparently intelligent. What is it then that makes these people rebel?

There is nothing new about young people challenging the materialistic way of life of their elders. Youth is idealistic, especially the youth from middle class backgrounds. Working class youth is too busy earning a living in order to survive and has little time to spare for revolutionary activity. Perhaps also there is little appeal in the intellectual philosophy of the New Left to a working man.

Most middle class youths lead a sheltered existence during their early years. Private schools and a suburban lifestyle limit their acquaintance with others from different social backgrounds. It is not until university, when they meet other students from all strata of society, that they really become aware of the inequality of society. With this awareness also comes a feeling of guilt, because they see their class and families flourishing at the expense of the working class. The feeling of guilt increases with the realization that western affluence flourishes, not only at the expense of its working classes, but also at the expense of the third world. So it is that disillusionment sets in, and idealistic youth is drawn towards an ideology that preaches freeing the working masses from their bondage.

Daniel Cohn-Bendit, one of the leaders of the student revolt in France in May/June, 1968, writing in his book Obsolete Communism the Left-Wing Alternative, has this to say:

> 'In the current revolt of youth, however, very much more is being questioned - the distaste is for the system itself. Modern youth is not so much envious of, as disgusted with, the dead empty lives of their parents. This feeling began

> among bourgeois children, but has now spread through all levels of society'.[4]

Disillusionment which turns to frustration sows the first seeds of revolt. It should be said however that it is only a minority of students who become involved.

> 'Thus, a fair assessment in British universities is that one in ten are protesters, one in a hundred are politically extreme, and one in a thousand are politically violent without being lethal. In the country as a whole (excluding Northern Ireland) only about one in a million would choose to kill for political aims. Few if any of these could be described as working class'.[5]

If the university campus is the place where the fledgling revolutionary is first made aware of social injustice, it is also the place where he can develop his ideas. The academic environment is the ideal spawning ground for the philosophy of the New Left.

The Philosophy of New Left

It is not possible in this paper to delve too deeply into the writings of the philosophers of the New Left - indeed, no two philosophies are the same. However it is necessary to identify the major themes of these philosophies to gain an understanding of why people resort to violent protest.

There is a common theme that runs through the writings of the more notable philosophers of the New Left such as Jean Paule Sartre, Herbert Marcuse, Franz Fanon and Daniel Cohn-Bendit. This central theme is that a society without exploitation is inconceivable where the management of production is controlled by one social class - 'in other words where the division of society into managers and workers is not totally abolished'.[6]

The problem that faces the proponents of this philosophy is that the workers themselves have been lured into complacency by the very materialism so repugnant to the revolutionary. The masses have lost their revolutionary ardour and do not wish to see their lives disrupted by revolutionary change. Herbert Marcuses' examination of the industrial societies led him to believe that scientific and technological developments had changed the structure of the working class

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[4]Cohn-Bendit D. and Cohn-Bendit G. Obsolete Communism the Left-Wing Alternative. London, 1968. p 44.

[5]Clutterbuck R. Guerrillas and Terrorists. London, 1977. p 89.

[6]Cohn-Bendit D. and Cohn-Bendit G. op cit p 103.

and thereby altered a number of Marxist assumptions. In the new technologically-based society of the west a labour aristocracy had developed, and a new alliance had grown up between big business and the working class which was no longer revolutionary or intent on overthrowing the established order. Marcuse predicted that it would therefore be the students who would lead the revolutionary forces against capitalism.[7]

Thus the revolutionary is faced with the problem of wanting to free the workers from the exploitation of capitalism, only to find that the workers themselves do not want to be freed. The only way open is to embrace the philosophy of Situationism. 'Devotees of this philosophy believe that the whole pattern of civilised life, as most people understand it, is artificial and unnatural and that if people can be made to realize this they will spontaneously take their lives into their own hands without regard for the remainder of the community or its laws'.[8] The way to achieve this is by bringing society into such a state of chaos that people will cease to believe that the existing system can maintain an orderly life for them.

There is another dilemma for the revolutionary. Marcuse predicted that students would lead the revolutionary forces against capitalism. But the very establishment of a leadership runs counter to the philosophy of a true democracy in which the masses take collective charge of the running of society.

> 'In other words, democracy is not suborned by bad leadership, but by the very existence of leadership'.[9]

The true revolutionary must not be a leader; rather, he must encourage the workers to struggle on their own behalf and show them how to drive a wedge into capitalist society.

Thus the idealistic middle class youth has moved from a realization of the exploitation of a capitalist society, to a study of the philosophies preaching true democracy attainable only by violent revolution. It is one thing however, to embrace the cause, but quite another to take the quantum jump to violent action. The years of indoctrination of middle class values inhibit most from becoming terrorists. However, the use of violence is justified and even exalted, in the writings of Guevara, Fanon, Sartre, Marighella and many others. Philosophical arguments are convincingly used and have an intellectual appeal to the less than totally committed revolutionary.

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[7]Marcuse H. One Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society. London, 1972.

[8]Clutterbuck R. op cit p 85.

[9]Cohn-Bendit D. and Cohn-Bendit G. op cit p 250.

Franz Fanon, the black psychologist from Martinique who became the ideologist of the Algerian revolution wrote:

> 'At the level of individuals, violence is a cleansing force. It frees the native from his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction. It makes him fearless and restores his self respect'.[10]

These concepts are also expressed in the existentialist ideas propounded by Herdegger and Sartre; that is only through our own actions or acts of will that we can escape from despair. Sartre in his treatise The Critique of Dialectic Reason states:

> 'Terror is the cement of fraternity and both the justification and the mover of history. Terrorism should therefore be eternal'.[11]

In an article in the periodical L'Arc a French professor of philosophy wrote:

> 'The philosophy of tomorrow will be terrorist. Not philosophy of terrorism, but terrorist philosophy, allied with terrorist political practices... Philosophy abandoning its flirtation with novelists and poets, will rediscover its pure theoretical intent and, on the other hand "political engagement" will no longer arise from the art of the word, because the society in which we live is condemned to refuse, with more and more savagery to listen to reason. Thus we are being led slowly but surely to the necessity of pure violence, since nothing but terror can now make the bourgeoisie retreat'.[12]

Strong words indeed from a man paid by the government to educate French youth.

So it is that the young idealist, filled with the ideal of achieving true democracy through revolution, finds justification for the acts of violence necessary to bring about the revolution. The writings of the New Left philosophers are powerful and have an intellectual appeal to young, impressionable men and women. By a process of reasoning they are able to convince themselves that not only is violence justified, but that it is in itself a cathartic force.

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[10] Fanon F. The Wretched of the Earth. London, 1967. p 74

[11] Sarte J.P. Critique of Dialectic Reason. Paris, 1960. p 68.

[12] L'Arc, No. 30, 1966, pp 30-32.

The Appeal of Violence

There is another theory as to why men are prepared to resort to violence. That is the appeal of violence itself. Perhaps the writings of the New Left philosophers serve only to stimulate something already present in man's subconscious. Brigadier R.G.S. Bidwell, writing in the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) journal, said:

> 'Guerrilla warfare is a weapon so cheap, deadly, insidious and difficult to counter that the temptation to use it is irresistible to incurably aggressive mankind.'[13]

'Incurably aggressive mankind'; this may be part of the answer. Fanon certainly suggests that violence has an appeal of its own.[14] John Gerassi echoed Fanon's sentiments in an essay he wrote:

> '... the exhilaration that comes with street fighting is not, as Establishment (ie adaption oriented) psychiatrists insist, escapism, parental rejection, masochism, sadism etc. On the contrary it is achieving selfhood, independence, the feeling that one is a man, taking pride in oneself and one's comrades. It is just as Fanon said, an act of growing up, not adolescent nihilism'.[15]

It is perhaps appealing for intellectuals to participate in acts of violence, since they have little experience of hard physical labour. For this very reason it is tempting for them to display their political virility and to show that they are not just men of words. They want to prove that they can fight and suffer like their theoretical heroes, the peasants and workers, people they know only from books and theories.

The appeal of political violence is also linked with what Robert Moss describes as 'the rhetoric of vilification'.

> 'When student radicals chant "racist pigs" at the police; when the Black Panther newspaper says that the Panthers "stood up in the bowels of facist Amerikkka" with guns in their hands and told "those murderous mad dogs who occupy our community like a foreign army" to get out; when Uraguay's urban guerrillas insist on describing a freely elected government as a "corrupt dictatorship", the political

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[13]Bidwell R.G.S. RUSI. March, 1972, p 1.

[14]Fanon F. op cit p 74.

[15]Gerassi J. Towards Revolution. London, 1971. Vol 2. pp 465-6.

> rhetoric means something. Its psychological effect is to distort the speaker's view of the situation so that it seems that are only two possibilities; to fight the authorities or join them, to overthrow the system or become its creature'.[16]

The rhetoric of vilification is an incitement to violence, and it is of interest that it is used so much by the revolutionary. Perhaps because, as Moss suggests, it turns complex situations into 'black-and white stereotypes'.[17] This fits in with the terrorists own philosophy, in which capitalism is evil, therefore it must be destroyed. Perhaps too, the rhetoric of vilification is also used as a defence mechanism, to protect the conscience of the terrorist. To kill a pig is easier than killing a person.

> 'We say the person in uniform is a pig, that is not a human being, and thus we have to settle the matter with him. It is wrong to talk to these people at all, and shooting is taken for granted'.[18]

It is one of the tragedies that this 'revolutionary' indoctrination, which might otherwise be harmless, can pervert the idealism and generosity of its victims so that a hard shell forms around them, further hardened by the rejection of those they wish to liberate. Sir Geoffrey Jackson, the British Ambassador to Uruguay, describes this in his book People's Prison.[19] Cooped up with his hooded guards in a tiny cellar, separated from them only by a piece of pig netting, he managed to get through to at least some of those who were still young enough for the human spirit not to have withered entirely within them. He did this by making them laugh, but sadly, the entry of another guard or some kind of alarm would often break the spell, and the human being would vanish once again into the shell. He came to the conclusion that, however young, once they had killed a man they were probably committed beyond hope of cure.

Having committed himself to violent action, the question remains, how does the terrorist believe that violence will assist him in the attainment of his objectives? To answer this question it is necessary to examine the aims of terrorism.

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[16]Moss R. op cit p 29.

[17]Moss R. op cit p 29.

[18]Ulrike Meinhof. - 1971. Cited in the UK National Defence College Revolutionary Warfare Folder NCD.A403. 25 May 78. p 14.

[19]Jackson, Sir Geoffrey. People's Prison. London, 1972.

The Aims of Terrorism

This section of the paper will discuss how the terrorist believes the application of violence will produce the democractic society for which he is struggling. The central problem for an urban guerrilla movement is to make converts. The battle is for minds, not for bodies. The terrorists start point is to prove themselves a credible fighting force through successful operations and to publicise their ideological aims. By establishing their credibility as an effective force terrorists aim to dis-credit government and alienate it from the mass of the population by forcing it to adopt repressive measures. Repression rarely leads to revolution, but it can lead to the collapse of the social concensus and a loss of faith in democractic ideals.

Carlos Marighella states that the aim is to make it impossible for the government to maintain ordinary life without harassment and repression, making life unbearable for the people, leading to chaos in which the terrorist can quickly seize power.[20] By his use of indiscriminate violence the terrorist also aims to promote a general feeling of nervousness, fear and disorientation. Conditions of general insecurity favour extremists in any society. The government comes under fire because it cannot provide adequate protection and the people are forced to ride with whatever group is in a position to given them protection. Hitler applied these tactics successfully to bring down the Weimar Republic. Of course a very singular set of circumstances existed at the time, but the rise of Hitler demonstrates that democracies are not immune from the corrupting effects of political terror.

The New Left terrorists see themselves as the catalyst to revolution. It is their job to create the conditions for the working classes to rise. If in the process he or others should die it does not matter. Kozo Okamoto, one of the members of the Japanese Red Army involved in the Lod Airport massacre had this to say in his confession:

> 'Revolutionary war is warfare for justice, which I define as creating a society for no class struggle. War involves killing and destruction. We cannot limit warfare to the destruction of buildings. We believe that the killing of human beings is inevitable... The incident has been reported worldwide, but it seems to me nobody has grasped the motivation for it. But when a similar operation takes place the next time, what will the world think?... The Arab world lacks spiritual fervour, so we felt that through this attempt we could probably stir up the Arab world... We three soldiers after we die want to become stars of Orion... I believe that some of those we slaughtered have become stars in the sky... The

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[20] Marighella C. For the Liberation of Brazil. London, 1971. See also 'On Principles and Strategic Questions', reprinted in Les Temps Modernes, November, 1969.

revolution will go on and there will be many more stars'.[21]

This statement has a fanatical ring, indeed it is the statement of a fanatic. The terrorist has convinced himself not only that a cause exists, and that it is necessary and just to use violence in pursuit of that cause, but that death is necessary. He has developed the martyr syndrome. Indeed, his own death perhaps offers him the greatest fulfillment of all, for then he will have achieved recognition. Unable to achieve recognition whilst living, he will pass into history with the other heroes of his philosophy. Perhaps also death frees him from his conscience, for no matter how logical the argument justifying violence, he is using ignoble means for noble ends. The cycle is complete. From a young idealist with a social conscience to a hardened terrorist.

Conclusions

This paper has traced the stages in the development of an urban terrorist, it has attempted to answer the question that parents of terrorists must have asked themselves when they learnt the truth about their son or daughter; why? In the author's view the terrorist is not a madman or a sadist, he is more like a religious convert, only the religion he has chosen has false gods.

Primarily, it is a social conscience, and an awareness of the inequality upon which capitalism is based which first motivates him. The intellectual appeal of the New Left philosophies develops his ideological fervour and provides an intellectual justification for the use of violence. Once embarked upon his terrorist career and having killed, he must then kill the very humanity within him that first motivated him. He becomes a terminal case and only death can free him. This is the tragic irony of the idealogical terror of the New Left.

The paper has not discussed the military methods of counter terrorism, because these are well known to those involved. It is hoped however, that a better understanding of the cause will lead to consideration of the methods of prevention, rather than the cure. Until then it is the author's view that liberal democracies will continue to experience increasing terrorist violence.

'C'est pour toi que tu fais la revolution'.

Daniel Cohn-Benit

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[21] From the transcript of the trial of Kozo Okamoto published in the Washington Post, 9 July 1972.

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GREAT EXPECTATIONS : OF OFFICER CADETS AND OTHERS[1]

BY

MAJOR N.W. SHIELDS, BA (HONS), DIP TCHG, RNZAEC

"Leadership, at its highest, consists of getting people to work for you when they are under no obligation to do so."[2]

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INTRODUCTION

All officer cadets join the Army with great expectations. Some want to be 'The General'. Some want glory, some want excitement, all want to accept the challenge of leadership. Many see leadership as that indefinable quality that makes other people follow when the gallant leader points his sword and yells, 'follow me, chaps'. If the followers do not receive the correct message, no amount of charisma, spit and polish, or 'commanding' will overcome this. It is unfortunate that most officer cadets are so busy learning the magic of command and control that they never have an opportunity to learn that leadership involves an ability to write.

An officer cadet spends a great deal of his time learning how to choose the "right hill". Having mastered this art the officer cadet sees

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[1]Apologies to Charles Dickens.

[2]Staley A.H. (Ed) Tongue and Quill: Communicating to Manage in Tomorrows Air Force, Air Force Staff and Command College, Montgomery, Alabama, 1984. p 6.

promotion and progress as successfully capturing a series of bigger and better hills. The majority of promotion requirements depend on a knowledge of tactics. The reality is that the biggest hill an officer has to negotiate is the paper mountain. The way to the top of that mountain is treacherous. Tasks such as writing up platoon commander note books, preparing summaries of evidence, and writing reports about unit training, loom like the South Col on Everest. Writing skill errors that the officer cadet could hide away are now exposed to Commanding Officers and Chief Instructors. End of course reports from Army schools claim that officers have poor writing skills. A claim that is substantiated by the poor quality of some of the papers that are submitted as course requirements.

The mutterings of Commanding Officers and Chief Instructors get amplified in the halls of higher command. The message that is broadcast is that young (and some not so young officers) cannot write. The following conversation could be imagined:

Senior Officer: "Look at this pile of end of course reports. They all say young officers can't write. I'm sure it must be true - some I have received were poorly organized, poorly argued, misspelt, ungrammatical clap trap which is not worth the paper it is written on. Get a course or something to train them properly. What do they learn at those officer cadet schools anyway? Fix it will you."

Some time later, a junior officer is heard muttering: "Another damn course - learn to write! Why bother? Nobody reads my reports. If they do all I get is criticism about my writing skills."

In the New Zealand environment where bureaucracy controls the purse strings, it is the written submission that wins the battle for a greater allocation of resources. The purchase of new equipment is the result of numerous submissions. The birth of them may well be the post-exercise report, written by a junior officer, documenting deficiencies in the current equipment. The written skills of all officers are important. It is not that the junior officers lack the writing skills. It is more that they have not adapted their writing skills to meet the demands of the military writing style.

The best example of the military style is found in 'The Service Paper'. The general concept of a service paper is that it is a medium for presenting a written argument. It is " ... concerned with the presentation of the solution to

a problem and of argument which will ensure its acceptance."[3] The style of writing used in a service paper is expository writing. The writing is factual, functional and utilitarian. "Organization of ideas, clarity of expression, development of style, proof-reading and rewriting are integral parts of expository writing."[4] Put simply, brevity, clarity, accuracy and relevance are the characteristics of the expository style.

Expository writing is a demanding skill. It demands rigorous thinking. It demands an ability in logic. It requires a suitable vocabulary. A lack of understanding of these requirements becomes visible when writing is characterized by poor choice of word, lack of logical construction, verbosity and lack of relevance. For many officers the first time they have to employ the skills of expository writing is writing their first report. Rather than criticising the officer for an inability to communicate effectively in writing and therefore having to attend a course, the Army needs to break down barriers that prevent officers adapting to and learning expository writing skills.

THE WAR OF WORDS

It is held that these barriers are unnecessary. If the skills of expository writing are not learnt, or are poorly practised, then the Army suffers. For those who decry the need to learn and practise these skills because the pen is less mighty than the sword, heed these words written about expository writing:

> "For those of you who have suffered the agonies of writing appreciations on the situation at the various colleges of knowledge, and I suspect many of you at times questioned the value of such an exercise, you may rest assured that it proved very useful. It certainly tends to concentrate the mind when one is doing it for real."[5]

The communication of information is a complex operation. Confusion may arise at any stage of the process. For example, it may occur because the message may not be clearly formulated, or the words being used are ambiguous, or the sender and receiver's perceptions of the message are different.

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[3]Joint Services Staff Manual : Service Writing 1970. Chapter 10, paragraph 1001.

[4]Logan, Logan and Paterson, Creative Communication: Teaching the Language Arts, McGraw Hill Ryerson Ltd, 1982. p 272.

[5]CO, 29 Commando Regiment. Combined Arms Brief on the Falklands. p 11.

PERCEPTIONS

In the complexity of communicating, the perceptions of an individual and those held by the organization can cause confusion, thus becoming a communication barrier. It is argued that in the case of potential officers and the Army, perceptions are barriers - barriers to learning the effective writing skills required of an officer. The potential officer does not perceive the great importance of being able to write, let alone being able to write using the expository style.

The New Zealand Army has little documentation about why people want to be officers. Bibliographies of the 1982 and 1983 Officer Cadet Training Company (OCTC) classes, in the main, state that these people undertook officer training for the following reasons:

a. job security;

b. the challenge the job offered;

c. to be a leader of men;

d. to have an active, exciting outdoor life; and

e. prestige.

The above reasons are not in any order of priority. All thought they had the necessary qualities to be leaders. The Army for its part had assessed each person as having adequate educational qualifications. All the Officer Cadets perceived the job of 'officer' as being highly exciting. The skill of writing effectively was not considered important. This student perception was and still is reinforced by recruiting propaganda.

The recruiting propaganda is the tool used to create an image of the Army to attract potential officers. Full page colour advertisements showing Lord Freyberg VC have appeared in the New Zealand Listener. Advertising jingles are played on commercial radio. Films are made of Army activities. All emphasize the concepts of leadership, challenge, active life style, excitement. 'You need a reasonable education and be between defined age limits. Enquire now!!' It does not mention that you need the skill of being able to learn the writing skills the Army deems necessary.

The potential officer's perceptions of the Army and the career he has chosen are reinforced in the first instance by recruiting propaganda. These are then reinforced during commissioning training. The emphasis in training is on "leadership". The leadership skills required are those which will enable the Officer Cadet to effectively lead an infantry platoon. Generally speaking the skills are:

a. Personal soldier skills - being able to use a weapon, dress, live in the field, maintain fitness.

b. Platoon tactical skills - being able to deploy the troops to best effect.

c. Knowledge skills - being able to state characteristics of own and enemy weapons being able to state doctrine, both own and that of the enemy.

Students are quick to pick up this emphasis.

The Learning Environment

The structure of the commissioning course emphasises the teaching of skills necessary to produce an infantry platoon commander. In less than 46 weeks a young adult is assessed as having sufficient knowledge and skills to lead a platoon. The rationale for this emphasis is lost in the shrouds of antiquity. It is suggested that the rationale is not applicable today. There is no doubting that platoon commander skills are important. They provide a uniform and universal starting point in the career paths of officers. What is questioned is that as a result of this rationale, officer cadets are being prepared for today's Army: an Army in which the need for martial skills is equally complemented by the need for communication skills.

In 46 weeks of training, officer cadets quickly analyse course content and set priorities. Even though communication skills are essential to leadership, and they are weighted as being of equal importance to tactical knowledge, officer cadets quickly rank communication skills as a lower priority. The course structure acts as a mirror for the officer cadet deductions. It is impossible to learn the skills of expository writing if a negligible amount of course time is devoted to it. If less than 12 periods are spent on writing a service paper then there is no way in which the skills necessary to produce a paper can be taught.

In learning the skills of expository writing the learner needs an environment conducive to excellence.[6] Motivation, example and relevance, are elements in such a learning environment. It takes time to ensure that the learners have the skills of expository writing. It is easy to assess personal soldier skills, but it is not easy to assess logical thinking.

Also, in the learning system there are demotivating factors. There is the image of the 'paper war', the form filling, the use of incomprehensible jargon.

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[6]See N. Station, The Business Of Communicating, Pan Books London 1982. p 17.

The Graduates

Barriers based on early perceptions remain once officers are commissioned. The young officer is ready to scale the highest mountain. He is fired up to command and control his troops. The young officer had never imagined being posted on graduation as assistant adjutant or surplus to establishment. The great expectations are dimmed.

Also there is a change in the Army's perception. A young officer is expected to show and develop his leadership skills. Mistakes are part of the expectation. He is given command of a platoon of recruit soldiers to 'practise' his leadership and man management.

A more dramatic change in emphasis is in the organization's perception of the writing skills of young officers. By virtue of the fact that they have graduated, they are assumed to be able to write. Immediately, they are given tasks requiring them to exercise their knowledge of written skills. A poor standard of written work is quickly noted by commanding officers. The conclusion leaped to is that young officers have poor writing skills, therefore they need training in writing skills. This conclusion is incorrect because perceptions about the message, the ability to write, are different to both the sender and the receiver. These perceptions cover what has been taught, what has been learnt and the relative importance placed on these processes by both parties.[7]

THE COMMUNICATION ENVIRONMENT

Researchers[8] trying to establish the attributes of excellent companies have stated that innovative and excellent companies have eight[9] distinctive attributes. Also stated is that "The excellent companies live their commitment to

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[7]See P.R. Timm, Managerial Communication: A Finger on the Pulse, Prentice Hall Inc, Englewood Cliffs NJ, 1980. p 64.

[8]T.J. Peters and R.H. Waterman Jr, In Search Of Excellence, Harper and Row, Sydney 1984.

[9]Peters and Waterman for details : the main headings are:

a. A bias for action.
b. Close to the customer.
c. Autonomy and entrepreneurship.
d. Productivity through people.
e. Hands on, value driven.
f. Stick to knitting.
g. Simple form, lean staff.
h. Simultaneous loose tight properties.

people ..."[10] The Army is an organization dedicated to people and the training of people. An individual can spend a whole career dedicated to learning. As a 'company', it can be argued that the Army is not achieving excellence in the training of officers in writing skills.

The communication environment is not defined or understood. There is a lack of a philosophical statement of why, how, or when an officer learns the skills of 'writing effectively'. Training doctrine as 'stated in the systems approach to training calls for analysis of needs and skills. From this analysis training programmes are developed. Without the analysis the systems doctrine is useless. An officer should not be criticised for the lack of writing skills required in a particular appointment if the skill requirements are not stated.

The lack of job specifications about writing skills creates uncertainty. It spills over into the organizational environment relating to communication. People are not motivated to prepare themselves or better themselves if there is no understanding of the communication objectives and the communication environment. "What we have to communicate is information within a climate of understanding. The second determines the comprehension of the first."[11]

If an individual knows the organization goals and environment, it is more likely that the individual will be well motivated. The better motivated a person is, the more effective that person is likely to be.

> "...good motivation, well communicated, builds efficiency. It instils pride, purpose and understanding in work. It lays the foundation for people to work together under the demands of situations. It invites the intelligent use of all human resources in the enterprise, and recognises that the prime asset in any organization is the goodwill of the people it is dealing with, both inside and out."[12]

The Army, without a philosophical statement about communication objectives and the communication environment has created an unnecessary communication barrier.

The Learning Environment of a Young Officer

The newly commissioned officer progresses from being a recipient of administrative endeavours to being the administrator. He will be required to deal with forms and paper that he is only vaguely familiar with. At the same time he

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[10] Peters and Waterman op cit p 16.

[11] J. Hargreaves, Good Communications: What every manager should need to know, Associated Business Programmes, London 1977. p 51.

[12] J. Hargreaves, op cit p 13.

is learning the skills required of him in his chosen Corps. He is practising his leadership skills and he is attempting to gain a greater knowledge of the military art. All the while he will be required to produce reports, letters and other written documents. He learns the writing skills required as on the job training.

The writing skills are learnt in many ways:

a. following the examples that are kept on file,

b. rewriting documents because of errors found by superior officers,

c. using examples gained at officer cadet schools, and

d. being guided and coached by a sympathetic superior officer.

There is some doubt as to the value of writing skills learnt through on the job training. Lamphear writes "Most on the job writing is mediocre in quality, much of it is poor."[13] He goes on to say that an estimated 40 billion documents are produced by on the job training in the United States each year. He says that an estimated 30% of the total "has to be rewritten to correct errors, omissions or misunderstanding."[14]

The nature of the on the job training for writing skills can be best described as ad hoc. Each officer will receive unique training. The content of the training may range from nothing but negative feedback to considered positive coaching. However, the characteristic of the overall learning of writing skills would be that of confusion.

Summary

There is no statement defining the writing skills to be learnt. The young officers have no goals to aim for in relation to learning writing skills. The training they receive is on the job training of an ad hoc nature. They are often confused and dissatisfied. They are not motivated to learn writing skills. All of these factors are barriers to the effective learning of writing skills.

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[13] L. Lamphear, Shortcuts To Effective On-The-Job Writing, Prentice Cliffs NJ, 1982. p IX.

[14] L. Lamphear, op cit p X.

FORMAL EVALUATION OF WRITING SKILLS

An officer's ability to be an effective communicator in the written form is apparently assessed by an ability to write a paper - be it either a service paper or an essay. Assessment is the formal marking of a paper which was written as a requirement for a course. If an officer fails to produce a satisfactory paper he may well fail the particular course.

The Pattern

Some time prior to the commencement of the course the student officer will receive details of the topic on which to prepare his paper. He is expected to hand in his completed paper on the morning of day one of the course. It will be assessed over the period of the course. He will receive little if any formal instruction during the course about how to write a paper. His assessed paper is returned to him. He will only receive written criticism of his paper and a mark.

Another pattern also emerges. Most courses are weighted towards the learning of skills other than writing. The test of the officer's ability to write is completed before the course starts. In the main, course content will emphasise tactical knowledge, decision making (a leadership skill) and a knowledge of logistics. Students have to produce written documents but, more as a tool to demonstrate other knowledge, rather than to demonstrate writing skills. The following quotation from Lamphear sums up the assessment of writing skills during a course. "Frequently, what passes as criticism of writing boils down to disagreements over the format to be used, or whether certain information should be revealed, or some other non writing concern."[15]

This example is typical of officer training. The officer is expected to be able to write. It should be remembered that the only formal instruction the officer has had on writing papers is as an officer cadet.

The student officer is supposed to produce a paper that is his own work. However, to enhance the likelihood of success the officer will have the paper critiqued by other officers of whom he has a high opinion. Often the papers are rewritten, sometimes totally, as a result of "advice" received. It could be argued that the final edition of the paper is an amalgam of the skills and thoughts of several writers. As a learning sequence this is not particularly effective.

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[15] L. Lamphear, op cit p 3.

The Stress Factor

The evaluation aspect of paper writing creates an artificial stress component. The officer must produce a satisfactory paper. The stress imposed is similar to that experienced in examination situations. Writing skills are degraded as a result of the stress.

The stress imposed, while difficult to define, is real. There is a range of factors. The range covers stress imposed by the demand of preparing the paper prior to the course. If the officer is in a high pressure job then there may be no work time available for research and preparation. At the other extreme is the stress of being seen to be a failure in the eyes of peers. The successful are promoted, the failures are not. There are implications for future courses and promotion. The implications may not be factually correct but because they are seen to be real they are real. People see being course qualified as a great stepping stone. It is held that the producing of a paper for evaluation is in itself a barrier to effective writing skills. The stress imposed is complex and real.

An officers writing skills are also assessed and commented upon by his commander annually. This is a different assessment because he is not being formally assessed against his peers. As there are few, if any, job specifications detailing writing skills then the annual assessment can be very subjective. Concepts of what constitutes brevity, clarity, accuracy and relevance differ from commander to commander.

Of all the barriers created, the formal assessment of writing skills is the most ridiculous. Why assess an officer's skills as a researcher and as an expository writer when he has not been taught them?

The formal assessment system epitomises the barriers to learning expository writing skills. To have one's great expectations of being 'General' crushed because of inadequate writing skills is not part of the wildest dream of any potential officer. To have one's promotion held up because of inadequate writing skills is an indictment on a system that assesses skills but does not teach them. To continue to demand long papers because of some rationale that seems to stem from 'What was good for me when I was a young officer, must be good now' suggests that the whole system of which writing skills are necessary needs to be revised.

SO WHAT?

It is easy to be critical. To be constructive is difficult. It is easy to demand a high standard of expository writing skills. It is difficult to show the relevance that the skills of the expository style have to other subject areas.

> "Although it may seem a gigantic philosophical leap from 'employing military force' to write an effective paragraph'

history illustrates the opposite."[16]

The great expectation of generations of future officers can be met if the communication barriers of today are destroyed. Let the recruiting propaganda be changed to highlight the need for excellence in writing skills in a peace-time Army. Let the training schedule be revised so that expository writing skills can be taught. Let there be recognition of the fact that the mental skills of expository writing - logical thinking, concise description, definition of solutions, explanation of best course -are universal skills. Let formal assessment be replaced by a communication philosophy that is positive in nature. Finally let excellence in writing skills be achieved through positive motivation.

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VALUES

When officers become uncertain about their values, confused about their purpose and lead in ways scarcely sanctioned by their traditions then soldiers, units and the country are poorly served.

General William R. Richardson, US Army
Kermit Roosevelt Lecture 1984

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[16]A.H. Staley, p 76.

HUMOUR IN MEDAL COLLECTING

BY

WARRANT OFFICER CLASS ONE H.E. CHAMBERLAIN, RNZE

WO1 Chamberlain joined the NZ Army in 1961. He has served with most RNZE units and as a recruiter. From 1963 to 1966 he served with 2 NZ Regt, 1 NZ Regt and 1 RNZIR on active service. As an engineer he has seen service throughout the Pacific and in Indonesia. He is currently the SSM of SME and has contributed to the journal previously.

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The business of collecting medals is a serious pursuit attended by much research and a need to concentrate on the subject being researched. Unfortunately many collectors tend to forget the 'other' side of a man's service which, in many a campaign, has kept him going in adverse conditions - his humour!

I am sure that there are many who recall the story (true or false I know not) of the occasion when General De Gaulle pinned an award on the chest of a buxom young miss only to embarrass her by puncturing her bra and leaving her somewhat lopsided. To match this would be hard to imagine; however, some of my forays into the basement of Army archives have led me to a number of short but humourous letters regarding the issue and replacement of medals. The following are a selection of these treasures:-

Wellington
March 1953

Dear Sir,

I served in the Wavell Campaign, Grease and Crate and every Desert Campiagn that the NZ Forces took part in, including being a P.O.W. for six weeks. The only time I was a base walloper was when they sent us back on survivor's leave after Prison Camp for a period of three months. When I rejoined my unit and spent nearly a year in action without any leave until we sailed for NZ in 6-6-45.

If I am not eligible for the 8 Army clasp please tell me who the hell is.

Hamilton
April 1947

Dear Sir,

As this is the first intimation I have ever had as having been mentioned in despatches and being curious for further information, I would be grateful if you would inform me why I was mentioned in despatches.

Another old soldier wrote to Defence Headquarters and proudly announced his forthcoming 80th birthday and enclosed a photograph to show that he was still fit and well. However he had announced that his medal ribbons 'was a bit wore out but not me'. One can see the spirit of the soldier still within that man.

A further letter about the same time was sent requesting that an old digger's medals which had been lost be replaced. He was requested to fill in a statutory declaration giving the circumstances of the loss. He in reply wrote 'I have 22 grandchildren. - What do you think?'. That explanation was enough to see his medals replaced.

The New Zealand Wars medal was only awarded to those who could prove that they had actually been under fire. In response to one application the certificate by the applicant's OC stated;

> 'I cannot certify this. Mr Gray never saw a shot fired under my command - except that it be granted that he was under fire when in command of a redoubt he opened fire on a scouting party of our own men for which I believe he claims it'.
>
> This claim was made in August 1871 and was not accepted.

Another soldier applying for his service medals and a copy of his service record after the first World War identified himself as a 'Private, New Zealand Medical Corpse'. I wonder if his request was considered timely and if he received his medals in the 'end'.

One wife responding to a further query from Defence Headquarters requesting details of her husband's service and in particular his regimental number wrote back stating 'that he could not remember. When he was discharged from the army he handed everthing back'.

An angry woman writing shortly after the end of World War One sent the following letter:

> Dunedin
> September 1921
>
> The Officer in Charge
>
> Dear Sir,
>
> In reference to the medals due to my late husband Pte Thomas.....I have been making inquiries "Why" they should be given to his mother, and not his widow and children. Why have I received all other things belonging to him, even his false teeth which are no good to me as I have my own. "They" should have been sent to his mother as she is years older than me and has got no teeth to speak of.
>
> I have been to see two members of Parliament to see if they can give me any information.
>
> I remain yours faithfully,
>
> Mrs . . . . . .

Finally, ten years after the return of a soldier from the U.K. in 1919, the following letter was received at Defence Headquarters.

August 1929

To Minister Defence
Wellington

Dear Sir,

I am writing to see about getting my two middlers which i think i am entite to the General Services and the victory Middler. I left New Zealand in 1916 and did not come back till 1919. My number is XXXX. I was goning to write before them but kept putting it off. hoping you will do your best in getting my middlers for me.

Yours faithfully

These examples just go to show that some soldierly spirits obviously live on long after a soldier leaves the colours.

A NEED FOR A NEW ZEALAND DOCTRINE?

BY

MAJOR A.P. RENTON-GREEN, RNZIR

'Some people hold a wrong view ... They say that it is merely enough to study the law or war in general ... that it is enough merely to follow the military manuals ... They do not see that these manuals give merely laws of war in general and moreover are wholly copied from abroad, and that if we copy them exactly without the slightest change in form or content we shall be "cutting the feet to fit the shoes"'

Mao Tse-Tung[1]

Major Renton-Green served with the British Army 1961-63 and 1968-74. He was commissioned in 1968. In 1976 after emigrating to NZ, he joined the TF and served on HQ LSG. In 1981 he transferred to the RF. He has held a number of Intelligence Staff appointments both in NZ and Australia and has been the Chief Instructor of the NZ Army Intelligence Centre. He is currently a Grade 2 Staff Officer in Defence Headquarters.

INTRODUCTION

The formation of the Ready Reaction Force (RRF), the Integrated Expansion Force (IEF), and the Force Maintenance Group (FMG) has served to rekindle the continuing debate within the New Zealand Army on the need to develop a New Zealand doctrine. This debate is not new. It has continued at differing intensities since the announcement by President Nixon of the Guam Doctrine which urged the Pacific regional states to contribute more to their own

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[1]Mao Tse-Tung. 'Strategy in China's Revolutionary War' Vol 1. Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1960 p 180.

security. The 1983 Defence Review raised the level of this doctrinal debate once again by stressing the need for a more self-reliant capability for the New Zealand Army. The continuing reliance on the doctrine outlined in the Australian Manual of Land Warfare series of training publications has been the catalyst for much of this debate.

Historically there has been no compelling need for the New Zealand Army to develop a doctrine to cover operations, training, and logistics as the Army has rarely been committed to independent operations. Combat and logistic support operations have often been provided wholly or in part by the allied force of which the New Zealand Army has formed a part. A significant number of New Zealand Army personnel at all levels have undergone training with the Australian Army based on the MLW doctrine. In this context the New Zealand Army appears to have been content to operate and train under doctrine developed in the main by the Australians, with some British and US influence.

The aim of this essay is to examine the relevance of Australian doctrine outlined in the MLW series to the RRF, IEF and FMG.

INFLUENCES ON DOCTRINE

> Doctrine; 'Fundamental principles by which military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application'.
>
> JSP(AS) 1 (A).[2]

While doctrine is a product of national objectives set by Governments, the national objectives of New Zealand and those of allies supported in the past have broadly coincided. The deterrence of military adventurism and the continuing peace in the south-west Pacific and Antarctica remain coincident objectives of New Zealand and Australia.

The two nations regard Australasia as a single strategic entity, the security of which is fundamental to the wellbeing of both.[3] This means that any direct regional military threat to New Zealand or Australia would not pass unchallenged by either nation. One result of this combined security perception is the acceptance by New Zealand of a military doctrine developed mainly in Australia for the purposes of combined deterrence and preservation of regional

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[2] JSP(AS) 1 (A). Joint Operations. Doctrine. Edition 2. June 1979.

[3] Thakur. Ramesh. 'In Defence of New Zealand; Foreign Policy Choices in the Nuclear Age'. New Zealand Institute of International Affairs. Phamphlet No 46, 1984 p 71.

security.[4] This recognises a need for both armies to be able to combine in the defence of the sovereignty of either nation, and is an essential element in achieving common national objectives. The current ANZUS differences do not alter this recognition.

There are matters over which the two nations differ. In addition to having different national objectives to support outside the Pacific Basin the New Zealand and Australian Armies have very different force structures. The principal function of the Australian Army for example is the defence of Australia, a role requiring a conventional warfare doctrine and capability and this has not been changed by the latest review of Australia's defence needs, "The Dibb Report". The role of the New Zealand Army is the defence of New Zealand and territories and the provision of assistance to Pacific states. This requires a somewhat different capability and structure.

> Australia is more intimately linked with the US military than is New Zealand; and New Zealand has much closer ties with Australia than the US ... Geographical and resource differences between Australia and New Zealand mean that the ordering of defence priorities for the two countries is not identical but complementary'.
>
> Ramesh Thakur[5]

The importance of the 1951 ANZUS Treaty is also a significant difference in strategic perception between the Governments of New Zealand and Australia. It is not within the scope of this essay to discuss the merits or otherwise of the present ANZUS argument but the impasse has already had, and will continue to have, doctrinal and training implications for the New Zealand Army.

A downturn or curtailment in activity has already occurred in areas such as intelligence sharing and exchange, combined ANZUS exercises, the exchange of technological information and equipment acquisition. This downturn includes the exclusion from US training establishments of New Zealand Army personnel, which if extended to Australian military training and educational institutions in the future, will inhibit the ability of the New Zealand Army in maintaining currency in allied doctrinal developments.

Historic ties between the New Zealand and Australian Armies, the commonality of doctrine, training, equipment and operating procedures have

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[4]Manual of Land Warfare. Pamphlet No 1. The Fundamentals of Land Operations, (Provisional) 1977 Chapter 4. Section 14, para 403.

[5]Thakur. Ramesh. op cit p 71.

proved of significant advantage to New Zealand. The facility to train as part of a combined force formation in a conventional war setting, based on the common MLW doctrine, has relevance to the roles and tasks of the RRF, IEF and FMG. This facility also enables commanders and staffs to 'slot in' to an allied formation in support of New Zealand's wider national objectives.

1983 Defence Review

The roles and tasks of the New Zealand Army were set out in broad terms in the 1983 Defence Review.[6] The New Zealand Army Reorganisation Instruction that followed detailed these roles and tasks more precisely.[7] The multiplicity of these roles and tasks can be summarised as: 'maintaining operationally ready, self-sufficient forces; provide a wider based responsive capability; to maintain a structure to support these forces'. It was clear from these broad requirements that a simple force could not fulfill all the roles and tasks and the formation of the RRF, IEF and FMG resulted.

> Postures which can deter one level of contingency will not necessarily deter another; and the forces necessary for one will not necessarily be of use in the event of another'. J.O. Langtry & Desmond J. Ball[8]

Since the publication of the 1983 Defence Review relations between New Zealand, traditional allies and Pacific neighbours have undergone significant changes. These changes mean that New Zealand cannot rely on these allies and neighbours for the same level of support as in the past but will have to become truly 'self reliant'. Commonality of equipment with the Australian Army for example has allowed the development of doctrine linked in part to the capability of that equipment. If the acquisition of the same equipment is denied to New Zealand alternative equipment may require the development of an alternative doctrine.

The geographic area in which the New Zealand Army has been tasked to operate stretches from the Equator to the Antarctic. The essentially maritime nature of this area poses doctrinal questions of intelligence, deployment, communications, equipment and resupply. The MLW doctrine covers some but not all of the considerations associated with operating in such an environment, yet presents a doctrinal base of trusted and tested principles from which to develop any necessary doctrine for RRF,IEF and FMG operations.

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[6]NZ Government. Defence Review 1983. Government Printer, Wellington, 1983.

[7]Army General Staff. Army-209/1/150/PD NZ Army Reorganization Instruction No 1. 14 December 1983.

[8]Langtry J.O. & Ball, Desmond J. Controlling Australia's Threatened Environment'. Strategic Studies Defence Centre, ANU, Canberra, 1979 p 20.

'As a principle, the value of taking a line that offers alternative goals is sheerest common sense ... but the art lies in adjusting yourself and your forces to the alternatives'
Basil Liddell-Hart[9]

The Ready Reaction Force (RRF)

What doctrinal considerations are raised by the formation of the RRF? The first is one of threat. Before the deployment of any force the commander must know what sort of enemy he is to face; this requires timely, accurate intelligence. In UN or Commonwealth peacekeeping operations the enemy could be anything from a unsophisticated, poorly armed factional militia to a large, well trained, led, and equipped professional army. In combined operations with the Australian Army on the Australian continent an enemy as depicted in the MLW, fighting up to a mid-intensity conventional war is possible.

For the RRF 'the enemy' in the area of prime strategic interest to New Zealand is of the greatest importance. In the region the RRF is likely to meet in the worst case an unsophisticated 'enemy' armed with small arms and light support weapons with the possibility of third country assistance. The prime role and tasks of the RRF in the region will most probably be counter insurgency, aid to the civil power, low intensity operations which are more 'policing' than purely 'military' in nature. These operations are a 'section commanders war' based on intensive intelligence gathering and analysis and swift aggressive action. In this context 'the enemy' of the MLW with its tank regiments, extensive artillery groups, naval and air support, is unrealistic not only in terms of what the RRF will meet operationally but also in terms of its capabilities. Current MLW doctrine reflects formation level conventional operations needed for the defence of Australia, its relevance to RRF operations in the Southwest Pacific is limited to broad principles.

Doctrine for the RRF must therefore reflect not only the capability of the Force in support of national objectives, but also the potential adversary. The development of a realistic training 'enemy' for the RRF, IEF and FMG is necessary. Such development may well give rise to questions of the RRF structure. Is there a viable organisation within the RRF structured to collect, and produce the detailed intelligence so vital to the success of low intensity operations? Is an artillery battery, a low level air defence troop, or an EW section appropriate for use against the likely 'enemy'? The type of operations for which the RRF was formed are manpower intensive. Would it not then be more appropriate to take non-infantry elements and cross train them for low-level operations in addition to their primary roles? The British for example have used other than infantry troops on peacekeeping task in Ulster since 1969.

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[9]Liddell-Hart, Basil. 'Thoughts on War'. Faber & Faber, London, 1943 p 224.

The MLW covering low-intensity operations is comprehensive but the doctrine reflects Australian national concerns and force structures. The relevance of the MLW doctrine to RRF operations is rather like the Curates Egg, 'good in parts'. As a prime doctrinal source the MLW is adequate, but development of doctrine for the RRF for intelligence, amphibious, parachute, airmobile, civil affairs, and very cold weather operations for example is necessary. A New Zealand supplement for each publication with the doctrine specific to these specialist operations, and including joint operations will ensure relevance to New Zealand national objectives and New Zealand Army capabilities.

The Integrated Expansion Force (IEF)

> '... but New Zealand's defence effort would be totally ineffective unless it were framed and integrated with Australia's'.
>
> Alan & Robin Burnett[10]

The brigade sized IEF comprised of regular, territorial, and reserve personnel is a far more familiar structure to the New Zealand Army than is the RRF. For at least the past ten years the brigade and division have been the organisations for which training and development has been directed. Frequently this training and development has been in a combined force setting within the ANZUS alliance. The New Zealand Army has therefore been directing doctrine and structures towards a capability to supplement an allied force at formation level. In this setting interoperability and commonality of doctrine with the Australian Army was necessary.

The IEF Interim Policy Statement emphasises the retention of a capability for the Force to integrate with another allied force for operations within the Southwest Pacific.[11] The current dispute within ANZUS makes any integration with an American formation extremely remote and therefore any integration will be with an Australian formation. In order that the IEF can integrate successfully with an Australian formation for combined operations the maintenance of the doctrine contained in the MLW is essential. The exposure of staffs to the command and staff skills in conventional war at formation level will also serve to maintain skills and professionalism within the New Zealand Army.

The other tasks set for the IEF however demand a strong capability to conduct independent low-intensity operations within the Southwest Pacific. The

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[10] Burnett, Alan & Robin. The Australia and New Zealand Nexus. Australian Institute of International Affairs, ANU, Canberra, 1978 p 273.

[11] Army General Staff. Army 7/1/PD 'The Integrated Expansion Force Interim Policy Statement. June 1985 para 7 (R).

development of doctrine in areas identified when examining the RRF apply equally to the IEF. Low intensity operations are essentially intelligence operations and manpower intensive. The nature of the 'enemy', the geographic size of the Southwest Pacific Basin, the deployment and operational considerations these factors raise may require a 'fine tuning' of the IEF structure. For example, the provision of intelligence staffs for liaison, civil affairs, counter intelligence and security duties on a larger scale than at present will prove necessary. As with the RRF, some units within the structure may be superfluous in terms of the threat and cross training for internal security operations will be appropriate. Helicopter support, ideally integral to the force, to provide the mobility and flexibility in deployment that these type of operations demand is another example of where doctrine development is needed and force structures may have to alter.

The key to the IEF is the mobilization and training of territorials and reserves. The development of a training doctrine for those essential non-regular components of the IEF designed to raise the combat and support readiness to higher levels, would shorten mobilization time which may well be too long at present.

Deployment considerations for the IEF are similar to those examined for the RRF. The greater size of the IEF will pose proportionately larger problems of initial deployment, re-supply, maintenance and reinforcement. To support IEF operations alone is probably beyond the capability of the RNZN and RNZAF. The employment of civilian resources, including manpower, will therefore be required if an independent operation is being conducted. The development of a joint doctrine to support both IEF and RRF operations is necessary and should include those necessary resources identified from within the civilian sector.

The Force Maintenance Group (FMG)

The FMG Interim Policy Statement describes the role of the FMG as: 'to provide third line logistic support for the RRF, and the IEF' and states 'the MLW series constitutes the New Zealand Army logistic doctrine'. Provision for the addition to or the deletion from the doctrine of the MLW for either RRF or IEF operations is also clearly stated.[12]

When examining the FMG a number of doctrine development matters coincide with those of the RRF and IEF. The level of 'enemy' and very cold weather operations being examples. A number of other doctrinal matters specific to the FMG also arise. The Policy Statement does give the impression that the FMG is also providing first and second line resources in addition to the stated role.[13] The Logistic Support Company integral to the RRF and the integral

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[12]Army General Staff. Army 3000/2/3/PD The Force Maintenance Group (FMG) Interim Policy Statement. Oct 85 paras 5 and 53.

[13]Ibid., para 15b.

logistic units of the IEF have first and second line resource functions. This apparent contradiction required clarification and development of logistic doctrine.

The MLW logistic doctrine of the 'traditional battlefield' of the division with its combat and communication zones is relevant to the FMG only in conventional operations. Relevance of this doctrine to the scenarios of an RRF or IEF deployment to a Pacific island or the Antarctic is doubtful. The MLW doctrine concentrates force in order to defeat an enemy. In the type of operations likely for the RRF and IEF the 'enemy' will probably operate in small widespread groups. The force deployed to contain or defeat that 'enemy' will itself have to be widespread and operate independently in relatively small groups, while maintaining a highly mobile reserve.

A doctrine to support these small unit operations will have to be developed for the FMG. The MLW offers the FMG a doctrinal base from which to build a satisfactory logistic doctrine to support these RRF and IEF operations.

Wherever the RRF and IEF deploy it will be with RNZN and RNZAF support. There is a need therefore to develop a joint logistic doctrine as this support will be required for deployment, re-supply, maintenance and reinforcement. Climatic considerations within the region makes the development of a logistic doctrine covering tropical and very cold weather operations necessary. This may necessitate structural changes for the FMG; for example the type and quantity of medical, transport, catering, engineering and ordnance support needed in these diverse climatic conditions.

CONCLUSIONS

> 'They fail to see that while experience should be studied, it should not be copied and applied mechanically, because the circumstances of our present war are different. We should take only what still applies today, and work out something of our own in the light of present conditions'
>
> Mao Tse-Tung[14]

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[14]Mao Tse-Tung. 'Strategy in China's Revolutionary War'. p 180.

As a set of tested principles for formation operations the MLW doctrine forms a good basis from which to develop any necessary doctrine for the RRF, IEF and FMG. However, a clear statement of present national objectives for the Army to support is necessary before the meaningful development of a New Zealand doctrine can take place.

Successive Governments both sides of the Tasman have recognised that New Zealand and Australia form a single strategic entity, the defence of which is of prime importance to both. The capability of the New Zealand Army to act in defence of this entity together with the Australian Army is necessary. The doctrine outlined in the MLW is relevant to the maintenance of this capability, particularly for the IEF and the FMG.

Other roles and tasks of the New Zealand Army make the development of doctrine necessary, particularly for the RRF. Factors supporting this need are the size of the RRF, IEF and FMG and the command level at which the MLW aimed. For the RRF doctrine development should be concentrated on company and battalion size structures operating independently in a maritime environment, including tropical and Antarctic conditions. The emphasis of this development should be on low-intensity, aid to the civil power and peacekeeping operations and include the development of a realistic 'enemy'.

The basics of specialist doctrine for intelligence, amphibious, parachute, very cold weather and airmobile operations are contained in the MLW. Development of doctrine in these specialities is required to take account of new New Zealand Army objectives, capabilities, and Force structures.

The development of a joint doctrine for the RRF, IEF and FMG can be considered as being outside the aim of this essay. However the Army requires RNZN and RNZAF support in order to conduct operations outside New Zealand covering long distances prior to deployment. The development must include deployment, reinforcement, combat support and re-supply, and identified civilian resources.

DOCTRINE

"Doctrine is what 51% of commanders in the Army think will work most of the time"

General Creighton W. Abrams

THE ARMY AS A SOLUTION TO SOCIETY'S PROBLEMS

BY

MAJOR A.J. MORRIS, B ED, DIP TCHG, RNZAEC

Major Morris joined the Regular Force in 1981. A former teacher, he held appointments at Regular Force Cadet School and Officer Cadet School before taking up his present position as Education Officer, Force Maintenance Group.

'The Defence Question', the discussion paper that preceded the Corner Committee's findings, raised the issue of Defence Forces being involved in community service. The Committee of Inquiry on Defence heard many submissions that indicated public support for some form of military training for young people. The question is - 'to what extent can the Army be expected to accept any additional commitment?' Servicemen in Force Maintenance Group were asked to express their opinion on this issue.

THE NATION EXPECTS

The Army's Role

The Army has to be careful when accepting an additional task such as community service because involvement in this area may lead to a confusion of roles. The Army's role must be military. If Government wants the Army to do other tasks such as the socialisation of the nation's young people then this could mean a radical change in doctrine.

By expecting the Army to provide 'discipline', society is copping out. There appears to be a confusion of image - society has an expectation that the Army can beat some sense into young people, whereas the Army depends on recruiting a proportion of self disciplined, highly motivated young New Zealanders. Consequently, to change to this new socialisation task there would have to be an alteration to the perceived role of the Army. It is generally held that if Army were to run community service schemes then what is productive for society must only be a 'spin off' from the Army's primary task.

Society's Problem

The problems with the present Limited Service Volunteer (LSV) Scheme, could very well stem from this confusion of roles. LSVs and soldiers have trouble resolving the non-military nature of the scheme. The trouble also stems from society's expectation of young people. A job, or getting a job, is a form of initiation in our culture. It is the step between child and adult. When a person does not have a job others look down at him as if he were still a child. Some of this carries over into the LSV Scheme. LSVs do not carry weapons - this does little to enhance LSV self image, they are seen by soldiers to be still children and they feel themselves being still treated as children. Even though LSVs have been brought into the Army they are still not initiated into the world of adults.

The Army may be making a dangerous compromise by training people in a semi-military fashion. In the past, 18 years olds have been treated as adults and used by the military.

At the moment the Army and society in general might be seen to be short changing these people. Jobs have to be available in the first instance if training schemes are to be relevant, but most of all society needs to address the whole problem of what the initiation from child to adult should be.

Soldiers feel that they should make a contribution to the problems which confront society. They know that they are good at providing training in self reliance, self discipline and co-operative organisation. If they have to do this type of work then soldiers do not want to do this at the expense of their primary role and they would never wish to do the task in a less than professional fashion.

THE PRESENT SOLUTION TO COMMUNITY SERVICE - THE LSV SCHEME

Problem Areas

Some servicemen see the LSV Scheme as a disproportionate drain on resources. They find the shortcomings of the scheme easy to list. Ad hoc staffing, poor medical and motivational vetting of LSVs, problems with job training, no compulsion to remain on the scheme as well as shortages of accommodation and facilities all tend to be quickly quoted as problems with the present scheme.

Benefits of the Scheme

Despite the problem areas outlined above there a number of servicemen who recognise benefits with the LSV Scheme. These people are principally those

who have worked closely with the young people and seen them develop during their time with the Army.

Staff have been impressed with the loyalty and teamwork intakes have developed. The LSVs increased personal confidence and knowledge of themselves have all been positive benefits. The fact that individuals have had the opportunity to plan their lives a little more and set personal goals is seen as a positive outcome of the course.

The Labour Department, who sponsor the scheme, have been pleased with the result. 58% of trainees from LSV courses in 1985 are known to have been placed in permanent employment or further training schemes.[1] In the Department's view results show that the Armed Services are an effective trainer of young unemployed people. The Army caters well for the needs of the targeted group with a wide variety of suitable work based training options and flexible selection criteria. Given the Department's interest in maximising training opportunities for young people under the Training Assistance Programme and the Armed Services proven ability to provide quality training the Army is likely to be asked to continue LSV courses.

COMMUNITY SERVICE OPTIONS FOR THE ARMY

Community service has wide ranging implications. What is it that society wants the Army to do? Do New Zealanders want the Army to run a 'street kid' programme, assume the reform of minor offenders, take a wider civil defence role, undertake tasks for Local Authorities, conduct National Service, or extend the current LSV Scheme?

Servicemen in Linton Camp contended that the Army could continue to provide the LSV Scheme, given certain refinements and dedication of resources. The other proposals were perhaps too far removed from the Army's primary role. This is not to suggest there would be no value in investigating some of the other suggestions. However, the most realistic option appears to be to improve on the LSV Scheme. By paying attention to problem areas such as: the need to create more awareness amongst prospective LSVs to work on their physical fitness prior to joining the scheme; improved vetting and selection by Labour Department Staff and Army Recruiters; some sort of compulsion built into the first part of the scheme to avoid early drop outs; and an improved attitude from senior levels that would give those who are tasked to run the scheme the feeling that there was a high priority attached to what they were doing; the Army could make a contribution to the problems faced in the community.

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[1]Margaret Richards Labour Department Report on 1985 LSV Training Schemes.

What form should this Voluntary Military Service take?

It is thought that the present LSV Scheme, with an extended basic that resembled more closely the training that a TF soldier undertakes, may be the solution. The move toward TF training has to be balanced against the very valuable and necessary parts of the present LSV training. A syllabus would need to be closely reviewed however the combination of more soldier related training and job skills training might better meet the LSVs needs and better fulfill the Armys requirements.



BASIC TRAINING SEES LSVS DOING ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE OF NORMAL EVERYDAY LIVING. HERE THEY DEVELOP TEAM WORK SKILLS DURING A PHYSICAL TRAINING SESSION WITH LOGS.

Suggested Objectives for the Proposed Military Service

There seems to be little problem with the objectives presently met by the LSV Scheme. However if there was to be more military training, weapon training would have to be introduced as an objective and this would increase the present period of basic training.

Other suggested objectives would include a defensive driving module and practical driving when LSVs work in units. It was also thought that first aid

training such as cardio pulmonary resuscitation would be desirable. Staff conducting the FMG LSV Scheme during 1986 report that a public speaking module run by the local Toastmasters was a great success. Adventure training activities such as rappelling and river rafting had spin offs in confidence building and camaraderie. A community based project such as track improvement in a National Park would be beneficial to both LSVs and the Army and could be included as an objective.

Broad Costs and Benefits to the Army of the Proposed Scheme

The cost of this scheme is manning. The classrooms, training facilities and accommodation are already in place. For LSV training outside what the Army can provide, the Labour Department will foot the cost.

The benefits for the Army in the professional conduct of community service schemes are immense. It is clear that society has an expectation of the Army to do this work. If the training and job skills involved work for outside agencies the scheme would be more visible. If training involved civil defence skills then this would tend to appease those in the community who view the Army as an anachronism.

Perhaps the most important benefit for the Army is that schemes such as the LSV programme allow good junior leaders to practise and develop their leadership. This type of work is what a corporal who is interested in people would really like to get his teeth into. The task would not suit the tradesman type soldier but would suit the soldier who gains satisfaction in training others, an opportunity that not all soldiers get. The important consideration is that their efforts are fully supported by the rest of the Army.

The training of young New Zealanders in any Limited Service Volunteer Scheme has to be conducted professionally. If this is done then the Army may have a small contribution to make toward solving society's problems.

QUOTABLE QUOTES

> That war is an evil is something that we all know, and it would be pointless to go on cataloguing all the disadvantages involved in it. No one is forced into war by ignorance, nor, if he thinks he will gain from it, is he kept out of it by fear. The fact is that one side thinks that the profits to be won outweigh the risks to be incurred, and the other side is ready to face danger rather than accept an immediate loss.
>
> Thucydides
> 471-400 BC

THE OPERATIONAL EDGE

BY

MAJOR J.S. HEARD, RNZA

Major Heard graduated from OCS Portsea in 1970. He served with 161 Bty RNZA and NZATTV in South Vietnam and has held a number of other artillery appointments including Battery Commander of 161 Bty and Chief Instructor of the School of Artillery. He is a graduate of the Royal School of Artillery Officers' Long Gunnery Course and the Australian Command and Staff College. Major Heard is currently SO2 Ops (Plans) at HQ LF Comd.

'Unity of Command - The most important principle at all levels is that a single commander must have both the requisite authority and responsibility for achieving the mission.'

JSP(AS) 1(A), paragraph 722.a.

INTRODUCTION

Since 1972 difficulties have been evident in the conduct of combined arms teams training and in developing effective administrative support arrangements for any such team. Successive Defence Reviews have left the Regular Army with units which must develop and practise capabilities divided by command, formation and geography.

Consideration of the task of developing and maintaining the Army's operational capabilities begs the question of what capabilities are needed? For the basis of the broad roles and structure of the Ready Reaction Force (RRF) and Integrated Expansion Force (IEF) discussion will be accepted. Nonetheless, in order to put the task of operational training in perspective operational requirements will be discussed. As most of the difficulties encountered arranging

operational training arise from Army structure and geographic location these aspects will be considered. Lastly, the feasibility of change will be discussed.

AIM

The aim of this paper is to consider the New Zealand Army structural arrangements for the conduct of operational training.

OPERATIONAL TRAINING

The Operational Requirement

Four general categories of threat are postulated:

a. Natural Disaster.

b. Threat to New Zealand Nationals Resident Overseas.

c. General Public Disorder.

d. Regional Armed Conflict.

Natural Disaster. By its very nature, disaster relief requires the rapid provision of a force with the capacity to, inter alia, provide potable water, move supplies and evacuees, accommodate and feed evacuees, provide or supplement communication systems and provide medical treatment. Whether all of these (or additional) capabilities are needed will be determined by the particular situation. However, while elements of the RRF could be involved in disaster relief, IEF and FMG elements are equally likely to be needed. The requirement is for trained groups operating within speciality areas or as unskilled labour. Such groups should be capable of deploying by RNZAF within New Zealand or within our area of interest.

Threat to New Zealand Nationals Overseas. The envisaged threat is limited in nature, duration and intensity. Put simply, it is foreseen that it may become necessary to evacuate New Zealand nationals from another country in a situation of prevailing civil/political disorder. In this scenario a rapid but limited duration response is needed. Such an operation would inevitably be a joint operation. Special action forces, infantry and possibly even light armour may be appropriate forces. However, once again there is little perceived need for extensive training. Joint contingency planning would, however, seem an appropriate precaution. The need for specific joint training could then be assessed.

General Public Disorder. Should a situation of general public disorder arise within a Southwest Pacific nation, to which New Zealand has constitutional defence obligations, New Zealand Defence Force assistance may be requested. It is also possible that New Zealand may be asked to contribute a peace-keeping force either by concerned regional powers, or by the United Nations. Within this general scenario the role, characteristics and size of the force will be determined by political negotiation and military advice. While a prompt response may be necessary, it is unlikely that an immediate or rapid response will be needed. Equally, while military organizations committed to peacekeeping must be well organized, disciplined and effectively administered they do not need combined arms operational skills.

Regional Armed Conflict. It is arguable that any armed conflict within New Zealand's area of interest would be of regional significance, given the area's peaceful history in the last forty years. Certainly there are facilities and localities within the Southwest Pacific which have a strategic significance beyond their present use and/or development. As World War Two history well illustrates, the conduct of sustained Southwest Pacific operations requires secure points of entry and secure advanced administrative facilities. Within the context of low level operations the RRF or IEF could also face the additional burden of securing vital elements of the civil infrastructure. For a pre-emptive committal and unopposed entry scenario the RRF concept does have some credibility as a deterrent force (presuming the political will needed for a pre-emptive committal exists). However, it is considered that the RRF orbat does not contain the combat power or administrative capacity needed to simultaneously secure vital military infrastructure elements and to conduct active operations. Within an Australian context the operational committal of some or all of the RRF would demonstrate political support; but it would have negligible operational significance. Therefore for either a Southwest Pacific or Australian scenario, the IEF comprises the pool of deployable Army resources. A sizeable contribution would similarly be needed from the RNZAF and/or RNZN. However, political guidance and/or positive political acceptance of scenario driven country studies are needed to more closely define required capabilities and response times. Nonetheless, it is only in a situation of regional conflict that a high level of operational military skills will be required. Such military skills include not only direct combat skills but also include joint operational and administrative skills.

Conclusions

a. The IEF should become the primary focus for force structure assessment and the regular exercising of operational capabilities.

b. The RRF has little relevance to regional conflict other than as an IEF lead element.

c. There is no perceived requirement for a balanced grouping of combat arms and support units based on an infantry battalion other than as part of the IEF.

d. There is a need for a rapid response capability at unit or sub-unit level across several capabilities. These capabilities include special action forces, infantry, engineers, communications, transport and medical.

e. Joint contingency planning must be completed in order to determine required capabilities and response times.

Collective Training Requirement

Most foreseen threat situations require a response by trained units or sub-units. This training requirement can be met within present structural and geographic arrangements. However, for an appropriate response to regional armed conflict or threat to New Zealand nationals overseas, a practised coherent grouping of units is required. Such a grouping will almost inevitably include units from the RNZAF and/or RNZN.

The difficulties experienced arranging and conducting RRF training well illustrates deficiencies in the current Army structure. This structure intertwines planning and day-to-day management responsibilities while also splitting resources on a basis other than operational functions. Priorities for RRF elements are often in conflict across the lines of command, and training is usually inhibited by the cost of inter-island movement. A considerable staff effort, and command support, is needed to co-ordinate the training activities of the Army to make combined arms and services training possible. Additionally, the training conducted has usually been focused on the infantry component of the team, rather than the team overall.

The recent emphasis on RRF training has been beneficial to the development and maintenance of combined arms skills at battalion group level. However as noted above, it is considered such skills form but a narrow portion of the spectrum of operational capabilities needed by the New Zealand Army. Emphasis should therefore be shifted to IEF and joint training. But our present Army structures have difficulty coordinating RRF training. The task of planning and coordinating relevant IEF and joint training is then likely to become a major distraction at command, Army and even Defence level.

Although given the responsibility for the conduct of collective training, Headquarters Land Force Command is hampered in its efforts to discharge this responsibility. Its inclusion in the line of command ensures that the Headquarter's primary focus is routine management. Exercise planning, other than in the scheduling of events, is either delegated or completed in haste. As specific contingency planning is not undertaken, exercise scenarios do not necessarily require perceived operational capabilities to be developed, exercised or evaluated. Further, joint training is usually an exercise by-product rather than an exercise design objective. Lastly, as exercise objectives are not deliberately related to operational requirements exercise evaluations have little impact on force structure, operational capabilities, or operational procedures.

Conclusions

It is desirable to:

a. separate the responsibility for routine management from the responsibility for operational capability,

b. vest responsibility for combined arms and services training in a single organization and group units accordingly,

c. base functionally grouped organizations on the same island proximate to training areas, and

d. exercise the IEF using a two year activity cycle.

Geographic Location

The New Zealand Army has an extensive infrastructure and is geographically dispersed throughout New Zealand. The disposition and infrastructure, with its attendant manpower and operating costs, is the product of history and tradition rather than deliberate design. It results from a long defunct divisional structure and a thinly spread Territorial Force.

The Regular Army, within New Zealand, apart from 2/1 RNZIR, is located predominately in the North Island. This again is a reflection of historical factors. However, it also reflects two realities; New Zealand's population distribution and the availability of live-firing training areas. Within the South Island, Tekapo offers restricted live-firing opportunities to offensive air support, armour, artillery, mortars and medium/heavy anti-armour weapons. While - subject to seasonal restrictions - relatively large manoeuvre areas can be arranged, it is not possible to conduct a free flowing combined arms fire and movement exercise within the South Island. Set piece battles can be arranged within Tekapo but realism and training value are limited. Conversely, the Waiouru Training Area does allow battalion group and brigade level fire and movement exercises. However, within the Waiouru Training Area manoeuvre options are restricted by terrain. Nonetheless within the North Island access can be arranged to suitable manoeuvre areas for battalion group and brigade level training.

It is considered that North Island training areas best meet the needs of battalion group and brigade level training. However, this in itself does not justify the relocation of 2/1 RNZIR and in due course locating 1RNZIR within the North Island. Arguably the regular exercising of units or the critical interface elements of units may suffice. Such reasoning, however, ignores the difficulties which are already evident with present arrangements, unless:

a. 3rd Task Force were only to exercise local administrative command over the RRF and IEF elements resident in the South Island, and

b. the operational budget was to be increased to allow for more inter-island movement.

Neither of these courses seem viable long term options.

Maintenance of the status quo also perpetuates some less obvious problems. 3rd Task Force currently has difficulty administratively supporting 2/1 RNZIR and armoured training. A case can, and has been made for 3rd Task Force's administrative capacity to be expanded, at the expense of the IEF capability. However, relocation of 2/1 RNZIR and armour to the North Island would allow better utilization of IEF resources while facilitating operationally orientated training. A bonus would be that armoured corps training would then be more efficient and effective. Relocation of IEF/RRF elements would also allow some reduction in the Burnham Camp infrastructure. This would be most evident in the areas of workshops and supply. The most serious disadvantage however, is that the basing of RRF/IEF elements in the South Island seriously hampers the effective mobilization of the RRF or IEF. Prior to deployment, the RRF or IEF needs to train for operations and exercise together. While sufficient notice may be given to allow inter-island movement, dispersing the RRF/IEF over two islands in effect necessitates two mobilizations with attendant time penalties and administrative costs. The South Island contribution to the IEF/RRF should therefore be minimised. A further and significant factor is that finance has been programmed for the construction of new barrack and office accommodation in Burnham Camp. The construction of these facilities at Burnham will perpetuate the present unsatisfactory arrangements for another forty to fifty years.

Conclusions

a. The basing of IEF/RRF units in both the North and South Islands:

(1) inhibits the development of effective operational procedures and capabilities at RRF and IEF level,

(2) increases operating costs,

(3) increases the administrative costs of arranging and implementing exercises to practise operational capacilities;

(4) increases the base infrastructure and administrative support establishment.

b. The Regular Army IEF/RRF units located in the South Island should be relocated within the North Island;

c. 1 RNZIR should be located within the North Island on its eventual return to New Zealand;

d. The South Island Territorial Force component of the IEF should be minimized;

e. The establishment of Headquarters 3rd Task Force, Headquarters Burnham Camp and Canterbury based administrative units should be reviewed and reduced.

Army Structure

As detailed above, it is considered that the present Army structure does not adequately separate responsibility for routine management from the responsibility for operational capability. Neither does the present structure allow for the proper development of joint operational procedures and capabilities. Lastly, the present structural arrangements ensure that much routine administration is re-staffed at successive command levels thus wasting valuable staff resources and decreasing command responsiveness.

Within the Army structure, primary responsibility for the development of operational capability rests and must continue to rest with Army General Staff. Conditioned by political and Defence guidance, assessments of Army's operational capabilities and required force structure should be completed by Army General Staff. Contingency planning, albeit broad in nature, should also be undertaken. Army General Staff should advise on which joint operational capabilities should be practised and exercised, and direct which Army operational capabilities will be practised and exercised. Army General Staff must also determine priorities for overseas courses, exchanges, and exercises. The remaining functions of Army General Staff should be devolved to an administrative Headquarters.

It is believed that the present Task Force Headquarters more than adequately discharge regional, routine training, and administrative functions. However, no good reason can be seen which requires Task Forces to report other than to a single central administrative Headquarters in the area of individual training, it is considered that Army Training Group well meets the Army's needs. However, there is no perceived need for Headquarters Support Command in its present role. But, the removal of Headquarters Support Command would remove the command linkage between the Force Maintenance Group, Linton and Base Area, Wellington. These elements then, could and should be linked into a regional relationship (2nd Task Force?).

Consideration of threats indicated that in most situations the operational requirement was for formed and trained units/sub-units rather than all arms/services teams. The basic collective training role at task force level is then to train units in unit collective skills. 3rd Task Force should be assigned the training and reinforcement role in support of the IEF/RRF. 1st Task Force should be assigned the role of training IEF all arms/service teams in combined arms and services skills at unit level. 2nd Task Force (re-established) should be assigned the role of providing such trained third line units as may be required to support IEF/RRF or other joint operations. The Task Force Headquarters should not be assigned a deployable role. It is considered that tasking Headquarters 1st

Task Force or any other Task Force Headquaters with the role of being a deployable Army Headquarters (or Army component of a joint Headquarters) would create unnecessary command succession problems at a time of operational and administrative crisis (i.e. mobilization). Additionally, the Task Force Headquarters (and Headquarters 1st Task Force in particular) inevitably become entangled in the mobilization process.

As noted above, it is considered that Headquarters 2nd Task Force should be reformed. It is also considered that Army General Staff should shed its current responsibilities for routine management of the Army. Given the recent relocation of service corps directorates to Wellington and the need to maintain a close administrative relationship with Defence Headquarters the following is considered desirable:

a. Headquarters Support Command should be retitled Headquarters Static Command and relocated to Wellington,

b. Headquarters Static Command should be restructured to include service corps directors,

c. Headquarters Static Command should be tasked with the routine management of the New Zealand Army, and

d. Army General Staff's functions and staffing should be reviewed accordingly.

At command and task force level responsibility for operational capability is currently divided. No formed deployable Headquarters has been identified and present plans provide for the raising of ad hoc Headquarters. At the operational level there is a need for a formed Headquarters which will discharge several functions. While Army General Staff may develop broad contingency plans these need to be refined and evaluated; this will often require detailed joint planning and assessment. Operational procedures need to be developed, documented, evaluated and amended. Joint and large scale Army exercises need to be designed, controlled and assessed so as to practise and evaluate required operational capabilities. A planning Headquarters which contains the capability to deploy an operational command Headquarters or the Army component of a joint Headquarters would meet these requirements.

The task of operational level planning and exercising should remain with Headquarters Land Force Command. Its proximity to the other operational service Headquarters and facilities within the Auckland area offer significant planning and deployment advantages. However, Headquarters Land Force Command should:

a. shed its responsibilities for routine management;

b. be retitled Headquarters Land Operations and should be re-roled;

c. be given responsibility for formation level training, joint operations planning; and

d. should constitute the New Zealand Army's deployable command Headquarters (or the Army component of a joint force Headquarters).

Headquarters Land Operations should answer to Army General Staff and only exercise command of such units as may be assigned from time to time.

Feasibility

While the proposed re-alignment of structural responsibilities and re-roling of Headquarters are significant, it is believed that:

a. better focus and greater efficiencies will result, and

b. little, if any, additional accommodation should be required.

The relocation of 2/1 RNZIR and other Regular IEF/RRF elements to the North Island is seen as feasible. Linton has been identified as the training base for 1 RNZIR on its return to New Zealand. Financial estimates for the associated work have been prepared and some work has already been completed. Given the recently evidenced strong public support for 1 RNZIR's presence in Singapore, it seems unlikely that 1 RNZIR will be withdrawn to New Zealand in the near term. Some scope then exists for the transfer of programmed finance from Burnham to Linton and the early implementation of the 'Kupe' works plans. The move of other IEF/RRF elements mainly involve the armour. The armoured elements should return to Waiouru, from whence they came.

Consequent to a decision to relocate 2/1 RNZIR it will of course be necessary to identify another base location for 1 RNZIR and recommence works planning. However, it is thought the earlier co-location of the IEF outweighs these considerations. Additionally it is considered that locations such as Hobsonville, Hopu Hopu and Whangaparaoa are good alternatives to Linton and are capable of development in the mid term.

Summary of Conclusions

The principle of unity of command should be rigorously applied in reshaping the current Army structure so as to task specific commanders with responsibility for:

a. definition of operational capability requirements and force structure,

b. development and command of operational capabilities;

c. routine management within the Army; and

d. mobilization.

IEF Regular Army units and the RRF components of the IEF should all be located within the North Island.

The IEF should become the primary focus for the development of Army's operational capabilities. The ability of the IEF and IEF components to fulfil required operational capabilities should be regularly tested and evaluated.

Contingency planning should be undertaken in a joint environment. Identified joint operation capabilities must be regularly practised, tested and evaluated.

REFORM

Reorganisation is not reform. It can often be a facade to escape the harsh reality of reform.

Senator Gary Hart

A ROYAL AUSTRALIAN AIR FORCE C-130 HERCULES TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT PREPARES TO TAKE OFF FROM KAITAIA AIRFIELD DURING THE OPENING HOURS OF THE NEW ZEALAND ARMY'S EXERCISE HEREKINO SAFARI. IN THE FOREGROUND IS ONE OF THE TWO NEW ZEALAND ARMY SCORPION RECONNAISSANCE TANKS WHICH THE HERCULES HAD JUST TRANSPORTED UP FROM WAIOURU 800 KILOMETRES TO THE SOUTH.

PROPOSED ARMY STRUCTURE AND ROLES



PROPOSED ROLES

Serial	HQ	Roles
(a)	(b)	(c)
1	Army GS	- Organize and prepare the Army for operations. - Command deployed operational elements where so directed by CDS.
2	HQ Land Operations	- Deployable Army command HQ/ contribution to NZ joint force HQ. - Development and evaluation of operational contingency plans for land operations. - Development and evaluation of joint operational contingency plans in conjunction with RNZN, RNZAF and HQs/agencies. - Development and maintenance of Army and land operational procedures. - Development and conduct of major exercises.
3	HQ Static Command	- Exercise routine administrative command of the Army on behalf of CGS. - Support HQ Land Operations directed collective training activities. - Provide HQ Land Operations with trained units and sub-units for brigade and/or joint operations training.

Serial	HQ	Roles
(a)	(b)	(c)
		- Mobilization.
4	1 Task Force Region	- Training of units and sub-units in the collective operational skills of the combined arms and combined services team below brigade level. - Routine administration of assigned units.
5	2 and 3 Task Force Regions	- Training of units and sub-units in unit/sub-unit collective skills. - Routine administration of assigned units.
6	ATG	- The conduct of individual training. - Routine administration of assigned units.

BOOK REVIEW

MYTH AND REALITY

BY

JOHN McLEOD

REED METHUEN PUBLISHERS LTD, 1986

REVIEW BY CAPTAIN G.S. TRENGROVE, RNZAC

My attention was first drawn to Captain John McLeod's book Myth and Reality by the extensive media comment. My interest was aroused by an ex-serviceman quoted with saying that what had been written was untrue and that the book should not have been published. The book reviews, however, were generally favourable but were probably written by people who were too young to serve in World War II. One of two reviews I have read by veterans who had served in World War II were not complimentary to Captain McLeod.

McLeod has presented his ideas backed by over 500 quotes from people who were intimately involved with the war. I was impressed by his thoroughness and could not find a statement which was not backed by a comment made by a participant. There is obviously much room for discussion between the 105,000 men who fought during the war, each seeing it from a slightly different perspective.

Myth and Reality is not a detailed history of the campaigns fought by New Zealand soldiers during the Second World War. This book explores the reality of the New Zealand soldier, from General Freyberg down, encompassing how he fought, what motivated him, and his reaction to fear and discipline. McLeod has also examined incidents which occurred outside the theatre of operations such as the refusal of some men to return to their units at the end of furlough.

The author has personalised the actions of New Zealand soldiers at war. Often historical studies are very dry accounts of battles fought by formations or units. Not many people will rise to command formations and while the lessons to be found in that kind of historical study are important it is sometimes necessary to remember that a formation is made of flesh and blood which comes complete with all the foibles of human nature. Often a combat veteran will be quizzed by uninitiated soldiers about active service and inevitably, more often than questions on tactics, questions will be asked as to how the individual overcame fear and what were the officers and men really like. This book answers many of those questions about the officers and men of 2 NZEF.

Myth and Reality describes the New Zealand soldier in a somewhat different way to that we have become accustomed to. However, if one uses a little imagination and common sense, it must be a sensible deduction to see that if a soldier is wayward in peacetime he is likely to be the same in war.

For the person uninitiated in war, this book gives an appreciation of what soldiers as individuals endured on active service. There is also an insight given of the soldiers' reaction on coming home, after years of active service to find able bodied men in protected employment earning high wages or watersiders required to unload ammunition ships demanding danger money.

The author in a chapter called 'An Image of War' discusses censorship at some length. The printed word 'has been used not only to reinforce the image but also to protect New Zealanders from the reality of war'. He continues 'the official histories are a sanitised version of New Zealand's participation in World War II'.

McLeod examines in some detail the actions of various commanders during some of the major battles fought by NZEF. This was of considerable interest to me, but at the same time highlighted what I consider to be a weakness in McLeod's book. Many of the criticisms of the brigade commanders and other officers came from Maj Gen Sir Howard Kippenberger. Undoubtedly these commanders made mistakes but what offends a sense of fair play is that there appears to have been no criticism of Kippenberger.

Kippenberger was the Editor-in-Chief of the Official Histories until 1957. Many of the quotes used by McLeod are from Kippenberger's personal letters or letters to authors of the histories. The author should have made it clear that these comments were written in hindsight with a then good idea of the whole situation, something the commander undoubtedly did not have the fortune to possess. I am not criticising Kippenberger. I am however, sceptical of a man who can escape criticism after being a commander at war for over four years. I think that McLeod has not done the other commanders justice by ommitting Kippenberger. On the other hand, one of the aims of any historical study is to promote discussion and for me, McLeod has struck a chord with Kippenberger.

McLeod has written a well researched book which is amply illustrated and has an extensive series of end notes, a bibliography and an index.

I have the greatest respect for the soldiers and their commanders who fought during the Second World War. This book has heightened that respect by humanising their actions, good and bad, and proves to me that the soldier of today is not much different to his contemporary of 40 years ago.

LETTER TO THE EDITOR

Sir,

I congratulate Capt Catto for his interesting article in the July Journal concerning "The Recruiting Appreciation". However, I take umbrage at his crude categorization of people as being either achievers, mediocre or dead wood.

By Capt Catto's definition I can only be mediocre, as I am over 35, enjoy my family and feel satisfied in that I have my own home. However these aspects of life do not amount to ambitions and nor do they necessarily reflect either ability or potential. On this basis and on behalf of a large number of other officers affected I express my concern at Capt Catto's trite remarks.

Similarly his use of the term 'deadwood' or 'non-achievers' when referring to soldiers and LSVs is offensive, arrogant and naive. Moreover it displays an ignorance on his part of the inherent value of every individual within any complex organization.

R.L. Scott
Lieutenant Colonel

POINT TO PONDER

"It is a general popular error to imagine the loudest complainers for the public to be the most anxious for its welfare".

Edmund Burke, 1729-1797