NZ Army Journal

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE 21st CENTURY

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About the NZ Army Journal

Intent

The intent of the NZ Army Journal is to encourage professional thought and debate within the New Zealand Army about the profession of arms.

Purpose

The New Zealand Army Journal provides a means for soldiers and officers to present their ideas and views about how the New Zealand Army prepares for and conducts operations. Articles, debates and opinions are invited and actively encouraged from all ranks, including ex-military and specialist subject areas related to the military or areas of operation.

Scope

The focus of this publication is the tactical and operational conduct of military tasks. Organisational and strategic/political matters are outside the scope of this publication. Generally speaking this publication deals with 'military art' (e.g. Capabilities, Deployable organisation, Training, TTPs/SOPs, Military equipment etc). Anything that a normal corporate entity deals with will in most cases be outside the scope of this publication (e.g. HR policies, Finance, Recruitment etc)

Philosophy

The NZ Army is full of talented, motivated and innovative people that are able to think on their feet and apply sound, pragmatic solutions to any problem they are faced with. Being able to share the experiences and insights held by our people is critical to developing our professional knowledge. Professional debate and critique is healthy and critical for ensuring the integrity and therefore the effectiveness of our army.

Disclaimer

Complaints or concerns at any aspect of this publication can be directed in the first instance to the editor via email to AWC@NZDF.mil.nz

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Editorial

Welcome to the first edition of the new NZ Army Journal. The purpose of this journal is to provide a medium through which we the officers and soldiers of the NZ Army can develop and enhance our professional military knowledge. To that end this journal is your journal. Embrace it, own it and tell us what you think by contributing to it. The NZ Soldier is apparently renowned for their initiative, innovation, and cultural empathy as well as for having strongly held opinions. My challenge to you is to now prove this. The NZ Army is your Army. Each and every single member of the NZ Army has knowledge and experience that when constructively engaged can produce results far in excess of anything we should be able to reasonably expect. There is also however a flipside to this. Learning, developing and growing also requires us to listen and give respect to other points of view or perspectives. We cannot grow if we are closed to different perspectives.

My aim as editor for the Army Journal is to make this journal accessible and relevant to all ranks within the NZ Army. In working through preparation for launching this journal I have had several people; usually older, higher ranked people, emphatically state that 'soldiers do not write'. I do not believe that. While I recognise that the more junior ranks may have less experience overall, they often also have more

relevant and detailed experience of where it really matters, on the ground on the 'frontline' of NZ Army operations.

There are of course some boundaries to this publication. The NZ Army Journal is about developing the NZ way of preparing for and conducting military operations in the 21st century. While the corporate/bureaucratic practises of the NZ Army/NZDF absolutely can have an impact on how we prepare for and conduct operations, this publication is not a means by which to discuss corporate/organisational concerns such as REM 14, the latest Health and Safety legislation or whether we should be providing uniforms to Shortland Street actors. There are plenty of other forums in which to discuss these matters. Let us focus the Army Journal on how we actually do the business as professional soldiers in the NZ Army. I also welcome contributions from our colleagues in the Royal NZ Navy and Royal NZ Air Force. As I am sure we all recognise, we cannot be masters of our profession without understanding how the other services contribute to the 'joint effect'.

This first edition includes a range of articles which loosely follow a theme of 'How can we be better?' This is headlined by Lt Col Brett Wellington's article 'Aspiring to be World Class'. While written some time ago, this article and the questions it asks are still very relevant today. We also have perspectives from three students on a recent SNCO promotion course on what they have learned and how they would do things differently. This is followed by my own article

in which I ask 'Are METLs of any benefit to the NZ Army?' SSgt Dean Rennie has then provided a rather thought provoking article about 'why we do what we do?' Finally Capt Johnny Samuela has contributed an article titled 'Te Reo Maori - Restricted to Nobody' where he offers a personal perspective on what it means to him when others use Te Reo. To me (as a sixth generation NZ pakeha), Ngati Tumatuenga is not so much about Maori per se – it is about showing respect for not only Maori culture, but for other cultures too. It is a tangible demonstration of a commitment to respecting all cultures. This underpins our ability as military professionals to work in the complex contemporary environment and I believe is one of NZ Army's key strengths.

I would like to close with a big thank you to all contributors for their articles. I look forward to others taking up the challenge and contributing to future editions of the Army Journal and contributing to the ongoing professional discourse.

Shane Atkinson
Major
Editor

Letters to the Editor

Readers are invited and encouraged to submit letters to the editor. Correspondence to the editor can be on any matter related to the content or purpose of the NZ Army Journal. Letters may be in response to a particular article or offer comment or suggestions for improvement to the Army Journal, or they can be short and concise points in and of themselves.

Letters should be short and to the point and also adhere to the submission guidelines. If a letter is in response to a particular article please provide full details of the article title, author and the edition of the NZ Army in which it appeared.

Letters will be printed, where possible, in a subsequent edition of the NZ Army Journal and can be emailed to AWC@NZDF.MIL.NZ

ASPIRING TO BE WORLD CLASS

By Lt Col Brett Wellington, RNZIR

Editors Note: *This article is an abridged version of a paper first written in 2010. While it may be dated in parts, overall it is still relevant today and has been reproduced to gain wider exposure and opinion. What do you think of the points raised by Lt Col Wellington and his review team? Do they still hold today? Have we addressed any of these points? How can we do better?*

INTRODUCTION:

'*How can we do better?*'[1]

On the 3rd of August 2010, Lt Tim O'Donnell became the first New Zealand Defence Force combat casualty in Afghanistan. This incident was a catalyst for the Land Component Commander, Brig A.D. Gawn, to form a review to examine what improvements could be made to better prepare our forces for operational service. Despite this critical incident the review was not Afghanistan specific, albeit study of that theatre was deemed pertinent to informing implications for the wider force[2]. Rather, the review team were to remain cognizant that the NZDF key determinant is the South Pacific, and identify if our current

[1] Question posited by LCC to review team.

[2] TG CRIB is the NZ Army's largest collective deployment and arguably highest risk theatre.

force generation practices are sufficient to operate in high risk environments.

This discussion paper identifies actionable areas to improve our deployed FE's operational capability, in doing so this paper will challenge the status quo and understandably provoke discussion. This is appropriate as the paper will challenge the paradigm by which Army currently seeks to be 'world class'.

OPPORTUNITIES

'How better to change something as big as an Army than by changing the way it thinks'

Gen D. Petraus

'Set a lofty goal, not a base one, set a specific goal, not a hazy one. It should be indomitable, not slack'

Chinese Proverb

COMMAND:

World Class Army. The NZ Army should determine what it can be world class at and then evolve from being good to great. Further rigor is required to define a NZ flavour reflective of our political, strategic, cultural, organisational identity, and national character. Respondents caution that this doesn't imply the development of a niche Army. Rather, it states we cannot be strong everywhere and further analysis is required to determine what we will develop world class capability in, and where we are prepared to accept risk. To

many of those interviewed the mantra 'world class army' without an accompanying definition has begun to ring hollow.

Risk. Challenges are being experienced managing risk. A call was made that commanders in various appointments are overly risk adverse; as such opportunities to develop innovative and adaptable subordinates are decreased. Frequent observation was made that FE's express dissatisfaction with an overly prescriptive HQ JFNZ. Somewhat ironically, an often made observation was that too much risk has been accepted with the tailoring of some deployed FE's. A frequent observation was that inappropriate risk had been assumed with various TG CRIB rotations; primarily due to components of the contingent not being optimised to the operating environment, force readiness and combat viability not being at an appropriate level of proficiency and effectiveness.

Campaign Planning. It was noted that the size, complexity and duration of various NZDF deployments necessitate an overarching campaign plan. However, campaign plans are not produced. Operational objectives and endstates are not defined. Accompanying measures of success are also therefore not defined nor understood. Comment was made that '*the lack of campaign plans often results in our commitments into theatres being a series of individual and unrelated deployments rather than an integrated and*

enduring operation'[3]. It is acknowledged that due to the limited duration of mandates and frequency of review by NZ GOVT it is difficult to plan an 'enduring' campaign. Nonetheless, it defies credibility to suggest NZDF does not appreciate an endstate prior to committing FE's to an operational deployment, irrespective of duration. The modern operating environment is becoming increasingly complex and our deployed FE's more commonly interoperate with a variety of NZ and multinational agencies. An overarching campaign plan was seen as essential to prosecuting operations within complex JIM environments.

Learning Organisation/Knowledge management. NZ Army must improve its knowledge domain. The management and flow of information needs to become more seamless. Knowledge capital needs to be freely accessed, shared, leveraged and applied. Systems and architecture required to exploit information require enhancement. It is encouraged that Army make greater utilisation of communities of practice[4], conducts more 'think tanks' and develops forums that encourage professional discussion. Additional mechanisms need to be developed that allow the sharing of information and reinforce learning across organisational boundaries (intra

[3] In a vacuum NZ PRT Commanders have been developing their own 'Campaign' plans. These however are not enduring and change as new contingents assume their Tour of Duty.

[4] The 2009 Shooting Concentration has been validated very positively by a multitude of interviewees.

and inter-service). Critical thinking needs to be more intensively targeted as deliberate competency development at all ranks. At all levels an 'AAR' culture needs to be inculcated that takes every opportunity to improve and learn inherent to normal battle rhythm. In addition our culture needs to formally recognise the criticality of evolving into a learning organisation. It is recommended that more focus is placed on product as opposed to process. Another impediment to learning, knowledge management and performance is siloing. Concern has been expressed that siloing occurs within Defence. As such problems within the organisation exist with work being conducted at cross purposes, duplication of effort occurring and/or the limited sharing of information/knowledge. An inefficient lesson learnt management process is but one example of the difficulty being experienced migrating information/knowledge across the Army. The effect of siloing decreases our ability to generate a high performance culture and organisation.

High Performance Culture. The NZ Army is justifiably proud of the success it has achieved on a multitude of operational commitments. Despite such success, it is debatable that the NZ Army has a high performance culture. Lessons learnt management is poor, organisationally our knowledge domain needs improvement, siloing is prevalent, risk is not accepted at various echelons of command, in addition it has been observed that a 'satisfising' attitude is common (attainment of the minimum standard as opposed to an unrelenting

determination to achieve beyond the minimum and pursue excellence). The Army would benefit from inculcating a culture of continuous improvement, or an SF philosophy of the pursuit of excellence. An example, of which many exist, relates to physical standards. Within Army these have progressed little, some suggest regressed, in the past twenty years in spite of significant advances in science, nutrition, mental peak performance models and training methods. It is difficult to imagine a high performance organisation such as the All Blacks not having made significant improvements in fitness, amongst other competencies, within a twenty year period. Coaching is another area that has been identified as poor within Army. Finally it is critical we develop individuals at all ranks that are prepared to challenge the status quo and identify improvements to existing paradigms.

INFORM:

Intelligence. A frequent observation is that intelligence is not leading operations. S2 sections need increased capability In order to understand and lead operations in complex human terrain environments. Doctrinal threat constructs need to evolve from traditional mid intensity conventional settings in order to support the prosecution of population centric operations. Enhanced software enablers are needed to support trend analysis. Intelligence is understaffed and struggles to gather, store and synthesise the substantial quantity of information that exists outside traditional intelligence channels. No genuine ability exists to fuse intelligence within our deployed FE's; TG CRIB for example

has both an exceptionally limited ISTAR capability and a very limited capability to fuse current, future plans, targets and IO. In that theatre our coalition partners are justifiably focused elsewhere and therefore the PRT has no advocate, or own force capability, for informing operations in the most dangerous part of the PRT AO. Commanders at all levels need to be trained to clearly prioritise and understand the questions they need answered. Another issue is that information is often stove piped into classified networks resulting in it being unreachable for a wider customer audience. Repositories and architecture need improvement in order to allow more ready access for customers. In addition, classification levels need review whilst the organisation needs to mature into one that is more comfortable operating within a classified environment.

Lessons Learnt Management. One of the most commonly identified concerns is that the Army has an ineffective lessons learnt management. Current lessons learnt management is not working. Observations and insights are being introduced into the system, however, further critical thinking and analysis isn't being conducted in a coherent fashion in order to discriminate lessons identified. Identified lessons aren't being disseminated in an agile manner to stakeholders that need to know. The problem is further exasperated by a lack of secure architecture. This defeats information push and sharing. Another often made complaint is that over classification disrupts the sharing of information with a broader audience. Lessons learnt management is not well

understood and a regime of education is needed. A behavioural change is required to inculcate an 'OPEVAL' mentality, one that continually reviews performance and identifies opportunities for improvement. EARLLS is validated poorly by users; complaint was made that it is considered a tool that is process as opposed to product orientated. More effort is needed to thoroughly debrief deployed contingents to ensure the transfer of experiential learning. Comment was frequent that personnel come off tour feeling their experience has not been captured and made available to wider audiences. EARLLS is not an effective mechanism for such a transaction. It is passive and compliance fed. Face to face interaction between operators and experienced lessons learnt teams is a more effective medium for the extrapolation of observation and insights. Opportunities for active collection aren't being exploited, for example; lessons learnt teams should be deployed into theatre during deployments and the FET. Review needs to be conducted of the manning of lessons learnt cells within HQ JFNZ and LTDG. Consideration should also be given to scheduling a bi-annual lessons learnt seminar within Army. In addition the establishment of a critical incident review forum would more readily support timely analysis and dissemination from such events. Lessons learnt management requires significant improvement.

Understanding Human Terrain. A current shortfall deployed FE's have is understanding complex human terrain. A lack of understanding of complex human terrain degrades the

effectiveness of our decision making. A significant factor is a lack of information superiority due to immature IO and civil affairs capabilities. NZDF FE's are resourced with unqualified IO personnel who assume such appointments by default. Our ability to integrate, track, target and measure IO effects is, at best, basic. This is further compounded through an immature civil affairs capability. NZDF has no formal capability and lacks the ability to analyse and influence human terrain through processes, resources and personnel. Such a capability is critical to achieving success in population based operations. Given an expectation to conduct ever increasing missions in a civil/military environment the current inability to understand and exploit human terrain needs to be re-dressed. Human Intelligence has been proven to be a force multiplier.

Cultural Awareness. Cultural awareness is a critical enabler within contemporary population based operations. Within NZDF an assumption is prevalent that our FE's are good at cultural awareness. However, this assumption can be challenged. A more accurate definition is we have cultural empathy, not cultural awareness. A critical validation contests that NZDF FE's do not understand in detail the nuances of cultures we interoperate amongst. It is likely we understand the 'shop front opinion, but not that of the alley'[5]. NZ national traits develop individuals who readily engage, interface and display sensitivity to other cultures.

[5] Quote Major Mikelson, S2 TG CRIB 15 and CI SMIS

However, NZDF has only a nascent cultural awareness capability; anthropology is not a skill set residing in the organisation, six month deployments don't support the development of long standing relationships and cultural understanding, assumptions made in NZ about Afghan perceptions of our capability and mandate have proven erroneous. NZDF infrequently deploys organic Human Intelligence teams and sponsored cultural education is limited. Language training and capability exists only at a rudimentary level within NZDF and is seen as a 'box ticking' exercise on PDT. It is contended that our deployed FE's have cultural empathy; however we do not have cultural awareness. A lack of cultural awareness degrades our ability to prepare our FE's for operational service and mission success.

PREPARE:

OLOC Generation. NZDF is frequently deploying FE's that are not at OLOC. This was one of the most commonly identified concerns amongst those interviewed. The risk that therefore has been accepted is validated by almost all respondents, as unacceptable[6]. There are a multitude of reasons why some FE's are not at OLOC prior to deploying. Significant quantities of personnel arrive at PDT not having attained basic

[6] Interviewees from all levels Strategic to Tactical expressed dissatisfaction. Soldiers at the Tactical level interviewed in Afghanistan felt disappointed at the levels of risk that have been accepted at their potential expense.

individual DLOC competencies. As such OLOC generation time, which is limited, is spent merely bringing individuals up to basic DLOC standards[7], totally unrelated to either achieving OLOC or the acquisition of theatre specific skills. An often repeated quote was that PDT appeared, due to the eclectic nature of contingents, to cater for the lowest common denominator. As such it doesn't develop a significant quantity of personnel above and beyond their current trained state. This was identified across all functional elements. Another concern is that mission rehearsal exercises, an example being Afghan Step, don't adequately evolve with changes that occur in theatre. Greater effort needs to be made to assist CTC maintain situational awareness of theatres NZDF contingents are deployed within. Personnel need to be posted to CTC direct from operational deployments. TOD's should occur to support PDT's and individuals recently returned from deployment should be made available as a priority to support mission rehearsal exercises. CTC should be provided opportunities to regularly deploy into theatres and conduct validation and measures of effectiveness of the training it delivers[8]. OLOC generation is often not theatre specific. The deploying contingent is not training as it shall fight. An example relates to TG CRIB and

[7] Despite the majority of individuals having been warned out months in advance for for operational service.

[8] Reports from contingents posted on EARLLS are deemed a mechanism of limited comparative value vis a vis CTC or lessons learnt teams visiting theatre.

the quantity of equipment, platforms, communications suites, weapons and other items that it assumes immediately upon arrival in theatre, but has had no prior training on before deploying. TG CRIB FE's are expected to assume operational effectiveness upon arrival into theatre with, despite never having trained against, the HMMWV vehicle, Blue Force Tracker, Command Post of the Future, GMG AGL, US ECM variant, AT-4, SATCOMMs, Thermite Grenade, ACOG weapon sight, 117 radio. In addition some commanders identify they aren't given a satisfactory understanding of the capabilities of the LEWT and Field Intelligence Teams. Commanders and soldiers have identified being overwhelmed with in-theatre training burden, concurrent with having to conduct operations in a high risk environment[9]. This situation is not indicative of a world class army and assumes significant risk. If the 3rd August contact had occurred earlier in the deployment (when personnel had not acquired some familiarity with new equipments) the results could potentially have been much worse. If operations are the organisations main effort it begs the questions why

[9] This does not simply pertain to tactical risk. Currently designated drivers within platoons (who by trade are rifleman not drivers) are required to become immediately familiar in theatre with the HMMWV, a left hand vehicle that has a wide wheelbase. The drivers have to operate the vehicle on exceptionally poor and narrow roads that have significant hazards, despite the fact that they have no prior experience with the HMMWV and only limited driving experience.

in-theatre equipment is not available to train with during OLOC generation.

DLOC Genearation/METLS. Observations have been made that the application of METLS needs harmonisation. Coalition settings are increasingly reliant on accredited standards. The METLS process enables accreditation. However the application of this process is not yet coherent within Army. Different philosophical perspectives exist with respect to the utility of the METLS process. At some levels guidance isn't produced and often that guidance is not synchronised with the DBS cycle. Units identify they are asked to address too broad a range of tasks, as such it appears the organisation is not able to adequately discriminate where it will accept risk. In addition units identify that conditions and standards have not been developed at the tactical level for tasks. As such units are determining conditions and standards which are then self validated. Inherent to the need to validate value for money it is conceivable that Army will have to more rigorously adhere to a process that quantifiably demonstrates measures of effectiveness. METLS, in lieu of an alternative being adopted, is the most appropriate process Army possesses. Additional education on the process is required. Currently the interpretation and application of the process meets with significant variance throughout the Army. In addition an electronic system should be developed and introduced that would support tracking and validation of METLS progress and achievement. An example is MONIKER as employed by RNZN.

Individual and Small Unit Training. Differences of opinion exist with respect to the current blend of individual and collective training. Some have identified the status quo as satisfactory. Others that additional collective training needs to occur at the expense of individual training. Conversely further opinion is more individual training should be conducted. This review supports the later contention that the basic building blocks are not presently being sufficiently developed. This is demonstrated through personnel arriving at PDT not having qualified on fundamental DLOC individual competencies, by issues identified on AAR's and EARLLS reports, and by general concern that basic individual and small team TTP's are not being executed to a satisfactory standard. Success in the contemporary and future land operating environment is, and will be increasingly reliant, upon the deployment of highly skilled individuals and small units[10] . Every soldier irrespective of trade is first and foremost a combatant (acknowledging that different trained states will exist across functional groups). The realities of the contemporary environment demand, a wider range of skill sets of our personnel[11] . Additional skill sets that were traditionally the domain of SF need to be acquired by the wider army; individual initiative, cultural sensitivity, linguistic

[10] For purposes of this paper small units are defined as primarily Sect and Platoon strength. Company strength could be considered for higher intensity conventional settings.

[11] Cultural awareness, strategic 'privates', ability to apply non kinetic and kinetic effects. A humanitarian, peacemaker and warfighter.

competence, mastery of sophisticated weapons and sensors. Rapid technological advances are increasing the individual training burden and individuals have to become more competent with an increasing array of equipment, weapons, optic and communication suites, and C2 architecture. Adversaries will continue to enhance their capability and lethality, requiring a continually increased trained state of our personnel. Any individual has the ability to create significantly adverse strategic effects through inappropriate action. All personnel have to possess an increased appreciation of strategic context. The balance between developing competence throughout the spectrum of individual and collective capability will become more challenged into the future. Risk will have to be accepted somewhere. Merely attempting to achieve a high degree of competence across the whole gambit will result in widespread mediocrity. More focused effort is needed on the development of highly trained basic building blocks; individuals and small units. Shooting is but one example of where a poor standard is currently being maintained across Army. Units tend to have a '5 day' shooting mentality (i.e. shooting once a year over a week in order to pass a compliance activity the AWQ). The AWQ has erroneously been identified as operational standard, it isn't – it's the equivalent of a minimum 'RFL G2' standard. Comment from SME's of the shooting community and SF community is that the wider Army needs to significantly increase the frequency of shooting that is conducted. Incident reports and AAR from operational theatres support such observations. The

individual shooting benchmark needs to be significantly enhanced in order to set conditions for success in close combat, force protection, assisting realise the adage 'every soldier a warfighter' and ensuring our personnel have the ability to apply discriminating fire within heavily constrained population based operations.

Highly trained individuals and small teams are a significant enabler for collective success[12]. PAR's, AAR's and incident reports on EARLLS identify issues with the individual trained state of our personnel. The NZDF ordinarily deploys contingents of Platoon or Company strength. Mission success in such environments is **critically dependant** upon deploying highly capable individuals and small units[13]. It is critical to future mission success that individuals and small teams are trained to higher standards then currently being attained. It has been suggested that the Army evolve into a

[12] This is requisite on combined and joint effects being integrated at a lower level, including the enablers that support such a construct.

[13] Interestingly, even in the high intensity conflict of World War II, a guiding principle within the large German Army was the creation of *cohesive platoons and companies,* for it was deemed at that level battles are won or lost (*Leadership: The Warriors Art, Christopher Kolenda, Ed, Army War College 2001*). Robert Cone (*Leadership: The Warriors Art)* argues that the violence, aggressiveness and lethality generated in platoons can lead to success in even the weakest Sqn/Bn plan. In highly decentralised contemporary operations a strong unit plan with weak small units and individuals is unlikely to be successful. Conversely adequate Bn plans with strong individual and small teams have a much greater chance of success.

'conventional elite' force. Achieving that will require significantly more focus on developing highly capable individuals and small units.

Resilience Training, Agility and Innovation. It is widely accepted that resilience, agility and innovation are key enabling attributes in complex operations. However, such attributes haven't acquired importance overnight. Some of those interviewed suggested that these traits are inherent to NZ national characteristics and by extension to our soldiers. Despite such confidence, this review and a number of personnel interviewed, recommend that real attention, not merely background noise, needs to be directed at the development of these competencies. It could be argued that potentially the NZ Army demonstrates resilience, agility and innovation 'instead of' rather then 'because of'. The aforementioned 'national characteristic' attitude implies complacency. An often said colloquialism that our soldiers perform as well as, if not better than contemporaries, doesn't appreciate that our Army has habitually participated in low intensity SASO, conversely our ABCA partners are prosecuting high risk combat operations. The resilience these partners have to develop inherent to partaking in persistent combat operations is something we are not experiencing. . The development of such attributes is achieved as a consequence as opposed to a deliberately targeted competency enhancement. Courses can be reoriented to directly target the development of such competencies, whether as stand alone courses or activity within existing courses. The recently

trialled Ranger Course is an example of a course that has been initially validated as very successfully targeting and enhancing resilience. Comment has been made that from induction onwards a more concerted approach needs to be made to enhance the development of mental and physical robustness in our personnel. In addition an environment needs to be cultivated in which individuals more actively partake in implementing new and better ways to achieve objectives. Prudent risk taking is to be encouraged in order to support personnel trying alternate paths, testing ideas to the point of failure and learning from experience. The human mind is assessed as the key to agility and will have to be developed by training our personnel for demanding complex operations[14]. Suggestion has been made that the Army consider evolving to a 'conventional elite' whereby our benchmarks are increased across a multitude of competencies and capabilities. Realising such a construct would include more targeted enhancement of resilience, agility and innovation in all personnel.

Warfighting Culture. The NZ Army is a warfighting organisation. Calls have been made that the Army needs to enhance its warfighting culture. What hasn't accompanied such calls is definition of a warfighting culture, why it is needed, where gaps currently exist and what has too be done to address identified deficiencies. The modern Army has to be appropriately trained to conduct both SASO and Combat

[14] FLOC, para 2.4

Operations. More critically it must posses the agility to rapidly transition between kinetic and non-kinetic activity. Given the modern battlefield is no longer linear in nature the divide between combatants and non-combatants has eroded. Non combat personnel can't have an over reliance on others to provide their immediate force protection. All are soldiers/warfighters first and foremost and tradespeople/technicians secondly. If warfighting is a mix of SASO and Combat Operations where do we most likely experience gaps? The NZ Army, whilst acknowledging continual improvement is required, has developed ample experience in SASO operations since East Timor (*our soldiers are all too well versed in the diplomat/policeman/peacekeeper aspects of contemporary operations).* Conversely it has limited experience in Combat Operations over the same period. An ability to prosecute close combat remains an enduring feature of conflict. Indeed its importance continues to increase as adversaries elect to operate in complex environments to degrade technologically advanced armies the ability to stand off and defeat them. Moreover adversaries operate increasingly amongst the population. Our ability to influence and protect the population will become increasingly reliant on the ability to master close combat (irrespective of participation in SASO or Combat Operations). Being able to execute close combat is the critical enabler that is common to prosecuting SASO and Combat Operations and is seen as a deficiency in our warfighting culture and capability. We don't however just need a warfighting culture. What we most need is a culture

and capability that will enable our deployed FE's to **excel at close combat;** whether armed/unarmed/lethal/less lethal, in any complex environment and irrespective of trade/corps. The ability to execute successful close combat is reliant on unique skill sets and attitudes. A significant number of observations suggest that the Army has gaps with respect to mentality, attitude, capability and skills that will be required to prosecute successful close combat. Our current training is not thorough enough in preparing individuals psychologically for close combat[15] , our individual skill sets need to evolve to a higher standard[16], it is assessed that there is only superficial buy in to the mantra 'every soldier a warfighter'.

PROTECT:

Protected Mobility. Protected mobility is a fundamental requirement to prosecuting operations in modern threat environments. LAV III was purchased as the solution for NZ Army protected mobility.

Currently across the wider Army it is not well understood what precludes the deployment of LAV III. The

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[15] Books 'On Combat' and 'On Killing' talk in detail to conditioning individuals to defeat the natural human aversion to killing. In addition they describe the unique stress resultant to having taken human life and how soldiers can be conditioned to their moral right to kill. A significant number of issues identified in these books are not addressed within our training regime.

[16] Shooting has previously been addressed. In addition amongst other competencies is included less lethal capability, CQB, mental and physical robustness.

issue is not necessarily whether LAV III should be deployed to Afghanistan[17]. *Rather the issue is an attempt to understand the decision threshold for LAV deployment.* Strategic assessment identifies that it is anticipated the future threat environment will be more of the same; low intensity human centric operations. Trends also identify that IED's will migrate as a global phenomenon. They will increase as a threat in our key determinant the South Pacific. Protected mobility will continue to be needed irrespective of the theatres we deploy to. If we are reluctant to deploy LAV we will regardless need protected mobility solutions in theatres. We maintain a high trained state with respect to LAV and have spent inordinate effort developing the ability to sustain the vehicle. We expend effort and expense maintaining CAV Coy capability at DLOC. If the decision threshold is very high to deploy CAV then are we managing resources and risk well? Money and effort could be re-orientated to options and capabilities that are more readily deployed, or that enable our deployed FE's. More robust debate is required about our CAV capability and future intentions for its employment.

[17] Albeit the review team assess the capability should be inherent to the NZ PRT. Arguments that an 'armoured vehicle' has no place in a PRT ring hollow. One of the authors deployed with PRTs that had MBTs in support during operations in MOSUL, IRAQ. The review team believes our foremost responsibility is to our own troops, if that comes at a cost to perception with the local populace then we have to get smarter with IO engagement. LAV does not preclude either.

This review concludes that organic protected mobility solutions are required for all but the lowest risk deployments. That solution currently is NZLAV.

OPERATE:

Deployed FE Orbats. Concern was expressed that unnecessary compromise had been taken with legacy TG CRIB rotations. The 'joint' flavour of past contingents has been critiqued as occurring at the expense of the proficiency and viability of the deployed FE. This review has discussed the requirements of a 'warfighting culture' and clearly identified the need for highly trained individuals in the contemporary environment. *Placing other service personnel in tactical land command appointments is adjudged a compromise of our warfighting culture and not reflective of a performance based organisation.* It is difficult to imagine elite organisations allowing such compromise (again, irrespective of assessed threat).

Additional orbat concerns relate to a perceived over reliance and expectation of our coalition partners. We run the risk of being over reliant, not developing own force capability, and being perceived as abusing goodwill. It is apparent that some deployments have very limited redundancy built into some functional areas. This vulnerability has the potential to be dangerously exposed by drawing down FE numbers and capabilities strictly in accordance with timelines.

Other issues related to the cohesiveness of deployed FE's. It was a relatively common opinion that more focus needs to be made on deploying cohesive FE's. Compromise appears to have been previously accepted through deploying composite organisations when the opportunity has existed to deploy standing platoons or sub units (with attachments). Highly integrated and cohesive sub units and platoons are proven force multipliers. It is encouraging that of late the deployment of cohesive entities has been common. Concern was expressed however that this remain standard practice**.**

Divide between Conventional and SF. In facing increasingly complex challenges the traditional divide between conventional forces and Special Forces is changing[18]. Conventional forces are increasingly acquiring skills and capabilities that used to be seen as SF only. Every soldier in contemporary conflict requires capabilities such as individual initiative, resilience, adaptability, cultural sensitivity, linguistic competence, mastery of sophisticated weapons and sensors and a capacity for small group operations[19]. Calls have been made that the conventional army needs to become more SF like. This review postures that such a call is pertinent and that it is part philosophical, part technical. As identified previously in this paper it is recommended that the conventional force develop a culture that has an SF philosophy of the pursuit of excellence, high performance

[18]NZ ARMY FLOC 2.12
[19]FLOC 1.16d

and critical self validation to continuously improve. In addition we need to develop a culture of self disciplined personnel who strive for continuous improvement. Aligned with becoming 'more SF' it has also been identified that the wider army needs to focus more attention on developing highly trained individuals and small units. Such an approach adheres to an SF philosophy of mastering the fundamentals and producing exceptional basic building blocks, critical to mission success in decentralised modern human centric operations. Not exhaustive, but inclusive of some previously identified areas for technical improvement , is enhanced close combat skills, mastery of weapons and shooting, individual initiative, resilience, adaptability, competence in an increasing array of weapons, sensors and C2 architecture. Aside from individual technical enhancement it is also recommended that additional collective capabilities are introduced to the conventional army. The NZDF Key Determinant is the South Pacific. To enhance our viability to prosecute future operations in the region it is recommended that improvement is made to both the vertical and horizontal insertion capabilities of our manoeuvre units. The South Pacific is a significant maritime environment that demands capabilities to operate in a littoral environment. Consideration should be given to enhancing our conventional force unit's ability to better integrate with NZDF assets that support this. This includes interoperability with RNZN on frigates and insertion techniques for point of entry capability utilising a variety of craft. Additional rotary wing insertion capability within manoeuvre units should be developed

utilising fast roping and rappelling. Opportunities should be sought to increase our infantry battalion's general support to Special Operations and interoperability with SF. More effort also needs to be made to evolve our night fighting capability. Urban capabilities require improvement including amongst others the conduct of explosive methods of entry. Infantry elements should become trained in close protection and a host of other skill sets traditionally the domain of SF. Finally as a culmination of closing the conventional/SF divide it is recommended that our manoeuvre units, certainly light battalions, evolve philosophically and capability wise to a 'conventional elite'. Whatever construct this takes would evolve based on a NZ flavour reflective of our political, strategic, cultural, organisational identity, and national character. However, broad construct examples include the US Rangers, UK Marine Commandos and should incorporate traits and competencies from a variety of credible tier two organisations. Such a move would be the catalyst for raising our benchmark standards throughout Army. It would also include more routine engagement throughout allied armies and the SO community.

Tactical Vehicle Manoeuvre. It is apparent that administrative movement is currently the only ubiquitous ALL CORPS vehicle patrolling skill. In the contemporary environment all functional groups conduct tactical vehicle manoeuvre. Vehicle movement outside of a FOB in a theatre of operations is tactical, not administrative. However, tactical vehicle manoeuvre is not taught as an all corps skill,

unlike all corps dismounted patrol techniques. Comment was made, thankfully by only a limited number of personnel, that such skills aren't applicable in Afghanistan because the routes are highly restricted. Indeed because the routes are limited is even more reason to be taught TTP's that enhance the tactical security of a patrol. In addition there is a capability deficiency with respect to tactical night driving. This deficiency degrades tactical flexibility. It reduces our ability to exploit one clear advantage we have over adversaries (night fighting advantage). It also degrades our ability to establish irregular patterns and maintain the initiative over adversaries. It is recommended that tactical vehicle manoeuvre, by day and night, is introduced as an all corps competency. Peacetime compliance needs to evolve in order to enable tactical night patrolling. Additional optics and equipment must be procured that will enable the development and execution of this fundamental competency. This skill should be maintained inherent to DLOC and needs to be enhanced as a theatre specific competency during PDT. In addition vehicles commanders need to be taught crew commander responsibilities and skills to manage the driver, gunner and vehicle drills. Given the increased all corps vehicle patrolling it is critical that vehicle husbandry and serviceability training is conducted more thoroughly across all functional areas.

SUSTAIN:

Post Deployment Closure. Suggestions have been made that end of deployment closure needs review. Concerns have

been made that contingents are not being given an adequate opportunity to effect closure as a collective group. TG CRIB contingents stage back through Dubai for a three day FET. The DUBAI FET process is acknowledged as well synchronised and executed. However an opportunity for complete contingents to have closure doesn't exist. Having been through an intense six month tour the contingent leaves theatre in separate flights which immediately disperse upon arrival in NZ. If a contingent can't FET together then options should be considered that enable post tour closure in NZ. Another issue is personnel depart their tour expressing frustration that their experience hasn't been exploited nor their 'story' told. More targeted opportunities should be exploited to extrapolate experiential learning from contingents. Lessons learnt teams can conduct reviews during the FET process or even centralise the contingent back in NZ for final reviews, lessons learnt and deployment closure.

CONCLUSION

The review emanated around a central tenant 'How can we do better'. A methodology was employed that captured the professional judgement of a cross section of NZ Army personnel. An unhesitatingly qualified 'yes' was the consensus to a question 'can we do better'. Such a judgement is not a criticism of NZ Army accomplishment. NZ Army personnel feel justifiably proud of our operational

success in a variety of theatres. Rather it is a validation that we are not performing to our potential. Our preparedness to operate in high risk environments is degraded through not realising our potential. In addition the aspirational goal of being world class isn't realised without a transition from being good to great.

The paper has populated an array of targetable themes to assist realise our potential. It has recommended that further determination is required to define a NZ 'world class' flavour reflection of our political, strategic, cultural and organisational identity and national character. Determination of our 'world class' construct and further discrimination of where we will accept risk and target improvement will assist our transition from being good to great. The paper is intended to assist inform future force development. It is also intended to promote discussion and decision making in order to continue evolving our benchmarks and realising the significant potential the NZ Army does have. This paper suggests evolution to a 'conventional elite'. Irrespective of such a construct, the critical requirement is that evolution is required in order to achieve mission success within increasingly complex operations.

Articles from the SNCO promotion Course

Editors Note: *The following three articles were submitted from students on a recent SNCO promotion course conducted at Army Command School in Waiouru.*

What will you go back and do better?

BDR Barbara KONZETT, RNZA, 16 Fd Regt

The title, one of the 3 questions LTCOL Lee (Commandant ACS) asked us on our first day here nearly seven weeks ago.

What will I go back and do better I asked myself? Me? Do better? I can't do any better, and if I can I'm already doing it. I just spent two weeks climbing high stuff and talking about feelings, I can do anything, yes, and this is the arrogance that is apparent in my HOGAN report.

However, as it turns out, and my 17 new friends and one old friend from my course cohort can agree, we have been on a journey the last nine weeks. I speak for myself when I say during the period of this course I have had many light bulb moments, by light bulb moments I mean realisation that there is a lot I can be doing better.

For a start, I need to work on building a better command relationship to show a united front for my soldiers. I also need to better my written correspondence so I can give

adequate guidance to my subordinates. I also need to accept advice and improvements given to me by my superiors. I will stop jumping on the defensive and ignoring this advice, instead I will apply it as it was meant to be applied – into making me a better soldier.

One big realisation for myself during this course, although it has been evident for a while that I am on track to being the first female SNCO of 16th Fd Regt, I need to do better, I need to do the best I can at everything I do to give faith to my superiors and subordinates that I am competent and deserve that title.

There is a saying I heard for the first time on this course and it immediately imbedded itself in my head and I know a number of fellow course members as well, and I will continue to take this saying along with me for my career. That saying, spoken by Australian Chief of Army, LTGEN David Morrison, goes, "The standard you walk past is the standard you accept". I can, and I will apply this to my life from here on in as it aligns with what I believe and where I want to go.

I want to be one day sitting where you are [audience of the Graduation Ceremony] listening to my soldiers talking about their light bulb moments and how they realise the correct applications of their superiors, and where they want to take their careers from here on in. That would mean a lot to me.

But, all this is all good to say, talk is cheap, and the instructors have given us all the tools we need to assist us in

the progression of our careers, all we need to do is pick up the ball and start running, and I'm sure my 18 friends are the same, but I speak for myself when I say, I am chomping at the bit to get back to the Battery and start on the beginning of the rest of my career. So as a whole, what will I go back and do better? Everything.

Ubique.

What will I do differently in my unit?

CPL Nathan MARSH, RNZAC, QAMR

During my time on the senior non commissioned offices course I have learnt a lot about myself, not only in my work life but also in my personal life as well.

I have learnt that there are many ways to influence others in a more positive way which enables a person to have a direct impact on what and how we do things in the workplace, whether this is in the garrison environment or on the battlefield.

Now that I have a clearer understanding of myself through conducting the Hogan's report I now see how others see and perceive me. So once I get back to the unit I can put into practice the tools I have learnt over the last nine weeks. This will help get the best out of my soldiers and also of myself.

I will be able to have a better understanding of my soldiers through the correct interviewing techniques, I hope to be able to identify when concerns are present but not expressed, I can now provide my soldiers with an informed and accurate course of action for their needs.

Too often we think an activity has been finished on the objective and often miss the just as important factors that precede it, I want to instil a mind-set of completing tasks to an end state, to practice the small but important jobs to ensure that my soldiers when faced with the operational

reality have the skill sets and mind-set to accomplish the mission in its entirety.

Through influencing my subordinates and supporting my command I hope to be able to play my small part in shaping QAMR into it's next 150 years of history. I am proud to be apart of a Regiment with such a long and proud history and I wish to carry this on by passing my knowledge and experience to those in my command.

I would like to finish with a quote, by Theodore Roosevelt, that I find appropriate to our position as senior leaders in our sub units, "In any moment of decision, the best thing you can do is the right thing, the next best is the wrong thing, and the worst thing is to do nothing".

This quote inspires me always to be proactive; my thought behind it is that by doing the right thing I can build off my success, or the wrong thing where I have the opportunity to learn from my mistakes. Either way I'm learning. To do nothing achieves exactly that….nothing.

To my fellow course members I thank you for being you. To the instructors your experience that you have shared has given me tools to take back with me.

To all Ake Ake Kia Kaha.

What have I learnt?

CPL Bryce WRIGHT, RNZAC, QAMR

The SNCO course covers a very broad content and I approached the course expecting to expand my existing skill sets and develop my leadership style.

Depending on people's individual backgrounds or previous experience determined how much of the course content was new, or was confirming and enhancing what they have already been doing at their unit's, as most of the students are already filling the role's of SNCO's.

The main point that stands out to me came from the ELDA phase where using the Hogan's reports and blunt peer reviews we analysed our individual personality traits. For most of us this either confirmed or slightly expanded on what we all ready knew about ourselves.

What I wasn't aware off was how these traits can be perceived by others especially your subordinates and the effects they can have on your leadership.

This has definitely given me some points to improve on in order to become a more effective and professional leader.

There were many lessons that re-hashed topic's that we hadn't touched since early in our career's, I found the visit to the marae was a good opportunity to revise our military culture and protocols as I hadn't been back there since my

basic training. This was also the first time I've spoken on a marae and giving a Pepeha and Mihi in Maori was quite challenging.

There were several topic's where new techniques were identified that will improve our performance and professionalism such as coming up with interview plan's rather than just grabbing a notebook and pen and making the rest up on the day as many people have done in the past.

The course also provided for most of us our first exposure to TEWTing and we gained some valuable tip's and techniques that we can continue to developed during the rest of our careers.

Over the duration of the course I have become aware that you can't assume that people will be fully competent with all arm skills, as some units currently don't have the time or manpower to conduct enough all arms training to be fully proficient at it.

This is something we all need to be aware of, and can all look to improve back at our units.

Overall the course has provided me with a great opportunity to meet and network with a diverse group of soldier's from a wide range of Corps on top of that it has taught me a few new skills, enhanced some skill's that I already had and made me aware of a few things that I wasn't doing correctly or as well as I could have been.

Are METLs of any benefit to the NZ Army?

By Maj Shane Atkinson, RNZSigs

The NZ Army first adopted Mission Essential Task Lists (METLs) from the US Army in 1999. It was intended that METLs would provide a means by which NZ Army training could be logically and comprehensively linked to outputs thereby providing a means to more clearly justify the reasons for activities occurring. Furthermore METLs were anticipated to provide a common doctrinal structure for NZ Army collective tactical tasks and thereby provide us with a consistent and widely understood list of tactical tasks that Army could be called upon to undertake.

Unfortunately METLs have struggled to provide any tangible benefit for either the trained state of the NZ Army or for the ability to track or link resourcing, activity and outputs. Many people cite the lack of development of conditions and standards for each tactical task as the reason for METLs failing to work properly. Others recognise the inherent linkage of METs to Doctrine and realise that it is a contradiction to use US METs while we predominantly use Australian Doctrine. It seems to me that the problem is more fundamental than either of these. Simply put we do not understand METs and consequently have misapplied them.

Whether METs and METLs have been poorly implemented within the NZ Army because they were poorly understood or if the poor understanding is a result of a poor

implementation is difficult to tell. I suspect it is a combination of both. Of greater relevance is how do we rectify this? Will undertaking staff effort to establish METLs for our deployable Task Groups (TG) solve this? Or will writing conditions and standards for the tasks established for our TG METLs solve this? We must first understand METs and METLs before we can answer these questions. It is my view that if we did fully understand METs that we would realise that they do not suit the NZ Army and we would look elsewhere for ways to achieve what we expect METs to achieve for the NZ Army.

A Mission Essential Task is defined as "*a collective task in which an organisation must be proficient to accomplish an appropriate portion of its wartime mission(s).*" Simple, got it, let's have some of that then. A Mission Essential Task List is defined as "*a compilation of collective mission essential tasks an organisation must perform successfully to accomplish its wartime mission(s)*." What could be simpler? Cut and paste that from the US FM 7-15 and we are good to go!

While that may be a little flippant, I do not think it is actually that far removed from our approach to implementing METs within the NZ Army in 1999. We saw that the US Army had a good idea and decided we would adopt it for the NZ Army. We decided we would create a NZ Army Universal Task List (AUTL) based on the US AUTL (but of course deleting all those tasks that included tactical nuclear weapons etc) and

we would use METs to justify our training programme when we did our annual DBS bids (and we all know how that goes!)

The NZ Army could now justify its training. If a unit exercise had to be cancelled we could instantly demonstrate its impact on trained state by showing all the METs we had not trained on and therefore achieved. This would of course support our justification to run substitute training. But of course this didn't quite work did it. In fact we often found that the same METs were on multiple exercises throughout the training year and through a lack of conditions of standards that it was difficult to differentiate between the MET '*Occupy and establish a battle or defensive position*' when we were training in Tekapo against a conventional near peer opponent versus the same MET when training on the West Coast of the South Island against an insurgent force. But who had the time to write all these conditions and standards?

So began the development of a 'METLs is a box ticking exercise' culture. Come forward in time 15 years and we have the situation where a TG Exercise plans to achieve 67 *Mission Essential* Tasks. It may be just me, but does this not cause alarm bells to ring? These METs are not directed (although it is a key exercise aim to achieve them), but I have no doubt that this exercise will achieve each and every single of these METs. How this process contributes to the trained state of the NZ Army is beyond me. It provides neither mission focus nor task focus. It most certainly does not assist any form of TG

evaluation and it does not provide any assurance that money is being well spent.

So what is going on here? Why do we find it so difficult to use METs effectively? Could it be that METs are in fact of very limited use to the NZ Army? There are four problems I see with METs being used by the NZ Army. These four problems are inter-related in that they are all fundamentally a product of our size as an army.

The first problem is a lack of focus. A METL process is intended by its very nature to focus training on mission essential tasks. The NZ Army is a small army yet we are also an Army that is expected to be ready for a wide range of tasks throughout the world and across the spectrum of operations. We therefore have difficulty focussing on a small number of METs with specific conditions and standards. We are caught on the horns of a dilemma – if we are too specific we are very likely to be caught out by an unexpected task under unexpected conditions and standards. On the other hand if we are too broad we lose our focus. Larger armies can afford to have dedicated units to particular contingencies. Other nations may also choose to focus their army on specific limited tasks. Both actions make the generation of a METL a much more manageable and useful activity. For the NZ Army however I would argue that this makes METs and METLs unwieldy and of limited utility. This is especially true when combined with problem two.

The second problem with METLs is that a METLs process does not complement how we generate our deployable forces. If we recall the definition of a MET we will recall that a MET is a task that a unit must be proficient in to achieve its *wartime mission.* Our garrison units are not our deployable units and do not have wartime missions. Therefore they cannot have a relevant METL, a list of tactical tasks they must be able to accomplish in order to achieve their wartime mission. What NZ Army garrison units have are missions to generate capability bricks. Figure 1 below represents how the NZ Army generates deployable elements.

Figure 1.



By definition METs are single service tactical tasks. Joint Tactical Tasks are the purview of Joint Mission Essential Tasks (JMETs). METs are therefore only relevant in a NZ Army context to 1 Bde collective training exercises. The only NZ Army units that should have a METL is the Light Task Group (LTG) and the Combined Arms Task Group (CATG).

The third problem with METs is our understanding of task definition and how it relates to our tactical organisations. Part of this problem relates to the fact that our AUTL is the US AUTL. The NZ Army AUTL is now officially the FM 7-15 the US AUTL. As such all METs available for units are US Doctrinal tasks. That is not a problem per se, but when you combine it with our typical 'jack of all trades' 'can do' attitudes we are perhaps a little over zealous when it comes to selecting METs. As an example let's take Army Task (ART) 6.1.9 *Conduct Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar Defence*. Apparently this is a task that the NZ Army can do – we can "plan and coordinate to protect operational forces, forward operating bases, and aerial ports and seaports of debarkation from rocket, artillery and mortar (RAM) attack by direct defence and by destroying the enemy's RAM capability". This ART is not achieved by digging a shellscrape! Remembering that a METL is a short list of mission essential tasks that focusses a tactical unit on the tasks it MUST achieve in order to achieve its mission (The US Army recommends no more than 5 METs on a units METL), this begs the question. What deployable tactical unit MUST conduct Rocket, Artillery and Mortar Defence in order

to achieve its mission? This problem may not exist to such a degree if it weren't for the forth and final problem.

The forth problem is that METLs are not directed by superior commanders in the NZ Army. In the US Army METLs are used for all tactical units from coy to corps level in the US Army and METLs are directed by immediate superiors in all instances. In the NZ Army unit commanders select their own METs and create a METL that is usually 15-20 METs long. The reason for this is that commanders are selecting METs to justify a budget to support a training programme to generate capability bricks of between det/sect and coy size. This leads directly back to problem one, a lack of focus, the very reason METs are supposed to exist.

How can we rectify this situation? There are really only two options here. We can invest resources into re-introducing and maintaining METs and METLs within the NZ Army or we find an alternative. We will briefly look at these two options.

Re-implementing METs and METLs is a cultural change problem. It requires an extensive education programme explaining how the NZ Army will use METs and METLs, what the purpose of METs and METLs are and providing guidelines on what are the boundaries to the problem. Using the US AUTL is fine as long as it is clear what the NZ Army is and what its capabilities are.

This is an area where we seem to struggle. We were light infantry, then we were mounted infantry, then we were light infantry again with cavalry and we have thought about being tier 2 Special Operations Forces or enhanced infantry. Personally I am not sure that we need to be definitely one thing or another but to effectively use METs and METLs we probably do need to definitely be something. The NZ Army soldier has always been adaptable and we cannot escape the necessity of being flexible in exactly what we deploy and for what purposes as we are a small expeditionary army that must be able to operate across the entire spectrum of operations. It is for this reason that I suspect actually locking down METLs to make them useful for the NZ Army is doomed to never work.

This leaves us looking at alternatives. What are the alternatives? While I am sure there are probably other alternatives I will suggest just one. Whether this is a viable alternative would require further investigation. An alternative to METs could be what I will term Mission Essential Competencies (MECs). A MEC would seek to articulate those competencies necessary for a capability brick or tactical unit to achieve its mission regardless of specific task and regardless of conditions and standards (ie regardless of environmental and threat conditions, level of war etc). Figure 2 below provides a list of possible MECs against the NZ Army Land Operating Functions (LOFs). A TG HQ could therefore have MECs of 'to be able to plan', 'to be able to communicate orders', 'to be able to adapt to a changed situation', and 'to

be able to understand the environment' (both weather and terrain, human and enemy environments) etc.

Figure 2.

MISSION ESSENTIAL COMPETENCIES

LAND OPERATING FUNCTIONS	MISSION ESSENTIAL COMPETENCIES
Command and Control	Able to Plan Able to communicate orders Able to adapt to a changed situation Able to integrate with JIM C2 capabilities
Information and Intelligence	Able to understand the environment Able to manage information Able to integrate with JIM I2 capabilities
Movement, Manoeuvre, Mobility	Able to tactically manoeuvre (incl fire & mnvre) Able to defend a location Able to tactically operate with JIM elements
Offensive Support	Able to target Able to deliver lethal fires Able to integrate with JIM Offensive Support capabilities
Influence Activity	Able to identify and understand groups present Able to influence groups Able to integrate with JIM Influence capabilities
CIMIC	Able to identify and understand non-mil elements present Able to coordinate with non-mil elements Able to support non-mil elements
Protection	Able to identify and understand threats to force elements Able to protect force elements Able to integrate with JIM force protection capabilities
Sustainment	Able to identify and understand FE sustainment requirements Able to sustain force elements Able to integrate with JIM sustainment capabilities

The strawman proposed above is a tentative first stab but I think you get the idea. MECs should focus our training on getting better at what functions we do in the battlespace rather than the potential tactical tasks which can be myriad. This means that a change in focus to different tactical tasks does not change our focus (or undermine) our force generation model. I am not proposing we ditch the FM 7-15. We will continue to need to develop our individuals

understanding of what specific tactical tasks are and how they are conducted. But what it will do remove the fantasy that we can or will routinely train a wide range of tactical tasks in a training cycle when the reality is that we are neither big enough or have the capabilities to undertake by ourselves many of these tasks. In true kiwi style we will adapt to the operational environment and leverage coalition assets to the maximum possible when they are available.

Reasons why we do what we do

SSgt Dean M Rennie, NZGM

New Zealand Defence Explosive Ordnance School.

I was asked to contribute to the Army Journal an article pertaining to 'the reason why we do the things we do' (or words to that effect).

So what was my thought process when I looked at the statement 'Why do we do the things that we do?' Well I thought it best to use something that we should all know well, that being the Annual Weapons Qualification (AWQ) shoot.

I wondered 'When we participate in an AWQ, what does that actually show us about some of the things that we do in the military?', and 'why do we do an AWQ above and beyond the fact that it is the current requirement for weapon handling testing and practising the application and employment of the marksmanship principles?'

When we look at the AWQ, we should also look at the statistics of the results we get from across the board and then from that determine or theorise or deduce what those results and statistics can possibly mean.

Okay, what serials are usually high scoring serials for our soldiers at the 300metres?.... as best I can recall, the 300 metre deliberate/application serials tends to produce a better result for an average shooter (well at least in my case)……

those serials being the prolonged static exposures when we are shooting from a prone or standing supported or prone unsupported position. These are also the serials when we are in a good supportive firing position (as we employ during our zero). From these positions we can shoot accurately and consistently, because the current sighting system we have on the individual weapon, when employed in conjunction with a good stable position when applying the marksmanship principles, can allow even an average shooter (like myself) to get rounds on the screen and target easily at a range of 300 metres.

So what else do we shoot okay with? Well as long as we know our correct aim off principles and/or what the correct sight picture is and we are in a stable position (be it kneeling supported or standing supported or prone unsupported), and we know or have a good idea of the range we are at, we can usually get a decent statistical hit rate on even short exposure snap shot targets. This is especially true if they tend to come up and go down within a similar location (because we usually just hold our weapon on that location where the target went down and just wait for it to come back up in the same location and then watch and shoot)…….

Also we can also see from our results that when our soldiers are mentally and physically stressed (from sprinting from one ranges firing mound to another, or are stressed from the time pressures we deliberately place upon them etc.), and shooting at short exposure and/or targets moving left to right or right to left (basically 'obliquely' moving

targets) from an unstable or unsupported position that our results or rounds on target are not usually as good… so what should that tell us?...

Well, it should tell us a couple of things, that moving or fleeting targets, moving at oblique angles are indeed harder to hit (not impossible… just harder… for some) and especially so when we are in an unstable position and mentally and physically stressed (common sense really).

This data should also tell us what our weak points in shooting AND movement are. This then provides guidance for us to now train to strengthen our strengths AND working harder to rectify our lesser capabilities and deficiencies so that we can make them additional strengths in shooting. BUT on the other side of the coin, what this should also tell our troops is that: When we are being engaged, i.e. when we are the ones on the receiving end of enemy fire, that the old adage of: DASH, DOWN CRAWL, OBSERVE, SIGHTS, FIRE though simple to say, actually has some sound tactical reasoning behind it.

Given what we now know about how we, and theoretically how other people shoot. Our best chance of surviving the encounter is by ensuring that we are briefly exposed, fast moving targets who are moving at random and oblique angels. It also tells us that when we do take cover, that we are not going down and coming up in the same location, because if we do all of that, we realise that we have a better chance of not getting hit.

Hence why we:

DASH; So we are moving as quick as we can and at oblique angels to where we think the fire is coming from.

DOWN; Then we quickly get down on the ground, because it can provide cover and concealment and that action has hopefully now taken us out of sight of our enemy.

CRAWL; Then we crawl quickly (once again, speed of movement is always a priority, and the faster the better) away from where you came down because the enemy is most likely concentrating his vision, efforts and maybe his fire on the last position he physically saw you, so getting away from that position is a priority.

OBSERVE; We observe because things have changed and are always changing, so we need to observe what is happening, assess the situation, and determine a course of action. (See what needs to be seen, and shoot what needs to be shot etc).

SIGHTS; Sights is not just find the right thing to shoot, but also getting into the best position so that you can accurately bring effective fire onto the enemy… and you know that you can shoot better when you are in a supported or prone position and when you are calm (not mentally or physically stressed). You also want to ensure that you present the smallest target possible. So get into the position that allows you to do that (whatever position that is….as long as you can balance effectiveness VS safety VS speed).

And then…

FIRE; Employ the correct application of fire to either neutralise or at least suppress the target you are firing at, hopefully allowing you, or another person, some safer time to make another bounding move, and then standby to do the whole process all over again, because staying in a static firing position in a 2 way range situation Is not a best practice for sustained survivability.

So then it all starts over again…

So……DASH – DOWN – CRAWL - OBSERVE - SIGHTS - FIRE!

So out of the training and testing that is the AWQ we can now also use that information to deduce teaching points to soldiers on why Dash, Down, Crawl, Observe, Sights, Fire is not just a cool ”warry” saying. It has reason and purpose because of what we can easily see from our own shooting.

BUT that is not the end of the reasoning. What happens when we throw in the idea of ‘pepper potting’ in pairs and/or groups under the banner of the ‘one foot on the ground’ theory during our movement?

While I am up and “DASHING” I am hoping I am only very briefly exposed. Although if I am briefly exposed to the enemy then I am ensuring I am moving fast and at oblique and irregular angels etc, so yes I am still briefly exposed… BUT… while I am exposed and it might still be possible to get effective fire upon me… my partner or the other group moving with me is using those same over arching shooting principles and is then either neutralising or suppressing the enemy and even if the rounds aren’t neutralising the enemy

they are at least now imposing mental and physical stress on the enemy. So not only am I limiting the time that the enemy can spend acquiring me into the correct sight picture, but my partner is imposing stress upon the enemy to make it even harder for them to execute effective fire upon me.

From our own experiences on an AWQ we can now understand some aspects as to why we teach 'Dash, Down, Crawl, Observe, Sights, Fire!' We do however need to also continually ask ourselves a further question. Is what we know and do still valid and applicable? All our current or future ideas should be able to stand up against this question. If they can't, then they should be changed or adapted.

Applying this question to the AWQ a basic answer would be yes. Because when we apply the current AWQ to our historical operations within South East Asia (Borneo, Malaysia, Vietnam and East Timor) the model of teaching and training our soldiers to engage an enemy at 300metres, or less, then the current AWQ fits that model. But what if we look to our more recent operational experiences?

In Afghanistan, a fair portion of it is an open country style conflict where in many of the small arms contact cases, we (ISAF) were being engaged by an enemy that had larger calibre 7.62mm weapon systems being operated at longer ranges than we had previously trained towards. The current AWQ format does not require us to train our soldiers to be proficient with the application of fire at long ranges (ranges 400-500 metres or longer) and at inclined and declined

angled shooting situations. When this was eventually identified a remedial training activity was required to be put in place during the PDT to bridge that deficiency.

So, if we now look back at our statement, in regards to our current AWQ and the training we undertake to complete that activity/operation, 'Is what we know and do still valid and applicable?', and now in regards to the aspect of the statement that says 'Is what we know still valid?' The answer is realistically yes (because it teaches us many things) in the close country area of operations which we had historically operated in and may still operate in in the future the current configuration of the AWQ is valid but the last part of the statement is '…and applicable?' Then the answer may be no because what we know and do (our AWQ) is not completely applicable to aspects of training for the open country Afghan theatre as the current AWQ configuration does not fill all our require skill sets for that operational theatre.

This idea was also reemphasized to me when I was helping to present a Counter IED presentation a few years ago when a series of questions and discussions arose regarding immediate action (IA) drills in regards to an IED attack and in particular an IED attack that is followed up with enemy small arms fire. At the time an infantry WO2 asked "why don't we just turn and fight our way through the ambush (which is technically what the IED attack and SA is) like we have done in the past"? Several of the audience members where nodding in agreement but at that time I did not pipe up in reply to the

WO2s point as I was not the primary presenting person to that part of the presentation.

But what I was thinking was if you apply his statement to the Afghan theatre and use the statement 'is what I know and do still valid and applicable', our answer would initially be yes, as that counter ambush drill of turning into the ambush is still valid for close country operations, as, this means we can close with the enemy quickly and then push past and behind them getting us out of the kill zone quickly (neutralising some on the way through hopefully) because in the close country we have historically operated in we have been in close proximity to the enemy when an ambush occurs.

Because the alternatives are: to hunker down and stay in the kill zone; or to maybe break contact and run directly away from the enemy kill group, which means we would possibly still be inside the arcs of the kill zone with our backs presented to the enemy; or, to maybe break contact by continuing forward or back from the way we came, but which would most likely bring us into the sights of the cut off groups who may then also engage us (as we would have laid out if we put out an ambush).

But remember that is still an applicable tactic when in close country environments today. But in Afghanistan in many places it is most definitely not close country. An ambush in Afghanistan that is initiated by an IED strike and followed up with small arms fire can occurred at extreme

ranges, some above 600m distance from our locations and can occur at altitudes above 8000ft above sea level. The enemy is often located on a very high, dominating feature and that in some instances has extreme gradients in elevation leading up to their position. In other provinces the enemy has put out other IED's between them and the location we were attacked from, hoping to draw us through their IEDs.

Now knowing what we know about some of these aspects of the Afghan theatre, do we really want our IA drill to be, turn into the enemy after they have attacked us and then attack into them?

This attack would be most likely over some distance from your current position, against an enemy that has comparative, or possibly better calibre weapon systems than our current 5.56mm weapons. This would be an attack up a steep gradient, commencing at an altitude where normal everyday movement can be made harder by the thinner air and even more so while we are wearing heavy body armour. We would be trying to engage an enemy at distances and angles we are not technically proficient at in an isolated location (possibly restricting communication and follow up support issues), and possibly through an area where the enemy may have laid out or prepared other IEDs. Let alone the possibility that this attack could have fatally injured some of our group, reducing our combat effectiveness as a group.

So, what we know and do in regards to ambushes in close country (which is still valid in close country operations) does not transfer so easily to another AO. Though it should be remembered that in close country areas of Afghanistan or in situations where you are indeed close to the enemy upon initial contact and on a leveller playing field, the turn and fight through ideal does indeed still hold sway. So, in a long winded manner of explaining things, we understand why we do what we do, but now we also know what our deficiencies are and should now work towards rectifying these identified deficiencies.

We should ALWAYS be assessing ourselves and we should always apply this question to where we are looking to deploy to next, and do so before we go there. We need to be constantly asking ourselves 'Is what I know and do still valid and applicable?' Because if we do not, I think we need to ask ourselves are we really looking to ensure we can continually adapt or be open minded enough to be able to adapt once change is upon us and thus truly knowing 'why we are doing what we are doing'.

Te Reo Maori - Restricted to Nobody

By Capt Johnny Samuela, RNZALR, LOTC

Tena koutou katoa.
Greetings to all.

Ko Waikato toku iwi.
Waikato is my iwi.

Ko Taupiri toku maunga.
Taupiri is my mountain.

Ko Tainui toku waka.
Tainui is my waka.

Ko Parawera toku marae.
Parawera is my marae.

Ko Teriki Johnson raua ko No'o Samuela oku tupuna tane.
Teriki Johnson and No'o Samuela are my grandfathers.

Ko Teraita Te Wao raua ko Ngametua Strickland oku tupuna wahine.

Teraita Te Wao and Ngametua Strickland are my grandmothers.

Ko Lelani raua ko Alicia aku tamariki.
Lelani and Alicia are my daughters.

Ko Trina McMahon taku hoa.
Trina McMahon is my girlfriend.

Ko Captain Johnny Samuela taku ingoa.
My name is Captain Johnny Samuela.

Tena koutou katoa.
Greetings to all.

It never ceases to amaze me what comes out of people's mouths these days, especially if it's in Te Reo Maori. Countless times I've attended a military conference where one of our senior officers (or soldiers for that matter) has stood up to speak and have felt shivers travel up my spine. Call me spiritual, or weird, or 'native' (lol) but nothing impresses me more than being greeted in Te Reo Maori , the native language of our country. Now, I think there are plenty of reasons to do a mihi such as, protocol or you are Maori or you are just keen, but I think there are several other reasons; such as connecting with your audience, gaining credibility and displaying cultural identity.

The thing is being of Maori descent myself, when being greeted in Te Reo Maori it is like connecting with me on another level. Just recently, I experienced a dose of the shivers at my kid's school assembly, when the pakeha principal did a mihi. It wasn't anything flash, but there was evidence of lots of rehearsals. From a Maori point of view, it

is sort of like the speaker is reaching out and shaking hands with my ancestors. On the other hand, to a non-Maori, it displays a level of respect and commitment to practice Te Reo Maori. Suffice to say, I did the unusual, which was listen intently even after the mihi.

Doing a mihi gives you credibility and people will listen, especially if you are not Maori. Do the job well and you are looking at a "high sat going up to sound" as we say at Log Ops Sch, and you will be remembered or maybe even talked about afterwards. First impressions, last. If someone gets up and does a mihi that's cool. If someone stands up and commands the room with his / her mihi, then that's operating at another level. It shows good teaching, rehearsal and practice. It also shows you have a respect and commitment to the native language of New Zealand, and the effect is that it gains you mana.

Using Te Reo Maori in your formal greeting identifies you as a New Zealander. I've been overseas a few times on ops, exercises and holidays, and when people find out I'm from New Zealand they want a haka. My pakeha mates experience the same thing. Quite often, the SNO will direct the contingent to do a haka and no matter what country we are in, people love it. It is no different with a formal speech. Using a mihi as part of a formal introduction is like doing mini haka . People hear Te Reo Maori and identify you with New Zealand.

Since I'm an awesome mate and care about my officer cohort, I've translated a short mihi above. As you can see, it gives a brief description of who you are and where you are from. Just exchange your details for the ones in green to make it yours. Your mihi would be perfect for introducing yourself when posted into a new unit, when attending a conference or even when you are attending a new course, it is up to you. Just as a bit of a precautionary, this is basic level stuff, and can built on significantly, but as I always say 'do the basics awesome and you'll be right'.

Lastly, I would like to leave you with this whakatauki :

"Ko taku reo taku ohooho, ko taku reo taku mapihi mauria"

My language is my awakening, my language is the window to my soul

Te reo maori is there for all of us. Do not be afraid of it or shy of it, it is but another means for you to have a voice. Grasp it and hold onto to it, it is there for the taking. Next time when I get shivers running up my spine, I hope that it may be you reaching out to me and my ancestors.

Tena koutou,

Tena koutou,

Tena tatou katoa.

Tactical Decision Game

Editors Notes:

(1) This TDG was first published as TDG 11-1 in the US Marine Corps Gazette in 2011. The Marine Corps Gazette retains all copyright to this TDG. The NZ Army Journal thanks the Marine Corps Gazette for permission to reproduce this problem.

(2) Tactical Decisions Games (TDG) are a way to develop our decision making abilities. Readers are encouraged to submit their solutions to the editor and 'noteworthy' solutions will be printed in the next edition of the Journal. At this stage there are no rewards offered for 'noteworthy' solutions other than basking in the glory of having your solution deemed 'noteworthy' by the editor.

TDG 14-01: Tajik Warlord Khorasan Parsi

Situation

You are Khorasan Parsi, a warlord of the Tajik clan in the city of Sar-e Pol. For the last several years, foreign armies have been operating in your country after ousting the Taliban from the government. Over a month ago American armies moved into Jalalabad, about 30 kilometers north of your city. The continued invasions of foreign powers over your lifetime have left their mark upon your family and clan. Your family has learned to deal with all countries that respect them, and your clan sells good and services to all people. At the same time, some members of your clan are resentful that outsiders

from Kabul, Europe, and now the United States seek power in your land for reasons that you do not understand. As a warlord, you know how to stoke the fires of resentment when needed and how to laugh and celebrate with strangers from all over the world, all the while looking to increase your clan's standing, influence, money, goods, and property.

Your family and clan reside north and east of the Styx River and in the north and east sections of the city south of the river as well. In the middle of your area a French and British nongovernmental organization (NGO) has been distributing food, blankets, and fresh water to those whose homes have been destroyed as a result of the invasion and occupation.

During the American invasion, the Pashtun tribes have gained the upper hand in the endless power struggle between the clans. Through manipulation of the French and British, they have convinced them to distribute the majority of the aid goods to warlords of the Pashtun clans who establish distribution points in the city center then charge tolls to cross the bridge. Through these tolls your clan loses most if not all of what they receive. The French and British do not understand the extortion, and the Americans are only seen in their armored trucks moving from Tora Bora north to Jalalabad.

A few weeks ago your clan leader ordered that the bridge be destroyed and the NGO camp attacked and looted with the spoils distributed among your clan. The bridge was

destroyed, and your clan leader ordered you to take charge of sacking the camp when he orders it. Your warband consists of 30 fighters who have trained with AK–47s and rocket propelled grenades (RPGs). As young children they learned to fight with all manner of improvised weapons. You also have 6 pickup trucks from your family, 1 cell phone with contacts with the rest of your clan leaders on both sides of the river, 2 radios, 30 AK–47s with 40 rounds each, and 2 RPGs with 2 rounds each. Your men generally move as a mob and will break into smaller warbands of two to five fighters once the battle is joined.

Yesterday evening, over dinner with the clan chief, he informed you that the time to take the camp is today. Whether to attack during the day or at night is up to you. All of the clan leaders and heads of the community have offered their support with the stipulation that you wait until afternoon or evening. You agreed to their requests and reconnoitered the camp that evening. You discovered that the camp has about 20 workers, 2 trucks, and enough food to see your family through the next year.

The next morning you notice a group of 50 or so American Marines with armoured trucks and a lot of construction equipment enter your area and begin work on building a new bridge. It is now noon, the attack must commence this afternoon or evening (within 3 to 10 hours), and the Americans look like they have no intention of leaving. What now?

The Requirement

In 20 minutes, explain to your men and supporting clan leaders what you intend to do and what you need them to do. Issue your orders to your warband.

Issues for Consideration:

1. What is your goal for this attack? How does the American presence complicate it? How do your actions negate the American presence?

2. What do you consider mission success?

3. How does your vision of success correspond to your clan leader's objective?

4. How sensitive are you to casualties among your own fighters? How sensitive are you to local civilian casualties and property damage? How do your actions reflect this?

5. Is your warband being used to attack the Americans, instigate the local populace to action, take the NGO camp, or something else? Whom do you use and who will be reliable to deal with other situations that your warband cannot handle; i.e., will they take the NGO camp and keep the supplies?

6. Do your actions force the Americans to fight your warband? If so, what are the possible repercussions of a fight with the Americans?

7. If you chose not to attack the Americans, what other methods could you use to neutralize them?

BOOK REVIEW

The Junior Officers' Reading Club: Killing Time and Fighting Wars

by Patrick Hennessey, Penguin Books, 2010, 335 pages, paperback:
Reviewed by Major Paul Garner, RNZAEC

"Violence is temporary, but learning is permanent" p.217

Don't let the title confuse you: this is Captain (retired) Patrick Hennessy's story. Born 1982, commissioned 2004 as a Guard's officer, he was eventually commended for gallantry for conduct during operations in Afghanistan in 2007. It is not a book about a reading club as such, much to the chagrin of several online reviewers! It is written in an engaging, witty, self-deprecating, British-military-adventurist style which is refreshing and which sheds light for us colonials on the British contribution to the



New Zealand Way of the Warrior. It is a first hand account of modern Western military training and service. This book is a must-read for all officer cadets in need of a light at the end of the commissioning tunnel; junior officers in danger of undue cynicism; intermediate and senior officers at risk of being captured by corporate culture, and for the warranted ,non-commissioned, and other adult supervisors of junior officers everywhere who would better influence their protégés through a glimpse in to the psyche, intellect and experiences of one of them. It's also a fascinating, humorous and compelling read for those just interested in a young man's account of modern warfare, and getting there.

Of Motives, Mayhem and Medals

The story begins with the author's experiences of joining up and commissioning through the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst. This part is revealing about enduring values and motivations of young Commonwealth officers. "…it wasn't the lifestyle or the money that drew me in, it was boredom with everything else" (p.33). The author recalls several initial training escapades which will ring true for all soldiers and officers, and he goes on to reflect on them with wit,, "I began to discover that LEADERSHIP, CHARACTER and INTELLECT are best developed by MARCHING, IRONING and SHOUTING" (p.37).

The tale then speaks of the bewilderment of initial posting as a second lieutenant, through to peace-keeping experiences in Bosnia and regimental Guards service in

London in the public eye. The reality of platoon command felt like he was, "…supposed to be a personal trainer, lawyer, doctor, social worker and padre, and…on some pretty shaky hypocritical territory there" (p.115). This phase of the story serves to question our own mess and service culture. The author's retelling of deploying to Iraq sheds light on the workings of a big Army in complex stability and support operations and of the psychology of seeking to test oneself in combat: "…we were coming round to a crushing realisation: for all that Baghdad was tense, exotic and top-trump-winning in the post-tour mess-boasting sessions, we weren't going to have a fight" (p.167).

Mr Hennessy gets his fight and then some. If combat and operational experience is what most interests you, go straight to pages 173 to 314. His retelling and reflections of the paradoxes and mayhem of coalition operations are informative and credible. They are useful as a window in to what to expect on modern-day operations, and the psychological impact such experiences may have. Mr Hennessy's attempts to make sense of it all may also be helpful to those who have been there, and others who may follow: "…the back-slaps of close friends and family was one thing; we wanted documents signed in black and white and glinting metal forged with our names to shout to the rafters that what we had done was not wrong, not bad, but glorious and heroic, and we weren't sick to feel that it had all been such f…ing good fun" (p.310).

The cover of this book includes a quote from *the Independent* describing it as "nerve-shreddingly intense". Maybe for a journalist? Likely, for the author's mum? Notwithstanding the hyperbole, it is several compelling things. An insight in to the motivations, hazards and humour of generation-y officers; revealing about the humanitarian and adventurist British warfighting-ethic; and, a window in to the chaos, lethality, and ambiguity of modern land operations. It's for these reasons, and not the Independent's one-liner, that you should read it.

Contributor Guidelines

Submissions are open to both current serving and ex-serving members of the NZDF to have their say on the issues they feel warrant wider attention. Submissions must be of a topic relevant to the purpose and scope of the Army Journal. All submissions should adhere to the NZ Army ethos and values. This at times may require a balance between values. Constructive criticism is welcome; however personal attacks or pointless complaining will not be printed. Submissions must be unclassified. Submissions can be of any length however it is recommended that in general that they are between 1000 and 2000 words long. Names of authors are to be included for all submissions and will be published with the article.

Submissions are to be emailed to AWC@NZDF.mil.nz.


WHAT DO
YOU
THINK?
Submit an article to the NZ Army Journal today: Email to AWC@NZDF.mil.nz