# THE NEW ZEALAND


# ARMY JOURNAL

No. 14 SEPTEMBER, 1992

EDITORIAL POLICY

The Journal's aim is to provide a forum for the publication and discussion of matters of professional interest to the New Zealand Army. The Journal will not be used as a vehicle for promulgation of official matters and articles submitted need not be tied to current official policies or thoughts.

Contributions of any length will be considered, but for articles the ideal length is 3000 words. Letters to the Editor are particularly encouraged and will be fearlessly published in keeping with the requirements of good taste.

CONTRIBUTIONS

All contributions for publication should be typed double spaced and be addressed to:

The Editor
New Zealand Army Journal
Army Training Group
Waiouru

The following are the latest dates for submission for inclusion in the issue shown:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| July issue | - | 1 May |
| December issue | - | 1 October |

STATUS

THE NEW ZEALAND
ARMY JOURNAL

No 14 September 1992

Contents Page

# IMPROVING THE PROFESSIONAL SATISFACTION OF NEW ZEALAND ARMY OFFICERS

by

Major J.R. McLeod, MA, BA(Hons), RNZAEC

Major McLeod joined the Regular Force in 1979 after completing a MA in History at Massey University. His first appointment was as Curator of the Army Museum in Waiouru. Since then he has held several staff appointments at Army GS and HQ ATG. In 1991 Major McLeod attended the RNZAF Staff College before returning to Army GS to take up his current appointment as GSO2 Personnel Policy and Services.

'You can buy a man's time, you can buy a man's presence at a given place, you can even buy a measured number of muscular motions per hour per day. But you cannot buy enthusiasm, you cannot buy initiative, you cannot buy loyalty, you cannot buy devotion of hearts, minds and souls. You have to earn these things.'

Unidentified Member of the British House of Lords[1]

## INTRODUCTION

The 1980s were the years of malaise for the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) and the 1990s promise much of the same. Budget cuts have been unrelenting; the military appears to have little public or Governmental support; past Allies shun the New Zealand military; some major capabilities are lacking while others are past or near the end of their useful life; the military have been overwhelmed by Public Sector reform; and perhaps worst of all the one opportunity for combatant forces to fight in a war - the 1991 Gulf conflict - was declined by the Government for political reasons.

In tandem with this institutional malaise has been a significant level of dissatisfaction by servicemen in each of the three services. This dissatisfaction has been a prime contributer to a morale and motivation problem in the services as well as one of the principle reasons for the services' retention problem throughout the 1980s.

It was the period of the introduction of the 1989 Armed Forces Pay Review (AFPR) that gave voice to much of the underlying dissatisfaction in the services. The AFPR reduced in real terms

---

1. Downes Dr Cathy. To Grasp the Wheel of Providence: The Officer Development Challenge of Managing Change. The New Zealand Army Journal, No 9, January 1990, p. 23.

the income of the majority of servicemen as well as changing some conditions of service such as leave entitlements. Concurrently there was an attempt to substantially increase accommodation and meal charges. Servicemen were openly hostile to these changes and the manner they were introduced. They publicly criticised the changes. and even challenged (successfully) Defence over the proposed rent increases in the Tenancy Tribunal[2] .

It is difficult to gauge the extent of this underlying discontent. The number of personnel leaving the services in the last decade is one indicator, although undoubtedly the attractive lump sum superannuation package available to servicemen since December 1986 has impacted on the more recent release rates. Nevertheless at most times throughout the 1980s each of the services suffered from attrition rates as high as 15 percent[3] .

The services have acknowledged there is a satisfaction problem which needs attention. Various Defence Committees have repeatedly considered options to improve morale and retention. Changes to the remuneration system and conditions of service have often been seen as a panacea, but they have had little lasting effect. In many cases they have increased dissatisfaction by creating anomalies or being perceived as unfair.

One group within the NZDF that appears to be particularly dissatisfied is Army officers. This is a major concern to the Army for its officers are intrinsic to its professionalism, ethos, and character. Recent surveys of Army officers have consistently highlighted dissatisfaction with the Army, and the officer release rate has been particularly high. The average release rate of 13 percent for the last decade has climbed to 16 percent per year in the last four years. (See Annex A) The current rate represents 113 officers taking release each year; yet the Army only graduates about 60 officers each year.

## AIM

The aim of this paper is to identify measures that will improve the professional satisfaction of New Zealand Army officers.

## STUDIES INTO REASONS FOR DISSATISFACTION

### Background

Two recent surveys have been conducted by the Defence Psychology Unit (DPU) on Army officer satisfaction. Additionally in 1987 the then Colonel Personnel prepared a study on retention and job satisfaction of Army officers and other ranks. The results of the two surveys and the Army GS study are summarised below.

---

2. Mortlock Lieutenant Colonel R.C. Money and Motivation: Reflections of the Relationship between Remuneration and Motivation in the New Zealand Armed Forces. Unpublished article, nd. p.4.

3. 'Summary of Army Monthly Releases'. Army 5535/1 dated 5 July 1991.

Army GS Officer Satisfaction Survey

The 1987 Army GS Officer Satisfaction Survey results showed that 75 percent of officers were either completely satisfied or mostly satisfied with their job. Where there was dissatisfaction it was caused by poor management including a lack of downward communication; a reluctance to delegate authority; lack of recognition and incentive; poor career and posting planning; a lack of work or challenge; and bureaucractic frustrations in jobs[4] .

1987 Army GS Report

In July 1987 as a result of the high number of releases submitted in the first six months of 1987, a reported was prepared for CGS on Retention and Job Satisfaction in the Army. It identified four fundamental areas causing dissatisfaction: communication; leadership; management techniques; and command organisation and structure.

The report considered the essence of the communciation problem lay in interpersonal relationships and the failure to set clear goals and objectives. This indicated supervisors were not practising the leadership and management techniques they had been taught. Other communication problems specified were the reporting system, and feedback to officers on their career prospects as they approached 20 years service.

The leadership problem was reflected in poor communication, lack of delegation, responsibility, and feedback, together with self interest and interference. Examples of poor management included the separation of authority and responsibility, and the lack of objective measures of performance and laid down criteria of success.

The final comment was on command, organisation, and structure. There were unclear channels and excessive levels of command resulting in a stifling of change and innovation, and lowered perceptions of recognition of worth[5] .

Army Satisfaction Survey

In 1988 DPU conducted a job and career satisfaction survey across all ranks of the Army. 315 officers responded to the questionnaire. The survey found that 67 percent of officers were completely or mostly satisfied with their job. Just under 50 percent agreed the Army had clear goals and aims, and the same proportion felt an effort was made to communicate those aims and goals. Half the officers felt their remuneration was adequate, while two-thirds considered the Army placed too much pressure on

---

4. McCone Captain A. G. Army General Staff Job Satisfaction Survey for Officers. Defence Psychology Unit, June 1987.

5. 'Brief for CGS on Retention and Job Satisfaction in the Army'. July 1987. Army 224/3/3/Pers.

their personal life. 40 percent thought their career was being managed properly and two thirds felt they were not properly informed on their career paths[6] .

## 1991 ARMY OFFICER SURVEY

### Background

In order to validate, and more clearly define, the extent and causes of Army officer dissatisfaction, a further survey was conducted in May 1991 by the author with the assistance of DPU. A questionnaire was distributed to 100 serving officers, 100 officers who had retired in the last three years, and the eight officers under release action at 30 April 1991. Total responses numbered 131.

### Results of Survey

The results of the questionnaire showed a positive attitude towards the actual job done and the level of responsibility. However it also highlighted a problem with the perception of the Army; career management; feedback and recognition; concern over military professionalism; and the impact of the military on the family.

Overall three quarters of the officers are (or had been) satisfied with their job. They view the work they do as important or essential; they have good opportunities to use their initiative; the work is interesting, varied and challenging, and they have enough say in how it is done; are given sufficient responsibility; and are delegated a sufficiently wide variety of work. However only half the officers consider they receive good recognition for their work, and adequate feedback.

Of retired officers, 82 percent felt their pay had been about right. This dropped to 62 percent for serving officers. Half of both groups thought the amount of freetime taken by the Army and the pressures put on their family are reasonable.

Contrasting this positive workplace attitude only 40 percent of both retired and serving officers are (or were) satisfied with the Army. Only 43 percent agree the Army has clear goals and aims. 56 percent of serving officers and 42 percent of retired officers believe the Army has the skills to enter a conflict. Only 24 percent of serving officers and 40 percent of retired officers consider the Army has the equipment to enter a conflict.

There were numerous comments supporting this negative perception of the Army. Examples were: 'No-one knows what we are doing or where we are going'; and 'The Army has lost its sense of purpose and has no clearly defined roles and aims'. As well a proportion of officers seemed to have lost faith in the Army. 'The great

---

6. Defence Psychology Unit. Job and Career Satisfaction Survey: Preliminary Results for the New Zealand Army. 1989.

majority of its personnel no longer believe in the Army. It is a Government Department in uniform with those attitudes.' On the same theme another officer wrote: 'The Army's success is based on the enthusiasm of its personnel. Right now people are just not enthusiastic. It is just a job.'

About 60 percent of serving and retired officers are (or had been) satisfied with their career in the previous year (or last year of service). However only 37 percent of serving officers (and 53 percent of retired officers) feel their career is (or was) managed as well as possible. Additionally only 26 percent of serving officers (and 40 percent of retired officers) agree they are (or were) fully informed of the paths their career could take.

Responsibility for Army Problems

In the comments of many respondents there is an underlying frustration at a perceived lack of Government and public appreciation of the military. Despite this, much of the responsibility for the Army's current problems and the lack of satisfaction, is blamed on officers (particularly senior ones) and their lack of leadership. Comments included: 'Basically the Army has lost its self-administration and forgotten about leadership - at almost every level'; 'How many leaders does the Army have as opposed to those who work in a job'; and 'too many politicians in senior appointments who have forgotten what it is like to be a soldier'.

## EXTENT OF, AND REASONS FOR, DISSATISFACTION

### Areas of Satisfaction and Dissatisfaction

The three surveys and the Army GS report are consistent in their results. Officers have a high level of job satisfaction, and seem reasonably satisfied with their level of remuneration including conditions of service. This indicates that any solution involving changes in these areas would have a limited impact on satisfaction levels.

The areas of dissatisfaction are: officers' perception of the Army; career management; feedback and recognition; military professionalism; and to some extent undue influences on the family.

### Army Aims and Goals

There is concern the Army has no clear aims and goals, or at least if it does, they are not effectively communicated. Yet the Army's mission - to prepare for, and if necessary fight wars - should be well-known and is clearly stated in the Army Plan[7].

---

7. The New Zealand Army Plan (NZ P9). paras 115-117.

However it is more likely that behind the concern over lack of clear goals is that many officers feel there is no clear vision (or at least communication of it) of how the Army is attempting to achieve its mission. Officers do not appear to understand how restructuring, reorganisation, and other changes such as financial management reform, together with unit activities relate to the attainment of that mission.

Career Management

The high level of dissatisfaction with officer career management is not new, having being raised frequently in recent years. The Military Secretary (MS) is responsible for officer career management as well as manning officer posts. His task is complicated by a number of factors including: future decisions of Promotion Boards; the relatively small number of officers at each rank level who can be moved at any one time; officers being able to take release at three months notice; and the constant orgainsational restructuring. Given these complications the MS is often reluctant to communicate to officers future posting plots as many of them invariably change as circumstances alter[8]. This lack of communication frustrates and dissatisfies officers, whose own future is complicated by important family concerns such as housing, spouse's employment, and children's schooling.

The MS's task is not made any easier by the mismangement of the processing of officers' reports (MD 68S). Many MD 68s are never raised; some officers do not bother to complete them; some disappear into the system and are never seen again; and others are actioned in a very tardy manner. In February 1991 over 50 percent of all officer reports were overdue[9].

Some officers consider the MD 68 does not recognise achievement, nor provide sufficient feedback to officers on how their performance could be improved. Moreover as the system is closed beyond the Reporting Officer, adverse comments on officers' performance and posting and training preferences could be made without the officer concerned being aware of it. Officers also considered there is very limited feedback on postings and training preferences made in the MD 68.

Military Professionalism

Just under half the officers surveyed agreed the New Zealand Army lacked the skills to enter a conflict and only one in four thought it had the necessary equipment. Given the impass with the United States and the current financial restraints it should be no surprise that officers are worried military professionalism has suffered.

---

8. Interview with Colonel R.J. Seymour. Previously Military Secretary, Army General Staff. July 1991.

9. Ibid.

The Army's equipment deficiencies and the impending block obsolescence of many of the capabilities of the other two services are well-known. The decision to purchase ANZAC frigates leaves little scope for any other major purchase in the next decade. Furthermore, despite all the best endeavours, there can be no substitute for the professional benefits of New Zealand servicemen training with one of the largest and undoubtedly the most modern, Armed Forces in the world.

While declining professional standards and equipment deficiencies are major problems, they are to a major extent shaped by external political and financial constraints. They will therefore not be considered further in this paper.

### The Military and the Military Family

The Army is struggling to balance the conflicting requirements of the military and military families in a modern society. Officers, while accepting some intrusion into their personal time for military activities, quickly become dissatisfied when military activities adversely affect their families. Family stability is a major issue and this, together with spouse employment and children's schooling, impact markedly on officer career management.

The 1988 Military Family Study[10] was commissioned in an endeavour to identify measures that would help improve the military's relationship with the military family. It certainly served to highlight the extent of the problem with one third of spouses saying they were dissatisfied with military life. The report produced a large number of recommendations, some of which, such as a posting cycle to coincide with school holidays, have been implemented. However, there has been limited feedback and followup on the report, and it seems to have been effectively shelved.

## GROWING OCCUPATIONALISM?

### Background

Most of the reasons for Army officer dissatisfaction have been raised previously and efforts made to redress them. Yet the various surveys demonstrate the problem remains extant. This would suggest that the reasons mentioned previously are simply symptoms and there is a major underlying problem that needs to be addressed.

The concerns over the lack of clear organisational goals and aims, the erosion of professional skills, and the quality of leadership, suggests the underlying affliction may be increasing occupationalism in the New Zealand military. Overseas research indicates that within western military organisations there has

---

10. Hunter Edna J. Upfront Downunder: An outsider's view of New Zealand Military Families - A Report on the 1988 New Zealand Military Family Study. Ministray of Defence, November 1989.

been a movement away from institutionalism to occupationism. This has weakened the cohesion, morale and leadership of these military forces.

Institutional/Occupational Theses

The institutional/occupational thesis was first developed by Charles C. Moskos, an American Sociology Professor, in 1977. Mokskos considered the American military was undergoing a 'quiet malaise', where recruits were brought in the labour market, where officers were driven by careerism, and the reasons for military service was obscured. He contended that within the bureaucracy there was an 'econometric mindset' towards Defence which was downplaying the less tangible non-economic factors and value-driven aspects of military organisations in favour of material dimensions. Moskos argued that this move to what he described as occupationalism was having a detrimental effect on military mission performance, member motivation, and professional responsibility.

Moskos saw occupationalism as legitimised by the market place, where supply and demand is paramount, and where there is a priority of self-interest. In the past the military had been seen as an institution legitimised in terms of values and norms, and in which institutional purpose transcended individual self-interest in favour of a higher good.

Moskos identified three principles that are at the core of any institution such as the military. Interestingly these principles cover the specific failings of the New Zealand Army that most concerned its officers. The first principle is that people will accept difficulties if those in charge are seen to be wholly involved in the system and concerned about it. Leaders need to display devotion to the ultimate goals of the organisation even at the risk of career progress. If attention is diverted to satisfying individual rather than institutional needs, servicemen will begin to think 'If the boss doesn't care what we're here for, why should I?' The second principle is that there must be a clear vision of what the institution is all about and how the separate parts relate to the core. The third principle is that members of an institution are primarily value driven. This is not to say that pecuniary interests are absent but rather that the military requires behaviour from its members that over-rides self-interest[11].

Occupationalism within the NZDF

The concern shown in the surveys by so many officers over the management of their own career is an indicator of the growth of occupationalism within the Army. It supports the assertion of some dissatisfied officers who consider many other officers have

---

11. Moskos Charles C. and Wood Frank R.(Ed). The Military: More Than Just a Job. Pergamon-Brassey's, Washington, 1988. pp. 3-7, 280.

lost sight of the Army's purpose, seeing it nothing more than a job, and whose loyalty and commitment to the organisation is subordinated by their own self-interest.

The AFPR, by introducing a remuneration system that was predicated on recognising and rewarding individual skill, qualifications and performance, in addition to that of rank and seniority used previously, was a significant step away from institutionalism. Military trades were aligned with those in the civilian community which has encouraged comparison with civilian pay rates. Also the AFPR placed a higher value on many of the technical trades than the combat trades. This diminished the perceived worth to the Army of those who actually do the fighting, thus reversing many of the military's internal values.

The increasing number of civilians replacing military personnel has also eroded institutionalism. Not only are the civilians not imbued with the same concept of military service, but it has encouraged the extension of civilian work ethics and practices, such as regular hours, to the military.

There has been an increasing reluctance for servicemen to live on camps and bases. This has in part been brought about by the move to market rates for NZDF accommodation, and partly by a desire to separate work and leisure time. As such many personnel tend to affiliate more with the outside community than with the military community as in the past.

With the introduction of financial management reform military officers have had to develop expertise in accrual accounting and manage their own budgets. Inevitably this has been detracted from the development and maintenance of professional skills, and offers the prospect that civilian financial management skills may become as, or even more, important than military skills in promotion decisions. Furthermore the 1990 Defence Act established a Ministry of Defence, comprises mainly of civilians, to monitor and contest advice and decisions of a professional nature made by military professionals as well as auditing their performance. This is an 'econometric' challenge to military professionalism.

<u>Effect of Increased Occupationalism</u>

The Army has not moved towards an occupational model to the same extent as the RNZAF which for many of its personnel is simply a job. The Army is still probably in the middle ground between institutionalism and occupationalism. It has still retained compulsory postings; has a remuneration system that balances skill and qualification based pay with the 'all of one company concept'; and still attempts to emphasise the military community concept.

Nevertheless consideration of the areas of Army officer dissatisfaction, together with available overseas research on the Institutional/Occupational thesis, suggests increased occupationalism has had a number of detrimental effects on the New Zealand military. It has encouraged self-interest; has partially substituted intrinsic institutional motivation with

extrinsic motivation; has challenged the concept of military professionalism; and has eroded the cohesion of the military community. This, in turn, has led to weakened military leadership, led to a blurring of purpose, and has fragmented the military community. All this lessens the ability of the military to achieve its mission.

In the past, and indeed currently, many Army officers have been drawn to the military by the lifestyle and the challenge. This was often accompanied by a concept of service. Extrinsic factors, such as remuneration, while in the background, have not been major motivators for becoming an Army officer. Officers became well-socialised into the military and learnt to value the customs, traditions, the cohesion of the military community, and their status as military professionals. The reasons for, and values of, military service have been somewhat depreciated in recent years by this move towards occupationalism. As this has happened it is suggested officers have begun to lose their motivation, and become dissatisfied with the service.

This is not to suggest increased occupationalism is the only cause of officer dissatisfaction. There are a variety of other reasons some of which may include the lack of challenge and excitement in a peacetime Army an officer's inability to cope with the level and speed of change and individual/unit circumstances that have nothing to do with events elsewhere in the Army. Rather the move away from institutionalism should be seen as an underlying factor that has a major impact on the satisfaction levels of Army officers.

## IMPROVING OFFICER PROFESSIONAL SATISFACTION

### Framework to Improve Satisfaction Levels

The Institutional/Occupational thesis is not a panacea for the problem of officer satisfaction but rather it provides a framework to develop a series of measures to improve satisfaction levels. It is important both for the effectiveness of the military and the satisfaction levels of its officers that this trend towards occupationalism be contained, though not necessarily reversed. This will not be easy as many of the occupational changes are being externally imposed on the NZDF while others are a product of societal changes.

Moreover a number of changes brought by the exposure to occupationalism have been beneficial in that they have challenged the stagnating bureaucracy of the old Ministry of Defence. The NZDF has been forced to undertake long overdue reforms particulary in devolution and accountability; its personnel have been exposed to different managerial and procedural concepts; and there has been a re-evaluation of its own roles, functions, capabilities, procedures, and values. Institutional and occupational values need to be balanced, but it should always be acknowledged the military must be predominantly institutional because it requires 'a commitment that cannot be brought'.[12]

---

12. Ibid, p. 228.

The Need for Leadership

Leadership is at the core of improving satisfaction levels. All leaders need to be wholly involved in the system and concerned about it. Senior commanders need to be clear in their own minds as to what is distinctive in military forces. They then need to emphasise this to both those inside and outside the military. Also they need to place 'personnel policies in an institutional perspective' and 'be seen as concerned and effective in protecting members' rights and entitlements'.[13]

Furthermore commanders must not only seek to retain, but also actively promote, uniquely military values and norms such as customs, traditions, dress embellishments, behaviour and discipline. They must also ensure servicemen understand that the military has a purpose which may involve their lives being at risk. Following on from this there is a need to focus on the warrior traditions and qualities of the military. This includes re-emphasising in practical terms the status of the combatant elements within the military.

The Chief of Defence Force (CDF) is in a unique position to oversee the protection of the rights and entitlements of servicemen. As the Chief Executive for the NZDF he not only commands the NZDF but he is also employing authority and budget manager. Most other Armed Forces have the latter two responsibilities vested in civilian authorities who have to be convinced of the uniqueness of the military lifestyle. This is not to suggest that CDF is not without other constraints; rather it emphasises the need for Headquarters NZDF to have a clear institutional perspective of the military.

Visions and Goals

Senior commanders must have a vision of how they will undertake their mission, and how all the diverse structures, procedures and activities relate to that mission. That vision is absolutely essential for without it the mission is unlikely to be achieved. They then need to communicate that to their subordinates, ensure they understand it, and that they in turn communicate it to their subordinates, and so on.

In tandem with the communication of the version there must be the setting of goals. These must be achieveable, unambiguous, and be consistent with the mission of the organisation. Leaders must not only set goals, but monitor progress, provide feedback, and ultimately hold subordinates accountable for the achievement of those goals. In doing this leaders must ensure they allow their subordinates to tackle their task without undue interference and allow them the maximum flexibility in deciding how to achieve it. There should be rewards for achievement but these should be intrinsic, such as recognition, rather than extrinsic. This might appear simplistic yet too often it is a failing. The need

---

13. Ibid.

for applying such principles on the battlefield is readily accepted but it is too easily overlooked despite being equally applicable to peacetime.

There are some signs that the Army is beginning to take some positive steps towards setting goals, communicating them, and then establishing accountabilities for the achievement of those goals. In the instance of the decision to close Papakura Army GS provided the direction to close the camp and then allowed the local commander to decide how to implement it. Commander Land Force Command has recently issued a directive[14] to his commanders detailing his concept and requirements for operational units. He has identified what output (what is to be achieved) he requires, how that output is to be assessed, and how he will hold commanders accountable. He has, however, not told them how to achieve that output.

Improving Leadership

It has been felt for some time within the military that the Army has a leadership problem. In response to this the level of leadership training has been increased markedly in recent years. How much this will improve the quality of leadership has yet to be evaluated, for it is not a problem that can be overcome quickly. It may take a generation for the proper application of increased leadership training to permeate through the officer corps.

Enhanced leadership qualities are, in my view, being hindered by inadequate socialisation of junior officers into the military and lack of example. Officer cadets are drawn from a society whose values and standards are increasingly at conflict with the military. They have 12 months initial training in a controlled and disciplined evironment, where they are supposed inculcated with military values, standards, and traditions. At the end of that period they are considered socialised and are often allowed to revert to much of their former civilian lifestyle including living off-camp. Inevitably the values, standards, and traditions that the military has spent considerable time and effort inculcating, are compromised. The military socialisation process needs to be ongoing, particularly in the early years of service. As a response to this problem the Base Commander at Ohakea requires newly commissioned officers to live-in for at least 12 months[15] .

An important part of developing leadership skills is example, feedback and guidance from one's superiors. All officers have a responsibility to train their replacements. The relative inexperience of many adjutants and sub-unit commanders mean they have neither the experience nor maturity to give their subordinates the guidance they need. Also they are products of a leadership process that did not provide them with the necessary

---

14. Land Force Comd 4500/Comd dated 16 Aug 91.

15. Briefing by Group Captain R.M. Bulger. Base Commander, RNZAF Base Ohakea for RNZAF Staff College, 12 August 1991.

guidance to develop their leadership skills sufficiently. If officers are not providing their subordinate officers with the necessary example, feedback, and guidance it becomes the responsibility for commanders and commanding offices to not only set the example, but to ensure their subordinates follow their lead. This should be part of the goalsetting process discussed previously.

Communicating Officer Career Management

While there is considerable concern over officer career managment one needs to ensure potential remedies do not pander to, or promote, careerism. Notwithstanding this one also needs to acknowledge that career management is a major issue to most officers. Communication plays a pivotal part in officer career management. Officers are always going to want more career planning information than the MS is able, or indeed willing, to tell them. There is no simple solution to this problem while there are so many variables to future postings. Given this, the onus is on the MS and commanders to communicate with officers as much as possible. This should include feedback on posting and training requests made in MD 68s, as well as information on career planning. Information on probable posting locations and the type of job an officer can expect to hold next shows, at the very least, that the officer's career is being planned for both his benefit and that of the service.

One area that can be improved is information on how officer's careers are managed. Many officers appear uninformed on the processes of their career management, and in my view, most MSs have not payed sufficient attention to rectifying this. While the publication of the 'Officer Career Management Information Booklet' in 1986 was one positive step in this direction there is a need for a constant educative process. Dissatisfaction with officer career management is now so high this educative process must be a priority. This could take the form of a series of briefing for officers on the processes of officer career management.

Changes to Officer Assessment Procedures

The current officer reporting system is a mixture of evaluation and feeback. The two processes are not necessarily complementary and can negate the value of the MD 68. The MD 68 form is used for all officers beyond one years service, despite junior officers receiving automatic promotion, while Majors and above receive merit promotion. Private soldiers and Junior Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) have a different assessment process that Senior NCOs and Warrant Officers. The same separation of levels of reports should be applied to officers. The emphasis on junior officers' annual (or indeed six monthly) report should be to provide a formalised structue for feedback and goalsetting.

Once officers become substantive Captains there is a need for an annual assessment which can later be used as part of the consideration for accelerated promotion, Staff College selection, and in time merit promotion. This, however, does not diminish

the need for feedback and goalsetting for these more senior officers, but rather simply places it in a wider perspective. Therefore there may be a need for an annual report for Captains and above to be in two parts - one which is a promotion assessment and another which provides feedback and sets goals.

A change to the reporting procedures would obviously take some time. As an interim measure it is suggested the current MD 68 reporting system be made open. The simple way this could be done is by MS staff photocopying the back page of the MD 68 and sending it to the officer concerned. If an officer wished to comment on the completed report he could do so by forwarding his comments through the command system for attaching to the completed MD 68.

**The Military and the Military Family**

The military and military families will continue to be in conflict in the foreseable future, and the military must be careful not to force military members to choose between the military and their families. It seems inevitable that the military will be pressurised into giving way to the family more and more in order to maintain morale and encourage retention.

Some measures to improve the relationship with the military family have already begun to be implemented. These include longer postings in one location, assistance with childcare facilities, and family involvement in military activities. There is however a need to revisit the Hunter report on military families and re-evaluate her recommendations.

## CONCLUSIONS

There is a significant level of dissatisfaction among Army officers which has lead to lowering of morale, an erosion of cohesion within the Army and an officer retention problem. There is a concern that there is no clear vision (or at least communication of it) of how the Army is attempting to achieve its mission. The majority of officers considered their careers are not being managed effectively. This is compounded by poor and often tardy processing of officer reports and an officer reporting system that fails to meet the needs of many officers. As well officers, while accepting some intrusion by the military into their leisure time, quickly became dissatisfied when military decisions and activities adversely affected their family.

The above concerns are symptoms of increasing occupationalism in the New Zealand military. Examples of this include officer careerism, a remuneration system based on recognising and rewarding skill, qualifications, and performance in addition to rank and seniority, the extension of civilian work practices to the military, greater civilian rather than military community affiliation by servicemen and the intrusion of civilian management practices together with civilian auditing of military performance.

Increased occupationalism has weakened leadership, led to a blurring of Army aims and goals, and has partially substituted intrinsic motivation with extrinsic motivation. Officers have seen this as an erosion of the qualities of military professionalism as well as the military lifestyle and have become dissatisfied.

The Institutional/Occupational thesis is not a panacea for officer dissatisfaction but rather provides a framework from which to develop measures to improve satisfaction levels. The military needs to contain this trend towards occupationalism although it should be acknowledged it has some beneficial as well as detrimental effects on the military.

Leadership is the key to improving officer satisfaction. Leaders need to be clear in their minds what is distinctive in military forces and then emphasise this both in and outside the military. They need to protect military rights and entitlements as well as promoting many of the traditional values and qualities of the military. CDF is in a unique position to oversee this as he not only commands the Defence Force, but he is also employing authority and budget manager.

Senior commanders need to have a vision of how they intend to fulfil their mission and how all the parts relate to the whole. They need to communicate this to their subordinates and ensure they understand it so they in turn can continue the process. In tandem with this there needs to be setting of achieveable, unambiguous, and mission orientated goals. These need to allow the subordinate maximum scope to decide how to achieve his goal.

Enhanced leadership qualities are being hindered by inadequate socialisation of junior officers into the military. Officers, after the completion of 12 months initial training where they are socialised into the military, are often allowed to revert to a semi-civilian lifestyle on graduation. This compromises the military socialisation process and affects the officers commitment to the responsibilities and values of the Army. The socialisation process needs to be ongoing. Feedback and guidance of junior officers, and some not so junior, is not being provided by their superiors. If officers are failing to meet their responsibilities in providing feedback and guidance to their subordinates, it is up to those officers' superior to ensure they do provide it.

Communication is pivotal to improving officer career management. There is a need to ensure officers understand the process of officer career management and the MS should place a high priority on conducting briefings for officers on this.

The officer reporting system should meet the needs of all officers and be open at all levels. There is a need for two officer reporting procedures. One should be for junior officers which should focus on goal setting and feedback while the other would be for more senior officers and be in two parts; one part setting goals and providing feedback, while the other is a

promotion assessment. As an interim measure officers should be provided with a copy of the back page of their MD 68s by MS Branch.

The military and the military family relationship needs to continue to improve. It seems inevitable that the military will give way to family needs in order to maintain morale and encourage retention. Some measures such as changes to the posting cycle have already been introduced, but there needs to be a re-evaluation of the Hunter Report to identify further measures.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that:

a. military personnel policies be considered from an institutional perspective;

b. an Army policy be developed that encourages the fostering of uniquely military traditions and qualities;

c. Army directives emphasise outputs, goals and objectives, set accountabilities, and provide the widest possible scope for implementation;

d. Army leadership training emphasis the need for goal setting, recognition and feedback, and commanders and commanding officers be encouraged to ensure their officers meet their obligation to provide their subordinates with recognition and feedback;

e. military socialisation programmes and policies be developed for junior officers after graduation;

f. the officer reporting system should be open at all levels, and be revised to take into account the differing needs of junior and senior officers;

g. as an interim measure MS Branch should provide offices with a copy of the completed back page of their MD 68; and

h. the recommendations of Hunter Report on Military Families be re-evaluated.

## BIBIOGRAPHY

Unpublished

An Alternative Structure for the NZ Army Officer Corps. Draft Paper. Army 1901/4/4 dated 18 February 1991.

Birks Colonel A.L. Officer Career Planning. September 1985.

'Brief for CGS on Manning in the services'. Chiefs of Staff Committee, 20 Mar 85.

'Brief for CGS on Retention and Job Satisfaction in the Army'. July 1987. Army 224/3/3/Pers.

'Brief for CGS on Retention Problems'. Defence Executive Council Meeting, 7 Jun 85.

Bruhns Lieutenant C.C.P. A Description of the New Zealand Defence Force in Comparison with other New Zealand Organisations. Defence Psychology Unit, August 1991.

Defence Psychology Unit. Job and Career Satisfaction Survey: Preliminary Results for the New Zealand Army. 1989.

Dennison David. advice to Policy Markers on Improving retention. The Technical Co-operation Programme Military Manpower Trends. September 1982.

Hunter Edna J. Upfront Downunder: An outsider's view of New Zealand Military Families - A Report on the 1988 New Zealand Military Family Study. Ministry of Defence, November 1989.

McCone Captain A.G. Army General Staff Job Satisfaction Survey for Officers. Defence Psychology Unit, June 1987.

Moloney Lieutenant Colonel D.W.S. Management of Middle Grade Officers. 21 September 1981.

'Manning in the Services'. Army 224/3/3/CGS dated 13 Mar 85.

Mortlock Lieutenant Colonel R.C. Army: Today's Crisis. Unpublished Article, c1991.

_____. Developing a Model to Illustrate Military Cohesion. Unpublished article, March 1989.

_____. Money and Motivation: Reflections of the Relationship between Remuneration and Motivation in the New Zealand Armed Forces. Unpublished article, nd.

Officer Career Management Information Booklet. Army General Staff, 1986.

Retention in the Army. Presentation CGS (AS) Exercise 1990.

1991 Officer Survey. Original questionnaires held by DPU.

'Summary of Army Monthly Releases'. Army 5535/1 dated 5 July 1991.

The Marilyn Report - A Report on Manning and Recruiting in the Lean Years of the Nineties. Adjutant Generals Branch, British Army, 1989.

The New Zealand Army Plan (NZ P9).

The Officer Retention Problem. Author unknown. March 1985.

Published

Alexander Lieutenant M.J. and McGavin Dr P.A. Officer training and Retention in the Australian Defence Force. Defence Force Journal, No 79. November/December 1979. pp. 20-28.

Downes Dr Cathy. To grasp the wheel of providence: The officer development challenge of managing change. The New Zealand Army Journal, No 9, January 1990. pp. 2-29.

Herzberg Frederick et. al. The Motivation to Work. John Wiley, New York, 1959.

Llewellyn Lieutenant Colonel M.R. Good Prospects - Salary and Benefits Negotiable. British Army Review. No 94, April 1990. pp. 62-68.

Moskos Charles C. and Wood Frank R. (Ed). The Military: More Than Just a Job. Pergamon-Brassey's, Washington, 1988.

Oakley Major P.S. The Army in the Future A Future in the Army. British Army Review. No 92, August 1989. pp. 56-61.

Regular Office Development Committee. Study Three Career Management. Commonwealth of Australia 1978.

Interviews

Ewart Lieutenant Colonel B.L. Military Secretary, Army General Staff. July 1991.

Seymour Colonel R.J. Previously Military Secretary, Army General Staff. July 1991.

Briefing

Briefing by Group Captain R.M. Bulger. Base Commander, RNZAF Base Ohakea for RNZAF Staff College, 12 August 1991.

# SOME CHALLENGES FOR STRATEGY IN THE NOT-SO-NEW WORLD ORDER

By Robert Ayson, Department of Politics, University of Waikato

Mr Ayson completed his B.Soc.Sc.(Hons) in Politics at the University of Waikato in 1987. He then gained a New Zealand Ministry of Defence Freyberg Scholarship to study for an MA at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre of the Australian National University. Upon completion of this degree in mid-1989, Mr Ayson returned to New Zealand and held a research position with the External Assessments Bureau in Wellington.

At the beginning of the 1991 academic year he took up an Assistant Lectureship in the Politics Department of the University of Waikato. He teaches a graduate course in Strategic Studies and contributes to the teaching of undergraduate courses in International Relations and American Foreign Policy. Mr Ayson is also working on a doctoral dissertation: his topic is New Zealand's involvement in the Five Power Defence Arrangements. The current focus of his research is the 1969 decision to maintain forces in the Malaysia/Singapore area. His other research interests include strategic theory, strategy and security in the post-Cold War era, and the balance of power in East Asia. He is married and lives in Hamilton.

## INTRODUCTION

Barely three years since the fall of the Berlin Wall signified the collapse of the Cold War, hopes for an increasingly less violent and more stable world appear to have faded. If Iraq's sudden invasion of Kuwait served to dent such hopes, then the violence associated with the disintegration of Yugoslavia seems to have finished them off. In the middle of 1992, as some of the leading players in the UN-sactioned response in the Gulf now find ways to avoid using force in Bosnia, the uniqueness of the allied response to Iraq's aggression has become increasingly clear. For his part, President Bush, who once led with great passion the crusade for a "New World Order", is now fighting for a new term of office.

What has replaced the Cold War order, then, can better be described as a Not-So-New-World Order[1]. But even this less

---

1. See the author's, 'Strategic Studies and the Not-So-New World Order', *New Zealand International Review*, Vol 27, No 1, January/February 1992, upon which this article builds.

pretentious title may still conjure up false hopes. For *disorder* is much likely to characterise the international environment in the years to come[2]. This disharmonious state of affairs, as John Mearsheimer has written, will be "why we will soon miss the Cold War"[3].

## The Realist Outlook

Given a not-so-new order, the means for analysing it are unlikely to be brand new. The best guide through these testing times is likely to be realist interpretation of international affairs. Aside from having a fairly modest opinion of human nature, realists view inter-nation politics occurring in a mainly anarchical environment where the quest by nation states for influence based on power is the driving force. In such a set-up "security" is a constantly elusive, and often ill-defined goal of each one of the competing nation states.

This paper holds to two very important assumptions which derive from such an interpretation of international affairs. The first is that national self-interest dictates that no one state can be trusted with unmatched power. (As Reinhold Niebuhr has written, "the man of power, though human impulse may awaken in him, always remains something of a beast of prey ... only rarely does nature provide armours of defence which cannot be transmuted into instruments of aggression"[4].) This is especially the case in regions which contain resources whose control might lead one state to hold others to ransom, or where several influential and/or historically antagonistic states exist side by side. (Of the former, a leading example is the Middle East, of the latter, a leading example is South-East Asia). The result of such concern on the part of the realist is, in most cases, the advocacy of some sort of a balance of power.

The second assumption is related quite closely to the first. If the primary and minimum aim of most states is to preserve a reasonable balance of power within which they can pursue their interests, the pursuit of peace is of no more than secondary concern. In fact, the use or potential use of armed force, may be necessary to erect, maintain, or restore a balance of power. Hence peace may be a by-product of a balance of power, but it is no substitute for it. Moreover, there can be no guarantees as to the quality and durability of that peace: "In each case the peace is a tentative one because it is unjust. It has been achieved only partially by a mutual accommodation of interests and certainly not by a rational and moral adjustment of rights"[5].

---

2. Hence Ted Galen Carpenter's article, 'The New World Disorder', *Foreign Policy*, No. 84, Fall 1991.

3. J. Mearsheimer, 'Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War', *The Atlantic Monthly*, August 1990

4. R. Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, New York: Scribner's, 1932, p. 13, 18.

5. *Ibid*, p. 19.

## Realism and Strategy

The realist interpretation of international affairs has, by and large, been favoured by students of strategy (albeit at times unconsciously). The reasons for this relate closely to the preceding discussion; state policy in an anarchical environment consists of maximizing one's own influence and balancing (if not eliminating) the influence of one's competitors. Strategy, which Gray has defined as "the direction of power so that it serves policy purposes"[6], is the way in which states attempt to address these objectives.

Given such a state of International affairs, strategy is not optional; it is a necessity for any and every state[7] (or for a group of states where coalition strategy or similar measures may be employed). The question for these post-Cold War years, then *cannot* be whether strategy is obsolete. Rather the question is whether *certain types of strategy* are less useful now than was once the case.

It has become commonplace for authors to assert that economic and not military power will be the main currency in the post-Cold War international system[8]. Even if true, this does not mean an end to strategy; rather it means that grand strategy (defined by Gray as "the art of employing all of the relevant assets of a country for the practical purposes set by high policy"[9]) will come to rely more and more on economic instruments of power and less and less on military instruments of power.

## A Minor Role for Strategic Studies?

While the future for grand strategy may be a secure one, the foregoing anaylsis suggests that the same might not be said for strategic studies. As an institutionalized academic discipline, strategic studies has grown up with the Cold War, and has taken much of its strength from the development of nuclear strategy. Moreover, it can be said quite fairly that over the last 45 years strategic studies has not had a particularly strong record for analysing the achievement of political objectives by means which do not involve armed force[10]. This does not appear to signal a

---

6. C. Gray, *War Peace and Victory: Strategy and Statecraft for the Next Century*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990, p. 9.

7. See C. Gray, *Strategic Studies: A Critical Assessment*, Westport, Conn: Greenword Press, 1982, p. 24.

8. For example, see C.F. Bergsten, 'The Primacy of Economics', *Foreign Policy*, No. 87, Summer 1992

9. C. Gray, *War Peace and Victory: Strategy and Statecraft for the Next Century*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990, p. 29.

10. This is indicated in the limitations some strategic thinkers have put on their work. For example, in a seminal article on strategic stuties, Hedley Bull referred to the sort of strategy

promising future for strategic studies if we are moving into a time when economic power is truly the *sine qua non* of grand strategy.

But there are two reasons to suggest that while the end of the Cold War has meant some soul-searching for students of strategy, the usefulness of their discipline has not come to an end quite yet. Firstly, the reliance of institutional strategic studies on events since 1945 must not obscure the fact that people had been thinking strategically centuries before the Cold War took shape. Hence an authority such a Clausewitz is important today not just because a number of Cold War civilian strategists dusted off old copies of *On War* and decided his writing was relevant in an era of superpower nuclear competition[11].

Secondly while the end of the Cold War may have swept away a world order so familiar (and profitable) to many a strategist, it did not and could not remove for long the use of armed force as an important ingredient of the inter-nation system. Like many others, Stephen Walt has referred to the recent Gulf War as evidence that "military power remains a central element of international politics, and failure to appreciate its importance invariably leads to costly reminders"[12]. This is one of the reasons why Walt believes "security studies" have a bright future.

This appears to take the reader right back to where this paper began - the false hopes of a non-violent world order. But in the intervening paragraphs strategy has been introduced into the argument as the means by which disorder can be managed by individual states. This marks strategy as a tool of action and not just of analysis.

Strategy, then, is not merely a study of potential and actual cases of international violence. This might be a better description of the much wider field of 'security studies'. Hence in order to position a good future for strategic studies, it is simply not enough to develop a list of instances where armed force has been used recently or may be used in the near future.

---

he was writing about as being "interchangeable with 'military strategy', it is the art or science of exploiting military force so as to attain given objects of policy", H. Bull, 'Strategic Studies and its Critics', World Politics, 20, 4, July 1968, p. 593.

11. Hence Bernard Brodie's claims for the continuing relevance of Clausewitz have outlived the era of nuclear strategy which Brodie himself spent so much of his time analysing. See B. Brodie, 'The Continuing Relevance of *On War*', in C. von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited and translated by M. Howard and P. Paret, Princeton UP: Princeton, 1976.

12. S. Walt, 'The renaissance of Security Studies', *International Studies Quarterly*, 35, 1991, p. 222.

While there will be an almost infinite number of 'security' problems to be found in the post Cold War era, the number and range of strategic responses will be finite.

It follows that if the definition of 'security' becomes so broad as to be nearly meaningless (and like lobbyists for the privilege of government expenditure, there will be many dubious 'security illnesses' demanding immediate attention), then strategy may well seem obsolete in some eyes because of its inability to respond to each and every circumstance. No single state or group of states can expect to have a set of national interests so wide or a set of resources so extensive so as to please every such request for action. So although Walt may be bringing good news for 'security studies', his message needs to be amended before being passed down to strategic studies.

## A Non-Specific Threat Environment: The Challenge of Selection

Far from leaving us with a non-threatening world order, the Cold War's legacy is better described as a "non-specific threat environment". This may please many scholars for, as Walt has written, "the collapse of the Cold War will create new policy problems and new research projects"[13]. But for governments with finite means the outlook is a difficult one. As Walt himself has said, "Issues of war and peace are too important for the field to be diverted into a prolix and self-indulgent discourse that is divorced from the real world"[14].

A non-specific threat environment is a challenge to the real world because the real world lacks the ability to cover every possible threat which may emerge. This is even the case when, instead of isolating specific threat scenarios around which to build a strategy[15], a government chooses to use for planning purposes more general levels of threat or conflict[16].

## Regional Stability and Security: The Challenge of Definition

Of course a Government may go even wider than levels of conflict, and refer to "stability and security" as the goal behind its strategy. An example of this from close quarters can be seen in the explanations given by successive New Zealand Governments for

---

13. *Ibid*, p. 222.

14. *Ibid*, P. 223.

15. "For New Zealand, attempting to match a force structure to specific scenarios is a waste of time and usually of money": The Defence of New Zealand 1991: A Policy Paper, Wellington: Government Print, 1991, p. 41.

16. For a, if not *the*, leading example of this approach see *Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities* (Report to the Minister for Defence by Mr Paul Dibb, March 1986) Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1986, pp. 52-5.

the maintenance of a military presence in the Singapore/Malaysia area. The 1972 White Paper noted of Southeast Asia that "its *stability and security* can be achieved only with the active participation of the countries of South-east Asia itself, but almost all will need the continuing support and assistance of friends"[17]. In both 1983 and 1987, the objectives of New Zealand's military presence in the region included the demonstration of "a commitment to the maintenance of *peace and stability* in South East Asia by continuing the mutually beneficial military training assistance arrangements, exchange programmes and exercises with the countries of the region"[18]. The most recent White Paper states that "New Zealand has made a large diplomatic and defence investment in the area, acknowledging that its stability and prosperity are of direct interest to both New Zealand and Australia"[19].

Such general commitments to security and stability are also involved in the commitments to East Asia made by much more than powerful states than New Zealand. In 1991, Singapore's navy head, Commodore Teo Chee Hean, argued that "there is... much to be gained from involving interested and like-minded extra regional powers who are committed to preserving *stability and security* in the region"[20]. For their part, some American scholars seem to agree. Michael Mandelbaum has argued that the US maintain a military presence in Europe and Asia to guard against "dangers to the *security* of America's friends" in both regions which "are likely to be more distant and nebulous than the sharply defined threat the Soviet Union was seen to pose"[21].

However, in the short term at least, these threats may be so 'nebulous' as to be nearly impossible to base a strategy around. It is most unlikely that it will be easy for any liberal democracy to sell for many years extensive defence spending to a public which can quite legitimately cry 'where is the threat' (and which can see quite tangible problems to be addressed in its own backyard). As another Singaporean, Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew said last year: "it's not the job or duty of America to maintain the *stability and the security* of the Pacific for the benefit of Japan and the Asian nations"[22].

---

17. Review of Defence Policy 1972: New Zealand's Defence Policy Perspectives, Wellington: Government Printer, 1972, p. 12; Defence of New Zealand: Review of Defence Policy 1987, Wellington: Government Printer, 1987, p. 31.

18. Defence Review 1983, Wellington: Government Printer, 1983, pp. 19-20.

19. The Defence of New Zealand 1991: A Policy Paper, Wellington: Government Print, 1991, p. 35.

20. *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 9 November 1991.

21. M. Mandelbaum, 'The Bush Foreign Policy', *Foreign Affairs*, 70, 1, 1991.

22. *The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly*, 4 November, 1991, p. 14.

What makes the job of linking these terms back to coherent strategy even harder now is that 'security and stability' are much harder to nail down since the Cold War has come to a close. In the days when 'containment' defined and streamlined strategy, any regional movement in favour of the Soviet Union implied a threat to Western security and stability (ie these terms were closely linked to the maintenance of a very straightforward status quo). But in a multipolar arrangement, there is no single axis on which to measure change and its likely threat to individual state's interest.

**Managing the Transition: The Challenge of Time and Patience**

In a few years time it may be possible for us to look back on the early 1990s as the early years of a period of transition between two quite clearly defined orders. The identification of the Cold War as the first order is the easy part.

It may be that the second order will resemble the international system which preceded those 45 years of bipolar confrontation. This is certainly consistent with the realist perspective argued in this paper. In such a case, strategy may come to resemble more closely what Hedley Bull has described as "the classical tradition of strategic thought from Clausewitz to Douhet"[23]. This may involve to a certain extent a reversal of the process since the Second World War when attention shifted "away from war as an instrument of policy toward the threat of war"[24].

In little more than a generation's time, the non-specific threat environment, which presently is making the strategists' life a very interesting one, is quite likely to have been replaced by some rather fierce competitions for regional power and influence. The challenge is to manage the intervening time in a way that should these quite specific threats to regional security and stability arise, there will be a coherent and effective response to meet them. This requires vigilance on the part of strategists, and patience on the part of governments and the publics which elect them.

Moreover, such threats to regional security and stability are unlikely to be contained solely by members within the regions themselves. It should not be forgotten that the two longest periods of peace in Europe over the last three centuries have been ushered in with a commitment by a non-continental state to the European balance of power. In 1815 it was Britain. In 1945 it was the United States.

The danger in the near future, then, is not the sudden emergence of a hitherto unrecognised threat to global security. The non-specific threat environment is unlikely to disappear quickly. The danger is that the vigilance and patience referred to above

---

23. H. Bull, 'Strategic Studies and Its Critics', World Politics, 20, 4, July 1968, p. 593.

24. *Ibid.*

will be in short supply as the competing demands upon nation states take their toll. Students of strategy may find it difficult in the short term to identify direct ways to achieve the often 'nebulous' goals being set for them. In the not too distant future, however, the policy objectives may have been drawn into much sharper focus. But by then what strategic means will be left to face the challenge?

# ARMY PUBLIC RELATIONS:

# THE NEED FOR UNIT INFORMATION OFFICERS

by

Lt B.A. Smith, BA, RNZCT

Lieutenant Smith graduated from OCS(NZ) in December 1988. Her initial appointments included attachment to the Media Support Unit for Ex GOLDEN FLEECE 89 and 2IC, 4 Comp Sqn. In July 1989 she was posted to Army GS as editor of "Fix Bayonets", the predecessor to the current "Army News". Between 1990 and December 1991 Lieutenant Smith served as the Assistant Public Relations Officer (Army) before being posted to STC as the Senior Instructor Catering, the appointment she currently holds. Lieutenant Smith has a BA in Modern Languages and Psychology from the University of Canterbury.

The success of a voluntary system of defence depends largely on the support and encouragement it receives from the Government, the employers and the general public. Without this support, it can never reach a high standard of efficiency, and unless this standard is attained, uneconomic expenditure is involved.

Major General J.E. Duigan
GOC NZ Military Forces
31 July 1937

## INTRODUCTION

### The Need for an Army

The function of the New Zealand Army is to provide operationally ready, self reliant land forces to meet low level contingencies, either independently or as part of a joint or combined force, and a realistic capability to respond with wider force options to threats of greater substance.[1]

Events over the past few months, however, have shown that the Army can no longer take itself for granted. Increasingly, Army's very right to exist as more than a Civil Defence or Home Guard unit is being questioned within Government and the community at large.

---

1. NZ P9, The NZ Army Plan, Part 6, para 1

There exists a need to communicate with, and to educated New Zealanders. Far too often the civilian population is heard to ask 'What does the Army do all day?'. This coupled with the obvious question of 'Why do we need an Army in Peacetime?' brings the Army expenditure vote under intense scrutiny. This, combined with the governmental need to reduce the fiscal deficit and the general reduction in Governement expenditure, has caused an inevitable reduction in Army's budget.

As a result of budgetary reductions, there may be less spent on exercises and other collective training activities. Any such reductions may result in a degradation of essential Army skills. This would not only have a flow on effect to Army's operational efficiency and effectiveness, but would significantly impact upon Army's ability to portray a viable 'image'.

The Army cannot afford to adopt the corporate posture, reasonably common throughout the Army, that we do not have to explain ourselves to the public. Such an attitude is arrogant, specious and dangerous, and is one that Army Public Relations (PR) cannot change without help from Unit Information Officers (UIO's).

<u>The Challenge of Communication</u>.

The Army is facing a major challenge in the field of PR and the essence of that challenge is communication. How can the Army effectively inform and educate society and, just as importantly, our own soldiers, of the Army's worth and its raison d'etre?

Groups such as 'Project X' and 'Just Defence' head a groundswell of public querulousness. Their theories and opinions are fed in the main by ignorance, yet these individuals and organizations question, in varying degrees, the need for an Army in this country. Disadvantageously for the Army, they tend to be given media coverage out of all proportion to either their size or logic. In many cases their arguments for the disestablishment of, or the reduction in spending on, the Army, are based on false assumptions.

Notwithstanding the validity or otherwise of their opinions, they do receive a very public airing. If the 'silent majority' is not aware of the more valid counter arguments, then the 'anti's' gain credibility. New Zealanders from all walks of life are becoming more remote from the Army and it is time to employ service personnel to uplift the public perception of the Army.

The number of politicians eligible to wear the RSA badge has diminished at every election thus reducing the level of informed support within caucus. We have a Defence Minister who is quoted in the 'Dominion' as saying that the focus of the National Government will be 'trimming the infrastructure, disposing of land and buildings, and possibly putting support services out to the private sector.'[2]

---

2. 'Dominion' newspaper dated 20 Sep 1991

Market research, and the Heylen Poll indicate that although 62% of New Zealanders believe it is important to have an Army, only 37% claim to have a working knowledge of its functions.[3] The challenge for Public Relations is to broaden the scope of image and exploit the mediums of transmission.

The public awaits our input but is not prepared to seek it themselves. The Army, therefore, has a responsibility to inform the public, not to mention a vested political stake in encouraging public interest. Army GS' two PR officers cannot hope to successfully cover all areas of the country. Rather, they need PR trained officers who they can rely on for assistance.

## AIM

The aim of this paper is to formulate an Army policy on Unit Information Officers, (UIO's).

## ARMY PUBLIC RELATIONS: THE PLAN

### The Aim of Army PR

The aim of Army Public Relations (PR) is to:

a. present the Army as an integral, essential and useful element of New Zealand society; and

b. to facilitate communication within the Army in order to maintain the morale of soldiers and their dependents.[4]

In theory, Army (PR) is based on the NZ P9, (Part 6), which is the Public Relations Plan. In reality, however, few personnel know that the Plan and its Supplement (Information Officers) exist and few senior officers support the implementation of a cohesive proactive action plan. That aside, the NZ P9 is largely outdated and requires revision.

### Army PR: Fact or Fiction?

The structure of the PR directorate in HQ NZDF consists of an Army Public Relations Officer (PRO) and an Assistant. Joint Service PR officers no longer exist in their respective posts in Auckland and Christchurch due to the recent Budget cuts. The directorate's joint budget that was $800 000 yearly, is now reduced to $80 000 ($68 000 of which is a salary). Consequently, the single services are being asked to fund all single service PR related activities.

---

3. Heylen Poll, 1990

4. Supplement to NZ P9, Part 6

With only two full time personnel working in Army PR, the task of spanning the country is becoming increasingly difficult. It is therefore logical that the provisions of the Supplement to NZ P9, Part 6, paras 4020-4034, are implemented in units throughout the country.

The Unit Information Officer

The Unit Information Officer (UIO) at present is described as responsible to his commander for:

a. establishing and maintaining liaison with the local news media;

b. keeping the media fully conversant on Army matters whenever possible and stimulating favourable publicity for the Army;

c. informing PRO (Army) of all events which might warrant wider national publicity;

d. informing his higher HQ and Army GS of matters which threaten to produce adverse publicity;

e. seeking PR guidance, as required, directly from PRO (Army); and

f. producing suitable articles and photographs of his unit for inclusion in such magazines as 'Reveille' and 'Army News'. These articles should then be forwarded to PRO(A) for editing and onward transmission.[5]

The Difference Between a PRO and an UIO

Within the ambit of the NZDF, the difference between a PRO and an UIO is:

a. the PRO works proactively to positively encourage publicity and good relations between the Army and the public; whilst

b. the UIO is reactive and provides a source of knowledge or the means to a source when required.

The roles of the PRO and UIO and distinctly different, but, are interrelated and due to lack of manpower and more importantly, lack of funding, should become more coordinated.

---

5. Supplement to NZ P9, Part 6

## THE PROBLEM

Although the guidelines on UIO's are written in NZ P9, the sad reality is that very little attention has been paid to this specific order. On a recent Regular Force, Grade Three Staff and Tactics course, only one out of 18 officers was aware of the NZ P9 and the requirement for UIO's. On a School of Military Intelligence course no one from a class of 14 SNCO's and junior officers knew of the Plan's existence. This is a sad indictment on a system that repeatedly criticizes the reactive PR content of the newspapers, and yet does not show enough upper management dedication to implement a simple and effective PR strategy that begins in the base unit.

The fundamental obstacle, therefore, is the difficulty the Army has in accepting the preception concept. Within the concept lies the premise that no matter how genuinely professional the Army is, the public image will be shaped by media stereotypes and hackneyed anecdotes. The challenge is to arrest this trend.

## THE SOLUTION

The solution, very simply, is to direct senior commanders to appoint personnel as UIO's for their respective units. Direction for Army GS, namely that of the Chief of General Staff, (CGS), will be vital to this end as experience has shown that the higher echelon managers have not adhered to the PR Plan in the past. In fact, when UIO's were called for to assist the 'Army News' team, nominations were very slow to arrive at Army GS. These officers were also restricted solely to writing articles for 'Army News'.

### Individual Training

Within the Officer Corps, training in PR awareness is virtually non existent. It is first introduced at Grade Three Staff and Tactics level and gets very little coverage on more senior courses. Last year it did not feature on the Regular Force Grade Two Staff and Tactics course at all. Ideally then, the PRO (Army) in conjuction with the Commandant of the Officer Cadet School, (NZ), should co-ordinate PR and media training at the Officer Cadet School. This should be followed up by at least a two hour lecture to all Junior Officer courses.

Having established a coordinated plan that requires little if any funding or loss of training time, unit commanders should appoint suitable senior Captains/Lieutenants who are to be trained by a PR firm in PR/media awareness. Not only would they initially train the UIO's but they could also monitor progress made by these officers both externally and internally. This will mean setting aside funding and mandays to meet the requirement, but the selected officers should emerge capable of expounding the merits of the New Zealand Army into the 1990's.

Those personnel who are appointed as UIO's should attend PR courses run by external PR consultancy firms which would run for at least two days in camp. They would be followed by visits to local media organizations such as newspapers, radio, and television stations.

Advantageously for Army, once such training was completed, these officers would then be competent to lecture to their own units about the benefits of proactive PR. Over time therefore, a reservoir of PR-aware officers, both Territorial and Regular Force, would increase.

Target Groups

Target groups in the community would be as directed by Army GS. Senior officers would be responsible for contacting parliamentarians and corporate heads at the national and formation level. This would have a trickle on effect to UIO's who would be seen at camp and unit level to be responsible for the education of regional heads, local government, provincial bodies, welfare organizations, community groups, media organizations and schools.

Command and Control

Every level of command must be given the scope to plan and implement the development of UIO posts. Given a coordinated PR plan and a degree of planning, officers would then be accountable for their efforts. All ranks would thus become aware of the implications of their actions.

An Ongoing Process

Having implemented a structural PR plan with UIO activities overseen by PRO (Army), commanders must ensure that follow up assessment is carried out. The effectiveness and acceptance of such a plan must be continually monitored and the results evaluated, preferably by an external PR firm against a criterion set by Army GS, and chosen in consultation with CGS and Army PRO.

If successful, this plan will provide a group of PR-aware UIO's who can be called upon to facilitate the everyday passage of information not only to the public, but also internally to the servicemen. They can also be called upon to assist major exercises such as Exercise GOLDEN FLEECE, Pacific Shield and Ivanhoe.

## CONCLUSIONS

There are mixed perceptions of the Army in the community. We do not exist to be popular. We exist for a fundamentally valid social reason and unit commanders should be aware of the tendency to merely 'image polish'. We must ourselves be fully aware and convinced of our mission. Much media activity to date for the New Zealand Army has concentrated on recruiting and, whilst

effective, has neglected to inform the public of the true merit and inherent beliefs of the Army. As such, the opportunity to gain public support has not been maximised. Image management is fragmented and uncoordinated.

With dedicated UIO's, the Army can begin to inform the public on Defence and Army matters. A developed plan would raise the credibility of the Army by conveying exactly how Army is structured to achieve and meet the objectives as laid down by Government. In coordination with Army PR in Wellington, UIO's could actively target community groups and individuals. UIO's should not regard this as an extra regimental duty, but should apply themselves to making this job a vital part of their role.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommendations are that:

a. CGS directs his senior commanders to enforce the Supplement to NZ P9, Part 6, paras 4020-4034;

b. Army approaches a selected PR firm with the view to introducting PR awareness courses for UIO's;

c. the NZ P9 be revised to reflect the current environment and include policy directives on the implementation of UIO's;

d. UIO's be appointed at unit and camp levels;

e. PRO(Army) co-ordinates all training and activities of the UIO's;

f. funding, manpower and mandays be allocated for the successful accreditation of UIO's;

g. follow-up accountability studies are carried out on UIO's and their units; and

h. internal PR awareness be developed to assist the UIO's.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. PR and the Achievement of Organizational goals, RPINZ, 1990.

B. Nicholas D., The Services and the Media: Thoughts of the Future. ADF, 1989.

C. Hooper A., The Military and the Media. ADF, 1986.

D. The Defence of New Zealand; A Policy Paper. 1991.

E. Huston J.E., Public Relations; The Way Ahead. ADJ, No 84, 1990.

F. Garnett J.A., The Army's PR Challenge on Public Perception, NZ Army Journal, No 4, 1987.

G. Mortlock R., Steady Under Fire. Army News, 1990.

H. NZ P10. Annex C to part 2 to Chap 1.

I. Media Watch. Vol 1, No 1, Nov, 1990.

J. Johnson A.G., PR in the NZ Army. Army PR, 1991.

K. Hales D., Defence PR Review. 1991.

L. NZ Army Coordinated Image and Recruiting. Carlton and Carruthers, 1990.

M. Martin R., Definition of PR. Link Consultants, 1990.

N. Fry P.J., NZDF PR Policy. 1990.

# INTEGRATION OF THE AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE FORCES

by

Major C.P. Richardson, BA(Mil), psc (AS), ANZIM, RNZSigs

Major Richardson graduated from RMC Duntroon in December 1981. He has held appointments as Troop Commander, Operations Officer and Officer Commanding 3 Signal Squadron, as well as Second In Command Ready Reaction Force Support Unit. These were interspersed with staff appointments in Headquarters 3 Task Force and Signals Directorate, Army General Staff. Between 1985 and 1987 he served on exchange with the British 4th Armoured Division Headquarters and Signal Regiment in Germany. He is currently Chief Instructor at the School of Signals.

## INTRODUCTION

New Zealand and Australia have much in common as a result of history and parallel development. Both were colonised by the British in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and adopted the Westminster system of parliamentary democracy on obtaining self government. Both nations also recognized that they could not be independent in defence matters and until WWII relied on Britain for collective security arrangements. Following the fall of Singapore this role fell to the United states, and the ANZUS Treaty formalized this tripartite security arrangement in 1951. On the basis of these shared perceptions of security needs, both defence forces also developed in parallel, fighting, training exercising together on a regular basis. By international standards each is small but well trained and comparatively well equipped with a high degree of commonality in doctrine and equipment. Both nations, however have economic problems and funding adequate defence forces has become increasingly difficult.

The perception of shared heritage, history of defence co-operation and financial pressures, has led to the suggestion of integrating the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF)[1]. Integrating the two forces would see them combined into a single entity.[2] There is public support for the idea and some evident benefits to be gained, but close analysis reveals some significant barriers. Whilst the two nations have co-operated and collaborated in defence matters throughout their short histories, they have also exhibited a number of divergent attitudes and perceptions. Most recently New Zealand has adopted

---

1. J. Pallot, 'Cautious Approach to Change' Asia Pacific Defence Reporter, June 1991, p.33.

2. The Concise Oxford Dictionary, 7th Edn, Clarendon Press.

policies which affect the relationship of the ANZUS alliance, and the perceived interests of Australia. A central issue in the trans-Tasman relationship has always been the sovereign independence and interests of each nation. The right to utilize armed forces to guarantee sovereignty is fundamental to nationhood. This paper will evaluate the prospective advantages of integrating the two defence forces and also highlight the barriers to the concept.

## AIM

The aim of this paper is to examine the concept of integrating the Australian and New Zealand Defence Forces.

## Motivation for Integration

New Zealand and Australia are both facing difficult economic times, with small levels of growth, high unemployment and both pay a large portion of revenue to service overseas debts. There is increasing pressure on both governments to balance their budgets and both are tackling domestic spending. As a result the ADF has been restricted to 0% real growth, whilst New Zealand has cut defence spending significantly. The latter will drop to 1.8% of GDP by 1993, as compared to 2.1% in 1987.[3] Although both defence forces are significant in the South Pacific, each is small and neither represents a substantial force within the Asian region.[4] Furthermore, restrictions on funding make maintenance of even the current force levels and capabilities difficult. Combined however the two defence forces represent not only a credible force, but are preceived as having the potential to make savings and economies through integration.

A Credible Force. A major motivator for integration of the defence forces is therefore to provide the basis of a credible force, which would improve the military standing of both nations. Once integrated all three services would have a greater pool of equipment, much of which is common to both nations. That which is not common, but maintained as an independent capability, would contribute to a better rounding of the total force. Additionally larger pools of specialist manpower would be available and, at the officer grades in particular these personnel have high levels of commonality in training. The existing large degree of common doctrine and procedure would make practical implementation very easy. By the removal of duplicated infastructure, and rationalisation of employment, more personnel could be concentrated in deployable forces, rather than support elements.

---

3. W. Cooper, Ministerial Statement: Improving the Operational Edge as Defence Slims Down, Minister of Defence, Wellington, 30 July 1991, p.1.

4. The final recognition of this was the withdrawal of New Zealand Force South East Asia from Singapore. T-D Young, 'ANZUS: Requiescat in Pace', Working Paper 189, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, 1989, p.7.

In effect the ADF would gain a 20% increment, whilst New Zealand would have access to a force six times larger than present, based on current force strengths.

Economies and Savings

The second and perhaps prime motivation for integration is the potential for financial economies and savings. Along with the actual ease of integration, these would result from the existing high levels of commonality in the ADF and NZDF. Common equipments are currently maintained separately and training is duplicated at many levels by each country. Combining the major item fleets (such as the C-130, PC-3 and ANZAC Frigates) would lower the overall numbers held for maintenance pools, thus increasing task availability, fleet efficienty and therefore overall capability.[5] Training integration would be effective as there is no need to duplicate training schools and depots. The greater size of an integrated force would also lead to economies of scale, especially in purchasing new equipments and the application of funding. Increased numbers of standard equipments, to be purchased through a single contract, should lower unit prices. Larger, single base facilities should be better equipped and produce savings from efficiencies in maintenance and handling, whilst research and development would benefit considerably from a single, cohesive effort. These financial savings and efficiencies make integration appear attractive as defence funding could be capped or reduced without the loss of capabilities.

These potential economies are, however, already undermined by a number of factors. For reasons of interoperability New Zealand already purchases much of her equipment from Australia. In doing so, she accepts the production premiums involved and contributes to development costs. Since the ANZUS split this tendency has increased (Hamel guns, Steyr rifles, ANZAC Frigates)[6] and could be expected to continue. Another problem is that some aircraft (PC-3 and C-130) have differing build standards, preventing immediate integration of maintenance and spares. It should also be noted that training duplications are already being addressed, particularly for pilots. New Zealand's decision to purchase fast jet trainers is difficult to justify unless they are to be utilized by more than the small number of pilots trained for the RNZAF. Lastly, although there is some combined planning for contingencies, such as the evacuation of nationals, there are no current duplications of operational effort (ie. no common borders) and hence no potential savings there.

---

5.

6. Agreement Between Austalia and New Zealand Concerning Collaboration in the Aquisition of Surface Combatants for the Royal Australian Navy and the Royal New Zealand Navy (ANZAC Frigates Agreement), Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, 14 Dec 89.

In fact, far from gaining, Australia may actually be disadvantaged financially by integration. The small increases to the overall force size must be balanced against the approaching obsolescence of some of New Zealand's major equipments.[7] In addition there is little likelihood that the New Zealand government will increase defence funding under a collective arrangement, though she currently spends proportionally less than Australia. The burden of defence funding would therefore fall disproportionately on the Australian taxpayer, which would probably prove unacceptable. Far from being an incentive to integration, financial considerations may actually prove a barrier, from the Australian perspective at least.

## HISTORY AND PERCEPTIONS

The historical precedents for integration can be strongly argued. Australian colonies sent troops to fight in the Maori wars; both dominions sent troops to the Boer War. The two nations trace their births under fire to Gallipoli with the ANZACs and later in Mesopotamia they combined to establish the Desert Mounted Corps. In WWII our divisions fought together in Greece under Australian command and on Crete with New Zealand leadership. Korea, Malaya and Borneo all saw the ANZAC tradition continued and in South Vietnam New Zealand sub-units were integrated into the Australian brigade[8]. This commonality of experience and history of co-operation shows that the two countries can, and have, integrated their forces successfully. Mutual appreciation of the strengths of each others personnel and training characteristics has resulted,[9] so that the two nations and defence forces, feel bound by their common heritages, reinforced in war.

Regardless, however, of the ANZAC spirit and this close defence relationship, there have also been occasions when the two nations have disagreed over defence matters. In WWII, following Japan's entry into the war, Australia withdrew its veteran divisions from the Middle East to fight in the Pacific. New Zealand, while facing the same Japanese threat, was convinced to leave her division in the desert and subsequently to fight in Italy. At the time this caused friction with the Australian Government, which believed New Zealand should have followed their example.

The concept that New Zealand and Australia are a single entity, geographiçally or economically, is overstated. Despite moves to Closer Economic Relations (CER) and other efforts to streamline economic co-operation, there is increasing divergence between the two.[10] This is a function of geographic positioning and

---

7. The Defence of New Zealand: A Policy Paper, GP Print Ltd.

8. Sentiments echosed by Senator Ray's spokesman quoted in D. Connolly, op cit. and from New Zealand by P. Charlton, 'Why Kiwis Would be Lousy Aussies', Herald Sun (Vic), 6 August 1991, p.12.

9. F. Cranston, 'Fusion of the Defence Forces Gains Support', Canberra Times, 2 August 1991, p.8.

10. P. Charlton, op cit.

population composition and attitudes. In defence considerations Australia is being drawn to concentrate on its near north, where it assesses there is an obvious approach and therefore the greatest potential for a threat to develop. Australian immigrants continue to have predominantly European backgrounds, despite the regional proximity of Asia. This has led to an outsider mentality, not aided by the unwillingness of some Asian nations to accept Australia as part of South East Asia. New Zealand, surrounded by one of the largest air sea gaps in the world,[11] is wholly within the Pacific and has large indigenous and immigrant Polynesian populations.[12] As a result of these factors significant elements of New Zealand society identify directly with the Pacific, which is reflected in Government policy and defence orientation.[13]

## THE BARRIERS TO INTEGRATION

### The Nuclear Issue

The clearest recent example of divergent defence perceptions has been the New Zealand Anti-Nuclear legislation. By denying port access to naval vessels that will not clearly state that they are neither nuclear propelled nor armed, the United States asserts that New Zealand is in breach of her ANZUS Treaty obligations. Both the US and Australia have insisted that if New Zealand does not modify or rescind these policies then she cannot function as a full member of the alliance.[14]

The anti-nuclear legislation is therefore a barrier to the concept of integration. The US could not treat the combined defence force as a full ally, whilst dealing with the New Zealand Governemnt on a different level.[15] On integration either Australia would lose its relationship with the US, or New Zealand would have to modify its policies beforehand. The former is unlikely and would seem to be neither fair, nor a balanced trade.[16] The latter would mean New Zealand entering the

---

11. The Defence of New Zealand: A Policy Paper, p.17.

12. Maoris currently comprise about 10% of the population and Pacific islanders a further 3% 'New Zealand in Outline'.

13. Leader of the NZ Opposition Mr M. Moore quoted in M. Metherell, 'NZ Politicians Split on Idea of Amalgamation with Australia', The Age, 24 July 1991, p.5.

14. The Defence of New Zealand: A Policy Paper, p.27. and there seems to be no relaxation of this stance per 'US Quashes Hopes of NZ ANZUS Ties', The Age, 7 August 1991.p.7.

15. P. Jennings, 'The Armed Forces of New Zealand and the ANZUS Split: Costs and Consequences. 'Occasional Paper No. 4. New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Wellington, 1988, p.72.

16. T-D. Young, op cit., p.17.

integrated defence force relationship by surrending aspects of the ability to conduct sovereign policy.

Sovereignty

'The prime interest of any country...must be maintaining its physical integrity and sovereignty.' 'Sovereignty is a broader concept than physical security-implying independence of basic political decision-making, and the free evolution of a society without external duress...'[17] The defence forces are the final deterrent which prevent a nation being physically threatened or otherwise forced to surrender sovereignty. Defence is therefore integral to the conduct of foreign policy.[18] Integration of their defence forces would therefore prevent both New Zealand and Australia from freely conducting individual foreign and defence policies.

Superficially, New Zealand politicians may find this acceptable. Without the benefit of the collective security previously provided by ANZUS, New Zealand has already accepted that it has become increasingly dependent upon Australia in defence matters. In addition the NZDF is perceived as increasingly incapable of maintaining even the limited range of capabilities it currently possesses.[19] With such perceptions the concept of integration with an existing major partner, into a credible force, represents an improvement. This may well account for the muted approval that the concept recently received from New Zealand's Minister of Defence.[20]

New Zealand would, however, lose much by such an arrangement; she is smalier than New South Wales and has less population.[21] Australia would therefore have a dominant role in defence, and consequently foreign policy, whilst New Zealand would have informally surrendered sovereignty to an extent that would relegate her to the approximate status of a State. In 1898 New Zealand decided to remain independent and therefore did not attend the Federal Convention. The two nations have maintained independence by choice, have conducted different policies in the past and majority public opinion in both countries continues to oppose political union.[22] Maintenance of sovereignty is therefore a final barrier to the concept of integrating the two defence forces.

---

17. G. Evans, Australia's Regional Security' Ministry of Trade and Foreign Affairs, canberra, 1989, p.1.

18. The Defence of New Zealand: A Policy Paper, p.7.

19. J. Beaglehole, 'Not One of the Family Any More', Asia-Pacific Defence Review, Annual Reference Edn, 1991, p.30.

20. M. Metherell, op cit.

21. P. Charlton, op cit.

22. M. Metherell, op cit. p.5.

## A WAY AHEAD

Having established that full integration is not an acceptable solution to current defence needs, there is nothing to prevent extremely close co-operation that stops just short of it. 'Complementarity' is a phrase recently coined to describe this concept. It involves maintaining high levels of compatibility and interoperability, but where there are individual capabilities these should use each force's strengths, concentrating on what each does best.[23] For example the New Zealand A4-K Skyhawk fleet fills a deficiency currently felt in the Australian force structure, as recognized by the recent basing of a flight of these aircraft at Nowra.[24] By coordinating capabilities and training, the total force mix is more 'rounded'. Where the two Governments agree, the scope for operational co-operation is therefore increased.

Close co-operation still allows each nation to maintain independent forces, capable of operation in support of sovereign interests. Those areas not critical to the maintenance of independent operations, particularly training, maintenance and procurement, can be combined. Thus the efficiencies and economies, through the removal of unnecessary duplications, will be gained whilst the sovereignty of both nations is maintained.[25]

## CONCLUSIONS

The economies and force effectiveness that could be generated by integrating and ADF and NZDF is superficially attractive. There are duplications and structural ineffiencies that are hard to justify, and expensive to maintain, within the limited resources that two small nations can apply to defence spending. These inefficiencies are accentuated by escalating technology and manpower costs, growing perceptions of force inadequacy regionally and increased pressure for government funding in other areas. By comparison integration offers economies of scale and effort, to produce a synergistically better range of capabilities and a larger force for the same or less cost. As a result of strong perceptions of common heritage, combined with a long history of effective military co-operation, there is public support in both countries for the concept. New Zealand might, however, have to increase spending to carry its share of the burden.

---

23. 'Ministers See Closer NZ, Australia Links', Army News, Wellington, Issue 19, 7 August 1991, p.3.

24. Agreement Between the Government of Australia and the Government of New Zealand Concerning Royal New Zealand Air Force Skyhawk Involvement in Australian Defence Force Air Defence Flying Support, Department of Foreign Affairs and

25. The Defence of New Zealand: A Policy Paper, GP Print Ltd.

In practical military terms, there would be little difficulty with executing the concept. Procedures, doctrine and many equipments are common between the ADF and NZDF. There are no language, and only small cultural, barriers to overcome. The shared military history of the two forces, combined with years of healthy respect for each others ability. It has been proven that the two forces can integrate elements and operate successfully with very little preparation.

The critical barrier to integration remains the issue of sovereignty. Despite heritage, history and current economic integration initiatives, the populations of both countries remain opposed to political union. As sovereign states there have been instances of significant policy differences, most recently illustrated by the New Zealand Anti-Nuclear legislation and its effect on ANZUS. This creates an immediate barrier to integration because the two Governments have different relationships with the United States. In turn this illustrates that, for integration to be truly effective, both countries would have to synchronize policies over a wider range than just defence, constituting a compromise of sovereignty for both. Therefore whilst close co-operation and maintenance of complementary forces is justified, full integration of the ADF and NZDF is not practicable.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are therefore made:

a. Australia and New Zealand continue to maintain national defence forces, capable of independent operation and deployment, to meet the respective sovereign needs of each country.

b. The ADF and NZDF continue their close co-operation (including training, doctrine development and equipment procurement) to ensure that, where deemed necessary by their respective Governments, they may rapidly and effectively combine.

c. Investigation continue to identify those non-operational areas where duplication is unnecessary, and integration of resources can be achieved without compromising the ability for either force to deploy and operate.

d. In cases where commonality of capability or equipment is not essential, then both countries deliberately co-ordinate their force compositions to provide a complementary force mix.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

Beaglehole J., 'Not One of the Family Any More', Asia-Pacific Defence Review, Annual Reference Edition, 1991, p.30.

Charlton P., 'Why Kiwis Would Be Lousy Aussies', Herald Sun (Vic), 6 August, 1991, p.12.

Cranston F., 'Fusion of the Defence Forces Gains Support', Canbera Times, 2 August 1991, p.8.

Connoly A., 'An ANZAC Army in 20 Years', Tele. Mirror (NSW), 24 July 1991.

Metherell M., 'NZ Politicians Split on Idea of Amalgamation with Australia', The Age, 24 July 1991, p.5.

Pallot J., 'Cautious Approach to Change' Asia Pacific Defence Reporter, June 1991, p.33.

'Ministers See Closer NZ, Australia Links', Army News, Wellington, Issue 19, 7 August 1991, p.3.

'US Quashes Hopes of NZ ANZUS Ties', The Age, 7 August 1991, p.7.

Cooper W., Ministerial Statement: Improving the Operational Edge as defence Slims Down, Minister of Defence, Wellington, 30 July 1991.

Evans G., Australia's Regional Security' Ministry of Trade and Foreign Affiars, Canberra, 1989.

Jennings P., 'The Armed Forces of New Zealand and the ANZUS Split: Costs and Consequences.' Occasional Paper No. 4. New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Wellington, 1988.

Young T-D., 'ANZUS: Requiescat in Pace', Working Paper 189, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, canberra, 1989.

Agreement Between the Government of Australia and the Government of New Zealand Concerning Royal New Zealand Air Force Skyhawk Involvement in Australian Defence Force Air Defence Flying Support, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, 13 July 1990.

The Defence of New Zealand: A Policy Paper, GP Print Ltd, Wellington, 1991.

'New Zealand in Outline', Ministry of Foreign Affairs Pamphlet, Wellington, 1987.

The Concise Oxford Dictionary, 7th Edn, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984.

# REPAIRABLES IN THE NEW ZEALAND ARMY

by

Major J.R. Bryant, BSC, NZCE, psc, RNZEME

Major John Bryant graduated from OCS Portsea in December 1977 into the Royal New Zealand Electrical and Mechanical Engineers. He has held the usual variety of appointments including the RAEME Training Centre at Bandiana, Australia. He was posted as Chief Instructor School of Electrical and Mechanical Engineering in 1984, and in 1986 served for seven months with NZCMFO in the Sinai as the Senior Staff Officer (Maint). Major Bryant served in staff appointments at Army GS and HQ Spt Comd before being posted to UN PROFOR in Yugoslavia in January 1992. He is currently convalescing following injuries sustained in the course of his duties with the UN.

## INTRODUCTION

In the NZ Army, the general policy relating to equipment repair and maintenance is contained in DM 52 Manual of Stores Administration and Management, Defence Council Orders (Army) Volume 1 (DCO(A) Vol 1), and the Australian Army Doctrine for Operations as detailed in the Manual of Land Warfare (MLW) series of publications. The specific repair and maintenance policy for most major items of equipment is laid down in Equipment Management Policy Statements (EMPS) issued for each individual item of equipment or group of equipment.

Essentially, there are two options when an assembly or component fails: replace it with a new item or repair the old one. In general, complete equipment items, engines, major assemblies and circuit boards tend to be maintained by the repair and replacement of components. For minor assemblies either option may be practicable.

Very few detailed guidelines actually exist within NZ Army policy documentation to cover the repair of specific assemblies. General guidelines are given in DM52, DCO(A) Vol 1, and the Australian MLW publications. Some assemblies are simply not economic to repair, others require the repair to be carried out in specific repair agencies because of a need to utilize special tools and test equipment. Others, being in short supply, are required to be repaired regardless of cost. Most are actually subject to repair at the repair agency's own discretion because of the lack of specific direction.

## AIM

The aim of this paper is to identify improvements that can be made to the management of repairables in the New Zealand Army.

## SCOPE

### General

This paper will study Army policy and technical documentation (where it exists). Consideration will also be given to staff and command relationships as they effect the management of repairables and components. Problem areas will be identified and solutions proposed where they are practical, and within the limitations and assumptions outlined below.

### Assumptions

The first assumption is that the Army has a very real limitation on resource allocation. This is not likely to change in the short and even medium term and means that whatever solutions are proposed by this study, they must be capable of implementation without the application of extra resources (other than those which are already in the process of implementation).

The second assumption relates to operational doctrine. Operational doctrine in the New Zealand Army for the repair of equipment is tied directly to that of the Australian Army. New Zealand Army establishments and equipment levels are directly tied to its operational doctrine. Although the New Zealand Armed Forces will have a capability to operate independently to counter low level contingencies, they will probably act in concert with Australian Armed Forces[1]. The assumption is therefore made that this fundamental operational doctrine is not able to be changed.

RNZAF doctrine, which is based on fundamentally different lines and grades of repair, is therefore not considered for comparative purposes in this paper[2].

## TERMINOLOGY

Definition. The DM 52 defines repairables as 'items which have been subjected to preliminary inspection by authorised technicians and definitely need repair, laundering, drycleaning etc., to bring them to the condition of serviceable[3]'.

Categorization. Categorization is the process of determining whether an item is to be subject to maintenance by repair, or by replacement. Unfortunately, little specific guidance is currently given to repair agencies. These agencies have to rely on the list of spare parts they may requisition which is given in

---

1. New Zealand Government, Defence of New Zealand - Review of Defence Policy 1987, Government Printer, Wellington, 1987, p 38.

2. For a study into tri-service repair rationalization in the New Zealand Armed Forces: see haynes, Major D.M.A. Monash Paper, Equipment Repair in the New Zealand Armed Forces, 1988.

3. DM 52 Manual of Stores Accounting and Management, Annex A, p A-22.

the Repair Parts Scale (RPS) for an item of equipment, the tools and technical publications they have available to carry out a repair task. The spare parts available to a repair agency are also supplemented by the general categorization of stores by type of unit, including expendables[4]. Specific guidance should be provided in Chapter 40, Part 4 of DCO(A) Vol 1, which is meant to cover Material Classification and parts Change. Unfortunately, this chapter of Vol 1 has yet to be written.

Common Descriptions. Within the overall class of repairables there are the following frequently used expressions:

a. Major Unit Assemblies/Rotables. Major unit assemblies/rotables are generally regarded as principal assemblies which are generally serial numbered and are only caplble of being overhauled at Base Level. They are generally mechanical in nature and are increasingly being overhauled on a planned repair basis.

b. Minor Assemblies. Minor assemblies are generally subject to repair as follows:

(1) Technical Assemblies. Technical assembly repairs are generally non-planned.

(2) Vehicle Assemblies. Vehicle assemblies are inreasingly subject to planned repair at base level, but are still often done at field level.

c. Line Replaceable Units (LRU) and Centralized Repair Items (CENTREM). LRUs and CENTREMs are an important subset and the latter are subject to special handling regulations[5]. Unfortunately, the control mechanisms which were in DCO(A) Vol 1 some years ago were removed, and have never been replaced. In-house fighting between RNZEME and RNZSigs Directorates has prevented this from occuring, and no formal policy now exists with regard to these items. by definition, LRUs are replaced at first line and, usually, repaired at second line, often by replacing sub-assemblies, CENTREMS, and motherboards etc. These in turn are then repaired at fourth line (1 Base Workshop) or by contractors. Policy should be resurrected for these items.

## MANAGEMENT

### Management Information

---

4. Defence Council Orders (Army), Volume 1 (DCO(A) Vol 1), Annex B.

5. RNZEME Instruction NZP 98 R 019 Series.

Logistic Management Information System (LMIS). 'In order to improve performance, it is first necessary to measure it.'[6] Currently, Defence Supply System Devleopment (DSSD) can give only limited information regarding stores holdings and classifications[7]. For example DSSD will only list stores held in supply unit stock accounts, and not in any other unit account. The Army's LMIS and its proposed link with DSSD provides an excellent opportunity to redress some of the previously identified deficiences in relation to the management of repairable items by collating data which will enable the measurement of a number of equipment management parameters. The aim of the LMIS project is to 'develop and implement an equipment management and maintenance data base system which will integrate and automate equipment management, equipment maintenance, procurement and project functions at all command and control levels'[8].

Management Responsibilities

Responsibilities for the management of repairables are as follows:

a. Commodity Managers (CMs). An item's CM is the Army Material Agency (AMA) Staff officer ultimately responsible to Col Log in Army General Staff (AGS) for that item's overall repair policy. An example job description for a CM is attached at Annex B. A CM is responsible for decisions concerning:

(1) which items are to be repaired (and, by implication, which are to be maintained by replacement);

(2) the rate of repair of items; and

(3) the use of funding allocated for the in-service support of his equipment.

b. In practice, CMs tend to be involved with repairables by exception, concentrating on those which are causing immediate problems. Reasons why CMs may take a personal interest in repairables include poor reliability, inadequate R&M Pools, too long a regeneration loop, inadequate funding, inadequate supplies of spare parts or loss of visibility of critical assets. The Base Repair Planning Committee (BRPC) planning action, in

---

6. Touche Ross Management consultants (UK). British 1A Report; D/QM/2672/3/1 dated 14 June 1989, p. 42, para 4.3.1.

7. See DSSD Customer Guide, DSSD Project Team, Apr 1990 for details of the information available on DSSD.

8. DEME 1951/1 dated 21 Dec 89, para 17.

particular can play a large part in determining regeneration loop times. In general, all of these factors are likely to affect the operational availabilty of the host equipment. Other factors that may lead to the direct involvment of CMs include safety, training requirements and exceptional item value.

c. The 1 Base Supply Battalion Supply Item Managers (SIMs). The SIMs at 1 Base Supply Battalion should be responsible to the relevant CMs for managing repairable items in the supply system which are not designated as Controlled Stores. No formal terms of reference exist for any technical direction link between the CMs and the SIMs, and their relationship is currently very unclear[9]. The SIMs are however responsible for ensuring that adequate stocks of ordinary repairables are held by actioning reorder reports as they are generated by DSSR/DSSD. In practice, the SIMs exercise the responsibility for a wide range of items and expand the detailed interpretation of the CM's general policies outlined in EMPSs.

d. The Technical Services Staff Officers (TSSOs). TSSOs are responsible for the preparation of the Maintenance Support Plan for new equipment, including recommending a repair policy. This plan may include the need for having equipment repaired overseas[10], the requirement for a R&M Pool, and the need for fourth line repair resources. During the in-service life of the equipment, engineering support problems are also required to be resolved and the TSSO are called upon to examine the engineering support implications of defects[11,12] modifications[13,14,15], mid-life overhauls, mid-life improvements and run-on.

## ROUTES TAKEN BY REPAIRABLES

There are a number of routes by which different repairables go round the regeneration loop. The routes taken will depend on a number of factors such as:

---

9. 1 Base Supply Battalion 45230-1 Ops dated 7 Sep 90, para 2.

10. NZ P98 op cit, Instruction M 160, Issue 2 dated Apr 88.

11. DCO(A) Vol 1 op cit, Chap 15, Sect 13.

12. NZ P98 op cit, Instruction M 300 dated Apr 88.

13. DCO(A) Vol 1 op cit, Chap 4, Sect 14.

14. NZ P98 op cit, Instruction M551, Issue 5 dated Sep 86.

15. Ibid, Instruction M552, Issue 3 dated Dec 89.

a. the nature of failure;

b. the repair policy[16];

c. the location of Special Tools and Test Equipment (STTE), for both diagnostic and repair action, and technical expertise; and

d. the requirement for tracking each item[17].

General Route. The general route taken may be summarised as follows:

a. At the point of failure, a repairable is examined by the unit attached tradesman/Light Aid Detachment (LAD)/workshop, and repaired if possible. The decision is based on the EMPS (which lays down the general repair policy for each type of equipment), the availability of STTE, technical documentation, and the judgment of the technician[18]. If spares are not available, a unit will await spares for a period consistent with the unit's 'date required by' or by the Repair Priority Matrix contained in DCO(A) vol 1, Chapter 15.

b. Items which are Beyond Local Repair (BLR) at first line will be backloaded to either second, third, or fourth line repair agencies depending on the policy contained in EMPS. The decision criteria are similar to those at the first line.

c. Items which are Beyond Economical Repair (BER)[19] at first line will be written-off and disposed of in accordance with EMPS or policy contained in Vol 1 where no EMPS exists.

d. Items which are backloaded beyond second line are collected in RSDS of 1 Base Supply Battalion (1 BSB). Here they are identified, brought to account, checked (eg for Complete Equipment Schedule (CES)), batched and eventually loaded via the BRPC onto 1 Base Workshop for repair or condemnation. The only exceptions to this are where equipment has been designated for repair either overseas or under contract. In these circumstances, 1 BSB loads the item accordingly.

---

16. DCO(A) Vol 1 op cit, Chap 25, Sect 4.

17. Ibid, Chap 37.

18. Manual of Land Warfare, Part Two, Volume One, Pamphlet 1 (MLW Pt 2, Vol 1, Pam 1), p 4-1, para 4.2.

19. DM 52 op cit, para 17001.

Variations. There are a number of possible variations on the general regeneration loop. These variations include any case where there is a need for certain equipment to be repaired:

a. under warranty;

b. by a civilian agency, either in[20] or out[21] of NZ;

c. regardless of cost[22];

d. utilising specialized equipment; or

e. utilising repair expertise or tools etc which only exist in particular repair agencies.

## PLANNING AND CONTROL

### Staff Control

Stock Visibility. Control of repairable items is made more difficult than it need be by the fact that repairable items may be held in different configurations under different Nato Stock Number (NSN). For example, an M113 Engine has one NSN as an assembly on its own, and another when it is in its special shipping container, as it usually is when stored and supplied. Different items also have differing controls[23]. Unserviceable items are 'invisible' to the supply system until such time as they are manually brought back on charge. Stock in transit and items under repair action also suffer a lack of visibility and progress status. The British Army has long experienced the same sort of problem[24]. LMIS will enhance stock visibility and control if it can be successfully linked to DSSD.

Stock Control. With the exception of those complete or major items of equipment which are currently controlled through the Army Equipment Management system (AEMS), stock control is by quantity and not by serial number. This means that individual items cannot be tracked down in the regeneration loop and visibility is compeltely lost once a fit item has been issued to a unit. Theoretically, this also means that a specific item could be issued to a repair agency and never actually repaired, whilst a flow of future carcasses or repaireable assemblies masked its effective loss.

---

20. DCO(A) Vol 1 op cit, Chap 25, Sect 9.

21. NZ P98 op cit, Instruction M160, Issue 2 dated Apr 88.

22. DM 52 op cit, para 17001(c).

23. DCO(A) Vol 1 op cit, Chap 4 Sect 2.

24. Touche Ross op cit, para 4.1.5.

Configuration Control. The retention by repair agencies of repairable carcasses adds to the delay of repair within the regeneration loop and is also symptomatic of a configuartion control problem currently being experienced by the NZ Army. This problem is similar in nature to one of the configuartion control problems currently being experienced by the Australian Army[25]. The problem leads to a higher number of repairables being required in the logistic pipeline, thus requiring more scarce capital resources. Carcasses of repairable itms are often held by repair agencies until the arrival of a replacement item, so that any parts missing or different from that carcass being replaced may be changed over at the time. The Mercedes Benz Build Standard Team for example, has found that workshops hold onto Unimog engine carcasses because new and unused replacement engines have left hand drive throttle linkages fitted rather than the right hand drive ones required for New Zealand Army Mercedes trucks. Furthermore, these new engines are missing two of the engine mount rubbers. Configuration control has a large number of other associated problems which require addressing but their detail is outside the scope of this paper.

CMs' and SIMs' Access to Information. CMs and SIMs have access to the information separately held by DSSD and LMIS to assist them in the detailed management of repairables. DSSD has so far been unable to link directly with LMIS and hence much of the potential for integrated information cannot yet be realised. These systems, if and when they are integrated, will redress some of the previously identified deficiencies in the Army's previous logistic management information systems. LMIS for example, if it can be directly linked to DSSD, will allow a CM or SIM to track repairables by serial number. This would enable a better ability to monitor modification states and configuration control, as well as providing some basic data from which RAM statistics could be drawn and used by CMs. No RAM system previously existed for CMs to use, other than the obsolete Army Defect Reporting System (ADRS).

Management and Planning

Base Repair Planning. Base Repair Planning is conducted on two levels. The scheduling and prioritization of equipment for repair or overhaul is a staff responsibility. This is currently vested in the BRPC, but is subject to confirmation by D Log Ops in AGS. Management of each repair or overhaul, once its priority has actually been set, is the responsibility of 1 Base Workshop[26].

Priorities. There are priority systems for the supply and movement of repairables[27] and for repairing them[28], but these

---

25. Australian Department of Defence Report A 89-12886, DGEME 36/90 dated 16 Jan 1990, p 1, para 3.

26. HQ Spt Comd 10032/1/EME dated 7 Nov 89.

27. DM 36 Chap 3.

28. DCO(A) Vol 1 op cit, Chap 15, Sect 2.

systems are not able to be used as effectively as they should be. CMs should be able to change them easily. The current procedures are not well integrated. Ideally, as the supply situation of an item deteriorats, the priority accorded to that item heading at all stages of its regeneration should be automatically and uniformly increased and all should be informed. Current systems do not have this capacity and crisis management is often the result.

Carcass Release. With the exception of CENTREMS, carcasses are generally kept with the host equipment until a fit replacement arrives. From the point of view of the repair agency, this is necessary for a number of reasons:

a. Double handling is reduced (particularly for transit packaging).

b. Carcass retention assists the fitter because he can see how an assembly is installed and reduces the risk of misplacing parts whilst awaiting the arrival of the replacement assembly.

c. If the fit assembly arrives in a different configuration, it can usually be installed using accessories removed from the unfit assembly.

d. Carcass retention allows the repair agency/workshop scope for initiative when fit replacements are in short supply, or unavailable.

However, having unfit assemblies at the point of repair awaiting replacements reduces the number that are circulating round the regeneration loop. This can delay repair and decrease repair batch sizes, thus delaying further the return of fit assemblies and possibly increasing the cost of repair. Ultimately the repair system would grind to a halt if the assembly failure rate continued to exceed the carcass repair rate. Major assembly shortfalls for the Army's Mercedes Benz trucks are evident at the moment because of problems with the regeneration loop timings. As part of their exceptional management action, CMs sometimes may be forced to order carcasses to be returned without a fit replacement being available despite the problems that this could then create. Usually however, this would result in the entire host equipment being backloaded and a replacement item being issued or a 'dues out' being created. With more management information, such as that proposed for LMIS, it would be possible for CMs to minimize these effects.

Planning. A more integrated system would allow for better forward planning. For instance, base repair planning is done in detail for items as they appear on the BRPC listing every three months, but the spares supply to support the execution of the plans is largely based on the historical requirements of the demand driven system. This would obviously be in direct conflict with any future repair plans, which could reflect a marked change in repair priorities. Given the lead-time for most overseas sourced parts, rapid reaction to change is just not possible. At the time of writing, some effort has been made by 1 Base Workshop

to overcome this deficiency by attempting to forward order 'standard packages' of spare parts to overhaul specific major assemblies. This has run into difficulties, for two reasons:

a. Firstly, there has been a lack available funds to procure large quantities of spare parts, for what have amounted to unprogrammed repair plans.

b. Secondly, 1 Base Workshop has had difficulty in identifying exactly what components would be required for an assembly overhaul. Oversized mechanical components, for instance, could be in any mixture and no standard parts list is possible in most cases. Mercedes Benz have advised that in their experience, each overhaul of one of their assemblies is likely to require very different parts.

Regulations. Decision criteria at all levels are based upon regulations. These are not, as a rule, 'live' documents; they are not easily changed with circumstances. With the advent of LMIS down to repair unit level in most cases, updated regulations and managment information can now be provided by electronic menas, rather than having to use paper. This would give faster updates of regulations, greater flexibility to managers at all levels, and allow the regeneration loop time to be reduced.

Procurement and Costings. At the moment, no repair agency has the ability to accurately determine whether or not a repairable assembly repair is actually economic or not. Decisions are invariably made 'by the seat of the pants'. The advent of accrual accounting should give impetus to the Army to provide more accurate and up-to-date costing information on spare parts. However, until such time as the accuracy of current information on DSSD is improved, and other costings (storage/handling/shipping etc.) are available, decisions will continue to be made which result in a waste of funds and/or resources.

Management Training. CMs now need an ability to be able to identify some fundamental economic costs (Marginal versus total cost, opportunity cost, fixed cost, overhead cost and so on). Training is therefore required for those who do not already have this ability.

Capital Verses Maintenance Costs. In the past, when a capital budget was tight, there was a tendency for some project officers (fore-runners of the CMs) to delete the purchase of spare assemblies or optional items from a project, rather than reduce quantities of capital equipment. They were unlikely to be held accountable for such actions, and held the expectation that the deleted items could be purchased later, and hidden in the 'maintenance' vote. For example, when the Mercedes Benz Unimogs where purchased, blackout lighting and exhaust brakes where deleted from the purchase description because of 'cost' (up front capital cost). The former have been refitted at a cost of approximately DM 5, 530 each compared to the original 1982 fitted

price of DM 638 nett each. The exhaust brakes are now under strong consideration because of the excessive rates of wear on brake components currently being experienced[29]. Any decision to do either of the above can have drastic long term consequences for the serviceability rate of the capital item concerned. It is simply false economy and CMs, who are now responsible for capital projects are now likely to be held accountable for their actions.

Run-on. Repair planning is carried out based on a profile of equipment numbers expected to be in-service. The lead time for phasing out an item of equipment is theoretically around 10 years, although in practice, detail starts to become important around four years ahead. In particular, stocks of fit repairables may be allowed to dwindle to match the anticipated requirements of a fleet of declining size and repair cost limit[30]. Spare parts are put on 'Run-Down' (where they are still available) and hence late decisions to run-on old equipment, perhaps because of some difficulty with a replacement project, can cause considerable difficulties with repair planning at all levels. Equipment run-on in some instances however, is just a 'fact of life' and CMs have to manage as best they are able.

## CONCLUSION

Categorisation of Repairables. The New Zealand Army needs a universal system of repair item classification. Initial categorization should be carried out by the item CMs, based upon advice from both Technical and Purchasing Services Staff in the AMA. This must take into account criteria such as availability of in-house capacity, the operational importance of the equipment, the relative cost of repair versus replacement, and the responsiveness of any local repair industry where available. Once in-service, items should be moved between categories as circumstances change. For example the category of an item may change if it ceases to be possible to purchase any further stocks of the item and therefore they must be repaired irrespective of cost. This would also be a likely occurrance in an operational scenario if an item was in short supply, and was deemed important enough to warrant the effort to repair.

The Logistic Priority System. The entire logistic priority system should be reviewed, co-ordinated at all points of the regeneration loop and a revised system implemented throughout the Army. A more sensitive and responsive priority system would allow for more centralized stockage of repairables than at present. This would lead to an increase in the availability of replacement assemblies without significantly impacting on average repair times within overall regeneration loop times.

---

29. Discussion with the Army's B Vehicle project officer, Captain L.J. Skinner, RNZA, June 1990.

30. DM 52 op cit, para 17001(a).

Advantages of Serial Number Tracking. There are a number of potential advantages in tracking repairables by serial number. The first would be a better ability to monitor modification states and configuration control. Secondly, it would also provide some basic data from which RAM statistics could be drawn and used by CMs.

DSSD and LMIS. Many of the problems identified by this paper are capable of some degree of resolution by the proposed LMIS or DSSD systems (should they work and should they interface as planned). However, because these two systems currently have no direct electronic link, there are still fundamental problems which will remain until this link is established:

a. There is a fixed, well-understood, all-embracing management system for repairables. As a result, the different elements of the system are not geared to serve the best interests of the whole.

b. There is a lack of management information available to the CMs. They are unable to track their assets with certainty and they are therefore unable to exercise efficient and effective day-to-day management. Their lines of authority are also unclear as is their relationship with the SIMs in 1 BSB. Clear direction is urgently required.

Role of CMs and SIMs. The Army-wide system for repairables management is bureaucratic, inflexible and fragmented. Different elements of the management organization tend to have narrow views of their roles and responsibilities. CMs however are only just starting to come to terms with their new jobs and if given both the authority and responsibility (including accountability) for their equipment types, could well break the current cycle of management by crisis/exception. The role of the SIM however needs clarification and the link between CMs and SIMs is tenuous to say the least. This needs defining. CMs also need some elementary training in economic costings.

Further Study Requirements. Further work is required to:

a. determine regeneration loop timings as a guide to problem areas for management;

b. consider in detail the implementation of an integrated priority system;

c. decide the need for methodology of asset tracking, including component mark;

d. detail CMs' information requirements and lines of authority;

e. determine the full capabilities for CMs of the proposed LMIS and DSSD systems and the modifications which will best meet the requirements of sub-paragraph (d) above; and

f. confirm a system of categorization for repairables and have it implemented, with flow on effects for repair parts scaling and consumption, as well as creating efficiencies within the regeneration loop.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that:

a. three categories of repairable items be adopted and details promulgated in LMIS, EMPS, RPS and DCO(A) Vol 1:

(1) Cat 1. To be maintained only on repair;

(2) Cat 2. To be maintained either by repair or by repleacement depending on the circumstances; and

(3) Cat 3. To be repaired only by replacement;

b. NZ Army policy for CENTREMs be reintroduced and based on the British 'Material Regulations for the Army Vol 10 (Army Equipment Management Instructions (AEMI)) Pamphlet No 26 Centralised Repair items (CENTREMs), modified for NZ conditions;

c. the entire logistic priority system should be reviewed, co-ordinated at all points of the regeneration loop and a revised system implemented throughout the Army;

d. potential advantages in tracking repairables by serial number also be explored; and

e. CMs receive training in elementary economic principles of costing.

## Bibliography

Blanchard B.S. Logistics Engineering and Management, Third Edition 1686.

**Note:** Opinions expressed herein are personal and do NOT necessarily reflect policy Statements of Army.