NZ ARMY JOURNAL

The intent of the NZ Army Journal is to encourage professional thought and debate within the New Zealand Army about the profession of arms.

The New Zealand Army Journal provides a means for soldiers and officers to present their ideas and views about how the New Zealand Army prepares for and conducts operations. Articles, debates and opinions are invited and actively encouraged from all ranks, including ex-military and specialist subject areas related to the military or areas of operation.

The focus of this publication is the tactical and operational conduct of military tasks. Organisational and strategic/political matters are outside the scope of this publication. Generally speaking this publication deals with 'military art' (e.g. Capabilities, Deployable organisation, Training, TTPs/SOPs, Military equipment etc.). Anything that a normal corporate entity deals with will in most cases is outside the scope of this publication (e.g. HR policies, Finance, Recruitment etc.)

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Submissions

Articles should not normally exceed 5 000 words and shorter articles are encouraged and welcomed. Articles are accepted in word format via email or on a disk. Hard copy articles are discouraged. All acronyms and abbreviations should be spelt out in full.

Articles for the next NZ Army Issue should be sent to

Email: awc@nzdf.mil.nz

Address: Adaptive warfighting Centre (AWC); TRADOC (NZ); C/-DSS Registry; Linton Military Camp; Palmerston North; 4820; New Zealand

Phone: +64 (0) 63517963

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Table of Contents

Editor's Notes

Submissions

Editor's Notes

From historical articles to critical thinking discussions, from leadership to challenging the way we do business, this journal has it all and is a good reflection of the diversity and levels of interest that we as a professional organisation exhibit.

The articles in the second edition of the NZ Army Journal have not only surprised me but surpassed all expectations of the Editors Board. Not only have the contributions doubled since the first edition of the journal was released back in November 2014 but the interest in this publication has grown immensely.

This edition of the journal includes a diverse range of topics and contributors are using the journal as a platform to facilitate discussion, and general interest and awareness of certain topics. Some of the feedback that we received after the first journal was released, was the need to have more open, frank and robust discussions around some of the articles that are published in the journal.

The first article in this publication 'The Land Operating Functions Conceptual Framework' is an educational piece that looks at the introduction of the Land Operating Functions. This is a concise article that gives readers an overview of the new framework and how it should be applied. Another article that stood out and can be relatable to any rank and trade within the New Zealand Defence Force, is titled 'So you don't have a mentor?' This is an easy read but is to the point plus applicable to our organization even though it was written for the U.S. Army.

Readers will also note that the format and look of the journal has changed considerably since the first journal was published. This has been done after general feedback from the NZDF and guidance sought from editors of military publications within the international military community. It is a very positive sign that readers have given feedback on the style and quality of the journal and interested in producing a journal that is professional looking, informative, interesting and easy to read.

At this point, I also want to take the opportunity to acknowledge the personnel that have made contributions to the journals. Unfortunately not all articles make it to the journal for various reasons however I strongly encourage you to keep on trying. We will work hard to get your article into the journal – we are interested in what you have to say.

The point of the journal is to be as inward looking as it is outward looking. It is an opportunity to write and express your opinions. I have always said that this journal does not belong to Army or the public; it does not belong to anyone but you. You are the contributors - you as the readers. This is your journal.

Kristy Hill

NZ Army Lessons Manager

Adaptive Warfighting Centre (AWC)

"It is not the critic who counts; not the man who points out how the strong man stumbled, or where the doer of deeds could have done better. The credit belong to the man who is actually in the arena; whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood; who strives valiantly; who errs and comes short again and again. Who knows the great enthusiasms, the great devotions, and spends himself in a worthy cause. Who at the best knows in the end the triumph of high achievement; and who at the worst, if he fails, at least fails while daring greatly. So that his place shall never be with those cold and timid souls who know neither victory nor defeat."

- Theodore Roosevelt ("The Man in the Arena")

Sketch contributed to the journal by Miss Janita Van Rensburg.

The Land Operating Functions Conceptual Framework

By Major Magnus Latta

Major Magnus Latta is currently an instructor at Tactical School. Tactical School prepares New Zealand Army Commissioned Officers for duty as All-Corps Staff Officers on operational headquarters. Introduction of the Land Operating Functions Conceptual Framework was approved at the Army Training Review Board dated 29 April 2015.

Recently, a new conceptual framework for Army planning was introduced, the Land Operating Functions (LOF). This article outlines what the need for this conceptual framework is, why the decision was made to replace the previous framework, and how the framework was developed. It will also explain how the LOF Framework is applied. Detail regarding the content of the LOF Framework itself is available in the Tactical School Guide: Conceptual Frameworks, on the Tactical School intranet.

Conceptual frameworks: what they are and what they need to do

A conceptual framework is a mental model used to understand different situations. In this case, it is a mental model about how the different capabilities employed by land forces are applied to generate land power. Land Power is the 'ability to exert immediate and sustained influence on or from the land in conditions of peace, crisis and conflict'[1]. Overall, capabilities are applied to influence other groups, either through force, the threat of force, or softer skills such as convincing them that alternative actions are better, or supporting other groups. So, as a mental model it needs to encompass all the

[1] LWD 1 (2008) *The Fundamentals of Land Warfare.* Australia: Army

aspects that builds up to create that influence (land power) so that planners can use it to figure out how to conduct a mission.

As a framework, it needs to be able to be applied to a variety of situations. Broadly, military operations are broken into combat operations and stability operations[2]. Combat operations are then broken into offensive activities[3], which includes such actions as the advance and attack, and defensive activities, which includes such action as the defence, and withdrawal. Stability operations include a range of actions[4] such as population control; disarmament, demobilisation, & reintegration (DDR), security sector reform (SSR), provision of humanitarian aid to name just a few. The planning framework needs to be able to be used in the broad range of tasks that military power may be applied to.

The contemporary operating environment includes operations that combine aspects of combat and stability operations at once, and so require the full range of military capabilities to execute Land Power across the differing tasks. Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations for example combine aspects of offensive, defensive and various stability activities. Additionally, there can be a number of disparate groups needing to be influenced in different ways. There may be a complex need for cooperation with allied forces, host nation security forces, other government agencies, international organisations, and non-government organisations. Neutral or uncommitted groups may require a more subtle approach, or require kinetic support to protect them from their own adversaries. Hostile adversaries may require very kinetic influence. And we are now seeing, as

predicted[5], the emergence of a hybrid threat: 'a diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorist forces, and/or criminal elements unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects'[6]. The conglomerate of elements in northern Iraq (ISIS and associated groups) is an example.

A conceptual framework therefore needs to cover all military capabilities and be able to cover a number of (possibly concurrent) tasks and groups. To properly aid group planning, as conducted in a staff military headquarters, it should help in breaking down 'stovepipes'. In this sense, stovepiping refers to the tendency for individuals to plan in their own area without integrating properly with other staff areas. This is particularly prevalent when individuals are employed within their own corps or trade area of expertise. A good conceptual framework does not match these natural divisions but instead forces people to plan across them. That is why the LOF do not match corps or trade boundaries. The danger in doing so is that some disconnects may occur in the planning, so a good framework also has mechanisms for ensuring those connections occur. The staff techniques referred to as Integrating Processes and Activities (IPA) achieve that purpose in the LOF Framework.

Why the change to a new framework

The Battlespace Operating Systems (BOS) is the Australian conceptual framework previously used by NZ Army. It consists of eight BOS: Command and Control; Manoeuvre; Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR); Offensive Support (OS); Mobility and Survivability; Information Operations; Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD); and Combat Service Support (CSS). It is a useful framework, and served

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[2] NZDDP 3.0 (2010) *Operations*. NZDF
[3] LWD 3-0-3 (2009) *Land Tactics*. Australia: Army
[4] NZDF JDN 1/10 (2010) *Guidelines for the Military Contribution to Stability*. NZDF

[5] National Intelligence Council (2012) *Global trends 2030: Alternative Worlds*. Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
[6] ADRP 3-0 (2012) *Unified Land Operations*. US: Army

NZ Army well particularly in planning combat operations in a conventional setting. However, during training exercises at Tactical School it was noticed that it was less applicable to stability operations, or indeed the types of operations that NZDF is currently conducting overseas.

Both the US Army and the British Army had adopted 'functions', the US War Fighting Functions (WFF) and the British Tactical

sustain[7]. Project at a tactical level is equivalent to the M3 LOF, while 'operate' in a land environment encompasses M3, OS, IA and CIMIC in the LOF. The 'prepare' capability is incorporated within the land operations process (plan, prepare, execute and assess).

As Tactical School commenced its rewrite of courses to meet the needs of the contemporary operating environment, it

TABLE 1. LAND OPERATING FUNCTIONS COMPARED			
NZ Army Land Operating Functions (LOF)	Australian Army Battlespace Operating Systems (BOS)	US Army Warfighting Functions	British Army Tactical Functions
Command & Control (C2)	Command and Control	Mission Command	Command
Information & Intelligence (I2)	Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance	Intelligence	Information & Intelligence
Movement, Manoeuvre, & Mobility (M3)	Manoeuvre	Movement & Manoeuvre	Firepower
Offensive Support (OS)	Offensive Support	Fires	Manoeuvre
Influence Activity (IA)	Mobility and Survivability	Protection	Protection
Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)	Information Operations	Sustainment	Sustainment
Protection (PROT)	Ground Based Air Defence		
Sustainment (SUST)	Combat Service Support		

Functions. These are shown at Table 1 compared to the new LOF and the previous BOS (still current for the Australian Army). These highlighted the requirement for a 'protection' aspect, covering a broad range of force protection aspects. They also took an expanded view of the ISR function, and the US WFF in particular also expanded manoeuvre to encompass all elements of the force and not just the manoeuvre arms (infantry, armour, and aviation).

These functional areas also aligned broadly with the NZDF Fundamental Defence Capabilities of command, inform, prepare, project, operate, protect and

was recognised that a new framework was required. The BOS lacked good flexibility for employment in planning stability operations. The focus of the contemporary operating environment on different types of military capabilities (soft influence skills) was not given adequate focus, yet was considered a key strength of the NZDF. The requirement for coordination with non-military elements with which NZDF was operating overseas also needed some focus, which was achieved by the CIMIC function that our allies have as a dedicated staff function but which does

[7] NZDDP-D (2012) *New Zealand Defence Doctrine.* NZDF.

not exist in the NZ Staff System[8]. Finally, the lesson that protection needed some holistic focus was learned from the US and British approaches.

The Land Operating Functions Framework

The LOF Framework was developed in consultation with all Corps schools in TRADOC. It is a framework for orchestrating operations. Orchestration is 'the arrangement of physical and non-physical actions to ensure their unified contribution to the mission'[9]. It is about aligning the purpose of operations, so the LOF framework is designed to allow conceptualisation of purpose as shown in Table 2. Orchestration is distinct from synchronisation, which is 'the arrangement of military actions in time, space and purpose to produce maximum relative fighting power at a given place and time'[10]. Orchestration is about coordinating purpose, and synchronisation is about coordinating the units or force elements carrying out that purpose.

The LOF Framework is designed to achieve three major purposes: to know what is happening and what to do about it, to act or engage across the domains[11] to achieve the mission, and to preserve the force and its ability to operate. The remainder of this article outlines in brief each LOF in regards to differences from the BOS and explains why the term has been adopted. Detail on what each LOF is can be found in the Tactical School Guide: Conceptual Frameworks on the Tactical School intranet site.

The C2 LOF in simple terms is headquarters, command processes, control measures (such as boundaries and timings), and communications systems. Command and Control is a well-established military term which encompasses all that the C2 LOF relates to – it is not markedly different from the BOS of the same term. The term was retained in preference to the NZFD Joint term 'Command' to highlight the control

	Purpose	Land Operating Function
KNOW	...what to do	**C2** (Command and Control)
	...what is happening	**I2** (Information and Intelligence)
ACT / ENGAGE	...on land terrain to gain positional advantage	**M3** (Movement, Manoeuvre and Mobility)
	...with lethal and less-lethal joint fires and effects	**OS** (Offensive Support)
	...to effect the will and understanding of groups	**IA** (Influence Activity)
	...to coordinate with and support non-military elements	**CIMIC** (Civil Military Cooperation)
PRESERVE	...the force's combat power	**PROT** (Protection)
	...the force's freedom of action	**SUST** (Sustainment)

TABLE 2. THE LAND OPERATING FUNCTIONS FRAMEWORK

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[8] In allied systems, the '9' function is allocated to CIMIC, however in the NZDF system '9' is finance. NZDDP 00.1 (2008) *Command and Control in the NZDF*. NZDF.
[9] LWD 3-0 (2008) *Operations*. Australia: Army.
[10] LWD 3-0

[11] The domains maritime, land, air, space, information (including cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum) and human. ADDP 3.0 (2012) *Campaigns and Operations*. Australia: ADF

aspect, and the complexity of controlling military operations in the land environment.

The I2 LOF has a wider scope than the ISR BOS, which was focused mainly on collection actions. The I2 LOF encompasses the systems used to process and make usable information collected, and recognises that information collected from means other than the traditional intelligence architecture is used in commander's decision making processes. 'Information and Intelligence' is the terminology used by the British Army (US Army uses 'Intelligence' as the warfighting function term). It was adopted in the LOF Framework to distinguish it from Intelligence as a capability and to highlight the wider scope of the LOF in comparison to the BOS.

The M3 LOF is greatly expanded from the Manoeuvre BOS which focused only on the actions of the manoeuvre arms of infantry, armour, and aviation. The M3 LOF recognises that all elements of a force need to be considered in a tactical sense in regards to their positioning and movement in a tactical area, hence the inclusion of 'movement'. The LOF framework also includes the Mobility (and counter-mobility) aspect from the Mobility and Survivability BOS, and so is comparative to the US term of 'Movement and Manoeuvre' in scope (which includes the mobility concept). Mobility was added to the US term to highlight the change from the BOS.

Offensive Support was retained as LOF terminology as there is no particular difference in scope from the previous BOS. In simple terms it is indirect fire provided by mortars and artillery systems, electronic attack, and joint fires (air and naval support). It has been used in favour of the term 'fires' employed by US and British Armies to highlight the non-kinetic and less-lethal aspects employable within the OS LOF.

The IA LOF takes half of the previous Information Operations BOS, the half that is focused outwardly on affecting the will and understanding of groups to achieve the mission. The term 'Influence Activity' is used to highlight the engagement focus of the LOF and the non-inclusion of the protective/defensive aspects of the previous Information Operations BOS (these are now under the Protection LOF). It is similar in scope to the US Army 'Inform and Influence' task that resides within the Mission Command function. The British Army has Influence as an overall effect, and Influence Activity as specific actions that are undertaken, but not as a separate function.

CIMIC is raised to the level of LOF in the framework, and did not appear in the BOS. Most other allied armies have the G/S9 function as CIMIC so the incorporation of those considerations into planning is achieved through their staff system. However the NZDF Staff System has the '9' function as Finance meaning that the NZ Army does not routinely include CIMIC staff in the standard HQ system. As NZ Army is likely to be consistently operating in close proximity to civilian elements and the local populace, the requirement to coordinate and orchestrate the effects produced by CIMIC requires a consistent consideration in all conceptual aspects of military operation planning.

The Protection LOF subsumes the GBAD BOS and the 'Survivability' portion of the Mobility and Survivability BOS as well as the range of Force Protection actions. Both U.S. and British Armies use the function 'Protection'. This is more expansive than anything in the BOS, and links closely with risk and safety management requirements of command. The term also aligns with the NZDF Fundamental Capabilities and Joint Functions.

The Sustainment LOF is similar in scope to the CSS BOS. It is focussed on supporting the force during the operation, and is therefore closely tied to Logistics, however the Sustainment LOF includes the delivery of facilities-related activity, Health Service

Support (HSS), operational Personnel Support, and financial and contractual support. Administrative movement (generally movement via strategic transport) is included in the Sustainment LOF. This terminology aligns with US Army, British Army, NZDF Fundamental Capabilities and Joint Functions.

How the Land Operating Functions Framework is used

The LOF are used in a headquarters that is required to generate combined-arms effects. It is only useful as a tool when a number of capabilities (i.e. a number of LOF areas) are present within the force element and some planning must be undertaken to ensure effective use of them. This is most likely at battlegroup (battalion-sized task organised group) and above, though may occur at combat team (company-sized task organised group). It is unlikely to occur at platoon or troop level and below. In essence, the more corps belts or different trades are present in a force element, the more likely it is that LOF will be a useful planning tool.

The headquarters staff will use the LOF Framework in the Military Appreciation Process. They will determine what they need to do (mission analysis) and where, when and against who (intelligence preparation of the battlespace) and then develop a course of action using the LOF Framework to orchestrate those actions. At this point the plan is in LOF terms, rather than being tasks allocated to specific units. They will then brief the commander, and possibly higher and subordinate commanders, using LOF as the conceptual framework to describe how the plan fits together.

Once the plan is approved, it is executed through the orders process. The LOF Framework is not used in this; the headquarters staff 'translates' the plan into the specific missions, orders, and tasks given to each unit or force element in order to aid clarity and brevity. This is a change from how BOS were used, as BOS concepts were sometimes put into operation orders (OPORD). In order to ensure that only those people practiced in LOF are required to use them, they are not put in orders as potentially many of the force elements executing a plan will be commanded by personnel who have not been through a Staff and Tactics course.

The requirement to translate exists because units (and trades) are organised along technical, training and functional lines. The skills required of a reconnaissance soldier (I2 LOF) and infantry soldiers (M3 LOF) are generally similar, however the purpose to which they are put are quite different. The skills required of an electronic warfare operator can be used to find adversary communications (I2 LOF), jam them (OS LOF) or protect our own communications (Prot LOF). The soldier is best commanded by the group that understands and employs the technical skills, but for a headquarters staff it is the effect that they can achieve that is most important.

This translation helps to reconnect technical elements that may have been missed during LOF planning. This is also achieved in the LOF Framework through the IPA as noted earlier. These exist to coordinate across staff areas within a HQ, and ensure a plan progresses cohesively through the operations process phases of planning, preparation, execution, and assessment. The eight IPA are Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB); Knowledge and Information Management (KIM); Liaison; Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) Management; Targeting; Land Battlespace Management (LBM); Risk and Safety Management (RSM); and Security. Detail on what these are can be found in the Tactical School Guide: Conceptual Frameworks.

Conclusion

The LOF Framework is a conceptual planning tool for orchestrating combined arms effects in contemporary operations. It is uniquely New Zealand to suit our particular needs and strengths, but remains highly interoperable with allied and joint headquarters. LOF are used by staff on a headquarters to plan the mission, explain it to other commanders and headquarters for approval or coordination, but not to execute it through orders to subordinate elements. It is supported by a framework of staff actions (the IPA) which ensures integration from planning through execution, and all parts of the operations cycle. Having been trialled on courses at Tactical School, it can confidently be said that the LOF Framework is an effective tool for planning and carrying out the application of land power.

Further information about the LOF Framework is in the Tactical School Guide: Conceptual Frameworks on the Tactical School intranet site (http://org/l-lotc/SPubPages/tac_sch/default.aspx). For more detailed learning, do the Grade 3 Foundation Knowledge (G3FK) Distance Education modules, also found on the Tactical School intranet site. As the information is unclassified, personnel without intranet access may send a request for further information to tactical.school@nzdf.mil.nz

Questions regarding this article should be sent to the author, Major Magnus Latta at magnus.latta@nzdf.mil.nz

A Force for Good

By Brigadier Chris Parsons

Brigadier Chris Parsons is currently the Deputy Chief of Army and recently returned from studying at the United States War College.

The object in war is a better state of peace—even if only from your own point of view.

—B.H. Liddell Hart[12]

Introduction

Legitimacy underpins western power. In the twenty-first century, political leaders need options to prevent and resolve armed conflicts, not just fight them. This paper advances a contemporary concept for the purpose and utility of force. It asserts that conflicts occur when legitimacy is contested and are only resolved when an accepted order (or legitimacy) is re-established.[13] The paper goes on to examine legitimacy and offers three reasons for the application of force and

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[12] B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy 2nd Revised Edition,* (New York, NY: Penguin Books Ltd, 1991), 338.

[13] Phillip Bobbitt, *The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History,* (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knof, 2002), xvi.

provides a model to illustrate its utility. The article then strips the jargon and outlines four military roles and four ways to win. Finally, five principles are proposed that underpin military success in the twenty-first century.

Legitimacy

Causes of Conflict

All conflict is a contest for legitimacy.[14] Phillip Bobbitt's seminal work *Shield of Achilles: War Peace and the Course of*

Hussein was refusing to dismantle an illicit program for weapons of mass destruction. This mistrust threatened the international order to the point that his legitimacy was forfeit. Having removed Saddam Hussein in a lightening war, the US-led coalition missed the moment in time when stabilisation efforts had the greatest potential to catalyse the people's confidence.[16] Consequently, the coalition lost legitimacy itself and Iraq slipped into irregular conflict.[17] Another example is the


Figure 1: Utility of Force

History argues that conflict is only resolved when legitimacy is re-established.[15] Recent examples of lost legitimacy include the 2003 Iraq war, which began as a conventional inter-state war because a coalition of nations believed Saddam

popular rejection of autocracy[18] that fuelled the Arab Spring's turmoil. [19]

Bobbitt's theory suggests that the Middle East conflict will continue until the question

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[14] Phillip C. Bobbitt, *Terror and Consent: the Wars for the Twenty-first Century* (New York, NY: Anchor Books, 2008), 12.
[15] Bobbitt, *The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History,* xvi.

[16] Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2003 to 2005,* (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2007), 149-153.
[17] Robert M. Gates, *Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War*, (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), 29.
[18] Ibid., 523.
[19] Shadi Hamid, *Temptations of Power Islamists & Liberal Democracy in a New Middle East,* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014), 213-215.

of who should govern and how is resolved. Yet even as this question is being 'waged' it has become conflated with deeper questions which are fuelling an Islamic civil war. In turn this seems to be drawing the world into a broader contest between virulent terrorist pathocracy[20] and individual empowerment under moderate democratic ideals. If these contests for legitimacy are not stabilised we risk triggering catastrophic collapse – a characteristic of complex adaptive systems. Whether this will be regional or global remains to be seen.

Rationale for the Use of Force

Needing to justify the expenditure of blood and treasure, statesmen and generals alike have long embraced Sir Edward Creasy's idea of noble sacrifice for bold decision.[21] Today, scholars like Antulio Echrevarria[22] and practitioners like General Rupert Smith[23] are questioning how decisive military victories really can be. The constant bloodletting after Saddam Hussein's decisive defeat underscores the point. If military force is not decisive – 'what are our forces for'?[24]

A new model for the rationale of force is needed. Taking Bobbitt's lead, military force deals with the symptoms of

contested legitimacy - violence. To have utility, force needs to regain control, establish security and allow legitimacy to evolve through the other elements of national and societal power. Therefore, the political purpose of military intervention should be to maintain or re-establish legitimate (accepted) civil governance within a rules based international order.

Figure 1 is a theory for the rationale of military intervention and success. The horizontal axis shows the conflict spectrum (peace – war), the countervailing military responses, and the indicative operational phases that are applicable across the spectrum.[25] As conflict moves from peace to war the scale and cost of violence increases up the vertical axis. Military force is necessary when civil legitimacy is contested to the point that violence crosses the 'conflict threshold,' ceasing to be a law and order problem[26] and becoming armed conflict. Military interventions are successful when violence is reduced to a policing matter and civil order is re-established as legitimate.

For New Zealand's military to succeed in the twenty-first century it must be compelling in combat, but combat is not an end in itself. Embarking with the ends in mind, military solutions need to include input from all instruments of society – public and private. Underscoring this, half the military phases in the model (phases zero, four and five) are multi-partner activities. They are either conducted under the auspices of another agency (phase zero)[27] or they need to be conducted in step with non-military efforts to succeed (phases four and five).

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[20] The term pathocracy was coined by Andrzej Łobaczewski. The etymology is from Greek *pathos*, 'feeling, pain, and suffering;' and *kratos*, 'rule.' It is a system of government created by a small pathological minority that takes control over a society of normal people. Andrew M. Lobaczewsk, "Political Ponerology: A Science on The Nature of Evil adjusted for Political Purposes," http://www.cassiopaea.org/cass/political_ponerology_lob aczewski.htm (accessed February 01, 2015).

[21] Sir Edward Shepard Creasy, *Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World: from Marathon to Waterloo 3rd Ed.,* (Macmillan & Co Ltd, London: 1901), 7.

[22] Antulio J. Echrevarria II, *Reconsidering the American Way of War: US Military Practice from the Revolution to Afghanistan,* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014), 4.

[23] General Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World,* (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007), 20.

[24] Bobbitt, *The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History*, 7.

[25] U.S. Army, *Theater Army, Corps, and Division Operations,* Field Manual 3-94 (Washington, DC: H.Q. Department of the Army, April 2014), 2-5 – 2-8.

[26] Some States use para-military force instead of military forces, for instance Vanuatu does not have a military. Instead it fields a paramilitary force called the Vanuatu Mobile Force.

[27] Operations conducted during 'phase zero' are typically under diplomatic lead. Civic operations may be in support of police, customs and border security or the Health Department, etc.

Utility of Force

There are three fundamental uses for force in the twenty-first century: to protect sovereignty, to protect people and to maintain a stable international system (including freedom of the global commons).[28] Used for these ends, military force has utility in both non-combatant and combatant roles.

Stripping away the jargon, military utility can be divided into four broad roles. Two roles are combatant: Conventional warfare[29] and comprehensive operations. The remaining two roles are non-combatant: civic operations[30] and humanitarian operations.

Conventional warfare is characterised as inter-state conflict.[31] New Zealand has been a combatant in three such wars in its history (World War I, World War II and the Korean War).[32] While conventional warfare has been infrequent this paper does not go as far as General Smith's assertion that 'war no longer exists.'[33] There remains very real risks of conventional warfare, particularly in the Indo-Asia-Pacific Region.[34]

Comprehensive operations fall short of conventional warfare. They range from peace time engagement, peace and stability operations to countering insurgency and transnational conflict and they may be thematic in nature. They are comprehensive by definition because success requires more than military power. Comprehensive operations have been the most common worldwide since WWII.[35] They have also been the preponderance of New Zealand's military experience since the New Zealand Wars of the 1840s.

Humanitarian operations are expeditionary and provide assistance[36] and disaster relief globally but especially in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, which suffers up to 80 percent of the world's natural disasters.[37] They may be pre-planned resilience building activities, but frequently they are very short notice responses to augment the capacity or capability of civil powers during crises.

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[28] The U.S. Military articulate these realist and liberal ideals as six security interests where they would recommend the use of military power. (1) national survival, (2) security of the global economic system, (3) prevention of catastrophic attacks on the nation, (4) secure, confident and reliable allies and partners, (5) protection of American citizens abroad and (6) preservation and extension of universal values. Jim Garamone, "Winnefeld Gives Blunt Assessment of Budget Options," March 17, 2015, http://www.jcs.mil/Media/News/NewsDisplay/tabid/6800/Article/580770/winnefeld-gives-blunt-assessment-of-budget-options.aspx (accessed March 17, 2015).

[29] The U.S. Department of Defense call this traditional warfare. Traditional warfare could also imply tribal warfare. The term conventional warfare is chosen instead because it is more descriptive of warfare based on modern theory, doctrine, laws and norms that govern the behaviour of states and combatants. .S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, Joint Publication-1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 2013), x, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1.pdf (accessed October 14, 2014).

[30] The term takes its name from 'civics' – the study of rights and duties of citizens and of how government works. Duncan Black, Robert Groves, Helen Hucker, Cormac McKeown, eds., *Collins English Dictionary and Thesaurus*, 4th ed., (Glasgow, UK: HarperCollins, 2011), 146.

[31] Conventional forces and by extension conventional warfare are considered by the U.S. to be non-nuclear. New Zealand has no use for this distinction because it does not have nuclear means. However, with growing potential for nuclear proliferation, New Zealand could be required to fight in a nuclear environment, for that reason operations in a nuclear setting are considered under the concept of conventional warfare.

[32] New Zealand contributed transport aircraft and medical teams to the 1991 Gulf War, but it did not directly contribute to combat. Therefore the 1991 Gulf War is excluded. "Medals by Campaign 3 September 1945 to 2013" linked from *The New Zealand Defence Force Home Page* at "General Medals Information," http://medals.nzdf.mil.nz/info/campaign.html (accessed October 11, 2014).

[33] Smith, 3.

[34] Wayne Mapp, *The New Zealand Paradox, Adjusting to the Changing Balance of Power in the Asia Pacific over the next 20 Years,* (New York, NY: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, May 2014), 28, http://csis.org/files/publication/140425_Mapp_NewZealandParadox_Web.pdf (accessed August 29, 2014).

[35] Colin Clarke and Christopher Paul, *From Stalemate to Settlement: Lessons for Afghanistan from Historical Insurgencies that have been resolved through negotiation*, (Washington, DC: RAND Corporation, 2014), 1.

[36] For instance, by international agreement New Zealand's search, rescue and recovery responsibility covers 30 million square kilometres, the largest in the world.

[37] Claudette Roulo, "PACOM Area of Responsibility Defined by Superlatives," linked from, *The American Forces Press Service*, (Washington, DC: January 16, 2014), http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=121499 (accessed December 13, 2014).

Civic operations reinforce legitimacy. They help build New Zealand's national identity and resilience by reinforcing civil authority with military capacity or capability when requested.[38] Examples include civil defence during natural disasters,[39] character based youth development programs, and support to national culture and heritage.

Related to the four broad military roles there are four ways to win. Conventional warfare is designed to destroy the enemy force.[40] Victory is achieved when the enemy, or the enemy commander, no longer has the will or the means to keep fighting.[41] Once brought to this point the enemy sues for peace or accedes to an offer of terms. This is the origin for Sir Edward Creasy's oft repeated concept of decisive battle.[42] Yet as observed by Liddell Hart, winning the war is not enough to win the peace.[43] Peace requires the belligerents to come to terms and live within them. If they cannot do so the war will be fought again.[44]

As opposed to the destructive approach of conventional warfare, the underlying principle of comprehensive operations is constructive. Comprehensive operations seek to reinforce the status quo or build a new order. This is not to say that they do not involve destructive action – only that destruction is not their primary purpose. It follows that winning in comprehensive operations is achieved when a legitimate civil order can manage violence through the rule of law. Successful examples with New Zealand involvement include, among others; the Boer War (1899-1902), Malaya (1948-1960), Angola (1994-2002), Timor Leste (1999-2013) and the Solomon Islands (2000-2013).

Success in humanitarian and civic operations occurs when civil authorities can manage crises within their own capabilities. Examples where New Zealand has responded include the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami, the 2011 Christchurch earthquake, the 2011 Japanese earthquake, tsunami and nuclear disaster, and the 2013 Philippines super typhoon Haiyan.

In all these examples military operations ultimately succeeded when an accepted form of civil governance was returned or reinforced. Even conventional warfare cannot ultimately succeed to its policy ends without a political solution that is accepted by the populace who have to live with it.

Principles of Force

To prevail as a force for good, a principled approach is required. Five principles are proposed, the first is organisational, the second and third relate to the generation of combat power and the two remaining principles relate to the difficult task of civil-military transition.

The first principle is agility. Agility maximises New Zealand's ability to deploy and redeploy task organised joint, interagency, civil and multinational forces throughout the conflict spectrum. It is advanced by an

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[38] New Zealand Ministry of Defence, *Briefing for the Incoming Minister of Defence: Background Document*, (Wellington, NZ: New Zealand Government, October 2014), 21, http://nzdf.mil.nz/downloads/pdf/public-docs/2012/bim/bimbackgroudinfo.pdf (accessed March 04, 2015).

[39] The Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management provides risk management and resilience for New Zealand in the event of disasters. The military are frequently called to assist when events are beyond the capability or capacity of civil agencies. "About the Ministry," linked from *The Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management*, at http://www.civildefence.govt.nz/about/about-the-ministry/ (accessed October 11, 2014).

[40] Carl von Clausewitz, Anatol Rapoport, ed., *On War*, (London, UK: Penguin Books, 1982), 316.

[41] U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, Joint Publication-1 (U.S. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 2013), I-5, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1.pdf ((accessed October 14, 2014).

[42] John Keegan, *The Face of Battle*, (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1978), 60.

[43] Liddell Hart, 338.

[44] Germany rejected the terms imposed after World War I and initiated World War II. World War II destroyed Fascism's legitimacy and Germany in the process. While Germany was defeated by military force the peace was won by civil means such as the Marshall Plan which provided the opportunity for a historic peace in Europe. Bobbitt, 24.

organisational commitment to clear-eyed simplicity.

Second is excellence. To have the operational edge over their adversaries New Zealand forces must continually strive for excellence. They must be individually and collectively better than their opponents who will have superior local knowledge and who may well be more numerous. However, this is not enough. In World War I New Zealanders were first rate soldiers and died well.[45] From a population of one million, New Zealand fielded 42 percent of its military aged men and suffered a butcher's bill of 58 percent killed or wounded.

Therefore, the second principle must be complemented by the third: New Zealanders must excel at generating leverage. This can be achieved with the creative use of surprise, technology, tempo, terrain and human understanding. For instance, a small force can gain relative superiority[46] by leveraging complex terrain. This was aptly demonstrated in Thermopylae's mountain pass by Leonidas, in the Burmese jungle by Wingate's Chindits, and in Petrograd's city streets by Trotsky. Moreover, in contemporary wars among the people, the greatest leverage will go to the side that best understands how to catalyse the people's confidence

The fourth principle is legitimacy. To win the confidence of the populace, the actions of New Zealand's forces must be seen to be legitimate. An intervention force cannot hope to be succeeded by legitimate civil governance if it does not first model proportionality, consistency,[47] justice and respect.

The fourth goes with the fifth, the pursuit of peace. The force must operate with the ends in mind. In this there are two elements – the imperative and the outcome. Regarding the imperative, New Zealand forces must understand whether they are pursuing national interests that are important, vital or for survival and then commit to them accordingly.[48] Regarding outcomes, and regardless of the imperative, the force must at every turn set the conditions to reduce violence, extend the rule of law and rebuild normalcy.

In any operation, other than one specifically designed to destroy the enemy force it is not possible to kill your way to success. In comprehensive operations, beating the insurgency is more important than beating the insurgent. Winning is increasing the use of judicial process, not maximising the number of detainees. Said another way, treating the cause is more important than defeating the symptoms. To win therefore, New Zealand forces must be ready to go into harm's way to build stability and reduce violence to law and order levels, in situations that span the conflict spectrum.

Conclusion

Conflicts occur when legitimacy is contested and are only resolved when an accepted order (or legitimacy) is re-established. Military success in the twenty-first century is when legitimate civil governance is returned or reinforced. It is argued that to do so, the military must work collectively with other elements of society to protect sovereignty, humanity and to assure the systemic stability of the international order. This may require the

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[45] Many more died within five years of the War's conclusion. New Zealand History, "First World War – Overview," linked from *New Zealand History* at http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/war/first-world-war-overview/introduction (accessed October 14, 2014).

[46] William H. McRaven provides a useful description of how to achieve "relative superiority." William H. McRaven, *Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice,* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1995), 4-8.

[47] '[A prince] is rendered despicable by being thought changeable, frivolous, effeminate, timid and irresolute;

which a prince must guard against as a rock of danger...' Niccoló Machiavelli, *The Prince and Discourses*, (New York, NY: Random House, 1950), 67.

[48] National interests are viewed in different ways. One useful distinction is to view them as for survival, vital, important or peripheral. J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr, ed., *Guide to National Security Issues Volume II: National Security Policy and Strategy*, 3rd ed., (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, June 2008), 4-11, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB871.pdf (accessed January 29, 2015).

military to conduct combatant operations that ultimately reduce violence to levels manageable by the police. But equally important are non-combatant tasks that provide humanitarian and civic support.

Regardless of the purpose and means chosen, the political aim for the use of force should be to prevent or resolve armed conflict. Therefore, to prevail as a force for good, the military must be ready to go into harm's way in situations that span the conflict spectrum and it must act in a principled manner. Five principles for success in the twenty-first century are proposed. New Zealand forces must be *agile*, continually strive for *excellence*, generate *leverage*, act with *legitimacy* and above all *pursue peace*. The first principle is organisational, the second and third relate to the generation of combat power and the last two principles relate to the difficult task of civil-military transition. If we do our work well, then as Bobbitt argues: stabilising the security environment may reduce the likelihood of catastrophic conventional wars.

So you don't have a mentor?

By Captain Nathan Wike, U.S Army

Nathan Wike is an officer in the U.S. Army, and an associate member of the Military Writer's Guild. The opinions expressed are his alone, and do not reflect those of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

The time has come to take the next step in your career. Behind you lies a string of accomplishments and a legacy that would be the envy of any leader (or not). In front of you the destination is clearly visible in the distance. But the road ahead is narrow, winding, and shrouded in uncertainty.

Courageously you step off into the unknown, walking the path of your future where you have never tread before. You have an idea of where you want to go. You have a road map and maybe you have taken a swing at planning the trip yourself. But do you have a guide? Do you have a mentor?

Sometimes the answer is an emphatic NO, or worse, the more ambiguous NOT REALLY. It's not your fault, just a condition of the circumstances you find yourself in. Perhaps your primary sounding board has moved

on to another post. Maybe their new job keeps them from staying in touch, and they are not the sort who reaches out. Or you may have taken the near-heretical step of switching branches, leaving the service, or choosing the Harvard Strategist Program over a berth with Project Warrior. You feel lost, uncertain, and alone. So what are you going to do about it?

Self-pity is a backwards step on the road to the future. Focus instead on self-development and actively seeking a mentor are positive steps that will jump start your journey.

If the answer is to sulk and drag your feet, then it could be that no amount of mentoring can get you to where you want to go. How many qualified leaders simply give up and either A) get out of the military spouting anti-service rhetoric, or B) stay in simply for the pay all the while filling a valuable Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) slot and taking no action to improve themselves or the organization? The first thing to do is make a decision to not be like so many who have squandered their potential in an endless cycle of melancholy. Self-pity is a backwards step on the road to the future. Focus instead on self-development and actively seeking a mentor are positive steps that will jump start your journey.

You do not know what you do not know, but there are resources to help light the way—start reading. Reading will sharpen your mind and prepare you for almost anything. The resources for reading in the digital age are truly tremendous. Ideas on what to read can come from an all-encompassing source, such as the Chief of Staff's reading list or from a more focused venue such as the Basic Strategic Arts Program's reading list, or a series on a particular part of history. Then of course there are the ever applicable doctrinal and conceptual publications that many

claim to read but few follow through with. If all that is too much, there is always the option to read something relevant once a week that would still put you ahead. Pick works that are relevant to your profession and your career desires, and maybe a few works purely for pleasure, and plow in with gusto.

Writing is a way to record your personal experiences and leave a record of your thoughts and emotions on a variety of topics while practicing a craft of vital importance. To write, you simply have to sit down at a keyboard or pick up paper and pen. Do not hesitate to seek out ways to put your writing out there for review and critique by society. Medium.com is, of course, a great place to self-publish and invite the feedback of others. Forums such as the Military Writer's Guild or the Veteran's Writing Project are terrific ways to have your writing assessed, critiqued, and presented in a low-threat environment. Some avenues for professional publication with a strong potential for professional feedback and notice are Armed Forces Journal or your service magazine. There are numerous writing competitions to choose from, such as the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center or U.S. Naval Institute's annual writing competitions, where you can possibly be published in a professional journal and earn a little extra cash. Regardless of your venue, be sure to edit your writing, and invite others to assist?—learn your weaknesses and polish your technique. It matters not however if your writing is never published? — The sheer act of writing is itself a panacea.

Seek a mentor in unorthodox ways. Learn to reach out to others? —sometimes the best advice comes from someone you interact with everyday but have never looked to for guidance. Go to lunch with people in your office. Host a low-key gathering at your home or at a popular

watering hole. Invite your friends, but do not hesitate to invite acquaintances or more experienced individuals you do not know personally. A mentor does not have to be your supervisor, or someone you once worked for. It can easily be a subordinate or peer who has their own unique insight and experiences. Mentorship should transcend professional boundaries. Do not waste the opportunity to pick the brain of the sergeant major with 25 years of experience, or the specialist with a master's degree. Even if they do not have direct knowledge of your career path, they can provide unique perspectives that will enrich your own journey.

A mentor does not even have to be someone you have met in person. Just as the internet is an invaluable tool for reading and writing, it is infinitely useful for reaching out to others. Believe it or not, you can connect with someone on Facebook, Twitter, or LinkedIn. Scrub your profile(s), make sure it is professional and an embodiment of the image you want to present to the world. Keep your service records, résumé, and curriculum vitae up to date and ready to present. If you are intimidated about reaching out, ask others to assist you. The military is a small place and odds are you know someone who knows someone who can make an introduction. You may not hear back right away because exceptional mentors are usually exceptional workers and leaders, and are likely very busy. But do not be discouraged, the best mentors realize that part of their duty is to be good stewards of the profession. If you take the time to reach out to them, they will respond to you in kind.

As you seek and find your mentor(s) do not be so focused on yourself that you neglect opportunities to mentor others. Like someone who grew up never knowing a parent and vows to be a better parent themselves, you can be a better mentor to others. There are subordinates and peers who maybe in the same situation as you? — full of talent but lacking a direction or facing a new career path all alone. Reach out to them, foster their growth, encourage their self-development. You will be surprised how much you learn yourself from being a mentor.

As you take the next step in your career, do not be discouraged if you lack a mentor. It is a temporary malady if you wish it to be so. Use the time for reflection, self-improvement, and increasing your value to your profession. Reach out to likely mentors? — The worst anyone can do is say no, and you will be better for the attempt. Be a mentor to others and leave your organization better than you found it. Your time need not be wasted, and your journey need not be lonely. So you don't have a mentor? — do something about it.

Conflicts Past, Present and Future: The Daesh Center of Gravity

By A/Col Mark Blythen

A/Col Mark Blythen is currently employed as a staff officer in the J5 Branch and the NZ SNR at US Central Command in Tampa, Florida. This article is taken from a strategy paper he prepared in Nov 2014 to discuss the Daesh Center of Gravity as part of a broader analysis and strategy development.

Introduction

The Middle East holds a prominent spot in New Zealand's heritage. Many families (mine included) have relatives still lying in those distant lands, kiwis that made the ultimate sacrifice in the pursuit of adventure, defence of our values and 'doing the right thing'.

100 years after our first forays into the region, New Zealand is once again preparing to send military forces to Iraq to assist in training the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to defeat Daesh (a.k.a. ISIL) and restore Iraq's territorial integrity. Our efforts, as before, are part of a wider Coalition of like-minded countries that perceive the threats emanating from regional instability too great to ignore.

During the development of the Regional Campaign Plan (RCP), there has been much debate within Central Command (CENTCOM) – the combatant command responsible for the United States' military interests in the region – on how to develop an effective strategy to counter Daesh and prevent its reemergence. A key part of CENTCOM's analysis - within the military

line of effort - has been to clearly define Daesh's strategy, capabilities, requirements and potential vulnerabilities that could be exploited and lead to the organisation's defeat.

Aim

The aim of this paper is to identify the Daesh Center of Gravity which, when negated, will lead to the defeat of Daesh.

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Daesh has declared itself as the Islamic 'State', the foundation for a caliphate. Currently, its main point of difference – perhaps its only one - from other similar organizations (AQ, Taliban, Haqqani Network) is that it **draws authority and legitimacy from controlling a population**. As such, **population control** is assessed as the Daesh CoG.

Background

In its quest to create an Islamic state, the extremist organization Daesh (an acronym from al-Dawlah al-Islamiya fil Iraq wa ash-Sham, being the Arabic equivalent of ISIL) poses a significant regional, if not global, security threat. Daesh's vision is grand, with designs on Saudi Arabia, Israel, and major attacks on the West, declaring that its jihadis will eventually "invade Rome and then conquer it"[49]. Its progress and profile have been enhanced by the sophisticated use of media delivering a global propaganda and recruiting campaign.

Daesh is currently much more than a terrorist group, or even a military force. The organization has exploited the internal strife in Syria and sectarian divide in Iraq to seize a sizable territory as the foundation for its caliphate vision; the elimination of post-colonial and "artificial" borders to form an Islamic State. To manipulate the

population, it has demonstrated a capacity and capability (albeit semi-effective) for finance, judiciary, governance and other civil services.

Although Daesh's military assets and leadership have been degraded by kinetic actions, it persists as a significant menace. It continues to spread its tentacles, undermining central authorities and gaining influence over the populace. For example, in many areas of Iraq, Daesh control is preferred over that of the Iranian-influenced Shia-heavy Iraqi government. The 'normalization' of life under Daesh's control has made the local population increasingly less likely to resist or expel the extremist threat.

Daesh has proven to be a complex and adaptive enemy that cannot just be militarily defeated on the battlefield; it is a product of the region's ills and a 'system' that must be comprehensively destroyed by dismantling its sources and enablers[50] rather than just attriting its symptoms.

Discussion

The Center Of Gravity (CoG).

The CoG is a much-touted but often misunderstood and misapplied concept. It encourages a search for some single vital core that holds an actor's structure together. According to Clausewitz's theory on war, if this core can be identified and successfully attacked, it is supposed that the entire system will unravel. For the same reason, equally important is identifying and protecting our own CoG and vulnerabilities.

It could refer to "… *a target, or a number of targets. which might constitute a source of enemy strength and/or a critical vulnerability, found in the physical, psychological or political spheres which might, if attacked, have by itself, or alternatively in combination with other*

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[49] DAESH *Dabiq* publication, July 28, 2014

[50] Currently assessed as its leadership, military capabilities, financial means, ideological messaging, governance tools and popular support.

events, a decisive effect or else possibly result in consequences with potentially decisive effects"[51].

To use a chess analogy, the CoG may be the Queen - a **strength** and main source of our opponent's power, or the King – a centerpiece or **vulnerability** whose loss will lead to the opponent's collapse[52].

A CoG may not necessarily be related to its actual military might; it might be an economic factor, a social factor, a religious factor, a logistics factor, a political factor, or a combination of any and all — a capital city or a particular member of an alliance - that once defeated would cause the whole to crumble. The CoG does not have to be a tangible thing. For both Vietnam and Iraq, the US CoG was public support – something the enemy understood and attacked with vigour.

The Daesh Aim.

Understanding the means, ends and strategic calculus of the enemy equips the strategist to identify the enemy's critical elements of strategic power then design an appropriate counter-strategy.

The Daesh aim is to establish an Islamic State where the caliphate – as an enduring system of Islamic political-religious leadership – can be implemented and observed. It requires a Caliph (in this case, self-declared by al-Baghdadi), a (willing?) community, and a territory (state) where the beliefs and protocols can be practised. It also needs a high degree of legitimacy and acceptance from the wider Muslim world, endorsements that are currently absent.

The Daesh Strategy.

According to its magazine *Dabiq,* Daesh's grand strategy is predicated on military force to seize terrain and establish control before subsequent political and religious authority is attained over the citizens. Concurrently, rigorous political messaging at local and global levels provides a religious narrative to justify its actions.

The practical tasks to establish and defend a sizable community of followers within land acquired through military conquest are:

- Shaping operations destabilize civil governance and generate conditions for civil war (e.g. Daesh exploits the opportunities that rifts present, drawing strength from the complex circumstances that are independently causing Iraq and Syria to fail, including domestic civil and sectarian cleavages, authoritarian leadership, and polarizing regional stressors).

- Military forces then wrest control of land, cities and infrastructure from the state.

- In the wake of victory, social control is enforced through coercion, incentives, information operations, assassinations, and civilian displacement.

- Exploit infrastructure and resources to provide revenue and leverage (e.g. dams, oilfields).

- Strategic messaging to publicize victories (actual or not), recruit new fighters, attract skilled professionals, and legitimize actions through religious rhetoric.

- Functional governance (public services, law enforcement, and judiciary) then legitimizes the strict religious authority.

To carry out the practical tasks outlined above, Daesh depends on an inter-

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51 Clausewitz, "On War" (as translated by Sir Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton University Press, 1976)
52 Recommended reading is "The Art of Maneuver", Robert Leonhard, 2009

dependent triad of critical capabilities to wage war, build state capacity, and connect with a global audience:

- A traditional **military capability** that Daesh uses to wrest physical control from the modern states' central authority and hold what it has gained.

- A **political capability** to provide essential state functions within the territory that Daesh controls. This enhances Daesh's legitimacy as a movement that can govern, not just fight. The ability of Daesh to deliver effective governance is essential to retaining its control and perceived legitimacy over a populace. It is only by being the 'preferred option' over a central government that Daesh can retain local authority. If Daesh was to lose this local popular support (i.e. there was a better alternative) the population would likely make Daesh's presence untenable. Therefore, governance is a critical (and targetable) requirement that Daesh relies upon to maintain influence over a populace.

- A **messaging capability** to strategically and locally 'influence'; Daesh can broadly and rapidly inform and persuade its target audience in the information space.

Daesh's strategy relies on the compliance of the local population. This compliance (tolerance?) currently exists in Iraq because the majority Sunni may not necessarily support Daesh's objectives or ideology, but do see it as a better alternative than Iraq's current Shia-dominated and prejudicial government. Self-interest has primacy. Although the dynamics and circumstances in Syria are slightly different, the Daesh strategy is comparable.

As Daesh's military conquests transform through statecraft and normalize into accepted legitimate authority, the potential for the Coalition to gain the population's assistance or even endorsement to remove Daesh becomes smaller. Unless it is interdicted, the more time Daesh is provided, the more it establishes the services, routines and influence that cement it into permanence.

Underpinning DAESH's rationale is **ideology**. Daesh's radical interpretation of Islam (extreme Wahhabi/Salafi) provides the movement with a powerful attraction, recruiting tool and, most importantly, source of inspiration and motivation. The fact that the ideology is drawn from Islam (albeit a perverted version) makes targeting it a complex proposition: it would be impossible to defeat, eliminate or convert the necessary critical mass of believers/followers to remove the fundamental idea; and there is a risk that attacking Daesh's beliefs (as opposed to the organization and its methods) could be interpreted as an attack on Islam itself. Ideology is therefore assessed as a critical requirement for Daesh, rather than its CoG.

The Daesh CoG

The Daesh CoG rests on the 'critical capabilities' triad identified above. Daesh has declared itself as the Islamic 'State', the foundation for a caliphate. Currently, its main point of difference – perhaps its only one - from other similar organizations (AQ, Taliban, and ANF) is that it **draws authority and legitimacy from controlling a population**. This is achieved by 'carrot and stick' governance of the people. Incentives such as financial rewards, provision of services, and a 'Sunni-favorable' environment reward those who conform. Conversely, those that don't comply face harsh penalties, including death, usually by a brutality that echoes back to previous eras.

Without a 'state', Daesh loses its point of difference, much of its income stream, its symbolism, and its relevance. Whilst the

powerful motivation of ideology is acknowledged, without physical territory and the inherent population for Daesh to govern, Daesh's statecraft becomes immaterial, its military capability becomes severely disrupted, and it much of its messaging rhetoric loses credibility and legitimacy with the target audience.

As such, **population control** is the Daesh CoG.

Counter-Daesh Strategy.

With this in mind, the counter-Daesh strategy needs to have a greater counter-insurgency focus; less concerned with attriting the enemy's combat capabilities (particularly now the operational momentum has been checked) and more directed toward degrading Daesh's ability to govern and winning over the local populace.

A key component for success against Daesh in Iraq is removing Daesh's popular support from Iraq's disaffected Sunni population; that is, providing them with a superior alternative. This effort requires significant reforms from the Government of Iraq towards representative, inclusive and equitable structures and policies to build a unified population that prefers and actively pursues central Iraqi governance over that of Daesh. To gain the people's 'ownership of the problem', and mitigate a potential sectarian or civil war there must be outreach and engagement with the estranged Sunni. For success against Daesh in Syria, Daesh must be prioritised as the worst of all the enemies and a political dialogue must be made the highest priority to end the Syrian civil war NOW and focus all efforts on defeating Daesh in that country via a counter-insurgency strategy.

The physical tasks necessary to remove Daesh's influence at the local and global levels are:

- An effective counter-messaging strategy that serves to:

  - Expose DAESH's battlefield losses and vulnerabilities;

  - Expose DAESH's human rights violations and atrocities;

  - Expose the suffering and dissatisfaction of populations living under Daesh control;

  - Discredit Daesh's religious rhetoric and integrity; and

  - Degrade the recruitment of foreign fighters.

- Remove Daesh's ability to deliver the goods and services (e.g. food, fuel, judiciary and other civil services) that promote its credibility and proficiency to govern the population.

- Improve and promote the performance, influence and legitimacy of central governments appropriate to the cultural and historical conventions, (e.g. an inclusive central authority for national strategy with execution through decentralized governance and security).

- Generating effective security for the populace that shields them from the effects of local coercion, crime, and corruption. Ideally, this is via law enforcement and judicial agencies rather than military elements.

Conclusions

Daesh's strategy doesn't require the whole-hearted support of the local population, just compliance. This is being achieved through incentives, coercion, displacement, a lack of viable of alternatives, and manipulation of the

population's normal behavior (e.g. markets, prayers).

Daesh's key point-of-difference (controlling territory) via **population control** (the CoG) must be negated; it cannot lay claim to being the 'Islamic State' if there is no 'state' (territory and citizens).   Most importantly, the popular support of the local inhabitants must be gained and held through a comprehensive counter-insurgency campaign. If this can be done, the job of regaining the ground ceded to Daesh across Syria and Iraq will be much simpler. Preferably, the indigenous population, security forces and law enforcement will lead the efforts to reinforce statehood, a sense of 'ownership', and territorial integrity.

Ultimately, success will only be achieved if Daesh is no longer perceived as the preferred governing authority, it lacks the means to enforce compliance, and the region's underlying causal conditions are addressed. The roots of the issue lie in repression in Syria and Sunni grievances in a post-Saddam era Iraq. A failure to fully redress these factors – whether Daesh is removed or not - will only lead to more aggravation, continued instability and further bloodshed.

Building Partner Capacity in a restricted operating environment

By Captain J.P. Martin

Captain James Martin is currently working in the Operations Branch of Headquarters Joint Forces New Zealand.

During OP CRIB 21 (Sept 12 – April 13) in Bamyan, Afghanistan Kiwi Team 3 (KT3), conducted a Building Partner Capacity (BPC) mission with the Afghan National Police (ANP) in a restricted operating environment. Not only were we restricted by usual barriers including culture, a limited period in which to develop relationships, and limits on budgets and resources, but we were also restricted by operational circumstances, and particularly the

ensuing completion of the operation. The operational constraints meant that we had to focus on establishing tangible and completed objectives for the BPC mission. In order to successfully complete a number of objectives it was crucially important to gain the buy-in of all involved actors and develop productive relationships between ourselves and our ANP partners. These relationships allowed us (in conjunction with the ANP) to accurately assess what the ANP wished to achieve, and then balance that against what KT3 could realistically provide. This realistic assessment created the conditions for the successful completion of a number of objectives

within the BPC mission, and also had positive spill-over effects into other operational areas.

Following the handover from CRIB 20 partnered patrolling with the ANP was restricted to local areas, and mentoring to the central police stations, local ranges and a number of checkpoints. After the withdrawal from the northern patrol bases in Bamyan, our area of operations was progressively contracted with the remaining NZDF force elements in Bamyan centralised in Kiwi Base in the provincial capital, Bamian. As CRIB 21 was now focusing on the handover of all security responsibilities to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) the distance from Kiwi Base which NZDF personnel were permitted to patrol was shortened at regular intervals. In conjunction, the transition of security operations in Bamyan, including all levels of Reaction Force meant that our mandate to be involved in kinetic operations that did not involve immediate threats to NZDF personnel was progressively curtailed. Consequently, this restricted those troops it would be appropriate to partner, and although the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) was training a Provincial Quick Reaction Force their provincial wide AO and mandate did not reflect NZDF priorities at that time. This resulted in the decision to conduct a BPC mission with the local ANP in Bamian town, who had been somewhat neglected, paradoxically, due to their proximity to Kiwi Base.

Upon the completion of introductions the immediate challenge was to establish a BPC plan that balanced the conflicting priorities of all actors. Even at platoon (KT3) level the actors directly or indirectly involved in the BPC included: local ANP, ANP Provincial Police Headquarters (PPHQ), EUPOL (a theatre-wide police training force), MFAT, PRT HQ, and the soldiers of

KT3. Each actor had different priorities and timelines – and ideally all of these needed to be reflected and catered for in the BPC plan so that their resources could be utilised. EUPOL, and later MFAT, would provide the bulk of funds for infrastructure redevelopment; the two HQ provided the time and space; and the local police provided the opportunity. Consequently, as time and space became more constrained, so the interest on ongoing projects and training intensified. Ultimately, a plan was developed that generated buy-in from all the actors which was split into three distinct phases: living with the local ANP to develop relationships; ongoing training, patrolling and infrastructure development; and the completion of redevelopment whist simultaneously discontinuing patrolling links.

The first phase of the plan, living with the ANP at their compound for a week, was crucial for developing the relationships which permitted the creation of a worthwhile BPC plan. I gained an understanding that although the 2IC was far more competent and proactive than the area commander, the 2IC would not act without his specific guidance. As a result, after a number of fruitless meetings, we developed an effective system where I would discuss a plan informally with the 2IC (often sitting outside in the sun smoking), the 2IC would then discuss it with the commander, then I would have another formal meeting at which the commander would task the 2IC with what we had already agreed upon. Although convoluted, it allowed the 2IC (a 10 year veteran) to drive the training, whilst maintaining the commander's (who was a relative of a member of government) status. Simultaneously, the soldiers and JNCOs were conducting partnered patrolling, competitive search lessons, and mentoring at two crucial checkpoints on the approaches to Bamian. Also, and perhaps more importantly for the

development of relationships we were relaxing together, sharing a number of meals and becoming comfortable around one another. It was in this period we came to a consensus that ongoing range and checkpoint training led by the JNCOs would provide an immediate and tangible benefit at section level for ourselves and the ANP, and a partial redevelopment of the local station would provide a quality of life improvement for the police whilst cementing useful command relationships for the impending mission completion.

The checkpoint mentoring activities, led by a section commander, were a successful example of section level BCP. The section commander developed effective relationships in the first phase by identifying his peers at both checkpoints, and then consistently returning to engage with them. This continuity of relationship, and observation, allowed him to gauge what the ANP wished to achieve but accurately balance that against the realities of our restricted operating environment. The mentoring focused on section level soldiering skills including the development of SOPs and Actions On (for Contact, IED, and Suspicious vehicle et al.), the construct of range cards, and the recording and transcribing of information. A potential for friction over our inability (due to time, cost and impending retrograde operations) to harden the ANP's checkpoint positions was avoided by providing technical advice (through an RNZE JNCO) and support for the checkpoint commanders to submit a proposal to their PPHQ. This also tied into the higher aims of ANSF BCP, to develop processes and structures that could be effective post our withdrawal. Tangible positive outcomes had been achieved through a sound appreciation of capacity and desire, both NZDF and ANP.

Simultaneously, EUPOL and MFAT were providing funds for the physical redevelopment of the local ANP station and relationships formed at the command level were crucial to overcoming a number of challenges. The redevelopment, encompassing the repair of walls and ceilings, installing of windows, and the building of a car shelter and toilet block, would provide a vastly improved quality of life to the ANP who primarily lived on site. This was an ANP priority, but due to the impending mission completion was managed by KT3 on behalf of MFAT and EUPOL, who were expected to provide a completed project prior to the withdrawal of NZDF personnel. The two major challenges in the redevelopment were the unrealistic expectations of the ANP in terms of the scope of the work, and the relaxed attitude of Afghan contractors to deadlines. At command level, the trust and understanding formed in the initial phase of co-habitation allowed for frank discussions about the intended scope, and increased the pressure the ANP placed on the contractors to complete the work, in accordance with the timeline imposed by our withdrawal. These command relationships were crucial in realising a successful conclusion of the physical redevelopment.

As the BPC progressed, its remit was progressively curtailed in line with operational requirements to prepare for the withdrawal and progressively diminish support to the ANSF, but it continued to provide tangible positive outcomes. By the final weeks of the deployment the only BPC movement permitted outside the FOB was the final meetings and payments to contractors that could not be conducted at the FOB. At this stage there was limited friendly force situational awareness of the AO, reduced troop numbers and reaction capability following the withdrawal of all NZLAV, and an heighted alertness towards 'green on blue' (ANSF) threats. The relationships and networks formed as part of the BPC provided another source of

human intelligence that enhanced our situational awareness, an additional layer (albeit of varying effectiveness) of security to the FOB and airlifts, and the requisite level of trust to complete BPC activities. Although its remit was curtailed, the lingering effects of successful BPC enhanced the operational security of the retrograde.

The BPC mission undertaken by KT3 had to overcome additional restrictions imposed by operational requirements outside our control, in order to achieve tangible positive outcomes. The early development of honest and productive relationships at a number of levels, which was greatly assisted by living with the ANP, was the crucial step in realising these positive outcomes. These relationships formed a base upon which a mutually acceptable BPC plan was created, which had been bought into by all the actors involved. This plan was then put into effect and friction points, disagreements and areas of confusion managed through frank discussion and sensible appreciations of ANP requirements and NZDF capacity. These discussions were often conducted in a manner quite divergent to NZ Army practices and without the early understanding engendered by continuous, close proximity would have been more challenging to bring to mutually satisfactory outcomes. The relationships developed were further enhanced as the mission progressed through the completion of agreed upon training outcomes, section level mentoring and combined efforts to complete the redevelopment of the local police station. The ability to achieve positive outcomes was ultimately attributable to a combined plan, agreed upon by all parties, that was enhanced by effective relationships.

The creation of a Combat Corps

By Major Mark Schmid

Major Marc Schmid is the Chief Instructor at Combat School, Land Operations Training Centre. Marc has recently returned from the United States Marine Corps Staff and Command College in Quantico.

The purpose of this article is to stimulate debate and discussion around the possible benefits of creating a single combat corps. On the 29th January 2001, the NZ Government signed an agreement to purchase 105 LAV, with which the Army planned to motorise the two light infantry

Battalions, as part of the Army 2005 strategy. While the 1st Battalion, RNZIR commenced motorisation in 2004 and transitioned into a cavalry organisation over time, 2/1st Battalion did not. Concurrently in 2003, QAMR reduced in size to a squadron[53] and moved to Burnham until it was identified as the Army's Third (Cavalry) Manoeuvre Unit as part of Army Strategy 2010[54]. In 2011, it was

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[53] Army General Staff 1920 / 7 / 05 CGS DIRECTIVE 14/02: DOWNSIZING OF QUEEN ALEXANDRA'S MOUNTED RIFLES Dated Aug 2002.
[54] CA DIRECTIVE 04/2005 ARMY 2010: ESTABLISHMENT OF A THIRD COMBAT MANOEUVRE UNIT (QUEEN ALEXANDRA'S MOUNTED RIFLES) dated 3 may 2005

decided that QAMR would move back to Linton and take over the Cavalry output from 1st Battalion, with the 1st Battalion re-rolled as light infantry[55]. Recently, a decision has been made to remove infantry soldiers from QAMR[56], posting them back to the 1st Battalion; essentially returning the Army (organisationally) into where it was in 2003, with two light infantry battalions and an APC (protected mobility) or Mdm Reconnaissance type armoured unit (QAMR). While the decision to remove infantry from QAMR has been described as temporary, there is a danger that renewed inter-Corps rivalry may disrupt significant gains over the past decade that could affect Officer and Soldier's career's, whilst also reducing the Army's ability to fight as a cohesive, Combined Arms Task Group (CATG). This begs the question - do individual Corps parochial priorities hinder NZ Army combat units from truly achieving combined arms excellence and would the creation of a single Combat Corps resolve this issue[57]?

Combining the RNZIR, RNZAC and RNZA into one combined Combat Corps could provide a start point for eventually creating three (like) combined arms manoeuvre units that fulfil the Army's obligation to government in providing a scalable and sustainable CATG for operations. A model for this amalgamation, the RNZALR, is evidence that by engaging critical analysis, self-reflection, robust debate, combined with strong leadership and an organisational will to "select and maintain

an aim," our Army can achieve what many sceptics before the RNZALR amalgamation had deemed impossible. Presently, our combat and combat support Corps have strong and determined leaders who have already demonstrated such will during the initial motorisation and cavalry capability developments of the past decade. Combining three (RNZIR, RNZAC and RNZA) soldier trade models will ensure greater utility, flexibility and employment profile opportunities for individual soldiers and officers. Young officers growing up in single combat corps with everyday exposure to direct/indirect fire and vehicle operations will become more proficient war fighters than their predecessors.

Previously, the RNZAC had the luxury of more than one armoured vehicle from which to base their trade model and career path for soldiers. Scorpion's, M113 APC and Land Rovers provided greater opportunities for the RNZAC crewman to move between squadrons and roles, thus providing new challenges and experiences throughout an individual's career. However, with LAV as the only platform, a LCpl (RNZAC) who completes his Crew Commander course will reach Band 5 and become top of trade, potentially within four years of service. Consequently, an RNZAC NCO has fewer opportunities to grow as a war fighter and complete additional combat related coursing (FSG, R&S and JFO) because places on these courses are tied to Corps, not units. Therefore, this RNZAC NCO may no longer see significant challenges or career development being restricted to one manoeuvre unit and one geographic location.

During each Defence White Paper review, the Ministry of Defence and other government agencies discuss and debate the relevance and employment of Artillery, a capability that has not been deployed in

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[55] CA DIRECTIVE 05/11: ARMY 2015 C2 CHANGE IMPLEMENTATION dated Nov 2011

[56] CA DIRECTIVE 08/14: MOVE OF INFANTRY FROM QAMR TO 1RNZIR dated 4th Nov 14

[57] LWD 1.0 Fundamentals of Landwarfare. Combat elements are those land force elements that are intended to engage the enemy with direct fire weapons. Combat elements include armour, infantry, Special Forces and aviation. Combat support elements provide offensive support and operational assistance to combat elements. Combat support elements include offensive support, ground-based air defence, ISR capabilities, electronic warfare elements, combat engineers and battlefield support aviation.

its primary role since the Vietnam War. The removal of Air Defence in the late 2000's reduced the employment profile for the RNZA soldier, however, adopting the Mortar capability from the infantry in 2009 went some way to widening the trade model[58]. The Artillery corps was worked hard in recent years to maintain operational relevance by training Joint Tactical Air Controllers (JTAC), owning UAV development and exploring expertise in non-kinetic effects. However, it is conceivable that during a future White Paper review, the indirect fire capability held entirely within the Artillery Regiment could be removed as an NZDF output. Consequently, the NZ Army would no longer retain ability to fire and manoeuvre effectively, thus no longer could we claim to be a true Army. By owning the decision to retain an indirect fire capability within a single combat corps, we could reduce the cost of maintaining two types of indirect fire weapon, two Schools, and a Regt HQ staff, with all savings (Personnel, Infrastructure, and Operating) that could be reinvested across a single combat trade. The RNZA, like the RNZAC is perhaps now at critical mass where amalgamation into a combat corps could re-energise a soldier's desire to serve by opening up greater opportunities to train and employ combined arms close combat skills.

The RNZIR is the largest of the three combat Corps and as a consequence is likely to contain the most vocal opponents (past and present) to amalgamation. Like the RNZAC and RNZA, the RNZIR prides itself on history and tradition, however, our shared history and traditions are actually based on the achievements of Units and those individuals and teams who served in them. Often acting in isolation, the RNZIR could be accused of influencing organisational structure and capability decisions based on what is best for their

corps and Units. For example a decision to increase the Infantry section size (to ten) impacts a number of enablers and their ability to support us, while also having an impact on the table of equipment across Army for critical pieces of equipment such as Night vision and Light machine guns. Additionally, RNZIR units expend significant time and resources developing capabilities under the Fire Support Group (FSG) umbrella, whose relevance outside a COIN environment such as Afghanistan are yet to be proven. A CO leading a combined arms manoeuvre unit would be able to deliver greater kinetic effects through the use of a Javelin, 25mm stabilised cannon coordinated with indirect fire from 8-12 km away, than he presently can with the .50cal and GMG. Freeing up the .50Cal and GMG weapons from the FSG role could provide the weapons and equipment to enable Combat Log patrols (A1 Ech), should a suitable armoured LOV replacement be identified.

The centre of excellence for the combined Combat Corps would remain the Combat School. Support Weapons Wing could absorb the staff and expertise required to train JFOs and teach the single indirect fire courses, while additional JTACs could be trained overseas with savings achieved through the reduction to a single indirect fire capability. The Combat Corps training would form the start point for all combat soldiers to progress into the Units and depending on the nature of the conflict which we are engaged in or preparing for; Unit CO's could determine which band three courses are a priority. Perhaps this model would also be better suited to the "Just in Time" Force Generation model for Army 2020 because it will remove Corps bias as to which trades (Rifleman, Crewman, Gunner) are more important, thus deserve priority for recruiting. Three like manoeuvre Unit CO's may even run concurrent band training during the year to achieve some level of efficiency in

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[58] CA Directive 10/08: Single Mortar capability dated Sep 2008.

training. Additionally, the Army could make better use of the significant capital investment in LAV hangers in Burnham.

The changes suggested in this article are significant and should not be understated. Any critique of military tradition or culture that discusses the amalgamation of Corps, disbandment of Units or loss of capability will stir passionate and valid arguments from across the military and society. This should be encouraged. Equally, failure to question the status quo, thereby merely accepting decisions without debate is not one of the qualities expected of engaged military professionals. If the Army is willing to accept that professional mastery of combined arms close combat skills can developed during a once a year training activity or on PDT as part of OLOC generation, then we should retain the status quo. If doubt exists as to the true effectiveness of this approach, then perhaps we could explore the concept of a combined Combat Corps with a single trade mode that provides the start point for developing combined arms manoeuvre units. Finally, while adherence to traditions and respecting our shared RNZIR, RNZAC and RNZA history has enabled us to create an effective warfighting culture, tradition and history must not be shackles that bind us to structures, locations or operating concepts which inhibit innovation and progress towards achieving land effects enhanced.

Addressing Wicked Problems through Wicked Solutions

By Mr. Ruben Stewart

Ruben Stewart is a former New Zealand Army officer who has spent the last 12 years working in conflict and post-conflict environs such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Sudan, Syria, South Sudan, Israel and Palestine. He has served as an advisor to NATO and a consultant to the US, UK and other allied governments, international organisations and NGOs in the fields of peace-keeping, counterinsurgency, stability, reconstruction, humanitarian and development operations including governance, disarmament, reintegration, elections and security sector reform.

"If the environment in which we operate is more chaotic, we've got to introduce chaos into the system."

—General Martin E. Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [59]

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[59] Brafman, O., & Pollack, J. (2013). *The Chaos Imperative: How Chance and Disruption Increase Innovation Effectiveness and Success.* New York: Crown Business.

Every piece of military writing has to contain at least one quote from that famous Prussian but given his dialectic approach this can lead to a little confusion. Whilst he did say, "*Everything in war is simple…*" he also said "*In war everything is uncertain and variable, intertwined with psychological forces and effects, and the product of a continuous interaction of opposites*"[60] and it is this last quote that will frame this discussion. Whilst not a new phenomenon the uncertainty and complexity of modern conflict has actually increased to the point where there are no "boundaries between the battlefield and what is not the battlefield, between what is a weapon and what is not, between soldier and noncombatant, between state and non-state or supra-state."[61] Whilst many people have tried to categorise the complexity of modern war, in reality it is a mosaic mixture with aspects of 4th generation warfare, revolution of military affairs, hybrid warfare, population-centric operations, humanitarian activities, information operations, net-centric warfare and a 3 block war all seemingly inextricably fused together.

Many of those with recent operational experience over the last decade plus, will agree that modern war is anything but simple and is actually exceeding complex. In 1973 two academics, Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber explored such complex challenges and defined them with the phrase: 'wicked problems'[62]. Whilst the term wicked problem was originally coined to describe the complexity of social planning, the characteristics are very familiar to military planners:

- There is no definitive way to formulate a wicked problem,

indeed some cannot be formulated as the context in which they arise is not stable,

- Wicked problems are interactively complex, have many inter-dependencies and can often be the symptom of other problems,

- Wicked problems have no clear solution and have no end-state,

- Solutions to wicked problems are not right or wrong, but good or bad and any trial of a solution will serve to alter the existing context, therefore changing the wicked problem again; and

- Wicked problems solution that may work in one area, may not work in another, as each wicked problem is inherently unique.

Acknowledgement of these challenges is found in the newly minted military acronym VUCA (volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity)[63] but whilst easy to describe, actually operating successfully in such environments is far more difficult. From the aforementioned characteristics one can see that the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) through its rather linear, phase based approach to achieving a clearly defined end state may have just a few difficulties in addressing a wicked problem. Whilst the characteristics above relate to the wicked problem or its solution(s) they are further complicated by additional characteristics that apply to the organisation(s) seeking to address the problem:

- Wicked problems often lie outside the realm of one particular agency or organisation and often there is no central authority,

[60] Clausewitz, K. v. (1976). *On War.* (M. Howard, & P. Paret, Trans.) Princeton: Princeton University Press.
[61] Liang, Q., & Xiangsui, W. (1999). *Unrestricted Warfare.* Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House.
[62] Rittel, H. W., & Webber, M. M. (1973). Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning. *Policy Sciences* , 155-169.

[63] McChrystal, S. (2015). *Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World.* New York: Portfolio/Penguin, page 64

- The time to solve a wicked problem is limited and the resources available are constrained; and

- Those trying to solve the wicked problem are also part of the cause of it.

In the last few years various military forces have adopted the term wicked problem to describe complex operations; counterinsurgency and stability operations in particular, as a colloquial term to describe the complexities that such operations generally entail. However modern conventional operations also meet most if not all, of the same characteristics and therefore they too can also be considered wicked problems. Additionally, there are some specific military aspects that further aggravate the characteristics listed above.

What or who is it that we are confronting? We are less likely to be confronting states and more likely to dealing with individuals and groups of individuals such as Non-State Armed Groups (NSAGs). Furthermore as we discovered in Afghanistan the real enemies to our mission included the dire humanitarian situation, corrupt and/or inept governance, fraudulent elections, drug trafficking, criminality of every shade and centuries old conflicts between families, villages, tribes, ethnicities and religious groups. These 'pre-existing' conditions were factors that led to and were exacerbated by the prevailing insecurity. Another example of what can challenge mission success is how we perceive others and how others perceive us, especially when misleading information is refracted and distorted through formal and informal information and media operations. Former United States Marine Corp (USMC) Commandant General Jim Conway summed up his time in Iraq by admitting that it was "*Al Jazeera (that) kicked our butts.*"[64]

What is it that we are being asked to do? Clausewitzian war, including what he described as limited war, were acts of force aimed at defeating an enemy state and the conquest of territory including the seizure of major cities[65]. We know exactly the attrition rates of what it takes to defeat, destroy and neutralise an opponent but often now our missions are to achieve vague and ambiguous conditions and often those conditions for success are not based in the military realm. For example when tasked to provide a safe and secure environment, what does that look like? To secure a population we need to know what human security entails, including a full cultural understanding of the population that we are securing, in all its aspects. Without external reference we generally define such conditions based on our experience, perceptions and resources at hand. For example as soldiers we may think that best way to be 'safe and secure' is by eliminating the people shooting at us, which in some instances can actually lead us into making it less safe and secure[66].

Military Planning

In 2009 USMC General Anthony Zinni warned that the military was entering an age of "process warfare," where we believe if we only master the process, we win the war. Focusing on processes actually makes us less adaptable, as we are attempting to make war fit the military planning process, rather than the reverse[67].

[64] Bolger, D. (2014). *Why We Lost: A General's Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, page 179

[65] Clausewitz, K. v. (1976). *On War.* (M. Howard, & P. Paret, Trans.) Princeton: Princeton University Press.

[66] Fairweather, J. (2014). *The Good War - Why We Couldn't Win the War or the Peace in Afghanistan* (Kindle ed.). London: Jonathan Cape, loc 6221-6222.

[67] Brown, J. M. (n.d.). *Uploading John Boyd.* Retrieved March 2, 2015, from Medium - The Bridge:

Chaotic and wicked problems require a more adaptive approach utilising a broader range of ideas and actors[68].

We shape our perception of the battlefields in our minds through the processes we have been taught to employ. During military planning we literally redraw the map to suit our military processes – boundaries are drawn primarily on the basis of the organisation and size of the unit intended to inhabit that box and the almost scientific force ratios required for a specific task, rather than any analysis of the current inhabitants. Towns and roads are renamed with easy to pronounce western names and terrain is classified as either trafficable or not to tracked and wheeled vehicles. Friendly forces are classified as blue forces; national security forces green, civilians white and anyone who shoots at us therefore must be red.

Such over simplification of a situation such as labelling anyone who attacks us as the "enemy" can be disastrous to our understanding of the context and therefore constrain our ability to generate a successful response. Lumping the Taliban into categories such as 'have a go', '$10 a day", village, foreign or Tier 1 did not help us understand the various dynamics that were played out in Afghanistan[69]. Certainly the unwitting US entrance into the inter-sectarian strife of Iraq and the British return to Helmand and it's simmering inter-tribal war should serve as sufficient warning of the dangers of such historical and cultural ignorance. Simplifying any information through analysis, especially to reach a binary result such as yes/no, go/no-go can be extremely detrimental. Allied

intelligence classified the Ardennes forests as not trafficable to German armour, but they used it as a major avenue of attack by armoured forces, twice, in the space of one war.

Despite eight years of experience in Afghanistan, Major General Michael Flynn serving as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence reported in 2010 that NATO forces in Afghanistan were "ignorant of local economics and landowners, hazy about who the power brokers are and how they might be influenced, incurious about the correlations between various development projects and the levels of cooperation among villagers, and disengaged from people in the best position to find answers."[70] Why? Because that's not what defence intelligence analysts were looking for or trained to look for. And General Flynn's list only includes some of the 'unknown unknowns' that surprised us as we stumbled through Afghanistan.

By shaping our intelligence inputs to fit what we expect or what we can process using our existing procedures we are in fact shaping our resultant plan. We like to think that the military planning process helps prepare us to operate in one of the most complex and unforgiving environments that exist. But does it? This planning process has been shaped over decades to focus on the military aspects of a problem. Whether we like it or not our pre-conceived solutions, training and education, shape our perspective and how look at problems. The dictates of time and desire for simplicity mean we focus on only feeding information into the intelligence cycle that which helps deliver what we expect to come out – a military solution. Whilst it's touted that a counterinsurgency problem is 80% political and 20% military, the reality

https://medium.com/the-bridge/uploading-john-boyd-4264b82d73ed

[68] Australian Public Service Commission. (2007). *Tackling Wicked Problems - A Public Policy Persepctive.* Canberra: Australian Government.

[69] Fairweather, J. (2014). *The Good War - Why We Couldn't Win the War or the Peace in Afghanistan* (Kindle ed.). London: Jonathan Cape, loc 3902

[70] Flynn, M., Pottiner, M., & Batchelor, P. (2010). *Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan.* Washington DC: Center for a New American Security

is that even modern conventional operations are never solely military problems. And whilst we have refined our ability to plan combined arms or joint operations to address conventional problems, we also need to ensure our planning encompasses non-military aspects.

War as practiced on exercises, Tactical Exercises Without Troops (TEWTs) and Command Post Exercises (CPXs) promotes the idea that wars are 'symmetrical' in that they are fought between forces that resemble each other in terms of tactics and capabilities[71]. Exercise planners are cast from the same mould as those taking part in the exercise so it is inevitable that the activities conducted will be similar to what they've experienced before, been taught before and what the commanders expect. Truly creative thinking is unlikely to occur if the problem always comes in the form of square shaped holes and our tool box only includes square shaped pegs. However as Lt Gen William Wallace, commander of the US V Corps in Iraq said, the resistance they encountered was "*not the enemy we wargamed*"[72]. And it almost always never will be but yet we are still surprised when the battlefield we encounter doesn't look like the one we practised for.

In an obvious illustration of this was the Millennium Challenge war games of 2002, which were unscripted, and where the red team through asymmetric and unconventional means bought a three-week exercise to an end after six days by "destroying" the blue force naval component. Rather than embracing an unforeseen opportunity and running a thorough analysis of the lessons learned, exercise control conducted a game wide

reset and then conducted a scripted exercise with the inevitable blue force victory[73]. The truth is in reality any opposition we face would be crazy to confront us on anything approaching symmetrical military terms and would certainly also utilise non-military means to affect a favourable outcome.

A Wicked Solution

We must understand the differences between problems that are structurally complicated and rigid and those that as wicked problems are interactively complex and fluid. Part of that understanding is that they must be addressed through different processes.[74] Whilst the current military planning process is sufficient for complicated military problems, such problems very rarely exist anymore. This points towards a need for a more adaptive and flexible approach to decision-making that incorporates a diverse variety of actors and their perspectives and ideas. Academic study is supportive of the notion that collaborative problem solving involving numerous actors is widely viewed as they most effective method of solving wicked problems which "make those people who are being affected into participants of the planning process. They are not merely asked but actively involved in the planning process"[75] or as recently promoted by General Stanley McChrystal, planning together as a team of teams rather than within bureaucratic silos.

"The Chaos Imperative" is a book that examines the role of chaos as the instigator of innovation, effectiveness and success

[71] Strachan, H. (2013). *The Direction of War.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p17
[72] Wark, W. K. (2005). *Twenty-First Century Intelligence.* Oxon: Routlegde.

[73] Borger, J. (2002, September 6). *Wake-up Call.* Retrieved January 23, 2015, from The Guardian: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/sep/06/usa.iraq
[74] Mark. (2007, July 16). *Part II: The Ideas at Boyd 2007.* Retrieved March 2, 2015 from ZenPundit: http://zenpundit.blogspot.co.il/2007/07/part-ii-ideas-at-boyd-2007-ideas-and.html
[75] Rittel, H. W., & Webber, M. M. (1973). Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning. *Policy Sciences* , 155-169.

and more specifically it recounts the work of the authors who worked closely with the US Army in an attempt to make it a more adaptive organisation. The book explains that chaos is viewed as something negative, which should be minimised and as a result organisations can become too structured and restrained in their thinking. The key components of harnessing the positive aspects of chaos are white space, unusual suspects and organised serendipity. White space is that place, devoid of organised structure, unfettered by pre-existing thought where new ideas are sought and often demanded to address a pressing problem. Unusual suspects are those creative or disruptive thinkers operating well outside the box who challenge the conventional perspectives of others in the team, and who don't seem to belong in the field they're in and weave together seemingly disparate worlds. And lastly is organised serendipity, which is where, and how new ideas are spliced onto existing processes and procedures, examined and tested and transferred to other parts of the organisation.[76] The US Army has tried to instil a similar process through the Asymmetric Warfare Group where innovative military and civilian thinkers are specifically selected and then tasked to address pressing operational and tactical problems. However another model worth examining is the work of the British Army through its innovative use of the 77th Brigade.

The British Army have recently established the Security Assistance Group, now renamed as the 77th Brigade which used to be the designation of the Chindit Brigade, in recognition that unconventional approaches can successfully assist in solving conventional problems. 77th Brigade undertakes a variety of tasks including media and information

operations, psychological operations and it contains the Military Stabilisation Support Group (MSSG). This Brigade can provide staff that can serve as a plug-in element for any headquarters as units or formations of all sizes need this expertise on the modern battlefield. Whilst the Brigade is a regular tri-service unit almost half the staff are territorials, supplemented by a roster of civilian experts with 77th Brigade serving as a conduit for "civilians with bespoke skills to serve alongside their military counterparts".[77]

The brigade and it's composition is recognition that hard power and military force are no longer the only tools needed in modern warfare and that "actions of others in a modern battlefield can be affected in ways that are not necessarily violent"[78]. Factors such as security, law and order and development are frequently interrelated to form a wicked problem. What really makes this new brigade different is its non-violent and non-lethal ethos, which can be used not only to support peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention operations and development in insecure and failing states but also to support conventional operations.[79]

In late 2014, a Divisional HQ planning and CPX exercise was held in the UK where the initial exercise script included a divisional advance and culminated, in rather typical military exercise fashion, with a deliberate conventional operation to capture a key city, roughly the size of Dunedin which was occupied by a foreign force. But during exercise planning a group of civilians were engaged to develop injects on a full range of human domain aspects into the

[76] Brafman, O., & Pollack, J. (2013). *The Chaos Imperative: How Chance and Disruption Increase Innovation Effectiveness and Success.* New York: Crown Business.

[77] BBC News. (2015, January 31). *Army sets up new brigade 'for information age'.* Retrieved February 12, 2015 from BBC News: http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-31070114
[78] Ibid
[79] Flint, J. (2015, February 5). *Army joins the social media war with psy-ops brigade.* Retrieved March 12, 2015 from The Conversation: http://theconversation.com/army-joins-the-social-media-war-with-psy-ops-brigade-37125

scenario, which itself was based on a "real world" location meaning that real time open source information could be used to supplement the scenario. During the exercise in a significant departure from normal process the Divisional HQ incorporated staff from 77th Brigade and civilians or unusual suspects in an attempt at wicked problem planning using unconventional and "out of the box" operations to compliment and in certain cases replace conventional activities. In this instance a select group of civilians from various governmental and non-governmental backgrounds were assembled and worked with 77th Brigade and the Divisional HQ staff to plan what would normally be undertaken as a rather routine advance and attack operation. A more informal, free flowing and collaborative planning process was employed resulting in plans that included kinetic, non-kinetic, lethal and non-lethal means to capture the city. The course of action selected by the GOC included normal conventional activities undertaken in concert with other unconventional techniques including a robust Phase Four plan that actually began at the same time as Phase One activities were underway.

It should be noted that the Divisional course of action selected by the General Officer Commanding (GOC) was put together by an integrated military and civilian future plans team led by a Territorial Army Lance Corporal from the Intelligence Corps whose civilian job was as a magician. As the old adage goes, no one has a monopoly on good ideas.[80]

Whilst an integrated and coordinated full spectrum approach using Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic (DIME) elements is important at the strategic and operational levels, it also valuable to consider these elements at the lowest

tactical level. When a section or platoon commander establishes a vehicle checkpoint, ostensibly for security purposes there's a potential that it will also affect the economy by altering the amounts, routes and efficiency of trade and traffic. Additionally it could create negative publicity for the troops from both host nationals and other international organisations whose travel may be delayed or denied because of that checkpoint and the practices employed there. And as a potential target it can also endanger the civilian population who live, work or travel in its proximity. The ability to analyse and consider these elements will often lie outside the scope of a military unit tasked to undertake them, which is why civilian elements such Human Terrain Teams or District Stabilisation Teams are increasingly used to advise military commanders and headquarters at all levels on such matters[81].

Samuel Huntington's "The Soldier and the State" is widely considered a definitive guide on how military officers should conduct themselves in regards to their civilian masters recommending that they develop their professionalism in a very distinct and cloistered fashion separate from civilian activities. Huntington and his advocates promoted the practise of a "military….. strictly limited to military affairs". This belief that the military should restrict their education, thinking and engagement to military matters has created an artificial divide between military and civilian actors that has created an insular and inwards looking profession at the very time it should be more outwards orientated. War however is much more than a military affair and therefore must be viewed comprehensively, or, as renowned

[80] Notes based on the author's participation.

[81] Fairweather, J. (2014). *The Good War - Why We Couldn't Win the War or the Peace in Afghanistan* (Kindle ed.). London: Jonathan Cape, loc 6069

strategist Colin Gray put it "war is about much more than warfare."[82]

A broader education of military leaders has utility in conventional operations also. As explained by Patton "*I have studied the German all my life. I have read the memoirs of his general officers and political leaders. I have even read his philosophers... I know exactly how he will react under any given set of circumstances...Therefore, when the day comes, I'm going whip the hell out of him!*"[83] Those selecting such commanders must take this professional and personal development into account. Indeed one could only imagine whether Patton would have had the same impact if he had been selected to fight in the jungles or islands of the Pacific Campaign. However such study must also be driven by the military's operational requirements or else we end up with the situation in 2008, where in the midst of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the most common online language packages utilised by US Defense staff were Spanish, French and German[84]. Whilst an understanding of your opponents' culture and language is extremely useful, it is just one area of study that modern military leaders can undertake.

The current method of professional development has actually insulated us from Communities of Practice (CoP) that could aid us in our work and it is worth considering that forward thinking military

personnel such as Kilcullen, Nagl, Petraeus, McMaster and MacFarland (who fostered the Anbar Awakening) all earned their Master's level education from civilian education institutions, supplementing their standard military education. This 'left of bang' education on "how the world works" is critical because as Doctor Stephen Biddle, advisor to both Generals Petraeus and McChrystal suggests, war "lies on the seams of the way academia is organized" and therefore "does not have a [single] discipline to study it" and concludes that the "best skill set is diverse and multi-disciplinary."[85]

It is almost impossible to maintain a full range of potentially required skills sets, especially in a numerically limited environment such as the NZDF, where structural and resource constraints prevent fostering and maintaining niche skills on a permanent or organic basis. It is therefore inevitable that certain skills sets outside traditional capabilities will need to be obtained from external civilian providers who will need to be rapidly incorporated into existing structures an retained for as long as that skill is required. When KFOR under General Mike Jackson first moved into Pristina, he sought and received civilian engineers from the UK's Central Electricity Generating Board to get Pristina's power station up and running again[86]. Likewise over the last decade we have seen many commanders call up and utilise civilian advisors in a multitude of roles. As noted this is something that the UK's 77th Brigade is examining closely as the commander's ability to call up whomever or whatever is required to achieve the task is proving essential to success on the modern battlefield.

[82] Cavanaugh, M. (2014, November 19). *War is too big for one academic discipline*. Retrieved December 2, 2014 from War Council: http://www.warcouncil.org/blog/2014/11/15/war-is-too-big-for-one-academic-discipline

[83] Nye, R. H. (1994). *The Patton Mind*. New York: Avery Publishers.

[84] Masellis, N. (2009, May 31). *Human Terrain: A Strategic Imperative on the 21st Century Battlefield*. Retrieved July 7, 2013, from Small Wars Journal: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/250-marsellis.pdf?q=mag/docs-temp/250-marsellis.pdf

[85] Cavanaugh, M. (2014, November 19). *War is too big for one academic discipline*. Retrieved December 2, 2014 from War Council: http://www.warcouncil.org/blog/2014/11/15/war-is-too-big-for-one-academic-discipline

[86] Jackson, M. (2013). Command of Kosovo Force 1999. In J. Bailey, R. Iron, & H. Strachan, *British Generals in Blair's Wars* (Kindle ed., loc. 1323-1677). Farnham: Ashgate, loc 1570

One recent and successful example of the use of unusual suspects was the employment of Emma Sky to advise General Ray Odierno then serving as the US Commander in Iraq. The employment of a foreign, female civilian with relevant language and cultural skills and who never shied away from challenging the prevailing military opinion, demonstrates an acknowledgement that standard military inputs to planning were insufficient, that external inputs were essential but more importantly it showed the willingness and confidence of a commander to invite criticism and sometimes scorn.[87]

As war, our particular wicked problem becomes more complex and uncertain; we'll need such diverse perspectives and ideas more than ever in our training scenarios, intelligence gathering, planning processes, professional development and command at all levels. Rather than shun chaos, we should embrace it, because it challenges our cultural stagnation and conventional thought and provides unimagined opportunities for innovation and adaptability. Chaos and wickedness are more than just a problem; they are also the solution.

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[87] Sky, E. (2015). *Unravelling: High Hopes and Missed Opportunities in Iraq.* New York: Public Affairs.

A legacy less known – New Zealand Division's Western Front Story

By Lieutenant Colonel Mike Beale

Lieutenant Colonel Michael Beale is currently the Military Advisor for the United Kingdom and Europe. He manages the Army relationship between the NZDF and British Army, and other European Armies.

Gallipoli has always overshadowed New Zealand's contribution to the Western Front during World War 1 (WW1). Through my involvement in New Zealand's WW1 centennial commemorations in Europe, I have come to appreciate the significance of the role New Zealand Forces played in the three years, 1916—1918, on the Western Front. The New Zealand Division (NZ Division) rightly earned a reputation as one of the finest operating in France and Belgium. Its exploits provide our nation and today's New Zealand Army (NZ Army) a proud and enduring, if less known, legacy.

The importance that New Zealand places on the Gallipoli campaign of 1915, as a critical event in the process of New Zealand's emerging nationhood, is one that I support. Those who served in the tangle of gullies and ridges that characterised an otherwise anonymous escarpment on Gallipoli peninsula forged

the Anzac legend through their deeds, courage, tenacity, bravery and, far too frequently, their sacrifice. As a young nation with a population of barely one million people, one hundred thousand New Zealanders served in uniform from 1914 to 1918. At Gallipoli, more than 2700 New Zealanders lost their lives and a further 4700 others were casualties. On the Western Front, New Zealand suffered more than 59,400 casualties of whom 18,166 died.

The casualty rates and duration of the campaign in Europe alone demand greater recognition. The profound effect the three-year crucible of the Western Front had on shaping our emerging national identity must also be acknowledged. On the Western Front through their deeds our forces earned the respect of our allies and foe alike. In doing so they affirmed New Zealand's place as a nation in its own right on the world stage. The experience of the Western Front was also significant in developing the NZ Army into the professional organisation it is today.

I will provide a summary of the NZ Division's Western Front story. I will then explore four lessons our contemporary Army can draw on today. There is plenty that Kiwis and military professionals can learn from our military forebears, even a century on. Are we up to the challenge?

The Western Front

In the wake of Gallipoli, New Zealand forces were reorganised in Egypt into the NZ Division and 'force troops' that served in Europe and a mounted Brigade that remained in Palestine[88]. The New Zealand Division arrived in France in April 1916 and first entered the trenches near the town of Armentieres in northern France, near the Belgian border. The Division moved south

and earned its spurs at the battle of the Somme in September—October 1916. At Messines in June 1917 the NZ Division showed how well it had developed in professional terms, both in preparing for and executing the successful attack. Messines showed just how good the New Zealand soldiers and commanders were in applying the harsh lessons taken from the Somme.

However, within months, the Division was forced into a period of introspection after its disastrous turn during the battle of Passchendaele on 12 October 1917. This battle remains New Zealand's worst-ever military disaster, and revealed that professional development at divisional level needed to be matched at Corps and Army if tactical effectiveness was to be consistently attained on the battlefield.

Throughout 1918 the Division proved its resilience and reasserted itself as a fearsome fighting organisation in both defence and attack. This was first apparent as the New Zealanders helped blunt the German Spring Offensive of March—April 1918, and then in the Hundred Days advance eastward through to the Armistice on November 11, 1918. It was thanks to the foresight of its commander — Napier-born Major-General Sir Andrew Russell — that the Division was trained, prepared and able to adapt so very quickly to the fluid and increasingly mobile warfare it was confronted with in 1918.

Lessons from the Legacy

So, beyond the myriad of memorials and cemeteries dotted across France, Belgium, England and New Zealand, what is the legacy of the NZ Division to its present-day counterpart, the NZ Army?

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[88] Other New Zealanders also served at sea and in the air.

The legacy is both considerable and inspiring, and cannot be given justice in a single article. I will, therefore, focus briefly on four areas where we can look to the NZ Division to draw relevant inspiration and lessons. Three of the areas are based on the article entitled 'Aspiring to be world class,' which was penned by Lt Col Brett Wellington and published in the NZ Army Journal's first edition. The final area is where I believe the NZ Army has an opportunity to exploit its current situation. The four areas are:

- aspiring to be world class,

- the training mechanism and methodology the Division established,

- the ability and the necessity to adapt, and

- investing in junior leadership.

Being 'world-class' is perhaps the most important legacy the NZ Division has left the modern NZ Army. The idea for the NZ Division to be world class was the mantra of Maj Gen Russell. He described it as the 'pursuit of excellence'. To achieve this he needed every man in the Division to understand and do everything in their power to achieve Russell's objective. To ensure his men strove for and achieved a high standard of professionalism he set clear objectives and held every officer, non-commissioned officer (NCO) and soldier accountable. The NZ Division was in pursuit of what would be recognised today as a war-fighting culture.

This was not limited to the manner and frequency of their training; the pursuit of excellence was pervasive. The focus was on doing the basics well and building from the bottom up, while at the same time Russell pushed his subordinate commanders to drive proficiency from the top down. It presented itself in the way the soldiers of the Division thought of themselves, the way they acted and the very image they held of themselves. It took time, but increasingly, the NZ Division walked with their heads held high, not with arrogance, but with the confident stride of someone sure of their own professional competence.

The training mechanism and method used by Russell complemented and reinforced his 'pursuit of excellence' for the NZ Division. The NZ Division's training regime and pursuit of excellence forms the basis of what we today recognise as the Army training system. The NZ Division established training bases in England through which reinforcements and those invalided from the battlefield were trained in the latest methods of warfare before joining their units on the Western Front. Training was also conducted closer to the front in France and Belgium. The NZ Division exploited every opportunity to up skill. Any down time behind the lines were used to hone skills and knowledge. In preparation for major actions extensive rehearsals were conducted on ground resembling that on which the operations would be conducted. Both collective and individual training was conducted. Individual training focused on leadership, marksmanship or specialist skills and knowledge. Collective training evolved into what we would recognise as combined arms training with infantry, engineers, artillery, armour and even the Royal Flying Corps frequently involved. Junior officers and NCOs were a vital component of training their subordinates. We can take pride and confidence that the foundations of our system grew from the NZ Division's hard-earned experience and remain applicable to the modern context to which we apply it.

The necessity to adapt and learn new skills and concepts was driven by the changes in warfare, either German tactics or technological advancements. The NZ

Division's ability to adapt came from a combination of factors. Firstly Russell constantly reviewed all aspects of his Division's performance. He and his subordinates also looked to their peer group — whether Australian, Canadian or British — to identify lessons to both extend and refine their skills. It was a mutually beneficial process. The results of this analysis then fed into the short and long-term learning cycles of the NZ Division. The short-term cycle enabled new tactical procedures to quickly be embraced, taught and implemented. The longer-term cycle enabled operational concepts to be developed at Division, Corps and even Army wide. Finally having a sound training system through which new methods could be taught and, having the process owned by the officers and NCOs who were driven in the 'pursuit of excellence', ensured the NZ Division was able to evolve and excel.

The NZ Army, like our closest allies, is transitioning, or having to 'adapt', from a period of high tempo of operations, 'the fight', to a contingency footing, which means being ready for 'a fight'. We can be sure that whatever the next conflict is we face the operational environment will be increasingly complex. Being on a contingency footing means we need to be trained and equipped to respond to a range of potential operations across the spectrum of conflict in a variety of potential theatres of operations. This demands we train for a broader range of scenarios and their associated challenges. Complexity and diversity necessitates a reduced depth to which we can train in each scenario compared to the mission specific training that dominated our training for the past decade. Mission specific training will close the skill gaps, adding the depth, once specific parameters of the next mission are identified. Faced with this transition the NZ Army would do well to turn its gaze back a generation or two especially to the period

of late 1917 and early 1918 when, through Russell's foresight, the NZ Division undertook training that would enable it to transition to mobile warfare in 1918 while still fighting in the trenches.

With the advantage of a tried and tested training system, a maturing lessons learned mechanism, and a culture of aspiring to be world class, the NZ Army has the necessary attributes to adapt successfully. We are able to add to this a decade's worth of experience across Afghanistan, Timor Leste, Solomon Islands and other theatres. However, we must carefully review our operational experiences from the specific theatres to ensure relevant lessons are identified and, where appropriate, embedded as a standard component of our contingency training regime. Any components introduced into our training must be adapted to ensure utility across the potential spectrum of operations and theatres. Retaining an understanding of the 'why and how' that led to the lessons being adopted is critical to ensure their enduring relevance. We need to ensure we do the critical thinking about what we have learned from a particular theatre and its applicability to different circumstances, as SSgt Rennie explained in his article 'Reasons why we do what we do' in edition 1 of the Army Journal.

The individuals who will implement the transition to a contingency footing will be our junior officers and NCOs as was the case with the NZ Division. During the last decade while gaining extensive operational experience, we suffered a degradation of our experience in planning and conducting training for contingency operations. This is most acute in the very people who will be critical in implementing our transition namely our junior officers and NCOs. They have for the past decade been focused on 'the fight' and have had

limited opportunities to plan and conduct training for contingency operations.

We do, however, have an opportunity to exploit this situation. We can utilise the wealth of operational experience garnered. We can invest in redevelopment of expertise in contingency training and enhance it with the accrued experience of the last decade. Battlefield attrition forced the NZ Division to invest in its junior leadership to ensure the pool of talent didn't run dry. The NZ Army must also invest in its junior officers and NCOs to exploit their operational experience and develop their skills and knowledge in training for contingencies.

Conclusion

Today's NZ Army can still learn much from those who served under the iconic Lemon Squeezer a century ago. As I have shown, the soldiers of the NZ Division, their NCOs and their officers were professional soldiers in every sense of the words. Professional development — whether on the field of battle or in the classroom — was part of their ethos; it meant the NZ Division fitted into and also excelled as part of the much larger British Army. Retaining relevance to our allies is something that we also must do as a small professional Army.

Our training system is world class and based on hard-won experience, but we must not take our eyes off the ball. We need to exploit the strength of our training system to ensure we can quickly shift from high-tempo operations to a contingency footing. We need to focus on the getting the simple things right to build from the bottom up and concurrently train our staff and senior commanders to drive for excellence from the top down. This transition must focus on exploiting the vast experience gained and the redevelopment of our ability to plan and

deliver training to prepare our units for the breadth of contingencies we may face. Investing in our junior officers and NCOs is crucial if we are to achieve our professional potential. The one thing I am confident of is that today's members of the NZ Army are up for the challenge; in the same way the soldiers of the highly regarded NZ Division rose to the challenge of the Western Front.

I would like to thank Andrew Macdonald, whose work and advice on the NZ Division I have drawn on heavily for this article.

For those interested in learning more about the NZ Division on the Western Front here a few suggested books to get you started:

On My Way To The Somme: New Zealanders and the bloody offensive of 1916, Andrew Macdonald, 2005

Passchendaele: the anatomy of a tragedy, Andrew Macdonald, 2013

In the Face of the Enemy: The Complete History of the Victoria Cross and New Zealand, Glyn Harper, 2007

From The Uttermost Ends of the Earth - The New Zealand Division on the Western Front 1916-18, John H. Gray, 2010

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