

**THE  
NEW ZEALAND**



**ARMY  
JOURNAL**

**No. 13**

**DECEMBER, 1991**



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MAJOR GENERAL ORDE WINGATE

by

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INTRODUCTION

Major General Orde Wingate was a complex man whose lack of orthodoxy and often undiplomatic tenacity frustrated as many people as his genius impressed. However, the most important memory of the man is for his accomplishments in the Burma campaign of 1943 and 1944. Orde Wingate's special force, or the Chindits as they became more popularly known, forged new ground in the history of land warfare with his audacious operations behind Japanese lines.

The whole concept of Chindit warfare was the invention of Wingate, who applied himself to the refinement of jungle conflict right from the strategic and tactical down to the standard operating procedure level. His unique understanding of mobility and logistics was transformed into the practice of long range penetration. The jungle became a cover for large formations of highly trained soldiers who, through stealth and cunning, wrecked havoc against the Japanese. It was guerilla warfare, but on a grand scale. It reversed all perceptions of the jungle as an impenetrable barrier, and created a strategic dilemma for the Japanese.

Wingate continually evolved and improved his long-range penetration concept through two arduous campaigns, and right until his untimely death during Operation Thursday in 1944. But for all his successes, Wingate was not without his critics. During his command there was contention in military circles about the viability of his strategy, and many would have stopped short of the experimental warfare into which Wingate led his men. But for Wingate there were no doubts, and it was his determination and clarity of vision that pushed him into the pages of history

and opened a new chapter on the practice of jungle warfare. The aim of this essay is to assess the military career of Orde Wingate, and the contribution he made to the development of strategy and tactics.

### THE STRATEGIST EMERGES

Wingate was the educational product of strictly religious parents whose passion for the Plymouth Brethren confined him to a socially isolated and studious childhood. He gained recognition at the Royal Military Academy only for his sullenness and somewhat unkempt appearance. Prominence as a military leader of significance only came with his commitment to the Zionist cause and his subsequent creation of the Special Night Squads in Palestine in 1938. His skill in irregular warfare resulted in his posting to Abyssinia in 1940 where he repeated his Middle Eastern successes with the raising of guerilla raiding parties against the Italians. Although neither of these campaigns were jungle operations, the cumulative experience well established his penchant for specialized strategies and tactics, and both provided the seminal base for his activities against the Japanese.(1)

### THE JAPANESE IN BURMA

When Wingate arrived in South East Asia in 1943 jungle warfare techniques against the Japanese were still a nebulous art. In Malaya, offensive operations were only on a very small scale.(2) In Burma, the British were still struggling against new tactics in terrain that was almost as exacting as the human enemy. They confined themselves inflexibility to road supply routes, and advised troops "to keep out of the jungle itself as it was too severe for Europeans".(3) The jungle itself was shrouded in a mystique of hidden peril. It was a psychological barrier, a dense undergrowth that promised a torturous demise to the unwary or unprepared.

The British viewed the primary jungle of north Burma as impenetrable. But to the Japanese, it was a tool. They occupied the jungle and "exploited it to make up for their unequal military strength and weaker industrial base".(4) The key to their strategy was their willingness to use the jungle as

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1. Bidwell S. The Chindit War, London, 1979, p 45.
  2. Cross J. Jungle Warfare, London, 1989, p 113.
  3. Ibid, p 21.
  4. Ibid, p 26.

physical cover. Under its protection they would advance on established British positions, and channel their attacks to force a predictable withdrawal along exposed routes. It was a simple strategy, but its devastating effect forced the Allies to recognize their own naivety in jungle warfare.

### WINGATE'S PLAN

#### General Strategy

Like the Japanese, Wingate viewed the jungle as friend, not foe. He knew that its density could provide a giant protective cloak under which a properly supplied force could operate at great length in a clandestine manner against a more restricted opponent. The key was to penetrate far deeper, move much faster, and stay for far longer, than the Japanese had ever contemplated. The quintessence of the plan was resupply - but resupply by air, not land. This was the germ from which grew the legend of Wingate's Chindits and the practice of long-range penetration.(5)

Wingate realized that the Japanese were vulnerable on their lines of communication and supply to the rear. His plan was to infiltrate large self-supporting units deep behind the front line to inflict damage far out of proportion to their own size. The units would have to be large enough to "deliver blows of the necessary weight, while small enough to slip through the enemy net".(6) The object of the campaign would be to operate as many units as possible in separate locations, thereby overextending Japanese resources. In Wingate's own words, the Chindits would be "engaging targets [the enemy] is unable to adequately protect and thus compelling him to alter his plans, thus causing a situation of which our own main forces are able to take advantage". It was intended that the units operated not as ends in themselves but as an integral part of a larger force.

#### The Chindits - Structure and Tactics

The long-range penetration was comprised of a series of columns constituting a brigade. Each column consisted of a heavily armed rifle company, plus three platoons, each specializing in either demolitions, reconnaissance or heavy weapons.(8) The whole force was equipped as lightly as possible for the task to ensure that the essential ingredients of speed and stealth could be retained.

5. Tulloch D. Wingate in Peace and War, MacDonald, London 1972, p 60.
6. Ibid, p 61.
7. Ibid, p 62.
8. Bidwell. op cit, p 51.

The tactical hallmark of the Chindits was to be fast evasion and unexpected aggressive action. Like a giant jigsaw puzzle the whole force could fragment into small self sustaining groups of variable size if the attack or evasion so required. The columns would independently or in combination draw the pursuing forces into the jungle where they could be ambushed, or elude them altogether, re-emerge at a different point, sting the enemy where least expected, and disappear once more. The whole process would slowly overextend the resources of the Japanese by forcing them to commit themselves to an increasing number of fronts.(9)

### Logistic Innovations

The key to the mobility of the columns was resupply. The only factor that limited the duration for which a column could operate was its ability to be resupplied with essential stores. The clandestine nature of the operations meant that supply by land routes was tactically inappropriate, so Wingate directed his attentions to the still experimental practice of aerial resupply.

Air drops on the scale that Wingate envisaged involved a logistic chain of some frailty.(10) Large numbers of aircraft both fighters and transport, needed to be exclusively committed to the campaign to maintain air superiority over the jungle. To streamline the process Wingate permanently attached air personnel to his columns so they could provide accurate navigational directions to aircraft. For this purpose, each column had to bear the weight of reliable but delicate wireless equipment. Finally the whole operation depended entirely on the additional hazards of low-level flying over the jungle. It was an inherently dangerous system, but Wingate's thoroughness and emphasis on training mitigated the risks to such a degree that a high-level of success and accuracy was possible.

### Training

Quality of training was an important part of the effectiveness of Wingate's overall strategy. In preparation for both the 1943 and 1944 campaigns Wingate supervised the training of his Chindits in a complete system of jungle warfare<sup>2</sup> of his own design. He reduced guerrilla tactics to a series of standard operating procedures for everything from basic movement in the jungle to advanced evasion techniques.(11) The thoroughness of the training and the emphasis that it placed on physical endurance allowed Wingate to mould the consummate jungle warrior. It was this emphasis on quality - from the level of overall strategy right down to basic soldier skills - that was a major factor in the success of the long-range penetration concept.

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9. Ibid, p 53;979, Sykes C. Orde Wingate, London, 1959, p398.

10. Bidwell, op cit, p 54.

11. Tulloch, op cit, p 62; Bidwell, op cit, p 57.



## OBSTACLES

### Criticism

There is no doubting the inventiveness of Orde Wingate. No other strategist had ever contemplated a major offensive in Burma other than by a laborious sea landing from the south that side-stepped the primary jungles. But for all its novelty, Wingate's plan was not without its critics. Prominent military figures lambasted him for his decision to leave behind casualties, and for what they saw as his intention to use whole units as sacrificial decoys to draw pressure off other offensives. (12)

But Wingate was a realist, and a realist who was working not with regular infantry tactics, but with a new more dangerous system of warfare. The ground technique of the Chindits was to move fast, to decoy, to bluff, always catching the enemy off guard. Such practices required out of the ordinary risks. Wingate knew this, and although never happy with it, it was a cost both he and his men accepted as part of their standard role. Wingate felt that in terms of the disproportionate damage his units could inflict and their meticulous training, long-range penetration was without doubt a viable strategy. (13)

### Indecisiveness

Another significant obstacle that Wingate faced was the indecisiveness of the military command at that time. The campaign for Burma had become a complex debate, and conflicting opinions plans and conferences juggled with different options, timings and levels of commitment. The pendulum swung back and forth between American, British and Chinese efforts, and for months the future of long-range penetration hung in the balance as resources were promised, withdrawn, then promised again. It was a trying time for Wingate, and it was largely his tenacity and fervent efforts to overcome orthodox thinking that secured the Chindits a prime role in the theatre. (14)

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12. Sykes, op cit, p 417, p 436; Tulloch, op cit, p 267; Slim, op cit, p 162.

13. Tulloch, op cit, p 255; Sykes, op cit, p 417.

14. Ibid pp 149, 266

## OPERATIONAL TESTING

### Operation Longcloth

The first deployment of long-range penetration forces was in February 1943. Known as Operation Longcloth, the Chindits were to form part of a three pronged attack of regular troops in north Burma. The initiative eventually collapsed (indicative of the uncertainty of the period), but Wingate was determined to demonstrate his concept. He convinced South-East Asian Command to let him take the Chindits behind Japanese lines for a more limited operation.(15)

For just under three months the 3000 men of the 77th Infantry Brigade harassed the Japanese in the Mandalay and Shwebo areas, effecting many major demolitions. The columns worked in conjunction with each other feinting, striking and disappearing back into the jungle. Some set-backs occurred, and two columns fragmented and escaped to India after incurring heavy losses. The hardest criticism Wingate suffered was for his tactical decision to recross the Irrawaddy river, which placed his forces in a vulnerable position.(16) Further heavy losses occurred before the whole force finally dispersed and filtered out to safety.

There are many arguments as to whether or not Wingate's final ground movements were the right ones. But the conclusive point remains that the losses were not a result of any flaw in the overall tactical and strategic deployment of the long-range penetration force. The aggregate damage inflicted on the Japanese was indication enough that the "operation was proving its strategical merit in abundance".(17) An unforeseen success was the effect that the return of the Chindits had on war morale. The public were given heroes that had proven the wall of Japanese occupation was penetrable. Suddenly, Wingate's perseverance had created a glimmer of hope in South-East Asia.(18)

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15. Although it was always intended the Chindits were to be a supporting force, their independent deployment here was not regarded as a tactical error due to the limited mission that was involved; Ibid, p 64.

16. Ibid, p 68.

17. Sykes, op cit, p 398.

18. Ibid, p 435.

### Operation Thursday

Wingate was determined to repeat the successes of his techniques, but this time as part of the complete campaign to reoccupy Burma. In 1944 a second force was raised and trained, and was to be deployed in conjunction with the regular forces of 14th Army and 4th Corps. Operation Thursday, as it was known, was on a far grander scale than Longcloth, and further evolved the long-range penetration practice.

As the decisive battles of the campaign were to be fought during the monsoon, long distance or swift movement through the jungle as a large formed body was no longer practicable. Wingate intended to establish 'strongholds', large defendable harbours deep in the jungle from which smaller parties and columns could operate. The strongholds were to be isolated, sufficiently supplied for long periods of isolation, and large enough to accommodate an airstrip for the aerial evacuation of casualties. Once suitable clearings were located, the whole force would be silently inserted by glider, thus avoiding the ordeal of a long and difficult approach march. (19)

On 5 March 1944 the first wave of gliders took off bound for one of the three planned strongholds. In the space of the next six nights a total of 9052 personnel and support supplies were surreptitiously moved into the dense primary jungle. The strongholds were quickly established, and operations began immediately. The Chindits deployed along two different 'fronts' and commenced their characteristic raiding activities. The simultaneous offensives by the regular forces achieved the desired aim and the Japanese were gradually forced to overextend their resources. (20)

### Death of the Chindit King

Despite their effectiveness, the Chindits were not to complete Operation Thursday in their long-range capacity. On 26 March 1944 the whole effort was dealt a severe blow by the death of Wingate in an air crash. As others of less flair and strategic insight assumed command, the Chindits were utilized more and more in a conventional infantry role in support of 14th Army. (21) In terms of efficacy it was a costly devolution of a force that had already proven its worth. For the purist followers of Wingate's strategy and tactics, it was hearsay.

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19. Tulloch, op cit, p 192.
  20. Ibid, pp 218, 236.
  21. Ibid, p 234.

### LONG-RANGE PENETRATION TODAY

The strategic success of the first weeks of Operation Thursday were demonstrative of the versatility of Wingate's concept and the ease with which he adapted it to apply on a large scale with more specific resources. Thursday proved that long-range penetration was not a strategy restricted to small forces, and that the stronghold development was a means by which the range and effectiveness of the jungle operation could be enhanced. Wingate's strange blend of daring and innovation had again borne results, and the role of long-range penetration in future conflicts been secured.

Never again would jungle be viewed in the manner it was prior to Wingate's campaigns. It became a prime medium for conflicts, and South-East Asia has ever since suffered a malaise due to the refuge that the jungle provides to the practitioner of deep penetration tactics. Numerous advances in military technology have further streamlined the insertion and resupply process, but the basic strategic concept has remained unchanged. The nature of the operations in Malaya, Borneo and Vietnam are all testimony to the soundness of Wingate's military skill.(22)

### CONCLUSION

Orde Wingate had a unique talent for special operations. He had a mind that traversed problems in a fresh manner, and thought laterally whilst others remained bogged down in convention and orthodox practices. He had a clear vision of the way in which jungle warfare should be developed, and it was his unrelenting commitment that propelled his ideas through obstacles to achieve their operational acid test.

The success of long-range penetration stemmed not only from Wingate's skilled management of logistics and understanding of mobility, but from the thoroughness and completeness of his whole plan. Wingate rewrote the book on jungle warfare, and turned his attention to every detail involved. He knew exactly what he needed for a long-range campaign, and set about moulding every facet to his exact requirements. The disproportionate damage that his columns inflicted upon the Japanese was indicative of the quality of the training and tactics.

No amount of training could have completely mitigated the risks involved. It was an inherently dangerous form of warfare and, inevitably, there were some significant casualties. To Wingate, although undesirable, the losses were not excessive in the context of the gains. It was experimental warfare, but by no means was long-range penetration a sacrificial gesture.

Its quality as a system of strategy and tactics is evidenced by its acceptance in modern conflicts. It was not a static concept, and it is the soundness of the basic principle which allows it to be adapted to different campaigns and situations. Orde Wingate may have had a tragically short military career, but the importance of his contribution is such that, in the chronicles of land warfare, his influence will be long felt.

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THE PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE  
ARGENTINE LAND WAR IN THE FALKLANDS

by

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'There is no such thing as a bad soldier,  
only a bad officer'.(1)

The Falklands land war reaffirmed the importance of sound planning for the effective implementation of land operations. Argentinian military plans were flawed by being based on the wrong aim, an incorrect assessment of opposing forces, a bad judgement of ground and a poor evaluation of timing. This led to faulty plans that were implemented by a confused command structure to muddled units. Through poor training and leadership units lacked the ability to conduct offensive action. An examination of the planning and implementation of the Argentine land war in the Falklands will explain why they were defeated so soundly.

On 2 April 1982 Argentine marines landed and captured Stanley. The Argentinians then steadily built-up their defences deploying eight infantry regiments (about the same size as a British battalion), and a marine battalion before the British landed at Port San Carlos 48 days later. In less than 28 days from the British landings, the British with a numerically inferior force effected the surrender of the Argentinians. The first step in assessing the reasons for this surrender is to examine the planning process.

Military planning is based on a problem solving process called the appreciation. The appreciation normally covers the aim of the operation and an assessment in detail of opposing forces, the ground and time factors that lead to likely enemy courses. An assessment of troops to task follows and this leads to the identification of military options. The best option is then selected and this forms the basis of the military plan. The Argentinians produced two main plans: the initial invasion, and then as a result of the British response, plans to defend the islands.

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1. Windrow M. (Ed), Battle for the Falklands (1) Land Forces, Text by Fowler, W., London, 1982. p 31.

The best laid plans will be of little value unless they are correctly implemented. A clear chain of command is required and at the highest levels command should be executed through joint service headquarters where resources can be centrally coordinated. This should also apply at lower levels where combined all arms headquarters coordinate resources. Units should be well trained and commanded by competent officers. An effective logistic and administrative system needs to operate to ensure supplies get to where they are needed.

These factors will be covered in assessing the implementation of the land war which covered four distinct phases: the initial Argentine invasion, the British landings at Port San Carlos, and the battles of Goose Green and Stanley. Also covered will be an examination of how well the land war was implemented when measured against the principles of war and the principles of defence. Key principles of war that warrant examination are selection and maintenance of the aim, offensive action, administration and maintenance of morale. Key principles of defence are the use of ground, the integration of defensive measures and the design for battle. The first and most important principles of war is the same as the first step in the appreciation process: the selection and maintenance of the aim. If this is wrong, the whole plan will be based on a false premise.

On 15 December 1981 Admiral Anaya (the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy) directed Vice Admiral Lombardo (the new Chief of Naval Operations) 'to prepare a plan to occupy the Falkland Islands... but not necessarily to keep them'.(2) The lack of planning for the defence of the Islands was based on a poor assessment of opposing forces: that Britain would remain passive and not respond.(3) This in turn led to hasty defensive planning as at the time of the sailing to invade the Falklands, the Argentine Army had 'been little involved and, if some reports are to be believed, little informed'.(4)

Not only was the Argentine aim and assessment of opposing forces wrong, but strategically their appreciation of timing was seriously flawed. An invasion day was planned for 15 September 1982, when diplomatic circumstances and the weather would be suitable; British forces in the area would be reduced,

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2. Middlebrook, M. The Fight for the Malvinas The Argentine Forces in the Falklands War, London, 1989. p 1.

3. Ibid pp47-48. Hastings, M. and Jenkins, S. The Battle for the Falklands, London, 1983. p 108.

4. Burden R.A. et al, Falklands The Air War, Arms and Armour Press. p 14.

conscripts would be better trained and 14 Super Etendards with 15 Exocets would have been acquired.(5) More importantly, if the Argentinians had waited a little longer, the British would have had a severely reduced ability to project air power or conduct amphibious operations. The aircraft carrier HMS Hermes was scheduled for the scrap yard and HMS Invincible was sold to the Australians. The 1981 British Defence White Paper stated 'needs do not warrant the replacement of specialist amphibious ships'.(6) After 150 years of waiting, a little longer would not have mattered it if meant the British had only a very limited means of responding. Instead of 15 September, the Junta decided on 23 March to invade on 1 April as they were not prepared to be humiliated by British marines evicting Argentine workmen from South Georgia.(7) As was to occur again, 'Latin Machismo' overruled reasoning.

The plan to capture Stanley was based on a crushing superiority coming from many directions. The key objective was Government House, but the troops tasked for its capture were changed at the last minute due to a damaged helicopter. Despite the loss of tactical surprise, no reinforcements and little information was given to the new attacking force.(8) This reflects a poor assessment of troops to task, but with 940 troops and 20 Amtrac vehicles against 81 British marines, it was inevitable that Stanley would fall.(9) At the tactical level the plan was well implemented as the British Commander later stated 'they had a very good plan and it was well coordinated.'(10)

British reaction to the invasion stunned the Junta. They were 'utterly taken aback by the speed and strength of the British military response'.(11) It was only the British reaction which jolted the Argentinians to contemplate the defence of the Islands seriously. So hasty was the planning that when it was decided to send X Brigade, its Commander stated, 'this new order came as a complete surprise'.(12) Hasty planning resulted in many units in a poor state of readiness deploying ill-equipped for their task.

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5. Middlebrook, M. op cit p 5.
  6. Hastings, M. op cit p 11.
  7. Middlebrook, M. op cit p 13.
  8. Ibid p 24.
  9. Loc cit.
  10. Arthur, M. Above All, Courage. The Falklands Front Line: First Hand Accounts, London, 1985, p13. Middlebrook, M. op cit, pp 32-33.
  11. Hastings, M. op cit p 108. Middlebrook, M. op cit pp 47-48.
  12. Middlebrook, M. op cit p 51.



With the initial aim of occupation hastily changed to defence, the Military Command assessed opposing forces to decide which units would be deployed. The British were sending their finest units - Royal Marines and paratroopers. To counter this strength, Argentina should have deployed their best units. Argentina had available the excellently equipped VI and VIII Mountain Infantry Brigades along the Andes and XI Brigade equipped for cold weather in the extreme south.(13) These three brigades were held back to counter a threat from Chile. This robbed Argentina of the best troops for the Falklands. X Brigade had been deployed shortly after the invasion and although it had been able to replace almost all of its recruits with reservists, and was well equipped, it had no experience in cold weather conditions.(14) Similarly III Brigade from the sub-tropical north was sent and this proved to be completely unsuitable.(15)

So far in the planning process a deficient aim had been selected to conduct an operation at the wrong time with the wrong troops. Now that the aim was clearly to defend the Falklands, ground (terrain analysis) became a key factor. Brigadier General Menendez correctly identified the capital Stanley as the vital ground and accordingly decided to locate most of his forces there (six of the nine regiments).

What the planners did get wrong was assessing the approaches to the vital ground. At Stanley (and at Goose Green) defences were sighted to cover approaches direct from nearby beaches, as opposed to assaults from inland (from the west to Stanley and the north at Goose Green). A lack of all-round defence and depth resulted in a reassessment of the defensive posture as the British closed. At Stanley 4 Regiment had to be redeployed from Mount Challenger and Wall Mountain to hastily occupy Two Sisters.(16) (See Map 1). Additionally at Goose Green and at Stanley it meant that defences faced the wrong way and minefields were negated as they were covering the wrong approach. This resulted in a poor integration of defensive measures.

There was one piece of key terrain overlooked by the Argentinians. This was Mount Kent, which not only covered the British approach, but also overlooked all of the Argentinian defences. Mount Kent was initially defended by B Company 12 Regiment, but they were sent to reinforce the battle for Goose

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13. Ibid p 56.

14. Ibid p 49.

15. Ibid p 56. Hastings, M. op cit, p 323.

16. Middlebrook, M. Operation Corporate the Falklands War, 1982, London, 1985. p 314.

Green. Menendez stated later that he would have liked to occupy Mount Kent in strength but he had insufficient troops.(17) His first error was placing a reserve element on such an important piece of ground, and his second error was incorrectly prioritizing ground and not using troops from what was now his rear to defend Mount Kent.

Argentinian assessments of British courses were flawed, particularly with regard to when and where the British would land. Argentinian defensive policy was based on the misconceptions that the approaching Task Force contained the main landing force and that it would land near Stanley.(18) Accordingly when the British landed at San Carlos it was not only dismissed as a diversion but Menendez found himself unable to move against the beachhead.(19) It also meant troops were bracing themselves for an attack which did not come when they could have been improving defences, rehearsing fighting patrols and counter-attacks.

The misappreciation of British courses was compounded by a poor assessment of troops to task. The only engineers deployed initially for example were deployed as infantry to Fox Bay whereas they should have been used more effectively at Stanley preparing defences or lengthening the airfield. (See Map 2). Failure to move air power from the mainland to the Falklands was a critical error which could have changed the outcome of the war.(20) The Argentinian Air Force suffered throughout the war by being able to spend only a short time over the Falklands due to range limitations. Had they deployed fighter aircraft to Stanley, this problem would have been overcome and increased significantly their chances of achieving air superiority.

The requirement to harass any landings was identified and two commando companies were hurriedly raised from former commandos. Instead of harassment, they were used on observation posts, individually as 'stiffeners' in defensive positions and on

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17. Ibid p 278.

18. Windrow, M. op cit p 13. Middlebrook, M. Operation Corporate, op cit p 313. Middlebrook, M. Fight for the Malvinas, op cit p 55-63. Burden R.A. op cit, p 20.

19. Crespo, Brigadier General E, (Commander of the Argentinian Air Force South), The Crespo Report, Buenos Aires, 1 July 1982, p2. Middlebrook, M. Operation Corporate, op cit p 313.

20. Record J. The Washington Quarterly, 1982. pp 44-45.

fighting patrols, (the conscripts were so poorly trained they were virtually incapable of patrolling).(21) They should have been employed behind the British lines in a harassing role. The commandos believed this also and criticized the role which was given to them.(22) A poor assessment of the task to defend the aircraft at Pebble Island resulted in only a platoon being sent there. A quarter of the Falklands aircraft were subsequently destroyed in an SAS raid. Counter-attack forces were identified but a poor assessment of the task meant only infantry platoons or at most companies were employed, when a whole regiment should have been used supported by the 10th Armoured Car Company (12 vehicles with 90mm guns) and artillery concentrations.

The worst assessment of troops to task came after a meeting on 22 April. As reserves were insufficient, Galtieri agreed to send a regiment as a new reserve. But it was to be sent only if serious logistic problems were overcome. Logistic difficulties were directly related to hasty deployment. The supply system was based on supporting one brigade (2000 men) for a month but ended up trying to support 11,000 men for three months.(23) Many units had deployed by air on light scales and had to leave their critical heavy equipment and supporting weapons behind which were to be moved later by ship.(24) Sea movement was severely restricted due to the British sea blockade. For example, two engineer companies were without most of their equipment and similarly 12 Regiment at Goose Green: it had only two radios out with companies (and these were borrowed from civilians at Goose Green); it only had 11 of 25 machine guns, two of ten 81mm mortars and one of four 120mm mortars. Many other units were similarly deficient including basics such as cooking equipment, spades and even rifle cleaning equipment.(25)

On 22 April instead of a regiment, headquarters advised 'a whole new brigade was being sent'.(26) This detrimentally affected the already serious logistic difficulties (halved food stocks). The Argentinian logisticians worked hard to get the supplies through, but the British sea blockade proved effective (sinking five out of nine supply ships). An air-bridge delivered 5500 tons of

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21. Middlebrook, M. Fight for the Malvinas, op cit p 199.  
Middlebrook, M. Operation Corporal, op cit p 409.
22. Middlebrook, M. Fight for the Malvinas, op cit p 199.
23. Hastings, M. op cit p 324.
24. Middlebrook, M. Fight for the Malvinas, op cit, pp 57-68.
25. Ibid pp 57, 61, 179.
26. Middlebrook, M. Fight for the Malvinas, op cit p 55.

supplies by 29 April but even this could not satisfy all their needs. Between 29 April and 6 May the air-bridge discontinued due to British air superiority. It then continued by night but at only 10 per cent of its former rate. The problem was one of scale. The Argentinians did not have sufficient logistic balance and the means to sustain what they had put ashore. Due to a lack of transport and an ineffective administration system, they could not get what they had ashore to the front line troops.

When III Brigade arrived it was broken up. It lost a Regiment to Stanley but gained a regiment at Fox Bay, which found itself commanded by its third brigade commander in a month.(27) X Brigade received III Brigade's artillery which was replaced from IV Brigade. At unit level reorganization was the same. 12 Regiment at Goose Green was less its B Company, but gained C Company 25 Regiment and a platoon from 8 Regiment. This muddle caused confusion and destroyed unit pride and cohesion so necessary in battle.

Having completed the appreciation the Argentinians came up with their defence plan. It was a simple one with six of the nine Regiments defending Stanley, (not one was identified as a reserve). Three Regiments were deployed to key locations - Goose Green and on West Falkland, Fox Bay and Port Howard. If landings were to occur away from Stanley (considered unlikely), they would be harassed by helicopter mounted reserves and special forces (commandos). The design for battle was static. No patrolling programme was implemented and no counter-attack plans or rehearsals were done. Apart from planned harassment of the landings no offensive action was planned or effectively implemented in the defensive battles and this condemned the plans to eventual failure.

Under normal circumstances military operations are commanded by a single commander through a clear chain of command that should have stability to avoid confusion. The implementation of the plan was left to a confused chain of command due to continual changes. The initial plan to occupy the Falklands on 1 April was commanded overall by General Garcia (Army) but implemented by the Marines (Navy). Immediately after the invasion command passed to Brigadier Daher and to Brigadier Menendez on 3 April. Daher became the land commander but his units were outnumbered by Brigadier Joffre's X Brigade when it arrived on 7 April. Menendez then chose Joffre as the land commander and Daher returned to the mainland. Two days later he returned to become Chief of Staff. When III Brigade arrived in the third week of April, Menendez became the land commander, Joffre commanded Stanley and Brigadier Parada of III Brigade the rest of the Falklands. A 'general de division' (Major General) should have

been appointed. 'Instead, four brigadier-generals were left to sort out a command situation never clarified by Army Headquarters'.(28) Menendez was also locked in constant dispute with Joffre and Daher. The Army's post war Calvi report even alleged that a mutiny was at one stage plotted to replace Menendez.(29) Joffre had too wide a span of command whilst Daher had none. A much better allocation of command was warranted.

Command should be executed through a joint service headquarters to coordinate resources. The joint headquarters only operated in the Falklands between 2 to 5 April after which it was relocated to the mainland.(30) The lack of a joint headquarters on the Falklands meant that Menendez lacked staff advice and the means to coordinate on the islands joint operations. This lack of coordination led to 'own goals' when ground forces shot down their own planes and an appalling lack of joint action when the British landed at San Carlos. The Army did not report the landings to the Navy or Air Force and it was only the initiative of each service that resulted in the heavy air strikes later in the day.(31)

Similarly there is little evidence at lower levels of combined arms coordination. Artillery fire was often not observed and lacked coordination and concentration. Integrated logistic staff at headquarters was so woeful, the administration system broke down.

The level of training was low as most units had conscripts with only four months training. Most had received no training in cold weather or night operations and this led to a 'high incidence of frostbite and ... the onset of a pervasive demoralization'.(32) The overall quality of leadership in officers was appalling. The officers were brutal in the enforcement of discipline and many withdrew from front line positions at the opening of battle.(33) With some officers even stealing food from their men, it was not

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28. Middlebrook, M. Operation Corporate, op cit p 88.  
Middlebrook, M. Fight for the Malvinas, op cit pp 41, 43, 53 and  
57. Burden R.A. op cit pp 15, 16.

29. Hastings, M. op cit p 324.

30. Burden, R.A. op cit p 15.

31. Hastings, M. op cit p 218.

32. Record, J. op cit p 47.

33. Hastings, M. op cit pp 295-296.

surprising that many hated their officers more than the British.(34) Some officers did lead competently but overall most displayed a lack of leadership and this led to a breakdown in morale: 'One of the principal causes of the collapse ... was the breakdown in the relationship between officer and conscripted soldier'.(35) Morale was also affected by the ineffective logistic and administrative system.

Having examined the planning process and aspects of the implementation, the three key land battles identify a poor application of the principles of war.

When Menendez received reports of the British landings at San Carlos he had to decide whether it was the main landing or a diversion. His operations staff dismissed it as a diversion.(36) Two separate staff assessments and a conference concluded that less than a brigade had landed and that a second brigade could land elsewhere. These assessments must have been based on little more than guess work. There was not a single contact between British and Argentinian troops from immediately after the landings on 21 May until 27 May when an Argentine Marine officer was captured.(37) This reflected an appalling lack of will to prosecute any sort of offensive action. Even at unit level commanders failed to deploy fighting patrols to deny British observation and dominate ground.

The only action taken was to move artillery to Goose Green (which had none). An attempt to implement the original plan of deploying commandos to harass the landings was made but three of the four helicopters were destroyed by Harriers. Some commandos were deployed but proved ineffective and were captured suffering from exposure.(38) Plans were considered to deploy 5 and 8 Regiments from West Falkland and a parachute regiment from the mainland. British naval and air superiority meant the risk was too great. Galtieri then proposed deploying his parachute regiment piecemeal to Stanley but this was impractical as it would take 10 days and Menendez lacked the means to deploy them.(39) Galtieri in the end urged action but nothing was done. The principles of war, maintenance of the aim and offensive action were not carried out.

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34. Middlebrook, M. Fight for the Malvinas, op cit p 275.  
Middlebrook, M. Operation Corporate, op cit p 315.

35. Arthur, M. op cit pp 144-156.

36. Middlebrook, M. Operation Corporate, op cit p 275.  
Hastings, M. op cit p 200.

37. Middlebrook, M. Fight for the Malvinas, op cit p 175.

38. Middlebrook, M. Operation Corporate, op cit p 229.

39. Ibid pp 229-230.

The next phase of the land war was the battle for Goose Green. The command set-up was a typical Argentine muddle with an Air Force officer in overall command whilst the Commanding Officer of 12 Regiment would have to fight the battle.(40) Brigadier Parada had been ordered to move to Goose Green to take command of the entire area. He delayed and attempted to fight the battle impractically over the radio.(41)

Virtually all the principles of defence were not complied with. After the British landings, Parada changed the directions of the defence (from expected sea landings to a land approach) and expanded the area to be defended to a 31 kilometre perimeter.(42) This meant the principles of mutual support, depth, all round defence, integration of defensive measures (minefields) and the best use of ground were impossible. Security was poor with little evidence of aggressive fighting patrols. Defensive positions were linear and lacked depth. The overall design for battle was static lacking deception and offensive action.

As the British 2nd Parachute Battalion steadily advanced into the defended area, the Commanding Officer of 12 Regiment ordered a platoon to counter-attack. This was an unrealistic task reflecting a poor assessment of troops to task. Parada flew in two lots of 80 reinforcements from Stanley during this battle, which showed troops could be deployed rapidly from Stanley. One group arrived quite unexpectedly from Mount Kent. Resources were poorly coordinated due to deficient communications. Although some Argentinian elements fought well, when pressed hard they disintegrated. Many officers ran away. The British surrounded the garrison which surrendered despite having plenty of men and ammunition. 630 Argentine infantrymen and 900 airmen surrendered to 450 British.(43) 'This remarkable victory, the first major encounter of the campaign on land, established a moral superiority over the Argentinians which was to affect all subsequent actions in the Falklands'.(44)

The British then began their advance to Stanley. They only came across one observation post which provided any resistance (at Top Malo house).(45) The British advance went unopposed. Fighting

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40. Ibid pp 253-254.

41. Loc cit.

42. Middlebrook, M. Fight for the Malvinas, op cit p 180.

43. Ibid pp 196-197.

44. Arthur, M. op cit p 139. The quote is from Major Christopher Keeble's DSO citation.

45. Middlebrook, M. Fight for the Malvinas, op cit p 199.

patrols from Stanley were few and ineffective. Mounts Estancia and Vernet near Stanley did not even have observation posts on them and Mount Kent which dominated the area was taken over unopposed. Again a lack of offensive action and poor use of ground is evident.

Another example of a lack of offensive action occurred when Menendez considered attacking the British in the area of the RFAs Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram bombings. The British were unbalanced and disorganized but Menendez decided against it as he thought the British would be too well prepared and the task was beyond him.(46)

By 11 June the British with seven battalions were poised to attack six Argentine regiments. The Argentinians had had six weeks to prepare defences, conduct training and practise fighting patrols as well as rehearse counter-attacks. Instead they had waited in tents and trenches cold, wet, hungry and hearing of nothing but defeat.(47) They knew their propaganda was lies; British artillery and Harriers dominated the battlefield.(48) The logistic system had broken-down and soldiers were hungry despite plenty of food being available in Stanley; front line soldiers at Stanley had to scavenge for food or buy their issue rations on the soldiers' black market. Their morale was sapped and they lacked the will to fight. They felt isolated, abandoned and were tactically surrounded. Menendez had lost touch to the extent he thought they were impregnable.

Galtieri urged offensive action. Again 5 and 8 Regiments were considered for action against San Carlos as was the Parachute Regiment from the mainland. All came to nought.

On the night 11/12 June, the British captured Mount Longdon, Two Sisters and Mount Harriet. Only one counter-attack was employed which proved ineffective. Few Argentinians fought well; most surrendered reflecting low morale. Brigadier Joffre had ordered a company to counter-attack but this never eventuated due to transport difficulties. The British were amazed at the potential strength of the defensive positions.(49)

On 13 June the British attacked Wireless Ridge and Tumbledown. As at Goose Green and the previous Stanley battles, a lack of mutual support, poor morale and leadership resulted in these positions falling. A counter-attack group of dismounted armoured

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46. Ibid p215. Middlebrook, M. Operation Corporate, op cit p 311.

47. Middlebrook, M. Fight for the Malvinas, op cit p 221.

48. Middlebrook, M. Operation Corporate, op cit p 316.

49. Hastings, M. op cit p 296.



car troops was formed but this failed. Joffre then ordered 3 Regiment to counter-attack or block.(50) At last the Argentinians tried to move a significant element of combat power but it was too late and nothing useful was achieved.


A lack of offensive action, poor administration, leadership and low morale combined with a failure to apply principles of defence resulted in Menendez surrendering in Stanley on 14 June 1982.

A misdirected staff lacking in joint service advice and coordination was unable to select the correct aim, and this led directly to the failure of the Argentinians to hold the Falklands. Not only did they invade at the wrong time when they were unprepared, they then deployed the wrong types and quantities of troops to defend ground from an approach that never eventuated. Their assessment of British courses was wrong and their assessment of troops to task caused confusion, destroyed their cohesion as an effective military force, misemployed some and expected too much from others. These factors produced poor plans lacking in offensive action which condemned them to eventual failure.

The plans were implemented by a confused command structure that failed to coordinate resources through joint or all arms headquarters. Training, leadership and logistic administration were poor causing low morale and sapping the will to fight. A failure to apply principles of war, particularly offensive action and maintenance of morale, and the principles of defence eventually resulted in inevitable defeat.

1. Map 1.
2. Map 2.

MAP 1  
 From Middlebrook, M. Fight For The Malvinas,  
 Op Cit, pp 226 227



ARGENTINE UNITS IN FALKLANDS, 30 APRIL 1982

Map 2

21 May  
British Landings

Pebble Islands

Port  
Howard

5th Regt

Fox Bay

8th Regt

9th Engineer Coy

12th Regt

Goose  
Green

Top Malo  
house Mt Challenger

Mt Kent

Mt Estancia


Mt Vernet

STANLEY

Gelched and Tristram bombed

Units in Stanley area:

- 3rd, 4th, 6th, 7th and 25th Regts
- 5th Marine Infantry Bn
- 3rd Artillery Regt
- 4th Air Mobile Artillery Regt
- B Battery, 1st Marine Field Artillery Bn
- 10th Armoured Car Squadron



From Middlebrook M  
 Fight For The Malvinas.  
 Op.Cit. pp 58 59.

THE MOBILIZATION, DEPLOYMENT AND LOGISTICS PROBLEMS  
THE BRITISH HAD TO OVERCOME DURING THE FALKLANDS WAR, AND  
WHETHER THE LESSONS LEARNED MIGHT BE APPLICABLE TO  
A FUTURE DEPLOYMENT OF THE RRF INTO THE SOUTH PACIFIC

by

CAPTAIN A.J. HACKER

Captain Alan Hacker graduated from the Officer Cadet School Portsea in December 1984 and was posted to 1 RNZIR in Singapore where he spent two years as a platoon commander.

On return to New Zealand Captain Hacker was posted to the Regular Force Cadet School as a platoon commander until October 1988. During this tour he spent six months as the Senior Instructor of Operations Wing, as part of the New Zealand Training Team, MFO Sinai. In May 1989 he was posted to Headquarters Support Command as SO3 Training.

In October 1989, Captain Hacker was posted to 1 RNZIR Linton as the Intelligence Officer. He is currently awaiting deployment to Angola, as part of the New Zealand Contingent with UNAVEM II.

"The cornerstone for any successful military operation is a sound logistic plan. Regardless of the sophistication of weaponry and the fighting qualities of the personnel, any operation will falter unless forces can be assembled, transported, landed; and more importantly, maintained once battle is joined".

...International Defence Review 6/1982

INTRODUCTION

On the 2nd of April 1982, Argentine Forces invaded the Falkland Islands, and the following day invaded South Georgia Island. Within two days, a British Task Force set sail from Portsmouth, (designated 'Operation Corporate'), to regain control of the British Colony. On 16 April, the Task Force had left Ascension Island, and by 26 April had recaptured South Georgia. On 21 May the main British landing took place at San Carlos Bay in the Falkland Island group, and Argentine forces surrendered on 14 June after a short, but intense war. The war cost Britain 255 men killed, 777 wounded and Argentina between 652-1000 men killed, and 11845 captured.(1)

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1. Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands 1983. pp 357-358.

The Falkland Islands lie 8000 miles south-west of the United Kingdom and over 3500 miles from Ascension Island, but only 400 miles from the Argentine mainland. In the space of seven weeks a Task Force of 28000 men and over 100 ships had been assembled (ensuring that it was self-sufficient in food, water, fuel, ammunition and all the other military equipment that it might require) sailed 8000 miles, effectively neutralized the Argentine Navy and fought off persistent and courageous attacks from combat aircraft which outnumbered its own force by more than six to one. This in itself was no mean feat. The Task Force then put ashore 10000 men on a hostile coast while under the threat of heavy air attack; fought several pitched land battles against an entrenched and prepared enemy who at all times outnumbered them, and, affected the Argentine surrender within three and a half weeks.

To dispatch a Task Force in such a short space of time and to keep it supplied despite the immense problems caused by operating so far from base was a remarkable achievement. That the British force soundly defeated the Argentine force, although outnumbered and operating with equipment that was equal or inferior to their enemy's, is also a remarkable achievement. "It was by any standards a brilliant campaign, marked by exceptional logistics planning and improvisation, and carried through with outstanding skill and fortitude".(2) Given the plethora of problems the British faced mobilizing, deploying and logistically supporting the Task Force for operations 8000 miles away, and that it so successfully addressed and overcame these problems, may contain lessons for other countries that have distant territories or interests.

As New Zealand's direct area of strategic concern is the South Pacific region, and the priority concern for the Army is to develop and maintain the effectiveness of the Ready Reaction Force (RRF) "... which can be committed to independent low level operations at short notice ...."(3), the problems the British had to overcome, and the lessons learned, may be applicable to a future deployment of the RRF into the South Pacific. This essay will examine the mobilization, deployment and logistics problems the British had to overcome during the Falklands war, and assess whether these lessons learned might be applied to a future deployment of the RRF into the South Pacific.

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2. The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons, December 1982. p 6.

3. Defence of New Zealand Review of Defence Policy 1987, Wellington, New Zealand 1987. p 35 para 7.20.

PROBLEMS THE BRITISH HAD TO OVERCOME

Mobilization

Fortunately for the British, 3 Commando Brigade (which provided the bulk of the initial land force) was used to operating on its own away from the United Kingdom and was practiced in taking with it all necessary stores. Having recently returned from a three month deployment in Norway, the entire unit was used to mobilizing, and did so extremely well. 3 Commando Brigade maintains a logistic regiment uniquely designed to provide all the necessary logistic support for the Brigade under one command and control organization. This system provided great flexibility and proved its effectiveness extremely well during the campaign.

3 Commando Brigade was thoroughly used to operating together as an all-arms force. Not only were they well rehearsed in amphibious operations, but they possessed unique training experience and equipment for Arctic warfare. Additionally, the Brigade maintained a high standard of physical and mental fitness and endurance. This physical and mental conditioning proved a decisive factor in the Brigade's success during the campaign.

The British Army maintains a 'spearhead' battalion ready to move overseas at short notice. This duty is undertaken in turn by most of the UK based battalions. At the time of the invasion, the spearhead battalion happened to be a parachute battalion, while another (parachute) battalion was preparing for this duty. Both these units had their equipment and stores already loaded on pallets in their barracks, and were thus able to mobilize with minimal problems. These professional mobilization procedures assisted these British units to mobilize extremely quickly and with few problems. Even so, it was discovered that many mobilization packs and assault packs were not always up to date and that a closer check of their contents was needed.(4)

Conversely, 5 Infantry Brigade's mobilization was anything but smooth, even though 5 Brigade was the designated 'out of the area' force. Formed in January 1982, Brigadier Wilson lost two thirds of his trained brigade when 2 Para and 3 Para were transferred to 3 Commando Brigade at the formation of the Task Force. In their place were two battalions from the Guards Division. This recently combined team revealed a lack of team experience, especially at Brigade staff level.(5) Another disadvantage 5 Brigade faced, as a result of never having been seriously prepared to deploy, was their allocation of resources. As opposed to 3 Commando Brigade, 5 Brigade lacked

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4. Truell G.D.S. Staff College Camberly TDRC 5003/7133, Presentation on Falklands 3. Log by Welch, 10 March 1988.

5. Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, op cit p 304.

a self-contained logistics regiment, air squadron or full complement of vehicles or guns.(6) This deficiency would become alarmingly apparent during the conduct of the war, and place unnecessary restrictions and hardships upon the Brigade.

In further contrast to 3 Commando Brigade, 5 Brigade was neither prepared nor experienced for the type of warfare they were committed to. Two thirds of the Brigade had just completed prolonged tours of ceremonial duties, (during which time their infantry training would have by necessity become less than that expected of a light infantry battalion about to fight a war) and were accustomed to fighting from APCs in a European setting.(7) This lack of cohesion, training and robustness was again to have drastic results during the initial stage of 5 Brigade's battle for the Falklands.

### Deployment

The first major deployment problem 3 Commando Brigade faced was that the Task Force had not been given a mission or directive beyond the requirement to sail as soon as possible. Additionally, there was no Joint Theatre Plan, any contingency plan for reinforcing the Islands, nor any intelligence assessment on Argentina. Second, to deploy a credible force would require more than the six elderly Royal Fleet Auxiliary logistic landing ships and one supply ship. This problem was immediately overcome by the urgent requisitioning of civilian ships taken up from trade (known as STUFT). More than fifty merchant vessels were used to support the Task Force.

A further problem that plagued the Task Force throughout their deployment to the Falkland Islands was their limited air-defence cover, fielding at any one time only 28 Sea Harriers (8), and having to rely upon their limited land based anti-aircraft defence weapons. This lack of air superiority limited the time supply ships could be offloaded to only a few night-time hours, before having to make for the safety of the sea.

The importance of Ascension Island during the British deployment to the Falklands was crucial.(9) As well as having a large airfield, Ascension Island had a good anchorage. More than 5000 personnel and 6000 tons of stores were flown in to this forward

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6. Ibid p 305.

7. Ibid p 306.

8. The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons, Her Majesty's Stationery Office December 1982. p 19.

9. Adams Valerie, Logistic Support for the Falklands Campaign Royal United Services for Defence Studies Vol 129 No 3 September 1984.

base. Here, not only had a massive logistics build up been performed to meet them when they arrived, but the men of 3 Commando Brigade were able to train ashore and zero and test weapons, whilst stocks aboard the ships were restowed to meet tactical landing and regrouping commitments.

In contrast, 5 Brigade was not given the opportunity to restow or train at Ascension and consequently arrived with stores loaded incorrectly and even unmanifested. As an example, 5 Brigade's headquarters tent remained undetected and sailed back to England after the war without even being unpacked! Some stores had been loaded without consideration for operational requirements with, for example, ammunition loaded first, so that when the Brigade landed, two days supplies issued to units had to be manually offloaded by soldiers forming human chains.

### Logistics

Although 3 Commando Brigade deployed logistically equipped for an extended blockade and contact with the enemy for a 30 day period, the arrival of 5 Brigade without an integral logistic regiment put additional pressure on their already overworked system. The first major problem in the logistic support was the transfer of stores from bulk afloat to shore, often during determined Argentine air attacks. With the absence of port facilities, not only were ammunition and other supplies stacked closely together, several units had to be accommodated nearby as well.

Once ashore, logistical problems were highlighted by the funnelling of stores through a single point. The geography and weather also created difficulties. As anticipated, the nature of the terrain and lack of roads prevented the use of motor transport, and as a result the Task Force had been discouraged from taking many vehicles. Thus, an unusually high reliance was placed upon helicopters and feet. With the loss of the Atlantic Conveyor, (including 10 Wessex and four Chinook helicopters), the lack of dedicated movement assets became a major logistical problem. Requests of a logistic nature were usually placed low on the priority list for the limited and valuable helicopters.(10) Such helicopter transport capacity as was available had to concentrate on lifting artillery and ammunition, so, for the most part, the troops walked and 'man packed' their kit, weapons and ammunition forward.

Another logistical problem that soon became apparent was that usage rates, particularly ammunition of all types, was much higher than expected. To illustrate this, during the last 12 hours of the battle for Port Stanley, five batteries fired the equivalent of one regiment's training ammunition allocation for four years.

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10. Hellberg I.J. An Experienced with the Commando Regiment Royal Marines, supplied by Lt Col (now Brig) I.N. Osborne, Command and Staff College Queenscliffe, May 1987.



### Lessons Learned

An analysis of these problems highlights several lessons, (some of which are new, but mostly old lessons that need to be reinforced or relearned). A brief summary of the major lessons are:

- Contingency planning at every level in every headquarters is well worthwhile, irrespective of the planned contingency. Contingency planning in peacetime leads to the production of established staff tables and rehearsed mobilization procedures.
- It is important to plan and train for joint operations.
- In order to mobilize, deploy and sustain the fight effectively and efficiently, one must be regularly practiced, trained and tested in realistic scenarios (as highlighted by 3 Commando Brigade). This was further emphasised by the ease with which both Parachute Battalions mobilized (having planned for, and prepared for mobilizing at short notice).
- The Commando Logistic Regiment RM provided invaluable logistic support to not only 3 Commando Brigade but also to 5 Brigade, in the absence of their own logistic regiment.
- There is no substitute for basic military fitness, effective and continuous military exercising and training, combined with adequate equipment and high morale.
- There must exist clear political objectives and close cooperation between the government and military.
- The significant contribution which civilian resources can make to a nation's military strength in a crisis needs to be acknowledged, studied, and planned for.
- The battle for air superiority was vital to the success of the campaign. An effective air defence system needs to be layered and have a mix of systems, including an electronic detection system, fighter aircraft, ECM, medium and short range missiles, medium calibre guns, and close range point defence systems.

- A friendly forward base, in this case Ascension Island, was vital for logistical build up, restowing and last minute training.
- Transportation was a vital and scarce resource, that had many tasks, (including evacuating casualties, ferrying ammunition and weapons, redeploying troops, providing flexible reserves, and moving vital stores amongst others). Because of the nature of the terrain helicopter transport was particularly suitable.
- Rates of usage of ammunition were higher than anticipated.

#### FACTORS AFFECTING A FUTURE RRF DEPLOYMENT

Before examining whether these lessons might be applicable to a future deployment of the RRF into the South Pacific, we must examine the factors affecting any future deployment. The initial planning will be based on whether the force will deploy by air or sea. The nature of the threat will dictate the size and composition of the force deployed, as will the duration and intensity of the operation. The climate and the terrain may impose transportation problems and may impose further limitations to the plan that need to be considered. Because these factors contain many 'unknowns' it becomes obvious that amongst others, the following points need to be addressed:

- Transportation, a vital and important resource, may be restricted to suit the terrain. Therefore helicopter transportation may be particularly suitable and necessary.
- It is probable that regardless of the nature of the threat, a friendly forward operating base would be desirable to allow 'battle preparation' to be conducted (including acclimatization) without interference from the enemy.
- Air superiority would be desirable to allow the RRF to deploy and establish a beachhead either by air or sea, as well as allowing operations from the beachhead to proceed.
- Given the financial limitations imposed upon the New Zealand Defence Forces during peacetime, civilian resources would need to be used to enable the RRF to deploy to the South Pacific.

- There would need to be clear government direction to allow the RRF to determine its objectives, and once committed, the military and government would need to ensure close cooperation to ensure political goals were achievable and achieved.
- The RRF would require its own logistics unit to provide enough logistical support to deploy and operate within the South Pacific until a resupply system was established.
- Contingency planning at every level for a future deployment to the South Pacific by the RRF would ensure plans and procedures were available, staff tables established and solutions to problems readily available. This also ensures intelligence information is available when required.
- Training of RRF personnel to high standards of physical and military fitness would prepare them for the rigours encountered during such a deployment.
- To mobilize, deploy and operate in the South Pacific, the RRF would need to be regularly trained, practised and tested in realistic conditions. Each exercise provides the basis from which to improve our procedures, and to address as many problems as possible before the RRF has to operate in a conflict in which each unaddressed problem may result in the loss of life.

Whilst not exhaustive, a quick comparison between these points that need to be addressed prior to a deployment into the South Pacific, and the problems the British faced during the Falklands conflict, reveals that they are almost identical. It is also apparent that the lessons learned by the British are equally applicable to a future deployment into the South Pacific by the RRF.

#### CONCLUSION

Clearly the lessons learned or re-learned by the British Forces during the Falklands Campaign are applicable to a future deployment of the RRF into the South Pacific. Whilst the majority of these lessons have been addressed by the British Army, they were gained at a cost of 255 lives. The New Zealand Defence Force, and in particular the RRF, have an ideal opportunity to also learn and benefit from these lessons, at virtually no cost.

It has been said that those people who do not learn from the mistakes from the past are destined to repeat them. If the Staff at HQ RRF wish to avoid the same problems faced by the British Forces during the Falklands campaign, they need to learn the lessons from this and other past conflicts. And to learn these lessons, is to prepare comprehensive contingency plans for any eventuality, and to conduct regular, demanding, and realistic training to prepare all elements of the RRF for any operation, including the possible future deployment to the South Pacific.

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THE ROLE AND EMPLOYMENT OF THE  
FORCE MILITARY POLICE COMPANY  
DURING LOW LEVEL CONTINGENCIES

by

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Captain Trevor Cameron graduated from Officer Cadet Training Corps in December 1981, when he was posted to Waiouru as an RNZMP platoon commander. In 1985 he left the New Zealand Army and served as the Chief of Security for the United Nations, based in the Middle East Regional Headquarters in Baghdad. In 1988 he returned to New Zealand and was posted to Headquarters 1 Brigade in Papakura as the Staff Officer Grade Three Training. Captain Cameron is currently the Staff Officer Military Police (Investigations) in Army General Staff.

'In a national insurrection the centre of gravity to be destroyed lies in the person of the chief leader and in public opinion: against these points the blow must be directed'.

Clausewitz: On War, 1832

NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE POLICY

The remoteness of New Zealand from major land powers has shaped Defence Policy, resulting in a preferred strategy of 'self reliance in partnership'. This includes the maintenance of armed forces to a level sufficient to meet small contingencies within our geographic region and to contribute to wider collective efforts where New Zealand interests are involved, such as support to United Nations peace keeping missions.

Of the eight major tasks the contribution to regional security is vital. The Defence of New Zealand 1991 (A Policy Paper) identifies requests for assistance in low level emergencies, a terrorist attack, or evacuation of New Zealand nationals from countries in the Pacific as the few security threats which will require a response from New Zealand.

The Defence Forces must look to deployments in Pacific countries, where the infrastructure is limited and the problems of providing operational and logistics support great. It is considered that lessons learnt from the Malayan Emergency and, more recently,

similar operations in Thailand are more relevant than the American involvement in Vietnam or the British Army's continuing presence in Northern Ireland.

This paper will discuss the relationship between the nature of low level contingencies and the requirement to operate within civil law. In particular it will focus on the enhancement of the commander's plan by the Force Military Police Company and the requirement for lateral tasking of military police in unconventional situations.

### AIM

The aim of this essay is to determine the roles and employment of the Force Military Police Company on low level contingencies.

### THE NATURE OF LOW LEVEL OPERATIONS

In any emergency the civil authorities will seek to re-establish control while those seeking to destabilize a government concentrate on three main phases. These are:

- to breakdown obedience to the government by the populace,
- to attack the government administrative apparatus, and
- to expand to support armed force to wear down the legitimate government.

The civil authorities must work within the framework of the law to counter these effects. In contrast, groups opposed to the government will use criminal activities such as the sale of drugs, kidnapping and murder to achieve their goals. As a response population centres and villages must be strengthened and supported within the law. This French strategy called 'tache d'huile' was used to great effect by the Thai government in overcoming the communist insurgency between 1972 - 1990.

While emergency legislation may allow for the use of armed forces or assistance from another country, the essential element is the retention and primacy of law and order. Before any deployment of New Zealand Forces could take place, a 'Status of Forces Agreement' (SOFA) between the host country and New Zealand would be required to provide the necessary tasks and the protection of the law for the deployed force.

In low level operations, one of the primary aims is not 'seek and destroy', but to prosecute criminals and regain confidence from the populace. In doing so, a force must balance a knowledge of civil law and control of evidence with necessary military tactics to bring military options to a successful conclusion.

A deployed force may include a number of elements, such as infantry for manpower intensive activities, engineers for reconstruction, and logistic units to support both the deployed force and provide assistance to the local administration. It is in the area of the maintenance of the law that the Force Military Police Company provides a useful and essential element of command and control.

#### THE ROLE OF THE FORCE MILITARY POLICE COMPANY

The 1991 New Zealand Army Restructure identified two major points that caused all military police resources to be placed under command of Land Force Command. These were:

- military police are a scarce resource, and
- command of the military police should be at the highest level.

It was also found the role of the military police should reflect the true nature of (military police) operations in both the operational and static role. As there is little if any difference to the police nature of their tasks, the role statement was changed to"

**"The Role of the Force Military Police Company is to provide military police support to the Army in peace and in war".**

#### THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MILITARY POLICE

The commander must consider all the characteristics of military police elements in his plan. These are:

- the capacity to move all elements long distances in unit transport,
- good communications,
- the capability to deploy on independent operations, and
- the requirement for timely and adequate information.



This allows the deployment of military police independently, at the same time providing the commander intelligence and support through normal channels of command. Despite these characteristics, the commander still faces a dilemma. He must ensure the deployed forces comply with the terms of the SOFA.

#### THE COMMANDER'S DILEMMA

In studying the problem, the commander's appreciation may consider some of the following additional points:

- The legal constraints imposed by the SOFA and how to ensure all his forces comply.
- The requirement to conform with the rules of evidence, in particular the rules relating to admissions, confessions, cautions, and exhibits.
- The most effective and efficient form of liaison and coordination with local police agencies and judicial system.
- Specialist tasks such as search, close protection, criminal intelligence and deterrence.
- Prisoners are dealt with as criminals within the existing legal system and are not subject to the Geneva Conventions as prisoners of war.

The dilemma for the commander is the dichotomy of responsibility between maintaining law and order, yet providing a credible force as a deterrent. It is within this area the military police provide support.

#### THE TASKS OF THE MILITARY POLICE COMPANY

While low level contingencies provide for lateral tasking of military police resources, such tasks should not be to the detriment of routine military police duties. The Force Military Police Company will be required to continue to provide the following support:

- route reconnaissance,
- patrolling,
- the maintenance of discipline,
- crime prevention,

- minor investigations,
- assistance with refugees, and
- absentee enquiries.

The Company performs a number of other tasks which allow the commander to concentrate on his mission. Further support to the plan is offered in a number of ways:

- investigations,
- vehicle and random check points,
- liaison with the civil authorities,
- close protection,
- special operations, and
- traffic control.

### Investigations

Any incident involving New Zealand servicemen has the potential to involve the New Zealand Forces in legal action, particularly where media interest may expose the action to close scrutiny from politicians and others, both inside and outside the area of operations. The American experience in Vietnam is an excellent example of how this political and military damage can occur.

In these cases trained military police investigators who work within New Zealand and local law can provide a detailed and impartial result. Should a prosecution follow against a soldier or civilian all rules of evidence will have been complied with. More important, in the eyes of the populace justice will have been seen to be done.

### Vehicle Check Points

At planned or random checkpoints, the potential for loss of cases against insurgents or criminals is greatest. Soldiers trained in other arts can overlook the legal requirements of cautions, the chain of evidence for exhibits and rules for admissions and confessions. Unlawful detention of civilians at these checkpoints may constitute an arrest under local law and will prejudice the result of any legal action.

It should be remembered the aim is to locate offenders for prosecution. By the counter insurgency force's not following simple rules, criminals may walk free from a court to continue to foster unrest in the community. Military police deployed in

sections in support of checkpoints will ensure procedures are adopted correctly. Furthermore, securing evidence and taking statements will control and reduce court appearances by soldiers as witnesses.

### Liaison with the Civil Authorities

In most recent emergencies such as Guatemala, Malaya and Thailand, close liaison with the police and the community has brought success in operations. Regardless of nationality, respect is always present between law enforcement agencies. In most low level situations the local police will still operate, although under pressure, and the arrival of 'supplementation' from trained law enforcement personnel will boost morale and bolster the police in the eyes of the community.

While the commander may use his military police on other tasks, at the very least Special Investigation Branch and intelligence personnel must maintain close liaison and provide the commander with sound criminal and tactical intelligence.

### Close Protection

In pursuit of the three phases of disruption, groups who seek to destabilize a government will target politicians and prominent persons for assassination or kidnapping as a method of breaking down obedience and attacking the administration. These risks extend to the force commander. Should it be possible to injure the force commander it will be shown the invited forces are not capable of protecting themselves or the local community.

Recent experiences within United Nations forces, South-East Asia, the Middle East and Europe have highlighted this. Trained military police close protection operators who carry out their duties discretely will enable the commander to continue with his duties unimpeded and efficiently.

### Special Operations

Low level contingencies involve incidents and planned operations which bear no resemblance to normal tactical doctrine. These may include demonstrations, limited cordon and search operations, undercover operations, 'controlled purchases' of illicit goods or drugs, and surveillance. Military police provide a legitimate and discrete means to carry out such tasks.

### Traffic Control

Traffic control in situations where the roads are the domain of the insurgent can be a commander's nightmare. The control of these roads and traffic can be supplemented by military police in the following ways:

- Temporary Traffic Control Posts (TTCP) in strength. TTCP will only be established for short periods during major road moves. Should it be vital to control a critical point, this task should be carried out by military police with infantry as protection.
- Information posts will be established in protected areas. It should be noted the requirement to provide checkpoints at the entrance to an area is the responsibility of the camp or force administration unit, not the military police.
- Military police convoy escorts can provide firepower and liaison services to formed convoys if the road state does not allow free running traffic.
- Road patrols in strength will provide route reconnaissance and may prevent saboteurs from laying mines or ambushes.

### CONCLUSIONS

The employment of New Zealand Defence Forces in low level operations is detailed in the 'The Defence of New Zealand 1991, A Policy Paper' which outlines the requirement for regional security. The Force Military Police Company was formed to meet this and other contingencies.

In deployments, local and New Zealand Forces will pursue the maintenance of law and order to reinforce the administration's right to govern. However, groups wishing to destabilize the country will use unlawful methods to achieve their goals.

In response, the military police provides the commander of New Zealand forces with a valuable tool for less conventional tasks requiring an understanding of law, discretion and liaison. This enables him to continue with the force mission in more conventional means. Despite the nature of the deployment the military police must also continue with those routine tasks with which commanders are more familiar.

In all situations conformity with the rules of evidence, exhibit control and arrest and detention procedures are adopted in order to achieve the aim. Offenders are treated as criminals and processed through the judicial system.

One of the most valuable assets available to a commander is the Force Military Police Company. This unit has the capacity to maintain discipline and preserve law and order which allows the commander's tactical and logistics plans to be implemented without interference.

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THE ROLE AND EMPLOYMENT OF  
THE READY REACTION FORCE ARMoured SQUADRON  
IN A LOW LEVEL CONTINGENCY

by

CAPTAIN D.J. STRONG, BA, RNZAC

Captain David Strong, RNZAC, graduated from the Royal Military College Duntroon in 1988 with a Bachelor of Arts degree in English Literature. He spent the next two years in Regimental appointments at Queen Alexandra's Squadron and completed an Armoured Officers course in Australia. Captain Strong's last appointment was as the troop leader of the Ready Reaction Force Armoured Personnel Carrier Troop. He has recently deployed on a UNTSO tour to Israel as a military observer.

"Once a good understanding of how each other operates is achieved, the use of armour in support of infantry in this theatre is only limited by the imagination and enthusiasm of all concerned and the need to adequately maintain the mechanical performance of the vehicle."

CO, Australian Infantry  
Battalion, Post Vietnam  
Report, 1970-71

INTRODUCTION

Since the Second World War armoured vehicles have been employed in numerous low level contingencies. Most government forces and some insurgent forces have used armour to enforce their political will on the population and enemy. The conflicts range from Ethiopia and Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s, to Latin America and Afghanistan in the 1970s and 1980s.

Dependent on political restraints, the inherent characteristics of armour; those of firepower, mobility and protection; allow for flexible employment throughout the area of operations. Tasks range from control operations including cordon and search and road blocks, to protective operations including route patrolling and ambushing. Armoured vehicles can also be used during operations in depth, for tasks such as attacks on fortified villages. Often, just the presence of armour acts as a deterrent to enemy forces. The New Zealand Army recognizes the potential need for armour in a low level contingency and includes a squadron of light armour in the Ready Reaction Force (RRF) order of battle.

The aim of this essay is to discuss the employment of the RRF Armoured Squadron in a low level contingency.

### THE RRF ARMoured SQUADRON

For the purpose of this essay the definition of a low level operation is, "controlled military operations conducted to counter threats to the maintenance of internal or external security."(1)

The RRF Armoured Squadron is composed of four Scorpion troops and one Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC) troop. Each Scorpion troop has four Scorpions, each with a 76mm gun and a 7.62mm machine gun mounted coaxially. The 76mm gun is effective in the direct fire role out to 2200m and indirect to 6600m. It fires high explosive, high explosive squash head, canister and smoke rounds. The APC troop is made up of 15 M113A1's. It is divided into a headquarters of three vehicles and three sections of four vehicles. Each M113A1 has a .50in calibre machine gun which is effective to 2000m and a 7.62mm machine gun mounted coaxially. The troop can carry one infantry company. As a complete unit the squadron is deployable at 14 days notice and is under command of the RRF Commander. The unit organization is at Annex A.

### Role

The role of the RRF Armoured Squadron is to provide direct fire support, security, APC and armoured reconnaissance support to the RRF.(2)

### EMPLOYMENT

The armoured squadron can be employed in many tasks other than those stated in its role. The tasks can be grouped under the major headings found in counter insurgency operations. They are control operations, protective operations and operations in depth. Due to the differences in vehicle capabilities and troop organizations, some tasks are more suited to APCs than Scorpions and vice versa.

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1. 1 Brigade Training Plan, July 1991 - June 1992, Annex A to para 5.
  2. Ready Reaction Force Armoured Squadron, Standard Operating Procedures, 1987, SOP 1.

### Control Operations

Control operations are defined as those measures undertaken to control the civilian population and resources. They are designed to protect the people, deny enemy access to them and re-establish governmental control.(3)

During control operations armoured vehicles can be employed in both roadblocks and cordon and search tasks. The troop's mobility allows for rapid establishment of cordons and roadblocks with little notice. This is an advantage if the rapid uplift of prisoners is required. The squadron provides a cordon and search commander with flexibility and economy of effort, in that the APCs can be used for a number of tasks during the operation. Tasks include being part of the outer cordon, a mobile reserve and as an armoured headquarters. One limitation in control operations is that if armoured vehicles are left for a significant period of time in a static role, such as a roadblock, they become vulnerable to short range anti-armoured weapons (SRAAW).

### Protective Operations

Protective operations are conducted to ensure the security of the force and to isolate insurgents from the population and resources.(4)

Key Installations and Defensive Positions. The RRF Armoured Squadron will normally be maintained in a forward operations base (FOB) with its support elements. Sub-units will usually be employed on tasks outside this area. However, when inside the position they are useful in providing fire support, acting as a mobile reserve or as part of a quick reaction force (QRF).

Escorts and Route Patrolling. The Squadron can be effectively employed in route and convoy protection. Sub-units can also be used to keep routes open by actively patrolling them. Here the APC troop is better equipped for longer routes due to its size and organization.

Ambushing and Observation Posts. These tasks are sometimes discounted as being armoured tasks due to such problems as noise, smoke and track marks. Regardless, many successful infantry and armour ambushes have been conducted in the past, notably by the Australian Army in Vietnam. Scorpion troops are equipped with observation devices and are trained to conduct observation posts. These should only be for a limited duration due to the low number of men in each troop.

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3. Australian Army Manual of Land Warfare, Part One, Volume Three, Pamphlet Number One, Counter Insurgency Operations, 1980. para 403.

4. Ibid p XI.



### Operations in Depth

Operations in depth are conducted outside controlled areas to harass, weaken and destroy insurgents, to permit the establishment and expansion of controlled areas.(5)

Search and Clear, and Attacks on Fortified Villages. A commander can employ armoured vehicles to their fullest potential during operations in depth. The troops can be used in a direct or indirect fire support role to clear buildings and shallow bunkers. They can be employed as mobile cut-offs or reserves and they add to security by acting as a roadblock or controlling junction posts. As discussed earlier, the APC is an effective headquarters for an infantry commander due to its protection, mobility and communications. If the commander recognizes an area of concern, the flexibility of armour allows him to quickly redeploy his forces and concentrate them elsewhere.

Insertion and Extraction. Insertion and extraction of friendly forces, especially when under fire, is a task well suited to an APC troop. The troop's protection and fire power, plus its range of operation, enables a high level of cooperation with the infantry to achieve the aim. One historical example of extraction was at the Battle of Long Tan in 1966. Here an APC troop aided a company of the 6th Royal Australian Regiment, while they were under attack by superior forces from the North Vietnamese Army.

### ADVANTAGES OF EMPLOYING ARMOUR

The employment of the RRF Armoured Squadron during a low level contingency increases a commanders combat power. Advantages of employment can be discussed in relation to firepower, protection, mobility and communications.

#### Firepower

The Scorpions 76mm gun is accurate out to 2200m when fired from a stationary position. The vehicle was proven in operations during the Falklands conflict, by destroying enemy bunkers during British attacks. In low level contingencies the vehicle can engage bunkers, buildings, light armour and infantry.

The APC troop does not offer as much direct fire as a Scorpion troop. The combined weight of thirty machine guns does, however, give it more machine-gun firepower than an infantry battalion. The troop carries a large volume of ammunition, some support weapons such as three 84mm Carl Gustavs, and can destroy light buildings, soft skinned vehicles and infantry.

### Mobility

The RRF Armoured Squadron is a highly mobile force. Sub-units are deployable at short notice and are self sustainable for short periods of time. The APC troop can deploy an infantry company into or out of battle while aiding in suppressing the enemy's fire. If required the troop can resupply an independent unit or a unit in contact. The squadron can also cover large areas through mobile patrolling, whether the aim is to disrupt the enemy or as a show of strength.

Mobility is limited by the terrain in the area of operations. The armoured squadron cannot move through swamp or over mountainous country. It can, however, move through most bush, if close infantry support is provided.

### Protection

The APC troop provides mounted infantry with protection against small arms fire, anti-personnel mines and shell fragments. In addition to delivering infantry to the point of battle, APCs can act as mobile headquarters and ambulances. When it is required, the armoured troops will give protection to convoys and VIPs.

The presence of armoured forces can act as a deterrent to insurgents. A troop may deter enemy action by conducting a mobile patrol through a village, or a roadblock on an likely enemy route. Insurgent forces are less likely to act aggressively if the return fire will be intense.

### Communications

Every armoured vehicle carries at least two radios with double the range of the standard AN(PRC) 77 set. In addition, the command vehicles carry up to four radios with greatly increased ranges. These effective communications allow supported elements greater flexibility by increasing their area of operations and dispersion on tasks. More efficient communications aid directive control and consequently the commanders ability to maintain his aim.

### LIMITATIONS WHEN EMPLOYING ARMOUR

The RRF Armoured Squadron is a small unit with only five deployable fighting sub-units. As a scarce asset it could often be in demand and therefore over-used. Vehicles will suffer mechanical faults, and in turn a reduced combat effectiveness, if time is not allocated for routine maintenance.

To keep the force operational, a regular resupply of petrols, oils and spare parts is required. It is usual for sub-units to be placed in support rather than under command of the unit they are working with. This ensures that the correct resources are, when necessary, made available by the squadron headquarters.

Political factors can restrict the employment of armour in a low level contingency. A commander may need to consider the implications of using armour in view of the civilian population. This is due primarily to armour's aggressive look and sound. If the conflict is low level and low intensity, both armour and artillery may not be employable in the theatre of operations.

As light armour, the RRF Armoured Squadron is vulnerable to SRAAW and anti-tank mines. If left static for long periods of time, the vehicles may become targets of opportunity to insurgent forces. Commanders need to consider vulnerability against the requirement for using armour, when deploying forces in roadblocks and other stationary tasks.

#### CONCLUSION

The RRF Armoured Squadron is employable in many tasks during a low level contingency. These include those outlined by its role, such as direct fire support and mobility. They also include participation in tasks generally controlled by infantry. These include search and clear operations, defence of key installations and ambushing.

The employment of armour increases a supported unit's firepower, protection and mobility. It increases a commander's combat power, his ability to rapidly concentrate forces and his flexibility. A commander who understands the characteristics of armour and employs the unit to its fullest potential, can only increase the chances of his operation being a success.

The armoured squadron's employment is limited by several factors such as administration and political restrictions. As it is a scarce resource and often in demand, time must be allocated for maintenance and resupply, or the operational strength of the unit will decrease.

If the RRF Armoured Squadron is able to be used to its maximum potential, employment is limited only by a commander's enthusiasm and imagination.

Annex: A. RRF Armoured Squadron Organization

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
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ANNEX A

RRF ARMoured SQUADRON ORGANIZATION



HOW MIGHT JUNIOR OFFICERS' TRAINING IN THE  
NEW ZEALAND ARMY BE IMPROVED?

by

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Major Clayton is a graduate of the University of Waikato and Hamilton Teachers College. He joined the Territorial Force in 1976 and served as a platoon commander with 6th Battalion (Hauraki), RNZIR prior to transferring to the Regular Force in 1982. He has held appointments in Defence Headquarters, Army General Staff and the Army Training Group. He is presently holding the position of Director, Queen Elizabeth II Army Memorial Museum and Military Studies Centre at Waiouru.

"Education is a weapon whose affects depends on who holds it in his hands and at whom it is aimed."

Joseph Stalin

INTRODUCTION

There is no stipulated requirement for officers to undertake any formal education during their first decade of commissioned service. Thereafter, they are expected to successfully complete two university courses, in military history and international relations, prior to promotion to substantive major. This educational void is in stark contrast to the training demands placed on the same officers. Continuous, progressive, and integrated programmes are the hallmarks of officer training in those same 10 years.

It has been accepted that, for training to be effective, it must be continuous, progressive and integrated. It must also be complemented by rigorous formal education that trains the mind, not only to acquire knowledge, but also to develop its intellect.(1) Without education, the mind acquires knowledge as a confusing jumble of unrelated facts, that dulls, and then deadens the intellect. The New Zealand Army has an enviable training system that has produced officers able to meet the

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1. ATG 4798/1 dated 1 Dec 87 para 6.

challenges of operations and overseas military institutes.(2) Unfortunately its training is not yet complemented by a suitably comprehensive educational system.(3) To improve the training of its junior officers the New Zealand Army must continually review its educational needs, examine what it supplies, and devise strategies to eliminate any identifiable shortfalls.(4) In short, it needs to develop an integrated educational programme that provides the basis for individual officer development.

### AIM

The aim of this essay is to examine junior officer education in the New Zealand Army.

### DISCUSSION

#### The Educational Requirement

The need to develop a comprehensive educational strategy has been recognized by the New Zealand Army for a number of years. For example, in 1987 the Regular Force Officer Training Project Committee (RFOTPC), undertook a detailed examination of officer education and its relationship to overall officer training and development.(5) The Committee felt that the Army needed to develop a tertiary level educational programme that would be intellectually challenging for its Officer Corps.(6) The Committee believed that such a programme would foster creativity, vision, flexibility of mind and an adventurous spirit.(7) These attributes, it was hoped, would produce officers who were discerning, literate, comfortable with change and, most importantly, well-informed.(8)

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2. Army Schools 4500/29 dated 30 Nov 88, para 7. ATG 4798/1 dated 26 Jan 89, para 2.
  3. ATG 4798/1 dated 1 Dec 87, Annex A, para 5.
  4. Ibid paras 4, 5, 13, 14, 15.
  5. ATG 4798/1 dated 1 Dec 87, Annex A, para 32.
  6. Ibid, para 8.
  7. Ibid, para 14a.
  8. Ibid, para 9.

To provide the requisite knowledge, together with the necessary intellectual rigour, the RFOTPC recommended the need for the programme to be allied to appropriate civilian institutions.(9) Further, it identified international relations, military history, organizational theory, group and individual dynamics, and the characteristics of leadership as the most appropriate subjects for study.(10) This educational blueprint was further refined in early 1988 by the Committee's education representative, the Education Officer for the Army Training Group who argued that it implied the need to teach two complementary streams of study. The first stream, referred to as military studies, incorporated the subjects international relations and military history. The second stream, labeled management studies, included those subjects which dealt with human and organizational behaviour. Transcending and permeating both of these streams was the study of leadership characteristics.(11) This refinement was readily agreed to by the RFOTPC.

#### Integration of Education with Training

The integration of complementary officer education with training necessitates that the streams of study be further sub-divided into specific subject areas and levels of study. The levels of study can be loosely described as: foundation, intermediate and advanced. These levels equate approximately to the officer cadet, junior officer and senior captain levels of a military career. In addition to outlining the areas of study it deemed appropriate, the RFOTPC identified specific subjects that should be taught. Politics, for example, requires basic theories to be examined, together with the political dimensions of conflict and conflict resolution at foundation, intermediate and advanced levels respectively. Similarly, military history courses need to examine at progressive levels the evolution of war, low level operations in isolation and operations in a wider context. The subject area dealing with human behaviour needs to examine critical thinking, human resource management and the psychological needs of individuals. Finally, the field of organizational behaviour needs to concentrate on the fundamentals of corporate organizations, public administration issues and the management of corporate policies and strategies.(12)

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9. Ibid, para 5d.
  10. Ibid, paras, 5, 7c, 8, 14, 21.
  11. AEC Waiouru 4798/1 dated Mar 88, para 5.
  12. ATG 4798/1 dated 1 Dec 87, Annex A, paras 5, 14, 19. AEC Waiouru 4798/1 dated Mar 88, paras 10, 14.



The 12 courses which are derived from the four subject areas within the two streams of study would take an individual a minimum of 1800 hours of effort. (This minimum is calculated by using the course commitment formulae of the New Zealand universities which detail that students undertake 150 hours of study for each individual course in which they are enrolled). If all officers were required to enroll in all of the courses identified, they would on average need to pass one course for each year of service between graduation and substantive major. Operational training, demanding regimental appointments, exercises, attachments and other service commitments would result in few officers being able to complete such a requirement. Accepting this reality, the RFOTPC recommend a pragmatic compromise that required officers to complete a representative selection of six courses. From both streams of study the RFOTPC recommended officers undertake three courses, one from each level. Although this compromise reduces the breadth of study, it still ensures that depth, progression and integration are maintained.(13)

#### Implementation of an Integrated Educational Programme

A transformation from concept to reality for the officer education blueprint has yet to occur. Significant progress has been made in some areas but the New Zealand Army, buffeted by economic and budgetary upheavals, has lost sight of the proposal for an integrated, progressive and comprehensive educational programme. Attention has been centred on the military studies stream to the detriment of its parallel management studies stream.

The very success of Army's negotiations with the University of Waikato is partially to blame. In 1987, the New Zealand Army transformed its in-house International and Military History Promotion Examinations into formalised university papers taught in conjunction with Waikato's Politics and History Departments.(14) This was followed, a year later, by the upgrading of the New Zealand Commissioning Course Military History module into a university paper examining the evolution of warfare. This is also taught in conjunction with the University of Waikato.

Building upon this relationship, negotiations were commenced in 1989 with the University of Waikato for the establishment of an integrated educational programme tailored to meet specific Army requirements. These negotiations have led to the establishment, at the University, of a formalized programme in defence and strategic studies.

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13. Army Schools 4500/29 dated 30 Nov 88, para 43b.

14. Army 4798/1/DAE dated 20 Jul 87.  
Army 4798/1/DAE dated 16 Sep 87.e

From 1992, the University will offer courses leading to an undergraduate diploma in defence studies, a post-graduate diploma and a masters qualification in defence and strategic studies. The undergraduate diploma in defence studies appears, superficially at least, to meet the requirements set out by the RFOTPC. Consisting of six papers at progressive levels of study, the diploma requires a careful examination of the military art. International relations, military history and the philosophical dimension of war and peace comprise the core elements. Students are then able to select a further three papers from a selection of politics and history papers. Some flexibility is offered with a provision that allows candidates to take up to two other papers from any other subject area with the approval of the Director of Studies.<sup>(15)</sup> It is clear, however, that the emphasis is concentrated solely on what the RFOTPC describe as military studies, to the exclusion of management studies. This defect must be addressed if the Army's identified needs for the education of its officers are to be met.

Waikato University's Management Studies Department, which teaches suitable subjects that would overcome the apparent weakness in the Diploma of Defence Studies, is currently unable to offer extramural courses. This is not a serious impediment. Massey University, with over two decades of institutional experience of teaching by correspondence, already offers courses in suitable subject areas. By combining the offerings from Waikato with Massey, the Army's requirements can be fulfilled. Such a combination should not prove difficult to arrange.

All three organizations have worked in close cooperation in the recent past. It was a combined team of academics from Massey and Waikato that undertook an external validation exercise of officer training courses, which resulted in credits being granted towards degrees from both universities. Though academic representatives from Waikato have expressed certain reservations about another tertiary institution being intimately involved in the teaching of its Diploma Programme, past cooperation should ensure that there are no insurmountable obstacles. It would be necessary, however, to formalize the relationship to prevent any misunderstanding concerning authority or obligation of the three parties involved. To this end, negotiations over the programme in defence and strategic studies should be broadened to include Massey University representatives.

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15. Programme of Defence and Strategic Studies, 1992 Booklet (University of Waikato, Hamilton, 1991).

### Defence Tertiary Institute

An alternative to outside assistance, for the teaching of an integrated tertiary level educational programme for officers, has been provided by major changes to the laws governing polytechnics. The monopoly that universities once held as the sole bodies for conferring degrees has been broken. Polytechnics, under the new Education Act, have been granted authority to award undergraduate degrees. Of greater importance is the requirement for Defence to establish its own polytechnic or tertiary institute for the validation and acceptance of its apprenticeship training. Once established, this Defence Institute could undertake to implement any educational programme the Army desires for its officers.

Implementation of such a programme by the Defence tertiary institute could be achieved by using a combination of existing suitably qualified service personnel and by contracting civilian agencies to teach specific courses as required. Should it become evident that Army is unable to achieve its aim of providing junior officers with an educational programme, which challenges its participants, this alternative should be given serious consideration.

### CONCLUSION

Without a comprehensive and integrated educational programme, the junior officers of the New Zealand Army will find it extremely difficult to meet the challenges of modern society. Although their professional training may enhance their survivability on operations, it will be of little use in the societal minefields that they will pass through as their careers progress. To guide them through these obstacles, they will require a sharp and well formed intellect. This can only be borne of a creative and flexible mind, nurtured by a progressive educational programme.

The Army has responded to this need by advocating a programme of studies that offers a broad knowledge base integrated with analytical skills development. It has not yet provided the means to achieve such a programme. Developments to date have been unbalanced. A distinct and worrying bias exists towards politics and history at the expense of the equally important human and organizational studies. This bias must be eliminated to ensure that officers are provided with a balanced education. If it is not, then any programme developed will fail to be complementary to junior officer training and might well detract, rather than improve, that training.

PUBLIC RELATIONS AND THE SURVIVAL OF THE ARMY

IN THE 1990s

by

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"When a nation loses its military spirit, the career of arms immediately ceases to be respected....."

Alex Tocqueville

INTRODUCTION

World Peace

Within the last 18 months the world has witnessed a number of historical milestone events such as the Berlin Wall removal and the unification of the two Germanys. The snowball effect has seen a reduction in Cold War tensions between Nato and the Warsaw Pact, culminating in Arms reduction talks. Hand in hand with this halcyon of peace is the growing opposition to the need for military forces by world peace lobby groups.

New Zealand Public Opinion

New Zealand is not isolated from international affairs and world opinion does affect public attitudes here. Defence issues have taken on greater meaning recently, particularly in the wake of the ANZUS Treaty breakdown. The ANZAC frigate projects sparked fierce public debate over the use of taxpayers money on defence. Recent budget cuts to Defence continue to reflect the low priority of the Defence Vote. Social and economic issues are having greater priority over defence. Public opinion on these matters has a great bearing on the direction that the Government takes.

### Impact on the Army

The impact of Budget cuts on the Army has been great. The Army has been forced to take reactionary measures such as a 10 per cent reduction in manpower, unit reorganization and greater civilian input. Attrition rates are high and recruiting levels are down. These manpower problems have been compounded by the recent Armed Forces Pay Review (AFPR) which has caused some dissatisfaction within the ranks. The future looks bleak for the Army unless a conflict or event arises which causes the public and the Government to focus attention back on defence issues.

### Public Relations

The current economic situation in New Zealand does not allow Government expenditure on Defence without some justification at least to the public. The ANZAC frigate issue was an example. In recent times little public debate has occurred on defence matters such that the general public have no concept of how the Defence Budget is used or what tangible benefits they receive.

Public Relations(PR) is critical to the operation of any Government service and the Army is no exception. The PR programme for the Army is designed to encourage Army support and to discourage both public apathy and doubts about its ability to carry out its roles. It is also designed to help foster high morale within the Army. In light of the status quo, a relevant question to ask is how effective has the Army PR plan been? The Army must realistically examine its PR plan and assess its effectiveness in light of the problems that it is currently facing.

### AIM

The aim of this paper is to assess the effectiveness of the current Army PR Plan in meeting the challenges of peacetime existence in the 1990s.

### THE CHALLENGES

The general outline of the body of this paper will be as follows:

- discussion of the PR challenges and the effectiveness of the Army's PR response, and
- highlight possible options the Army can take.

The success of any PR programme depends on a clear, well defined plan, supported by the necessary resources and personnel.

### The Army PR Plan

The Army PR plan broadly covers two main areas:

- External PR. This is aimed at presenting the Army as an integral, essential and useful element of the New Zealand community.
- Internal PR. This is aimed at maintaining the morale of servicemen and dependants.

Any plan requires a means of implementation, so therefore the Army PR organization must be looked at.

### Army PR Organization

The success of any PR plan depends on the resources available for its implementation. At present the Army's PR organization is based on one Public Relations Officer, (PRO) Army, located at Army General Staff. The PRO (Army) has two special list commission officers on his staff. It does not receive any financial allocation.

Regional Level. At regional level PR is a command responsibility with each unit in the Army supposedly having an information officer. Very few units, if any, have one appointed. Terms of reference are scarce and do not provide a comprehensive guide. The appointed officers generally have no formal training in PR.

Assessment of the Army PR plan. Using the analogy of a tactical operation the Army PR plan has flaws and would possibly receive an "unworkable" for its execution. The main reason for this is that the Army lacks the required financial support and the necessary staff in order to meet its PR aims. The size of the PR organization at Wellington is insufficient to effectively coordinate and process all PR matters for the Army. The value of the information officers at regional level is questionable and the lack of finance means that active PR cannot be undertaken at all levels.

### Public Perceptions

Looking at the wider setting of New Zealand, the Army is part of the political, cultural, economic and social wheels which make society turn. The Army is not independent of society. In order to keep abreast with any changes and not become obsolete or rejected, the Army must monitor the latest public trends. This means determining the public's perception of the Army.

**Research.** Research by the Armed Forces on public attitudes has been given little emphasis and accurate information is lacking. The 1986 Defence Committee of Enquiry into public perception provides some insight.

**Perceived Threat.** From the Defence Committee of Enquiry's findings it was determined that the public perceived the invasion threat of New Zealand as being low.(1) As the primary aim of the Army is to defend New Zealand and her interests, it is highly unlikely that the Army will be employed in its primary role in the immediate future. As a result the Army's peacetime roles take on greater meaning.

**Peacetime Time Roles.** Over 90 per cent of the people polled during the Defence Committee of Enquiry believed that the peacetime roles of the Army included:

- Assisting Civil Defence.
- Disaster relief in the South Pacific region.
- Counter-terrorism in New Zealand.
- Search and rescue operations.
- Survival training for civilians.

**Assessment.** This document shows that the public has little concept of what peacetime roles the Army has. The public is unaware of the capabilities and expertise the Army possesses in terms of management, project planning and leadership. The high level of public ignorance is testimony to this fact. The Army has failed to achieve its aim of promoting itself as an integral, essential, and useful element of the New Zealand community. The lack of public and Government support has made an impact on the Army.

### Internal Impact

The lack of support has forced the Army to make changes including opting for a 10 per cent reduction in manpower. Amalgamation of units and corps cutbacks to reduce administrative costs have been undertaken. In areas of logistic and service support greater use has been made of civilian resources. New accounting systems have been introduced in order to prevent unnecessary spending.(2)

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1. Defence Committee of Enquiry, Defence and Security: What New Zealanders Want, Wellington NZ, 1986. p 40.

2. Oram, R. Army Top Gun Philosophical over Cuts NZ Herald, May 1990. p 9.

**Manpower.** Events to date has affected the Army's most important resource - its manpower. Attrition rates have been high in the last 18 months and the Army is operating at about 700 soldiers under strength. A number of contributing factors such as an Armed Forces Pay Review (AFPR) which left 80 per cent of service members without a payrise, an attempted boost in housing rents and few extensions given to personnel after 20 years service have all taken their toll on manning levels.

**Recruiting.** The high attrition rates is causing a headache for the Army. This problem is being compounded by the drop in recruiting levels.(3) The Army is looking at cutting back on recruit trade training as a cost saving measure. This may affect the Army's appeal as a long-term career. Current recruit training is designed to accommodate loss rates of up to 10 per cent per annum. There is growing concern that the long-term average may be rising from around eight to 15 per cent each year.

**Future Problems.** The high attrition rates and the lower recruiting levels means that gaps in the ranks will appear in later years and accelerated promotion will have to occur.(4) The Army is losing more manpower than it can afford.

**Assessment.** The high attrition rates and the lower recruiting numbers cannot be blamed purely on the Army and its reorganization. These manpower problems must be considered in their entirety. It is fair comment to say that morale is not high in the Army and efforts need to be made to rectify this problem. This situation has been compounded by the Army's reactionary response to its problems. Army PR mainly revolves around adverse publicity such as explaining to the public the events that led to the tragic deaths in August 1990 of six soldiers on Mt Ruapehu. This does not improve morale, particularly when the Army is always seen to be portrayed in a negative light. Based on this observation the Army PR is partly responsible for the status quo and therefore have, in part, failed to achieve its aim of maintaining internal morale. The problems confronting the Army are real and need to be acted on quickly. The response required needs to have all the qualities which make up any successful military operation.

#### WHAT CAN THE ARMY DO

In conducting an appreciation of the situation there are two main options which the Army can undertake. Any other alternatives are just variations on these. The options are:

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3. Oram. op cit p 9.
  4. Oram. op cit p 9.



- Ignore the current PR challenges and remain with the present setup.
- Actively promote itself to the New Zealand public.

The scope of this paper does not allow the facility to examine all options and therefore only the two main areas will be considered.

#### Remaining with the Present Setup

The Army can remain with the present PR set-up and ignore the challenges facing it today. In the short term this means that the Army will not have to change its current expenditure of the Defence Vote to include PR matters.

This option is, however, going against a military principle of war which calls for offensive action. It will mean that the PR will continue to be reactionary, aimed primarily at defending the Army against adverse publicity. Sadly the status quo will continue and the Army will be hard pressed to meet its operational requirements in the immediate future. This option lacks initiative and will reinforce the perception of helplessness portrayed by the Army in face of Government cuts.

#### Active Promotion

In order to gain public and Government support the Army can take the initiative and actively promote itself. It can use its own military principles and considerations to devise a promotion campaign and implement it. In fact many business corporations use the military analogies of tactical, operational and strategic planning to assist them in corporate marketing and management.(5)

Resources. The Army PR organization does not have the resources to actively promote the Army PR. A major deficiency in the Army PR plan is the lack of finance and trained staff. These drawbacks can be overcome by:

- Allocating finance for the purpose of active promotion.
- Review the current PR policy and give personnel, holding PR appointments, formal PR training.
- Contract a professional PR consultant to assist the Army in preparing a promotion campaign.

**Policy.** As the present PR policy revolves around responding to adverse publicity, some policy changes will need to be implemented. Some current research concerning public attitudes will need actioning so that any changes can reflect accurately what the public wants from the Army.

**Positive PR.** The Army can promote the positive points associated with its organization. By highlighting those qualities or activities which have value to the New Zealand community it is helping to dispel public ignorance and promote interest. Points worthy of promotion include:

- **Army involvement in Community Aid.** Examples of this are the 1990 Expo Road Show and the 1990 Commonwealth Games.
- **Promoting Skills.** Army personnel can be portrayed in terms of human resource managers, project managers and leaders. There are numerous examples of servicemen possessing technical skills which are suitable for promotion. (6)
- **Recognition.** This includes making the general public aware of the demands of service life such as military law, liability for duty 24 hours a day every day, and the ever present demands of leadership and orders. This is all in addition to being liable for active duty at any time.
- **Race Relations.** The Army has a sound record in race relations. This is worthy of promotion considering that the Army is one of the largest Government employers of Maori people.

### **Best Option**

The best option for the Army, in the long-term, is to actively promote itself as a valuable peacetime asset to the New Zealand public. This will help to generate support from the public and also improve morale internally as the Army is seen to be doing something positive about the predicament that it faces.

There are examples of active promotion being conducted by Army units. These include:

- Advertisement of the Army Museum on television.
- The 1 NZSAS Groups new approach to its selection approach using an advertising campaign and camp talks to overcome manpower shortages.

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6. Garnet, Maj J.A. The Army's Public Relations Challenge on Public Perception New Zealand Army Journal No 4 July 1987.

### CONCLUSION

The New Zealand Army is living in an age where it is, increasingly having to justify its peacetime existence to a discerning public.

The interface between the military and the public is the Army PR programme. The objectives of the Army PR programme is to promote the Army as an integral, essential and useful element of society and to maintain internal morale. In order to assess the effectiveness of the Army PR programme it was broken-down into the three main areas of the Army PR organization, public perception and the changes within the Army's internal structure.

It was found that the Army's PR organization was unable to meet its aim due to a lack of finance and staff. This meant that the Army's PR organization has a limited capability. This problem was compounded by a lack of research on public attitudes. A vicious circle had then developed which resulted in the Army being subjected to major changes in its organization.

In order to improve the situation, the Army could either remain with the present PR situation or actively promote itself. The better option is to actively promote itself to the New Zealand society as a peacetime asset. To achieve this the Army would have to allocate finance for PR purposes, train its PR staff and obtain the assistance of a professional PR consultant. Points worthy of promotion would include the skills possessed by servicemen, service life demands and the Army's race relations record.

### RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are made:

- The Army allocate finance to its PR organization.
- Ensure its PR staff receive formal PR training.
- Obtain the assistance of a professional PR consultant in preparing an active PR campaign aimed at promoting the Army as a peacetime asset.

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ROLE OF THE ROYAL NEW ZEALAND ARTILLERY

IN LOW LEVEL OPERATIONS

by

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INTRODUCTION

The Defence White paper has identified New Zealand's area of strategic interest as the south west Pacific basin. The New Zealand (NZ) Army has been reorganized to better cater for this area of interest, including increased preparations for low level conflict. So far, the employment of artillery has been such that on low level operations exercises, the guns are not used. During Exercise Golden Fleece, artillery was not allowed to engage targets and casualties were high. The question had to be asked, "would these figures have been so high if commanders were able to use the guns?" It is the belief of gunners that the artillery has been "misemployed as a result of lack of understanding of doctrine and definitions which apply to operations of this nature".(1) "Commanders at all levels have little appreciation of the employment of artillery in defence of their own troops in a low level setting".(2)

AIM

The aim of this essay is to discuss the role and employment of the Royal New Zealand Artillery (RNZA) in Low Level Operations (LLOPS).

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1. Major G.R. Williams, RNZA Presentation Artillery in LLOPS.
  2. Lt Col D.G. Box, RNZA Address to Regt Offrs after Ex Hunua Pass 1990.

### CHARACTERISTICS OF REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE

Mao Tse Tung understood a revolutionary war to be primarily centred on political control of operations. He stated "War cannot for a single moment be separated from politics. Politics is war without bloodshed, while war is politics with bloodshed". Revolutionary forces conduct operations to meet political objectives.

The key to success in any revolutionary war is the population. There must be popular support for the operation and so effort is concentrated on mobilizing the population. "The defeat of the military enemy, the overthrow of the government are secondary tasks in the sense that they come later. The primary effort of the guerilla is to mobilize the population, without whose consent, no government can stand".(3).

Commonly known as the "hearts and minds" campaign, the objective is to gain popular support through coordinated political, economic, psychological and military measures. Obviously the intention is to direct support against the government. During the Chinese Civil War Mao demanded a high standard of behaviour by insurgents so as to retain this support from the population. For example there was no rape or pillage of local villages.

The war is likely to be a protracted affair where the insurgents aim is to survive long enough for the insurgent infrastructure to become a viable entity. The insurgent infrastructure is at all levels of the society, but primarily concerned with the replacement of the government by forming either parallel governments or destabilizing the existing government. Again, the emphasis is in creating chaos so as to undermine the effectiveness of the legitimate government.

### PATTERN OF REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE

There are normally four phases of revolutionary warfare.

#### Preparatory Phase

The intentions of this phase are to set up and expand the party organization. The infrastructure on which the revolution will build is set in place. This includes infiltration into key positions, recruiting and training. Support for the revolutionary movement is canvassed so that momentum is generated. Most of the action is covert.

### Active Resistance Phase

During this phase active resistance to the government is encouraged. The party organization is further expanded and more supporters are recruited, sometimes by coercion. Limited force is used to intimidate and coerce the population with increasing acts of terrorism. More ambitious targets like police stations and military stores are identified and attacked.

Mao said "Fight only when victory is certain; run away when it is not". This typifies the tactics of the terrorists who will only attack weak or ill defended forces.

### Insurgency Phase

As the revolutionary movement gains strength so too does the intensity of terrorism. This expands into guerilla warfare which concentrates on attacking government security forces such as police pools and minor military units. Sabotage of government supply routes and communications are all targeted in an attempt to discredit the government, weaken its supporters and the government forces and to deny them access to areas occupied by the guerillas. With the consolidation of popular support comes the introduction of an alternative and better administration/government.

### Open Offensive

This last phase is indicated when the balance has definitely swung in favour of the revolutionary forces and the movement becomes a peoples war against the government. Guerilla war is supplemented by mobile warfare, which sees the increase of forces up to divisional strength. Escalation to a limited war has been inevitable and achieved.

These four phases show a simple progression but in reality the phases all merge and can be altered or may even be reversed.

### COUNTER REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE (CRW)

The essence of revolutionary warfare is the battle for the minds and allegiance of the population. A more effective strategy is required by the government forces to win this battle. The government must realize that a balance between a military solution and a political one must be achieved in order to gain success. Political measures alone could be used to prevent insurgencies at the outset, but once insurgency is in place, both political and military measures are required to restore peace. There are a number of principles to be observed when planning for CRW which is why the campaign takes time to develop.

### MILITARY OPERATIONS

Weapons available to the government before flexing the military muscle are psychological operations (in the battle for the minds) and also the gathering of intelligence (central to the function of command).

The ultimate weapon available to the government is the army. The soldier is called upon to preserve and if necessary re-establish the peace, and to restore order where integral government agencies have failed. The calling out of troops is normally the last resort of the government which has no alternatives left. Local forces are no longer able to deal with an existing or developing threat. The aim of the military is to restore the situation to that where the police can enforce the law. The four phases of revolutionary warfare provide an answer to the commander who is in doubt as to the employment or modus operandi of his force. Counteraction to phase one, the preparatory phase, is concerned with civil law enforcement activities which mainly concentrates on police operations. Counteraction to phase two, active resistance, is internal security operations. Counteractions for phases three and four (insurgency and open offensive) involve counter insurgency operations escalating to limited war. These measures collectively form counter revolutionary operations.

This pattern of revolutionary warfare (the four phases) has identified that there are two different types of operation that the military could be involved in. The first concerns measures to assist the government to maintain control during phases one and two. This will be called level one. Level two concerns measures to re-establish government control - lost during phases three and four.

The deduction can now be made that the armed forces can be effectively employed in counter revolutionary operations but must be made aware and trained for the particular "phase" of that counter action.

### THE ROLE OF ARTILLERY

The role of artillery is to support other arms and services by establishing such fire supremacy in the battle area that the enemy can neither interfere with our operations nor effectively develop his own. (4)



A trend within the NZ Army has been to convert and utilize artillery as surveillance or rifle companies during low level operations.

"Commanders of brigades can employ their available trained pool of manpower as they see fit. If they choose to utilize a gun regiment as an additional battalion then so be it. Artillery advice to the commander must clearly state the effect of choosing to employ gunners on tasks other than providing fire support".(5)

When looking at the pattern of revolutionary warfare, level one operations (assisting the government to maintain control) lends itself to the employment of artillery in such alternative roles as infantry, specialist surveillance groups or forward operation base security.

The employment of artillery would be in a defensive role to support the police in civil law enforcement activities and internal security operations. These actions do not require the use of guns. The RNZA is easily adapted to operate within these alternative roles because of its inherent command, control and communications organization. Time however would be required for appropriate training prior to deployment.

Level two operations (to re-establish government control) are more suited to the primary role of artillery. This is more the case during the open offensive phase of this level where gunners are employed to do what they do best - provide fire support.

It is thought that artillery breaches the "use of minimum force principle" and by doing so fuels the enemy propaganda machine. When artillery is brought to bear, then using the minimum necessary force has been inadequate and the time to act resolutely and ruthlessly has arrived. This "level" signifies the change from a police response to a military response.

#### ARTILLERY IN LEVEL TWO OPERATIONS

Artillery provides fire support to protect life at any time of the battle. It takes the risk away from the soldier on the ground by providing a better alternative - artillery to take out a sniper or a machine-gun post rather than committing troops.

The effect of artillery in psychological operations (PSYOPS) is to lower the resistance of the enemy and to serve as a warning to all, of things to come. The guns symbolize death and destruction to the enemy but to others, they are symbols of hope and freedom. Such is the nature of PSYOPS.

The modern technology available to the gunner allows for first round accuracy to within meters. The fear of commanders that artillery is indiscriminate is now unfounded. Once fixed, the target and only the target will be hit.

### CONCLUSION

A complete appreciation and understanding of the pattern of low level conflict is necessary and indeed vital before commanders at any level can think about imposing counter measures.

The classic concept of revolutionary warfare has identified that the pattern of this movement follows four distinct phases. This highlights the two levels of operations; level one, assisting the government to maintain control and level two, re-establishing government control.

The military involvement can be included at either level. What needs to be made clear is exactly what level the conflict has reached, so appropriate training and employment of deploying forces can be managed.

The RNZA can adopt any of the alternative roles given it to join in with level one operations. The characteristics of the RNZA lend itself easily to these alternative roles.

When the RNZA deploys to level two operations, it does so with its guns and with the realistic aim of using them. This is the employment of gunners in an artillery role.

The employment and role of the RNZA in LLOPS is not a difficult concept. Confusion and doubt arise only when there is no recognition and differentiation between the two levels of operations. When this is achieved, things become easy, the role and the way in which the RNZA is employed is as for conventional operations.

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