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
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WAR: ART OR SCIENCE?THE TEACHING OF THE OFFICER PROFESSION

BY

CAPTAIN C.M.W. PEDERSEN, BA, RNZA

'Too great an emphasis in junior officer training is placed upon teaching the science of the officer profession rather than the art'.

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Captain Pedersen is to assume the appointment of Joint Intelligence Liaison Officer at New Zealand Defence Liaison Staff, Canberra, in February 1988.

INTRODUCTION

The question of whether the officer profession can be reduced to the simple label of 'art' or 'science' or is a combination of the two has vexed military theoreticians since the dawn of educated debate. Evolving naturally from this debate is the question of how to teach war.

In trying to resolve this argument it has been necessary to make a number of assumptions. These assumptions concern the definitions of art and science, the role of the officer profession and the nature of war.

The 'Pocket Oxford Dictionary' provides the precise meaning of art and science. Art ¹ is 'something in which skill may be exercised' (doing). Science ¹ is 'the principles regulating the pursuit of systematic and formulated knowledge, a body of quantitative and self evident truths' (knowing). This definition of science is a crude mechanistic Newtonian one which the modern scientist may well take issue with. However, for the purposes of discussing military principles and their application this definition of science will suffice.

¹ Fowler F. & Fowler H. Pocket Oxford Dictionary.
Press, Oxford, 1972.

The officer profession is concerned with the conduct of all facets of military life. However, when reduced to its most fundamental level the officer's profession is 'The direction, operation and control of a human organisation whose primary function is the application of violence ...'.² This military function requires a high order of expertise and no individual, whatever his inherent intellectual ability and qualities of character and leadership, can perform these functions without significant training and expertise. Thus, for the purposes of this paper the role of the officer profession is to wage war.

The nature of war was most actively debated in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. To the Eighteenth Century rationalist thinkers of the Enlightenment war was quite clearly a science governed by immutable principles. By the Nineteenth Century, when the romantic ethos was dominant, war had become an art; an affair of men ungoverned by rules and formulas which was instead, decided by will and intellect. Today war is viewed, in our rather flexible perception of all things uncertain, as a combination of the two; principles, not rules, which allow the intellect to play upon them. Thus, war utilises art and science in the same way that photography utilises the two to produce an object through the synthesis of technology and creative impulse.

If one accepts this notion of war then it follows that the teaching of war must be based on principles but the greatest emphasis must be given to the application of the intellect. It may be questioned if this is the approach followed in New Zealand.

Armed with these definitions it is time to turn our attention to the central debate. For the linkage between art and science to be fully understood it is necessary to consider two issues. Firstly, what constitutes the science and art of war? Secondly, how should we teach war? Only when we have the answers to these questions can we establish whether the emphasis should be given to art or science in officer instruction.

SCIENCE AND ART

There are two schools of military thinkers. Those who try to establish firm principles based on quantifiable geographic, logistic and technical data are the scientists. The artists are those who stress the intellectual, moral, psychological and political aspects of war which makes its outcome an uncertainty.

The scientists seek clear, consistent, interdependent principles as a guide to understanding and action. These ideas are embodied in the teaching of subjects like 'Artillery', 'Armour' and 'Infantry'. This rationalist Newtonian search for principles is displayed by the teaching of quantifiable certainties, the range of a rifle is 600 m and the fall of shot of a field battery covers 150 m by 150 m.

These scientists number amongst them men like Bulow and Jomini. Bulow conceived of war as a geometric problem whilst Jomini believed that victory could always be attained, regardless of intellect, by the observance of basic principles.

'... a simple theory, one free of all pedantry, going back to first causes but eschewing absolutely systems, based in short on a few fundamental maxims, may often supplement genius.'³

Principles are all very well but the scientists exhibit a dangerous tendency to move further into analytic reasoning and the abstract. They quantify everything into immutable zones of operation, lines of communication and boundaries; everything to complicate issues and fascinate theoreticians.

The artists believed that war was unpredictable, uncertain and required the application of will, intelligence, personality and moral fibre. These concepts are embodied in the teaching of 'Tactics' and 'Battlecraft'. The romanticism of the artists is displayed by the emphasis on initiative, lateral thought and the search for original solutions to battlefield problems, ultimately, 'may the better man win'.

Clausewitz, Marx and Engels are all exponents of the art of war. Clausewitz, although not a pure artist, believed that theories only served to educate and should not be used to dictate tactics. Marx and Engels, the founders of modern warfare for they recognised its four fold nature⁴ believed that war was an art, 'Insurrection is an art as much as war ...'⁵ For them, art lay in the sense of timing and the application of force required to attain victory whether it be on the battlefield, working class slum or the factory floor.

What is the answer; is war something that can be categorised in the same way that animals are categorised? War is neither wholly art nor science. Instead war is an amalgam of science and art. The science of war is fixed constants; the range of weapons, the fuel consumption of a vehicle and the endurance of an aircraft. The art of war is the ability to apply these constants against a living, reacting body to achieve a goal with the minimum loss of time and own resources.

³ Jomini quoted in Brinton C., Craig G.A. and Gilbert F. "Jomini". Earle E.M (ed) Makers of Modern Strategy. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1971. p 87

⁴ For Marx and Engels war was diplomatic, economic, psychological and as a last resort, military.

⁵ Nuemann S. 'Engels and Marx: Military Concepts of the Social Revolutionaries' "Earle E.M. (ed). Makers of Modern Strategy. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1971. p 158.

IN THE CLASSROOM

The teaching of war should recognise the dichotomy of the subject. However, it is in Jominian terms that soldiers are trained to think, the principles of the attack and the constants of firepower and logistics. The artistic approach of Clausewitz and the like is too complex whereas Jominian principles provide a ready made, understandable outline for officer training.

We have already established that war is a combination of art and science. The degree to which one should favour art or science is derived from the political philosophy of the nation. Our military system, deriving as it does from a democracy, encourages initiative and flexibility whilst discouraging formalism. To achieve this emphasis must be put on the art not the science of war. To do otherwise is to handicap an officer by educating him in a formalistic, rigid, scientific manner whilst expecting him (post training) to perform in a flexible way that displays insight, intellect and initiative.

Taking as an example the block syllabus for the Officer Cadet School,⁶ we find that there are 152 periods of military science (subjects such as 'Air Support', 'Signals' and 'Infantry') and 360 periods of military art ('Military History', 'Tactics' and 'Battlecraft'). This gives a ratio of art to science of approximately 2:1. There is no reason to believe that this ratio is vastly different in other officer courses. This ratio appears to give a good weighting to art however, when it is realised that much of 'Tactics' is devoted to the teaching of principles then the ratio becomes less healthy. Even more disturbing is the paucity of 'Military History', 22 periods out of a course total of 3260.

What teaches the art of war? TEWTs, exercises, Command Post exercises and the like; anything that permits an officer's intellect to play upon both problems and principles. Activities of this sort are not the dominant officer training activity. Most officers do very few TEWTs except for those undertaken on courses. A course is not an environment that encourages adventurous, innovative thinking. Instead the conservative approach that ensures a pass mark is the way to achieve success. Ideally TEWTs should be waged or have an active enemy so that the uncertain nature of war is truly simulated. However, before these activities can yield best results the intellect must first be developed by the encouragement of analytical techniques rather than the exhortation of principles.

New Zealand's emphasis on Jominian principles rather than a more free thinking artistic approach is evidenced by the low status of military history. We are one of the few organisations in the world that instructs through the medium of history. This is obvious as battles that have yet to occur cannot be studied. History is the basis of all our training and yet so little time is devoted to it. There are only limited opportunities for the officer to acquire the practical elements of the profession. The skill of the officer is universal; it is not affected by changes in time or location and is

⁶ Officer Cadet School OCS Block and Detailed Syllabus, December 1985, pix.

continually developing. Only if the officer is aware of the historical development of the techniques of organisation and the direction of military forces can he be truly aware. The history of war and military affairs requires continual emphasis; the artistic approach of analysis, skill, insight, imagination and judgement must be given preference to the continually changing scientific precepts of range, endurance and even principles.

Courses emphasise principles at the expense of historical truths. The majority of the presentation topics for the 'Grade Three Staff and Tactics Course'⁷ exhort the use of history to show a principle in action, ie the application of a formula to history to prove the existence of the formula. The officer then searches and discards historical examples until one is found that displays the principle. Does this mean that because the discarded historical examples do not display the principle, that the principle is not one of the universal keys to success that we are told to put our trust in? Surely it is a more productive approach to ask an officer to study an historical incident and then decide what actions ensured defeat and victory? This approach, using history to encourage questioning and analysis of commanders' actions, would do much to redress the balance of art and science.

CONCLUSION

This paper began with the questions of what do we do and how do we teach our skills? The succinct answer is to wage war, something that is neither fish nor fowl. War is a combination of art and science with neither being able to exist without the other. All thinking is art because where the scientific constants end and the theory must be applied we enter the domain of judgement, that intellectual process which is art. However,

'... it is impossible to imagine a human being possessing merely the faculty of cognition, devoid of judgement or the reverse, so also Art or Science can never be completely separated from each other'.⁸

Thus war is a combination of art and science, science being the foundation on which we base our art. With the present emphasis on science and the down playing of the intellectual side of war we are in danger of becoming the implementers and not the managers of violence. To remedy the situation more emphasis needs to be given to the creative subjects such as military history and tactics. Instruction should be carried out in the main via the medium of TEWTs which should be wargamed. Instruction, and more importantly, thinking about war should not be restricted to courses. TEWTs should be conducted at all levels on a regular basis and the study of military history should be given greater emphasis. Officers' minds must be encouraged to search history and to

⁷ Tactical School Regular Force Grade Three Staff and Tactics Course Handbook, undated, Annex C to Serial 2.

⁸ Clausewitz quoted in Clausewitz on War. Pelican, Hamondsworth, 1968. p 202.

question the universal applicability of the principles. Without the development of initiative we run the risk of breeding officers who don't question but instead rigidly apply constants to problems.

Ultimately the success or failure of our present approach to officer education will be measured in bodies, New Zealand bodies.

In conclusion, let us by example show that the ideal army of democracy is an army in which all ranks obey cheerfully and without reservation; where the maximum effect is maintained with the minimum of effort; where sacrifices are made and service given freely and ungrudgingly by all. A disciplined army of free men!

POINT TO PONDER

"The whole art of war consists of getting at what lies on the other side of the hill, or in other words, in deciding what we do not know from what we do".

Duke of Wellington

LEADERSHIPBYCOLONEL J.H. THYER, AIF

The following article was an address given by Colonel Thyer to officers, warrant officers and senior non commissioned officers of the 8th Australian Division at Changi Prisoner of War Camp on 18th June 1942.

The Australians had at this time been prisoners of the Japanese for four months and of course had no idea of how long their confinement would continue. Colonel Thyer obviously felt the need for the address in order to give some guidance to his subordinates on how to conduct themselves in the adverse conditions of a prisoner of war camp.

Colonel J.H. Thyer was a signals officer of the Australian Imperial Forces (AIF) and this address was kindly obtained from the Australian School of Signals at Watsonia, Victoria.

We have now had time to review the actions and reactions of the AIF as we have seen it since the inception of the 8th Division up to the present time, in conditions of peace during training and under active service conditions. Those of us who have reflected at all deeply on this matter - and of such there must be quite a number - feel that our standards were not as high as they should have been, that we did not insist upon obtaining such standards as were deemed adequate, and that as a result the Force has not acquitted itself in a manner which would give us all the deepest satisfaction and pride. Some of us feel that the questions should be now analysed; discussed dispassionately, so we might see what standards are necessary and the means by which they can be achieved. There are some who might say that the fight is over, that we are prisoners of war, and that everything is finished as far as we are concerned. This is a most pessimistic outlook, and one which does not look very far into the future. However, even these must still accept responsibility, as military law provides that an officer or soldier, although a prisoner, remains subject to the provisions governing the military relations of superior and subordinate and the military duty of obedience, which demands of the superior both command and example. This is a responsibility that all ranks must recognise and accept.

I do not desire in any way to usurp the function of unit commanders in the matter of discipline. There are however, obviously erroneous ideas in many sections of our force, and it is necessary that we should at least aim at a common standard. There are many who have not given the subject much thought and there are others who have not had the opportunity to give it much thought, and consequently the ignorance which one meets from time to time on the question of discipline is to be expected. These remarks are given as a

guide to put the subject as simply as possible and in perhaps a new light, so that you may be assisted in making your own decisions and getting the required discipline in your own section. The first point we must remember is that discipline is not created by edict. You do not achieve discipline simply by giving orders: discipline is inspired, created and maintained by leadership. Without that inspiration and without that necessary leadership, you will never get discipline.

It is necessary first to understand what discipline is, and in this there is some confusion of thought. Simply stated, it is conformity to a standard of conduct governed by fixed rules laid down by a competent authority, a conformity which gives the maximum effect with the minimum effort and equality of sacrifice. In other words, good discipline requires immediate and unquestioning compliance with orders in all circumstances without reservation. It means cheerful and immediate compliance. It is easy to obey when things are peaceful, when the circumstances are easy, when the obedience does not require much personal sacrifice. It is difficult to obey when the person is isolated, when he is overcome with acute fatigue, when the obedience would incur risk of life. Yet in war, it is under such circumstances that the obedience is necessary, and the standard of discipline should be of such a nature that the obedience is instinctive, and that must be the objective of our training. We must not fall into the trap again of thinking that such a standard can be acquired on the instant. It demands months of hard training.

Without discipline all military bodies become mobs, and worse than useless. Discipline maintained by punishment is a poor sort of discipline and would not stand any strain at all, but at the same time discipline by material inducement is also a poor sort of discipline. What must be aimed at is that high standard of discipline which springs from a military system administered with impartiality and judgement, so as to induce in all ranks a feeling of duty and the assurance that while no offence will be passed over, no offender will be unjustly dealt with.

The 1st AIF has been held up to us - and deservedly so - as a shining example of what soldiers should be. We are proud of the fact that the Australian in that force was a wonderful soldier, but if we examine it carefully we will come to the conclusion that we have gained two wrong impressions; firstly that the Anzac became a soldier without training, and secondly that he was not amenable to discipline. The 1st AIF came into being after four years of compulsory training when it was in its most intense and active form. In those days there were no counter-attractions such as dancing halls and continuous pictures, and consequently a considerable number of the Australian youth spent their time training voluntarily. When the AIF was formed, the question was not raised - Are we amenable to discipline or do we need training? On the other hand, most ranks were concerned with the thought that they would shortly be fighting alongside highly trained regular troops, and they were rather apprehensive about letting Australia down. Consequently they entered into their training with the fullest enthusiasm. After a few months in Australia they received about four months' intensive training in Egypt, and then as a highly trained division they executed the successful landing at Anzac. There, their training and their high standard of discipline stood them in good stead and there are numerous instances, freely quoted, where companies were reduced to 30 strong; where small section posts in isolated positions held for days under pressure and there was no thought at all of any backward

movement, but a constant urge to get forward in spite of the discouraging conditions. That standard of discipline was maintained throughout the existence of the 1st AIF, and reinforcements before joining units were invariably subjected to rigid training for at least three months. After the final victory in 1918, when supervision was to an extent relaxed and when one could expect riotous behaviour, it is a fact that any such behaviour was extremely limited and was quickly controlled. The discipline in England was good, and there was no trouble on the troopships returning to Australia. The men were all demobilised and returned to their civil life in an organised manner. This was because the basic discipline was sound, and the instinctive habit of obedience was retained when pressure was relaxed.

And then followed 21 years of peace, a peace in which most people developed a gentle pacifism and did not interest themselves in military matters. Consequently, a type of propaganda - unconscious perhaps, but nevertheless just as effective as if it had been inspired 5th Column - was permitted to flourish. The general theme was the portrayal of the private soldier as a badly dressed, ill-disciplined, slick tongued private who always got the better of the NCO or officer, generally depicted as the moron type. As a result of this insidious propaganda the impression was gained amongst the general public that the Australian was a natural soldier, that he was not amenable to discipline, and that very little or no training was required to fit him for his task in war. There was no resistance to this impression, for the general public was averse to military training as it called for some little sacrifice on their part. It is difficult to understand why this feeling that the Australian soldier was not amenable to discipline came to be accepted, because it meant in effect, that he was not capable of obeying, and yet as a good citizen he complies implicitly with the rules of the country because he realises that it is for the common good and the well-being of the nation. Strangely enough, when he gets into the Army and where compliance is more necessary to ensure the existence of the nation, he ceases to be amenable to discipline.

Between the two world wars we had the development of mechanisation, which put another spanner in the works. War was to become mechanical; elementary drill was unnecessary, and it was ordained that the period of drill should be shortened as much as possible. The 2nd AIF came into being with the thought that we did not require to pay attention to matters such as drill; that we were not required to obey orders; that we were not the type who could obey orders; that we were a type of super-men, and as soon as we donned khaki we became first class soldiers. Drill, which assists materially in formulating the habit of obedience, was greatly decreased, and in some technical units entirely eliminated. With what result? You all recollect the trouble in Australia with leave trains. This was regarded lightly by the press as due to high spirits to be expected from our soldiery, yet the same actions if performed a week earlier as civilians would have been stigmatized by the same press as hooliganism. We had trouble on board all our transports. Conduct was such that all ranks derived only the minimum of comfort and the minimum of safety. Think what might have happened if anything had occurred to endanger life on board any of our troopships. Would the good discipline that minimised certain disasters in the past have suddenly come to light in the event of a similar emergency? It is extremely doubtful. On reaching Singapore our conduct was not the best. We saw the badly dressed Digger swaggering about the streets. There were innumerable cases of begging by our soldiers in the streets, which irregularities we all seemed to accept as part of the make-up of the Australian soldier.

When action commenced it became a little different, and although the brigades on the mainland acquitted themselves with honour, one could not say exactly the same about our fighting on the Island. We must face up to the fact that for every two men within the perimeter, there was at least one who was a deserter. We cannot say, of course, that these men in their right senses deliberately left their comrades. We must realise that the majority of them were not normal mentally when they did it. Lack of order, danger, unusual conditions and other factors scared them into a state of mind where mass psychology had its effect. These men when they deserted the battle area were demented.

Some of us attribute this lack of battle discipline to deterioration of our manhood in Australia. The deterioration of the younger generation has been referred to in every age, but has never been borne out by the facts. It must be quite obvious that the general standard of the people, with improving conditions, must improve also. The material has not deteriorated, but rather that we attempted to use the material without any cutting or polishing. There are others who say that we were let down, that the conditions imposed were not of our seeking, and that we were defeated in this country because of the fault of others; but we must be very careful in accepting this point of view, and the fact must not be denied that the same thing happened in Libya and in Greece, where conditions and circumstances were not the same. We cannot seek cover in advancing these two views: both are wrong. We must look that matter squarely in the face and recognise that the basic cause of all this conduct has been lack of training and the consequent low standard of discipline, and this can be amply supported by examples from history. I am quite convinced that if we had had a good basic discipline, none of this would have occurred, our actions would have been entirely different, and we could all now look back on the past with no small degree of pride.



Rice distribution from the cookhouse outside Changi Gaok


Since coming to Changi we have had further instances brought about by lack of discipline. The open rifling of kit bags was bad enough, but it was worse when the effects of comrades were disposed of in the 'Black Market'. It was condoned by some officers and NCOs because they could easily have stopped it. The result was the lowering of morale. We began to lose faith in ourselves and there was an apparent lack of true leadership.

Some might say, why bring all this up now? That is not the point. We are not out of the woods yet, nor for that matter will we ever be. We will always be faced with problems requiring discipline, more particularly now and in the immediate future. Try to imagine what might happen in Changi. It may be that we will be running short of rations in this camp and in Singapore generally, and the urge of hunger, which is a very potent force, may react upon the unthinking until they become an uncontrolled mob. The result might be the looting of the ration stores, when very few would benefit and a large part of the food would be destroyed in the getting. It may be that our honourable hosts will walk out and leave us here. If that should happen you will have to suppress any rioting and looting by the native population. Possibly our own men may rush into Singapore and clash with the natives. You can imagine the result. The uncontrolled, fanatic native population and our own men all struggling for the small amount of food left would present a sorry spectacle which might easily end in the loss of life and considerable damage, and possibly a large part of Singapore going up in flames. I do not think that we, as responsible leaders, could face Australia if anything like that did happen. We must anticipate these circumstances and be ready for them. Then again we have to consider our return to Australia. It would be a very bad thing if we went back with trouble on board ship and trouble at the first port of call. We must remember that the circumstances of Singapore are widely discussed in Australia. If we go back a disorganised rabble, the people will be inclined to say it was no wonder. On the other hand, if we go back a disciplined body the people of Australia will feel that the loss of Singapore was due to circumstances over which we had no control. We must consider the restoration of morale. This is gradually being built up, but the maximum can only be achieved by getting discipline, by building up confidence between all ranks. We must think of our future in civil life. There we can only fight our battles if we are mentally and physically fit, and we can only be such if we maintain a high standard while here. We cannot afford to say, 'It is all over; let's rest and forget it'. There is as much now as ever the necessity for discipline and for the leadership on our part which produces that discipline.

And now a few observations on how discipline may be obtained. Firstly it can be achieved by compliance with orders under threat of force or by fear, but that sort of discipline will break down when the threat is removed. It is, of course, necessary to have punishment which should, however, only be used in extreme cases. Discipline inspired by force or by fear is not real discipline and cracks under strain. Discipline may be inspired by a national sentiment. The Nazis and the Japanese are fanatical in their zeal and in the manner in which they obey. We, as a democracy, should be inspired in the same way, but there is one weakness in the democracy: it encourages individualism, and individualism breeds selfishness, and so although we may agree that discipline is necessary, we are probably governed by our selfishness which makes us say, 'Let me see that everyone else obeys, but let me look to my own comfort'. This is a problem we must face up to in our democracy. Individualism reacts against the giving of unrestricted service to one's country. Discipline should come initially from background; it should give one the desire

to subscribe fully to the requirements of service; the will to do; and, in the ultimate the will to die.

Discipline may be achieved by reasoning. If men can see the reason for things they will obey more readily. As an instance, the 'Black Market' was declared illegal. If we had accepted orders cheerfully there would have been no black market. Many of us were selfish and spent our money in this market to increase our own personal ration. Consequently it flourished. The reason for the order was to conserve general credit. On reflection, it was obviously stupid to squander our money in this way and get only one-third of its real value in food. The men now wish they had saved their money, since the advent of the authorised canteen. Unfortunately, this aspect was not explained to everybody. Most men failed to realise the ultimate effect of their actions, and now when we have the facilities for using it, our general credit is greatly reduced.



The Changi Area, looking south east. Batu Puteh is in the foreground.

Perhaps the best method of obtaining discipline is by leadership. Officers and NCOs by their own conduct, sacrifice and example, inspire similar conduct in their subordinates. This demands that we as leaders must appreciate fully the meaning of, and the necessity for discipline. We must determine what our standard of conduct must be, and without considering the sacrifice that it entails, we must set ourselves the task of adhering to that standard. We ourselves must develop the habit of obedience before we can expect or hope to get it in our subordinates. Drill teaches the habit of obedience, and constant drilling will produce a certain standard of discipline. In ceremonial the men express pride in their drill, which is an additional incentive, but drill and ceremonial, although necessary, are not sufficient in

themselves. These are all means by which one gets discipline. They must all be considered and to a certain extent each can be used, but I would emphasize the thought that the most effective way is by example or leadership.

The relationship between officers, NCOs and other ranks has probably perplexed some of us. Men who have been employers in private life and have not lived separately from their employees cannot see the necessity for living separately in the Army. There is a difference in that the private employer is his own selector; he lays down his own conditions and dismisses or promotes at will. Subject to the limitations imposed by the Arbitration Court he is a dictator in his own small sphere. In the Army these conditions do not apply. Men are not selected by their commanders, who are not at liberty to promote or discharge as they see fit, and this circumstance immediately brings into relief three reasons why officers and ORs should live apart.

Firstly, officers have to administer justice. Individually they have limited power, but collectively they have powers similar to those of a Supreme Court Justice, powers which include the death penalty. In civil life judges and justices are required to live somewhat apart and not to mix with the people generally. This is necessary in order to keep the judiciary pure and on as high a plane as possible. Mixing with other civilians, even although only temporarily, might give them a bias. It must be obvious that the effect would be greater in the Army where the parallel of judges and litigants - ie officers and ORs - were forced to live together continuously. There would be unquestionably a degree of bias which would lead to unfair treatment and be the cause of complaint. Secondly, men are promoted either by, or on the representation of officers. If officers lived entirely with the men they would gravitate to one section where they would find more congenial companionship. This section, as far as promotions went, would either get preferment or the officer, in order to show that he was not biased, might leave them out of his recommendation. Whichever way it went there would be some suspicion attached to recommendations, again causing discontent. Thirdly, officers are responsible for the well-being of the men, their housing, their feeding, their recreation. In order to do this most effectively they should stand off and view the picture as a whole instead of being influenced by one small section only. For these three reasons - that is, to obtain maximum justice, fair dealing and the well-being of the men - it is necessary that officers should live apart, and in a similar way NCOs should not mix too freely with rank and file. If these three reasons are not sufficient to convince, we must recognise this fact, that in the armies of monarchies, autocracies, dictatorships, etc, no matter what experiments may have been conducted, always it has been recognised that suitable types must be selected as officers, set apart, and specially trained. It is interesting to note that an officer has a servant, not because he is a superior being, but because he has responsibilities which require certain preparation of work and constant attention to duty. His time, if properly spent, is too valuable to be wasted in ordinary barrack room fatigues.

Saluting has presented a problem to us Australians. If we think of its origin and its meaning, it should present to us no difficulty. It was the greeting permitted between free men or soldiers and their leaders. Slaves were not permitted to salute but were obliged to pass their superiors with their head averted and eyes cast down. We in Australia have developed the idea that saluting is a symbol of slavery, and in order to overcome it we have really forced ourselves to behave as slaves, and instead of seeing the trained soldier

and the efficient officer exchanging salutes, we see more the soldier passing by as did the slave in days gone by. Saluting is a necessary adjunct to discipline. It is a free and public acknowledgement of the willingness of the individual to subscribe to the system. We are inclined to be amused at the Nazis and the Fascists and the Communists with what we think is their much overdone saluting, but those people recognise the value of saluting in building up discipline, and we too should discard our superficial ideas and recognise its worth. Saluting is the outward and visible sign of good training. A trained soldier is not diffident or nervous about it; he does it naturally and with pride.

And now I shall make some observations on the manner of contact between officers and ORs. 'All ranks having authority must administer discipline with firmness, while remembering that arrogance and abuse of power produce resentment and discontent in the lower ranks. Equally destructive is weakness, which creates contempt'. The amount of contact and the degree will vary with the disparity between ranks. A subaltern will have almost continuous contact with his men. As officers get seniority, that contact diminishes and decreases. The point of contact is between the subaltern and the soldier. That is where friction is likely, and this is where we have to take particular pains to see that the points of contact are well oiled. It is very true that familiarity breeds contempt. There is no necessity at any time to be unduly familiar. A junior officer said to me quite recently that he had enlisted with his section and had known them all intimately during his service. When he became an officer in the same section he found it impossible to stop calling the men by their christian names, and the men continued to call him by his christian name. I said that our system - a democratic system - recognises that officers must be drawn from the ranks. If the men of his section were truly democratic and subscribed whole-heartedly to the spirit of democracy, they would show recognition of this by giving him every support as an officer, by investing him with every dignity to which he became entitled on his appointment. Instead of doing this, however, they were debasing the coinage and by their actions breaking down the system which they claimed to support.

Although it is wrong to address men by their christian names and vice versa, they must not be treated as inanimate objects, but be considered as human beings having rights, feelings and individual aspirations. Know each man by name, get to know his individual characteristics. This will help you to move amongst them with confidence, and when you know your men as you should know them, then you will be able to deal with each in a different way to get the same common result, and will not be over gratified by some and over displeased by others, which results from a superficial knowledge and ends in dissatisfaction and complaint. You must not take advantage of your position. Rank confers privileges, but it also imposes responsibilities. Too often we grab the privileges and forget the responsibilities. You must try to remember always that it is only after you have fully discharged your responsibilities that you are entitled to your privileges. By so doing, you will earn the confidence of your subordinates. You must endeavour to prevent crime. It is a very easy thing, and one which is very often done, to place a man under arrest for the slightest trivial offence. This sets in train a legal process which does not always end in justice being meted out, but it starts a more potent and reactionary train of thought in the mind of the victim; instead of achieving any good purpose it may do incalculable harm, and if we look back on our own experiences we must see numerous instances of men being ruined in the military sense by the action of irresponsible and inexperienced

superiors. It is our responsibility to educate the men, teach them the necessity of obedience; make sure that they understand, be patient with them, and only when these methods fail resort to punishment. You will then find that you will only be punishing the irresponsible person and the natural rebel. On the other hand, we must not shut our eyes to crime. If it becomes necessary to take action and we have fully considered the circumstances and decided that action is necessary, then we should be firm and unhesitating. In the matter of the rifling of kit bags, had action been taken in the first few weeks, then it would have stopped. Unfortunately no action was taken, the men considered that was the correct thing to do, and it became almost impossible to stop it.

Always endeavour to look at things from the men's point of view. This does not mean that you must have your ear to the ground and be influenced by all the petty complaints which are bandied about the barrack room, but a complete understanding between the platoon officer, platoon sergeant and section leaders will be helpful in this direction. If the men recognise that you have their interests at heart, it will breed confidence. You must constantly attend to their welfare in the matter of feeding, quartering, recreation; without obtruding yourself during their meal hours you should ensure that the food is properly cooked, decently served, and that each man gets his proper portion. You must see that the quarters are kept thoroughly clean as far as the local circumstances will permit. You must see that the men have occupations to fill their leisure hours: reading, entertainment, further military education. Remember your responsibilities do not cease when you dismiss your platoon: they are with you 24 hours every day. Don't worry about what the men think of you. There will always be some who think harshly of you; there will be others who may think highly of you; but don't be concerned or influenced by either. Your only concern is their welfare and efficiency. Keep your mind concentrated on this: their appreciation and their ultimate affection will be automatic. Do not try to run with the hares and hunt with the hounds. Too many of us sacrifice our pride and our position to get brief applause or approbation which does not last. Too often we sell our birthright for a mess of pottage. Be strong and consistent. Don't try to impress. Be natural. Set your standard and adhere to it. These rules are simple; they are difficult to maintain and they require sacrifice from those who would fully observe them, but the results obtained from the strict adherence to them are worth more than the necessary sacrifice.

Let me briefly summarise. Our discipline in the past has left much to be desired, and we must admit that it has produced rather tragic results. There is the necessity for good discipline now and in the future. The achievement of that discipline rests with us as officers and NCOs. It is not only our duty to ourselves; it is also our duty to the men, and it is a responsibility which we owe to Australia, to see that it is achieved and maintained. We belong to - and pride ourselves in belonging to - a democracy, but we must recognise the fact that that democracy will cease if we have not the ability to defend it or the will to fight for it. In order to preserve our national liberty we must at times sacrifice our personal liberty, and without that personal sacrifice the national liberty will be endangered. Those who live after us will be faced with a similar responsibility. When we return to Australia our responsibilities in this direction will increase. We must recognise in the world in which we live that a surrender to our selfish desires will mean the ultimate surrender of our ideals and our liberty.

In conclusion, let us by example show that the ideal army of democracy is an army in which all ranks obey cheerfully and without reservation; where the maximum effect is maintained with the minimum of effort; where sacrifices are made and service given freely and ungrudgingly by all. A disciplined army of free men!

MODERN LEADERSHIP

This is the age of the computer, and if you know how to program the machine you can get quick and accurate answers. But, how can you include leadership - and morale which is affected by leadership - into your programming? So, let us never forget the great importance of this element leadership, and while we use computers for certain answers, let us not try to fight a whole war or even a single battle without giving proper consideration to the element of leadership.

General of the Army
Omar Bradley
16 May 1967

SERVICE WITH THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE
AND OBSERVERS, SINAI

BY

MAJOR I.A. BENNETT, RNZCT

Major Bennett joined the New Zealand Army in 1975 and was commissioned in 1977 from the Officer Cadet Training Unit, Waiouru.

Major Bennett has subsequently served in various RNZCT units and in staff appointments throughout New Zealand. She participated in Exercise Long Look, in 1980. She served with the Multi-national Force and Observers in Sinai in 1985-86 as the Senior Staff Officer Transportation.

Major Bennett is currently the Officer Commanding of the 4th Composite Squadron, RNZCT, in Waiouru.

I was the Senior Staff Officer Transportation (SSO Trans) working in the Logistics Branch, HQ Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) Sinai from Jan 85 until Feb 86. The Logistics Branch was headed by an American Colonel and included officers and soldiers from the United States, British, New Zealand, Australian, French, Italian and Uruguayan Armies, Navies, and Air Forces, as well as staff of other nationalities. Norwegian, Dutch, Colombian and Fijian contingents were also represented in the overall force structure. The variety of personalities, languages and cultural backgrounds was a revelation and remains one of the most interesting aspects of service with the MFO.

My assistant in the Sinai was an Uruguayan (Infantry) Captain, who filled the SO Trans appointment. I learnt the value of, and, sometimes difficulty of communication in a second language! Although American English was the official language of the MFO, the Uruguayan officer initially had to learn 'Kiwi' English, then both of us had to comprehend American jargon! The Uruguayan officer and specialist linguists were invaluable in interpreting Spanish speaking members of the MFO. From this experience I soon realised that multinational force operations require multilingual personnel, if possible, to communicate effectively, both orally and in writing. We do not appreciate this fact in New Zealand and should spend more time training personnel in languages.

The MFO provides good lessons in arranging real logistic requirements. Getting manpower and equipment from the United States to the main port of entry in Israel then through the border to the two MFO bases in Egypt was an exercise in forward planning, patience and awareness of political constraints. More New Zealand tacticians who normally pay lip service to Logistics should be employed, like my Uruguayan counterpart, in Logistics appointments in the MFO. Only then will they fully appreciate the difficulties of suppliers and movers.

Militarily, a lot of valuable experience was gained in larger scale operations. The insight I gained confirmed my impression that 'biggest is not always best'. New Zealand personnel are by no means inferior in any theatre. However, unless we continue to be exposed to overseas service we will be naive and inexperienced in dealing with the complexities of multinational operations. Such aspects as nationalistic pride and 'face saving' are very important lessons when dealing with many nationalities.

I now appreciate all the more the logistics and maintenance requirements of a force in an inclement environment. Items like water and air conditioning become of paramount importance if personnel are to function effectively. Good food, facilities and suitable transportation for recreation and duty are also very important elements.

Personal communication is most important in the Sinai. This includes an understanding of the various languages and cultural differences of each country, including the host country, plus sensitivity to the reason for the Force's existence in the Sinai.

Personally, I became more independent and assertive from my experience in the MFO. As a female officer in charge of vehicles, which were of high morale value in the Sinai, I received a lot of 'attention' from various contingents, seeking to gain concessions and partiality in their vehicle allocations. I had to be diplomatic but decisive in ensuring that no one contingent gained favours at the expense of others.



Lt Gen Ingebrigtsen (Norway) presents the MFO medal to 1985 members of the New Zealand Contingent. From left are Maj J.K. Williams, RNZEME, WO1 W.E. Milne, RNZCT and Maj S.G. Ransley, RNZE.

I also gained a greater understanding of interpersonal relationships. Conflicts are, for the most part, unavoidable and can be aggravated by stress factors like isolation, absence from families, failure to adapt to the environment and excesses of, for example, alcohol. The difficulties created by these conflicts can be overcome, to a certain extent, by tolerance, face to face communication and sustaining good team spirit.

To follow on from this aspect (but not directly), I would like to advocate that New Zealand servicewomen are given further opportunities for service with the MFO. While there may not be many female instructors capable of filling the New Zealand Training Advisory Team training appointments the administration and contingent commander appointments can conceivably be filled by servicewomen. It would give them the challenge, variety and achievement that a career in the Army needs.

From my tour with the MFO, I gained the challenge which gave me the motivation to continue my service past the 9-10 year 'itch' stage. I now know that the memories have to last me a lot longer. The comradeship of many different nationalities was a high point in my experience, combined with the chance to live in a Middle Eastern environment and experience at first hand entirely different cultures, especially as they apply to women. I travelled extensively and developed personally through exposure to various aspects of life, in general.

Since my return, I have for the most part been unable to share my experiences with anyone other than ex MFO personnel. Whilst a lot of publicity is given to the team's work, many servicemen are simply ignorant of the conditions which are experienced in that area of the world. Reluctance for personnel to volunteer for service in the Sinai can be partially attributable, in my opinion, to this ignorance. Naturally an unaccompanied six-month tour is not acceptable to a great number of service personnel and their spouses. Many wives mistakenly see the Sinai area as being included in the Middle Eastern War Zone they see every night on their television. Better briefing to dependants as well as servicemen could help to overcome this fear.

In conclusion, one last encouragement for personnel to volunteer for MFO service could be the approval of the wearing of either the Sinai medal or a New Zealand General Service Medal. That, in my opinion will do as much to encourage volunteers in this current non combatant, non ANZUS environment as any one other factor and will give MFO Sinai service the recognition it deserves.

Will I receive mine before I retire, or will I have to live on my memories yet again?.....

REVOLUTION

"Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable".

John F. Kennedy

THE ART OF COARSEMANSHIP: PART II
TEWTING: HOW YOU TOO CAN SOAR WITH THE EAGLES

OR

DON'T LOOK NOW BUT THAT KNIFE IN YOUR BACK
HAS GOT YOUR MATE'S NAME ON IT

BY

MILE IGNOTUS

FOREWORD

Readers of the NZ Army Journal Number 4 of July 87, will recall a chimerical but succinct chapter on the fine tuning required to ensure one's time at the Tactical any other Army School would not develop into a futile exercise, the emphatic message was that the third principle of logistic support was to be adhered to at all times. There was also a vague throwaway line at the end of the dissertation threatening a further sententious salvo concentrating on providing the 'good oil' for those who wish to shine in the fields of fantasy. This vague promissory note of further verbiage to follow was to be in direct contravention of the first of Mile's Principles of Successful War in Peace (PSWP), ¹ and it is embarrassing to admit that even a hoary old veteran from all the hard fought campaigns of Triad/Trumppenant/Hernia Pass to say nothing of countless Tac Studies has succumbed to ego and broken the golden rule -NEVER VOLUNTEER FOR ANYTHING. Having committed hari kari so to speak, your faithful correspondent has had to suffer a series of pleas, threats in the form of messages and heavy breathing type phone calls to front up with the goods. Initial efforts to resist have been met with sudden ill timed appointments to Courts of Inquiry, investigations and oddly shaped duty rosters with moi's name featuring heavily on the Sabbath. Now Mile has never been known to be a groveller but he has always adhered to PSWP Number 2 ² so the middle-night oil has been burned.

Early Warning

I refer my avid readers to the Army Journal Number 4 p.27 paragraph 2. The comments made there remain valid. For those who haven't read that particular masterpiece, it is a short direction for those of overbearing ambition

¹ Economy of Effort - to achieve the maximum results with the minimum necessary effort.

² Never be a 'Yes Man'; if the Boss says 'No', then you must learn to say 'No' too.

or a lack of a sense of caprice to desist from reading that article and to press on a few pages to some dross on man management or the terrors of Mongolian strategy in 400 BC. The same advice applies to this contribution.

Why Tewting?

Tewting these days (when there is a shortage of suitable enemies - or many friendlies come to think of it), is a useful device whereby officers can display their tactical perspicacity or lack thereof. Unfortunately in these days of having to prove you are good enough to do the job, one's performance out in the paddock can be critical to the progress of the career plot and can mean all the difference between Staff College or a life of oblivion as SO3 Ranges at ATG. The subject will be dealt with in a series of short snappy paragraphs all of which will contain priceless gems of wisdom gleaned from many a fearful day defending Ngawhiotaketake from relentless assaults by 101 Inf Div.³ These 'Golden Rules' of tewting, if adhered to, should allow you to slide through the Grade III and II without too much denting of the ego or reputation.

The Aim of Tewting

In fact there would appear to be three different aims of tewting. These depend on what perspective you have:

- a. The Directing Staff (DS) aim. The most noble of all - is to teach and train a gaggle of military impuissants in all the black arts of tactics.
- b. The aim of your fellow students. To pass the course and demonstrate their ability to the best effect, if it has to be done at your expense, then so be it.⁴
- c. Your aim is to survive with your credibility intact. At the same time you will extend a helping hand to those of your comrades that deserve it and expose those whose efforts have identified them as not being Men of Spirit, (MOS).

Preparation

Tactics is still a somewhat subjective sport. The manner in which you present is almost as important as the substance of your plan. A good tactician has to be able to give the impression that his plan is exquisite and that all others should immediately be binned. To actually get the DS cheering and stomping with the remainder of the class takes a fair amount of effort but

³ Come to think of it, why do we always defend Ngawhiotaketake. When is Tac School going to muster up the courage to attack the place?

⁴ See NZ Army Journal Number 4 pp 29-31 for analysis of fellow students.

it can be done with some forethought. First impressions will count and you must arrive at the stand looking as though you know what you are doing, some carefully contrived props or costumes will add to the illusion you will create of your military prowess.

Creating the Impression - Form not Function

Appearances are critical. It is essential that you wear as little NZ issue kit as possible. 'Foreign' gear insinuates the big 'OE'. A suggested recipe for attire could be; 'Herbie J' beret, silk cravat, Para Smock/British Winter Warm/cut down Ocker Great Coat, faded non NZ cammy trou and Desert Boots. Accoutrements may include knobby cudgels (RNZAC speciality), old canvas lunch bags with United Nation badges on them and a snappy set of rubberised DPM fieldglasses. Don't be too excessive, Hugo Fanning made a rare error of judgement by swaggering around with what he claimed was an Iban Blowpipe using it for a pointer. His cover was blown when a passing Ordnance Conductor recognised it as being a 'Pole Supporting Screens Latrine Other Ranks', and tore it from our hero's grasp and marched it back into the 4 Sup Coy store. Even worse was Bert Throttlehead's⁵ attempt to impress by wearing a bootlace around his neck with what appeared to be a number of ears strung through it. Sadly one day the bulk lunch failed to arrive at Feature 'F' and Bert's appetite overcame discretion and he was collared surreptitiously gnawing on a couple of what turned out to be well dried apricots with a smattering of dye.

A Turn of Phrase May Help Turn the Tide

Tewting requires a certain aptitude with the vocals. Let's face it when it's your turn to present at Jane Russell all that you will have to support your plan will be some vague scrawl on the map board and your ability to talk your way through the minefields that lie ahead. Your cause will be aided immensely if you can string a few sentences together laced with suitable adjectives that give you that authoritative air. This can be a tough time for certain individuals (particularly those from the tooth type Corps), whose working vocabulary tends to be monosyllabic in nature.

Establish early on the fact that you have loquacity. The ground brief is a good change. Consider this example:

'The terrain in question has a drainage tilt from east to west and the high mean precipitation coupled with the antediluvian mud stone has meant extensive erosion causing a cross compartmentalisation of the terrain that will significantly degrade mobility'.

⁵ Bert was the archetypical Military Clod. His main, and only, virtue was his determination to press on in all circumstances. There are still a few of these types to be found and they are normally located in the front row of the nearest scrum. Military Clods often display 'thruster' type tendencies so should be avoided at all costs. Usually they are fairly obtuse and one can insult them gratuitously all day with never a fear that they will comprehend what is happening.

How much more authoritative does that sound compared with:

'Ahhh you can see the land falls away to yuh left sortof, and there's a lotta gullies round here which I dropped a VB in once so youse gotta be careful'.

Easy is it not? A few well chosen words will make all the difference between a positive start and a fumbling introduction. Ensure you have a good grasp of the 'Buzz Words' and that every sentence includes at least one of them. Such meaningless terms as 'Synergise the Combat Power of both Formations' and 'Utilisation of the Inherent Mobility latent within the Unit' will stand you in good stead.

Well we have covered the preparation fairly comprehensively so we will press on with what I consider to be the 'Eight Golden Rules of Tewting'. Pay attention and take note all you fellow MOS.

RULE No. 1 - Don't Fight the White - Bend with the Breeze

The Principles of War are fairly well documented, why bother trying to invent your own? The party line is comfortable and rewards those that remain in its embrace. For those that go against the grain there will be hard times from the DS and only derision from your fellow students, (who rather like seagulls will turn on the member of the pack who dares not to conform). So when you are struggling to defend the approaches to Waiouru Junction against the Musorian Hordes don't go in for lateral thinking and rush forward the brigade reserve (the gallants from 9 Rakaiia), or by pressganging the Palmerston North taxis for transport. Neither will organising a crafty seven phase clearing operation on Waitangi be met with any enthusiasm. Such flights of fancy can be attempted by Specialist Officers and even they will be told to go away and lie down for a while. ⁶

RULE No. 2 - Present First or Last but NEVER EVER Second

The order of batting at presentation time is critical. My advice is to make sure you are numero uno. You can arrange this by volunteering. If this is not possible make sure that you are last. This is harder since volunteering to be last will rouse the suspicions of the DS as to your intentions to plagiarise the other presenter's work. If you present first you will get some credit (to say nothing of sympathy), for courage. Even if your plan is shakey so long as it is given with competence then the opposition will tend to keep their distance. After all yours is the first plan they have heard, there will be


⁶ You will have to wait for a real war to use your imagination in this manner. Joffre moved the 7th Div from Paris to the Marne by taxi in September 1914 so stalling H.J. Moltke, (not H.K.B.) and it appears some characters from 3 Para organised a seven phase attack on a position called Goose Green which from all reports had a modicum of success.

the nagging thought that you might be right, better shut up rather than display ignorance by opening up at question time. Therefore the vultures will remain in a holding pattern.

Now the wretch who delivers second is in real trouble as the thrusters will have regained their courage. This could be their last chance to impress the DS that they have 'got a grip'. So reaching down they fire up their 'McCullochs' and go in just behind the knees. Of course if you are last in the line things will be cool, everyone is thoroughly bored. You will have heard enough solutions to be able to do some fine tuning to your own plan (like change it from an attack to a withdrawal), and the team's main aim is to get back for lunch or happy hour or whatever. So it will be once over lightly and 'Home James at the High Port'.

RULE No. 3 - Use Only The Ground You Can See

An almost universal phobia amongst the students is their conviction that the DS are out to trick them. Not true sir, the students only deceive themselves. At a TEWT get to the presentation stand as early as possible, survey the miserable scene in front of you of stunted scrub clinging to the scabby hills of Waiouru through the inevitable stinging dust, (Summer), or driving rain (any other time of the year). You should be able to pick out that part of the terrain your plan should be based on, ie, the piece of turf you can best see. Don't worry about trying to organise the plan to accommodate sneaky little outflanking manoeuvres that can't be seen from the stand. The students will be straining their imaginations to follow your plan let alone trying to visualise the unseen terrain it will occupy.



RULE No. 4 - Recognise Defeat, Admit it and Press On

Even the smartest will fall down occasionally. Do so gracefully and salvage some of your reputation. It is a dreary sight watching some ingrate endeavouring to rearrange the deckchairs on the 'Titanic' when everyone else has headed for the rail. Thrusters have a penchant for this sort of thing arguing to the death their lost cause. The DS are in the happy position of having the final say, your classmates will snigger and you will go down. If you have cocked it up, admit it. Fanning always recovered well from these positions with a brusque 'Good point Sire, and extremely well brought out,' as he rapidly withdrew from the mire.

RULE No. 5 - Getting the Last Word Sometimes Means Having the First One

The manner in which you handle the questions will affect your grade. Remember be respectful to the DS, (as one should to a deity whose tactical acumen is beyond reproach), and tear the throat out of your classmates if they have the temerity to make even the mildest inquiry as to the reason why. It pays to establish early a reputation for ruthless rejoinders that kneecaps the opposition without mercy. From then on your fellow course-persons will treat you with respect and keep their distance. You must refrain from the normal abuse that gets hurled about, your responses must slash not bludgeon. Boring imprecations such as 'Dropshort', 'Turrethead', 'Nutstrangler' or 'Blanket Counter' should be refrained from. You should develop a more imaginative series of phrases that will scythe down the opposition, a few are listed below as examples:

- a. 'It is obvious that it has been an extremely long time since you did any real soldiering' - to any ingrate hailing from LF Comd or the SAS Centre.
- b. 'I can see only one Principle of War demonstrated in this plan, that of Surprise and it bloody well astounds me'. to Specialist Officers (especially SOBs).
- c. 'One gets the impression you have been standing close to the muzzle without your ear defenders, surely you heard what the DS said last period' - to RNZA types who are being particularly thick.

RULE No. 6 - Be Good at Something

It is surprising how demonstrating an expertise in one area will flow onto the rest of your work. Make every effort to learn about one small area of tactics, something such as siting of MMGs will do the trick, and become the authority. This is actually quite easy to do, a few casual remarks about 'beaten zones', 'grazing fire', 'secondary arcs' etc will suffice; most infantrymen are fairly vague on such matters and the remainder will be loathe to have you on.

RULE No. 7 - Watch Your No Two

Syndicated presentations are fraught with peril. Quickly identify what capabilities your No 2 has and get him working in those areas. Education Corps No 2s can be disastrous with tactics but generally are really smart on the graphics, so get them going knocking out the Grouping Chart. If you are a No 2 endeavour to support your No 1, unless he is a SOB or a Thruster, then a demolition job could be in order. This can be done in many ways. The most devastating being at the start of the presentation with a short speech along the lines of 'I am part of this syndicate but I do not support my leader Nigel's plan. However, I have done my best to assist him despite my scepticism'.⁷ I can assure you that such a move will leave poor Nigel hard aground and taking water fast.

RULE No. 8 - Graphics. The Less You Have The Less They Have Got To Hang You With

Beautifully scribed graphics may demonstrate your ability at technical drawing but any part of your plan committed to hard copy will anchor you along with it. It is bad news to be straight-jacketed to your graphics. If they are too detailed no way can the mid presentation adjustment be done. Just stick down the broadest outlines. A smart trick is to have the Grouping Chart on the back of the outline plan, that way you can quickly show it and then turn it around out of sight and out of mind.

RULE No. 9 - Dirty Tricks, Nothing is Fair in War or Tewting

Did I say eight rules? Never mind, an extra one never goes astray.

Some people have been known to adopt sabotaging techniques to interfere with ones progress. Now I would never dream of such reptilian behaviour, save perhaps if there was a particularly obnoxious type about. Certainly I do not commend my readers to indulge in such practices, however, for interest sake I have included a couple of possibilities that will guarantee confusion such as:

- a. Having a small syringe of meths handy. A surreptitious squirt on the opposition's map board two minutes before he presents will cause some alarm and despondency.
- b. A crafty substitution of Annex A, the Order of Battle. Replacing the current problems Annex with an old one relating to a different problem will also cause distress. It is best done in the back of the Rover to the driver's copy of the problem as he rarks up SH1 in the daily Tewting Grand Prix.

⁷ Before dropping one of these ensure that Nigel lacks the physical capacity to exact retribution.

- c. Fanning absolutely devastated one Thruster by slipping him a purported copy of the 'Green' for Grand Alliance Number 17. The victim's confusion at the stand was a joy to behold as he floundered deeper and deeper in the mire with a totally unworkable plan.

Well Gentilepersons that concludes this chapter. If you pay attention, carefully dissect the facts from the fatuous then you should thrive. In the extremely unlikely event, (haven't I said this before?) of there being a further edition of the Army Journal, and if I continue to be serving the Queen you could look forward to further exposes of how to survive in the military environment. Watch out for:

'POSTED TO DEFENCE HQ? - HOW TO CONVERT DESPAIR INTO DELECTATION'

Pip! Pip!

SPECIAL CONSTABLES, 1913:FREYBERG WAS ONE

BY

PROFESSOR LAURIE BARBER

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THE PROBLEM

The 1913 Waterfront Strike was a 'Law and Order' issue wherein militant Farmers' Union membership, 'Special Constables' and the Armed Forces, played a forceful role. ¹

Wellington was the venue of the Strike's beginning, when shipwrights disgruntled at the discontinuation of transport and travelling time allowances affiliated themselves with the aggressive Wellington Watersiders' Union. Their employers argued that the discontinuation of a travelling payment was fair in that all the Union Shipping Company's workshops had been shifted to Evans Bay in 1912, and that the preferential payment previously made to shipwrights was no longer justified. The Watersiders' Union did not accept this plea and, with provocation on both sides, the contest escalated, until on 22 October 1913 an illegal stop work meeting was followed by a 'lock out' that in turn was followed by a strike. The 'Great Strike of 1913' soon spread to other New Zealand ports, and to other industries, especially coal mines.

Violence was an early expressed characteristic of the Strike and the police were ill-prepared to meet this violence. In 1913 the Wellington Police District was staffed by only 15 inspectors and 146 other ranks, ² a force incapable of keeping order amongst the 1500 strikers, amongst the 'Free

¹ Hughes, Virginia.

'Massey's Cossacks: The Farmers in the 1913 Strike', unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Auckland, 1977; J.R. Claypool, 'The Southern Waikato Contingent of Massey's "Cossacks"', unpublished B.A. (Hons.) exercise, University of Waikato, 1982; R.C.J. Stone, 'A History of Trade Unionism in New Zealand, 1913-1937', unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Auckland, 1948.

² Hughes, Virginia.

op, cit; p.40.

Labour' bent on working the ships, and amongst the anti-unionists, towns' folk and farmers, who were keen to teach the 'socialist' strikers a lesson.

On 24 October clashes occurred in Wellington streets, when striking trade unionists broke through the wharf gates and attacked the 'Free Labour' loading the steamer 'Defender'. Senior police officers were disturbed and began to consider their options in the maintenance of law and order.

On 26 October over 1000 strikers prevented work on the wharves, and in the afternoon a large crowd marched in procession to the Basin Reserve, stormed the gates, and held an angry protest meeting.

Herdman, the Minister of Police and Justice was now under pressure from capital city business interests to assure the protection of their property, and he reassured them that:

'Everything is being done to maintain law and order and ensure that proper protection is accorded to citizens and their property.'³

The minister then appealed to the country for 'Special Constable' volunteers, to come with horses, to reinforce the regular police. The Farmer's Union, a vigorous and political movement, bent on maximising rural advantage, had already anticipated this appeal, and farmers, their sons, and some farm workers (impressed or adventurist) arrived in the city eager for action.

In the confrontation that followed crowds were charged by baton wielding 'Special Constables', revolvers were fired both by 'Specials' and strikers, troops with fixed bayonets guarded some key points, and strikers armed with fence palings attacked the police line. A correspondent with the Wellington daily The Dominion reported a riot near Buckle Street on 3 November, a riot representative of several of the fierce city street fights of late 1913:

'There was a roar from the crowd, as the main body of the Specials charged down Taranaki Street, shots were fired. It was now dusk so that although I saw the flashes of guns from the centre of the road any gunplay from the footpath was now in the nature of an impression. Horses plunged and reared. Cries of anguish and two riderless horses told their tale. The crowd roared in anger and defiance...there was a respite when the Specials passed onwards down the street, but not for long. They wheeled

³ Spyve, P.J.

'The Barracks on the Hill'; a history of the Army's presence at Mount Cook, Wellington, 1843-1979'. Unpublished manuscript, Defence Library, Wellington, 1982.

around. As they galloped past a renewal of gunfire and the murderous fusillade of stones and palings, even an empty kerosene tin, hurtled through the air at which horses reared dangerously...it was not time for the rival factions to lick their wounds. The injured were removed from the streets littered with debris. Doctors and an ambulance arrived. It was found that two civilians and a permanent officer had been wounded from gunfire'.⁴

Given this undisciplined use of batons, buggy-spokes, and revolvers, by the 'Specials' it is surprising that there was no loss of life. It is hardly surprising that the wild west behaviour of the fiercely anti-syndicalist farmer 'Specials' convinced the government that they must be brought under proper and strict discipline before Wellington streets began to flow with blood.

RESOLUTION

Who was to accomplish this miracle and transform the 'Specials' into a disciplined law enforcement unit? There was only one government agency equipped with the trained manpower for this task - the army. Army Headquarters in Buckle Street now became the headquarters of the visiting Special Constables, and the Dominion's small regular force of officers and NCOs began to assert its authority over their trouble-seeking country cousins.

Routine orders, issued by Colonel Stuart Newall, CB, soon began to appear from Army Headquarters. Newall was authorised to name himself Commander of The Force of 'Special Constables', and appointed Colonel A.H. Russell as his Chief of Staff on 9 November 1913. In the same routine order of that day he named eight acting captains as squadron commanders.⁵ Discipline was quickly imposed. A parade of 'Specials' was ordered for 0800 hours on 10 November, and picquet and camp fatigue duties were delegated to E Squadron.

On 10 November routine orders reveal that the army was still facing some difficulties in asserting its authority over the 'Specials'. Those quartered at Mount Cook Barracks, Wellington, were ordered to refrain from invading the Royal New Zealand Artillery kitchen to obtain their hot water.⁶

On 11 November twenty acting lieutenants were appointed, and on 12 November D and E squadrons were ordered to furnish one man each for the sick horse lines each day. In this routine order Special Constable Gallaghan

⁴ Lawlor, Pat. 'End of an Era', Wellington, 1979. p 333.

⁵ Orders by Colonel Stuart Newall, CB, commanding the force of Special Constables.

⁶ Ibid, 10 November 1913.

was dismissed for drunkenness and insubordinate conduct.⁷ By this time the Army Permanent Staff had created some order from chaos.

Despite the army's insistence on military discipline and despite a leavening of soldiers with rifles and bayonets at the entrance to the Buckle Street Headquarters, the army's control over the 'Specials' on-street operations was never total. Paul Spyve notes:

'Special Constables themselves revealed that they tended not to use their batons discreetly. In one charge against strikers D.P. Fraser, a Special Constable, noted that as casualties increased "our baton strikes became heavier, and more than one striker got something that would make his head sing for a day or two"... shop-keepers and homeowners also complained of abuse. Several shopkeepers who refused to serve 'Specials' complained of assault, and when one striker sought refuge from 'Specials' in a private home his pursuers wrought havoc. "They wantonly smashed pictures, photos, crockery, a firescreen, a sewing machine, and practically all the china and glassware in the room'.⁸

The army did the best it could to make a silk purse out of a sow's ear. Colonel Russell insisted that all Special Constables must wear their arm-bands conspicuously when on parade, and insisted on clean quarters, medical parades, church parades, and obedience. On 15 November the army commanders were able to rid themselves of those who responded poorly to discipline, by inviting volunteer 'Specials' to make new applications for enrolment for the duration of the industrial conflict. Squadron Commanders and Staff Officers vetted the applications to reject troublemakers.⁹

By the close of November most of the Dominion's ports were functioning again and the 'Specials' began to move back to their farms, sure that the 'Red Feds' had been smashed. The last of 'Massey's Cossacks' left Wellington soon after the strike was formally ended on 20 December. By this time the army's authority was able to be asserted with military precision. The orders for 'Special Constables' leaving camp were:

| | |
|-------------------------------|---------|
| Checking and Returning Stores | 3.00 am |
| Pay | 3.30 am |
| Coffee | 4.00 am |
| Move off | 4.30 am |

'All of those going will be formed up facing Taranaki Street. Manawatu men in front.'¹⁰

⁷ Spyve P.J. op. cit; p.222.

⁸ Orders by Colonel Stuart Newall, 15 November 1913.

⁹ Ibid, undated.

There were rewards for returning veterans. The Committee of the Hawkes Bay Jockey Club posted complimentary tickets for its summer race meeting to each and every 'Special' who returned to the Bay. In Auckland a flamboyant Farmers' Union Provincial Committee presented a commemoration medal to all serving 'Specials'. The face of the medal showed a uniformed farmer with a baton at the ready, with the reverse showing a sailing ship beneath a bag of produce and a crossed shovel and pick.

THE ANALYSIS

How pleased was the army to have the Special Constable command imposed upon it? For the army the 1913 strike with its requirement for command and discipline of the Wellington 'Specials' provided a first test for the Dominion's new Defence Act 1909. This Act had made provision for the general military training of all young men up to the age of twenty-one, and for the maintenance of a Territorial Force of 20,000 of all ranks. The Act applied the Swiss concept of every man a soldier to New Zealand; its aim was the transforming of civilians into soldiers.

The Defence Act of 1909 was legislated to allow a speedy training of citizen soldiers, and some of the 'Specials' who came to Wellington in 1913 were Territorials who understood the army's hierarchy and command structure. This leavening of Territorials within the ranks of the 'Specials' made the army's task much easier.

All in all the officers and NCOs of New Zealand's permanent force emerged from the 1913 strike with a heightened reputation for their capacity to discipline and command a citizen force, some with military experience, some with none. In less than a year from the strike's beginning the same regular officers and NCOs were required to exercise this function again, in the preparation of an expeditionary force for the battlefields of World War I.

In this larger contest, at Gallipoli and Flanders, two men who had served in Wellington streets in 1913 gained lasting fame. The first was Colonel A.H. Russell who commanded a brigade at Gallipoli and then, as a Major-General, commanded the New Zealand Division in Egypt. The second was a legend in his lifetime. Later dubbed 'the Salamander' by Winston Churchill, in 1913 he was known as Special Constable B.C. Freyberg.

QUOTABLE QUOTES

"Despite the growth of the logistical dimensions of warfare, the professional soldier is, in the last analysis, a military commander and not a business or organisational administrator".

Morris Janowitz

MAINTAINING PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EXPERTISE
DURING PEACETIME

BY

MAJOR E.J. BRIDGE, B.A., RNZ SIGS

No study is possible on the battlefield; one does there simply what one can in order to apply what one knows. Therefore, in order to do even a little, one has already to know a great deal and to know it well.

Foch¹

Major Bridge graduated from Canterbury University with a BA and was commissioned into the New Zealand Army in 1976. She has held appointments in both 1 and 4 Signal Squadrons. In addition she has served on the Army General Staff and has been an instructor at Officer Cadet Training Company. Major Bridge graduated from the United States Armed Forces Air Force Telecommunications System Staff Officer Course in 1985. She was the Chief Instructor at the School of Signals in 1985-87 and attended the RNZAF Staff College in 1987, the first female Army Officer to do so. Major Bridge has contributed to the journal previously.

INTRODUCTION

Although war is as old as mankind, the military profession itself is comparatively young. It was not until 1890 that military officers became 'professional', that is, more than the mercenaries who fought for profit and the nobles who fought for glamour and glory. Subsequently, the technology of war developed to such an extent that the military officer became a specialist, a man who devoted himself full time to acquiring the knowledge and skills necessary for successful armed combat.

New Zealand's regular military officers today face a unique challenge to their profession. It is now 42 years since New Zealand was formally at war and the country mobilised to support the war effort. Although since then

¹ Foch, Marshal.

The Principles of War (translated by Hilaire Belloc). Chapman and Hall, 1918. p5.

New Zealand servicemen have actively served in Korea, Borneo, Malaysia and Vietnam, participation has been of a lower scale. This decade, New Zealand's contribution to world peace has been restricted to peacekeeping operations in Rhodesia and the Middle East. Over these years, the regular cadres of the three Services have reached varying strengths and structures, depending on changes in Defence Policy.

Protracted peace poses a peculiar threat unique to the military profession. As with all professional fields, military knowledge and skill are vulnerable to lack of use, even misuse, yet war is not a state to be encouraged merely for the maintenance of professional military standards. How then is military professionalism retained? This essay will assess the ability of regular New Zealand military officers to maintain professional expertise during a period of protracted peace.

DEVELOPING AND MAINTAINING PROFESSIONAL EXPERTISE

Developing Expertise

What is 'professional expertise'? It can be defined as 'specialised knowledge and skill in a significant field of human endeavour'². The specialised expertise of military officers encompasses advice on, and the organisation and execution of military power. However, professional knowledge limited solely to a military specialisation is not sufficient for today's regular military officers. Military power is not exercised in isolation - it is used by countries in conjunction with political and economic power; consequently, professional officers must have an understanding of the politics and economics of today's world. They must also understand the pressures on the present peace, the strategies of the nations involved in its maintenance and the backgrounds, and issues of current conflicts around the world.

Professional knowledge and skills are developed through extensive education, study and training. As a base to professional knowledge, military officers should initially obtain a broad liberal education, so that they can appreciate disciplines other than the military, and how the other disciplines relate to the profession of arms. After this, officers should receive formal schooling aimed at imparting the specialised technical expertise peculiar to the military and to individual officers' particular roles.

Maintaining Expertise

Maintenance of this expertise should then be achieved by practical experience interspersed with further formal training at certain stages in the officer's progress through command and staff appointments. Learning

² AC 71334 (Pt 1), British Army Publication - The Army Field Manual Vol 1 Part 1, The Application of Force. p 22.

traditional procedures and techniques is not enough - officers must be constantly aware of new technologies, capabilities, innovations and developments within the profession. Officers should work to add not only to their own knowledge but also to that of the profession.

Peacetime provides extensive opportunity for most aspects of developing and maintaining professional knowledge. New Zealand's present state of peace offers one vital ingredient - time. With no immediate foreseeable threat, New Zealand's regular officers have the time to gain the education required in a wide variety of areas such as arts, sciences, law, and politics. All Services have tertiary study schemes available at the beginning of and throughout commissioned service - full time, part time or extra mural.

Formal military schooling is intensive in all three New Zealand Armed Forces in preparing officers for their special areas of expertise. Some establishments, for example the RNZAF Command and Staff College, recognise the importance of officers' general education and aim to improve this rather than further develop the specialised fields of individuals.

Contact with other countries' forces by way of courses, exercises and visits, and by professional magazines, assist officers to update their knowledge on new developments in, for example, equipment, tactics and doctrine. Modern commercial media are available to keep the officer informed on international events of relevance and technological changes in warfare.

Lack of Combat Experience

Peace however, does not include the practical experience of armed combat. The military profession has a unique flaw in that part of its roll is to ensure that its stage of preparation provides adequate deterrence; the contradiction is that the Armed Forces may never receive the ultimate test of their professionalism. This leaves the training of professional officers incomplete as practical wartime experience not only provides the best test of officers' professional abilities, it also adds other dimensions to their professionalism. Successful combat experience adds confidence, and a mental 'robustness'³ to military officers.

In the absence of the 'hardening' effect of battle, regular officer training should be as demanding and realistic as possible. In the absence of personal experiences regular officers must study the experiences of others: military history can illustrate clearly many facets of warfare. The campaigns of previous centuries demonstrate the validity of principles of war; modern conflict helps officers to learn about the employment of today's military capabilities and how to better prepare themselves for the reality of warfare as it could occur in the 1990s and into the twenty-first century.

³ Ibid. p 71.

Professional Attitudes

Perhaps the greatest yet most insidious inhibitors to maintaining military professionalism are officers' attitudes to the profession. There are a number of factors related to New Zealand's current political and social state that affect the attitudes and emphasis of officer training.

The lack of an obvious direct threat to New Zealand and the protracted peace give the Services a lack of focus for their activities. It is easy for individuals to deny that they are part of a profession and either to accept the military as a secure, comfortably paid job with ample opportunity for an '8 to 5' lifestyle; or to embark on the pursuit of 'careerism', that is, personal advancement and success, in the absence of any other worthwhile challenge.

As a result of this lack of identifiable focus or aim, and also perhaps because of a feeling of social isolation, the Armed Forces tend to look to other sectors in the community for standards, systems and techniques⁴. There are many things that the Services can learn from the civilian community, however military officers must remember that the Armed Forces are unique in their purpose and that that uniqueness should not be diluted just because it is uncomfortable.

There may also be a danger that technical specialists and managers receive more training emphasis and attention than combat leaders⁵; the training of technical specialists is more quantifiable than that of combat leaders, and managers can be trained and assessed relative to the civilian world. Combat leaders however, are at the heart of the military profession and their education, training and professional development must be treated as such.

CONCLUSION

Protracted peace offers New Zealand's Regular Force military officers with both time and facilities to develop and maintain professional expertise. Vital combat experience is not available, but can be partly compensated for by demanding and realistic officer training, and study of the past and present conflicts of other nations.

The most serious threat to professional military expertise may be the attitudes fostered by the current New Zealand social and political conditions. New Zealand regular officers who wish to retain 'professional' expertise must resist the temptation to regard the military as anything less than a profession.

⁴ For example, the RNZAF Command and Staff College Senior Staff Course studies leading New Zealand companies and compares company management to that of Defence.

⁵ Combat leaders' are defined as those officers directly involved in armed combat, that is, combat arms commanders (NZ Army), Seaman officers (RNZN) and General Duties officers (RNZAF).

A professional attitude of striving to 'know a great deal and to know it well' is the regular officer's key to a worthwhile contribution in both war and peacetime.

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COMPULSORY MILITARY TRAINING - MORE SOLDIERSOR BETTER CITIZENS

BY

MAJOR M.I. POPE, RNZA*'There are lies, damned lies, and statistics'**Sir Winston Churchill*

Major Pope joined the NZ Army in 1974 and was commissioned in 1975 from the Officer Cadet School, Portsea, Australia.

Major Pope has subsequently served in various RNZA units and staff appointments throughout New Zealand. He served as a member of the Truce Monitoring Force Zimbabwe/Rhodesia in 1979-80 and served with the Multi National Force and Observers in Sinai in 1985-86 as the Visits/Protocol Officer.

Major Pope is currently Staff Officer Grade 2 Operations on the Headquarters Support Command.

INTRODUCTION

On 31 Jul 86, the Defence Committee of Enquiry, chaired by Mr Frank Corner, CMG, tabled its report on New Zealand attitudes to defence and security issues. Entitled 'Defence and Security : What New Zealanders Want', it revealed inter-alia that 72% of the population were in favour of some form of Compulsory Military Training (CMT). In some age groups (ie, the over 55 year old category), support was as high as 89%. Unfortunately, these simple statistics tell us nothing of the motives that prompted this response, nor of the preferred form and scope that training should take.

Detailed analysis of the Corner Report indicates that there were two distinct factors influencing the thinking of those who favoured a return to CMT. The first was the ANZUS debate, which stimulated the proposition that CMT was needed to compensate in some measure for the loss of United States security 'guarantees'. The second was that the youth of New Zealand was becoming increasingly alienated from 'mainstream' values and that some form of military service was needed to imbue the younger generation with a sense of pride, discipline and self worth. Submissions to the Corner Committee that 'my concern is not with the military hardware: but with the youth of New Zealand' underscore public misgivings about the failure of society to provide equitable social, educational, and employment opportunities for all its citizens. The

Zealand¹ underscore public misgivings about the failure of society to provide equitable social, educational, and employment opportunities for all its citizens. The Labour Department, in conjunction with the Ministry of Defence, has already moved to counteract these imbalances through the highly successful Limited Service Volunteer (LSV) scheme.²

This collaborative project aims to provide unemployed youths the opportunity of improving their personal qualities and acquiring skills which might be useful in the New Zealand workforce.³ How much further the Army should, or is equipped to travel along the Social Welfare road is the moot point. The Army is not an adjunct to the Labour, Justice or Social Welfare Departments, nor is it a corrective establishment. Its role is to train for war. In training LSVs, its very finite manpower and material resources are considerably stretched. Traditionally, the Army's training emphasis has been on producing better soldiers. If the findings of the Corner Committee were accepted as policy, then the Army could be asked to assume new responsibilities which have traditionally fallen within the purview of other Government Departments.

This essay examines the extent to which the Army should, and can assist the community in producing better citizens.

Emphasis will be placed on the current LSV scheme as an 'in being' institution, and an estimate will be made of the costs and benefits accruing to Army as the result of any possible widening of training commitments.

Assumptions

In analysing the Army's ability to respond to calls for greater community involvement, the following assumptions are made:

- a. that the current Defence Review will not significantly alter the roles and tasks of the Ready Reaction Force (RRF), or Integrated Expansion Force (IEF);
- b. that the size and composition of the Army are sufficient to meet current defence needs;
- c. that the finance available to Defence will continue to be strictly limited; and
- d. that other government departments are willing to assist.

1 Corner F. CMG. Defence and Security: What New Zealanders Want. Wellington 1986, P51.

2 Gordon K.M. Brig. LSV Implementation Directive. Defence HQ, 2 Feb 84, P1.

3 Gordon K.M. Brig. Ibid.

THE ARMY AND SOCIETY

Reality and Myth

It is axiomatic that the first duty of any government is to defend the country. It is equally axiomatic that in a democracy, the Army exists to support the government in fulfilling that particular function. Its responsibilities extend from combating external threats, to assisting the police during internal disorder situations, and supporting the country's Civil Defence (CD) organisation in times of Regional or National emergency. It is not a self-perpetuating organisation which exists beyond the rule of law or in spite of popular demand. On this basis, it can reasonably be argued that if the public, through a duly elected government, wishes the Army to extend its training skills into the community to help counteract forces which undermine its social cohesion, then it is duty bound to respond. Perhaps the question needs to be asked though whether or not the Army is the most appropriate Government Department to provide the support required. Possession of certain specialist skills does not automatically imply that the owner of those skills is the best person for any particular job. Doctors might be very good at splinting fractures; but when a horse breaks a leg one calls in a vet.

Over one third of those who made submissions to the Corner Committee preferred a training curriculum based on the establishment of educational workshops covering 'Social Responsibilities, Cultural Understanding, Loving Relationships and World Peace'.⁴ Arguably, the Army is not the best teacher in any of these subjects and the Education and Social Welfare Departments might be better suited to assist.

Notwithstanding the fact that no study has ever established a correlation between military service and good citizenship, the public clearly perceived that the by-products of military training, (self-reliance, discipline, camaraderie and self-esteem), were also essential ingredients in the fight against crime.⁵ It may be purely circumstantial, but since the abolition of CMT in 1958, the youth crime rate has burgeoned alarmingly.

It is tempting to speculate that military service did exert a tempering influence over recruits. The establishment of the 'Otara Brigade', which seeks to give first time offenders the opportunity of improving their personal qualities through discipline, teamwork and self-esteem, seems to support this.

The Military Requirements

In the absence of any direct military threat, it is difficult to justify a significant increase in the size of the New Zealand Army. Indeed, the Prime Minister has already confirmed a reduction in our strategic area of influence

4 Corner F. CMG. Defence and Security: What New Zealanders Want.
Wellington 1986, P51.

5 Corner F. CMG. Ibid.

and has elected to withdraw 1 RNZIR from Singapore. The Regular Force (RF) is presently constituted to respond to a crisis in the South Pacific Basin and the Territorial Force (TF) is, by and large, geared to support it in that role.

The creation of the RRF and IEF should constitute a rationalisation of strategic priorities, training needs, and economic reality. The weak link appears to be the TF which has been reduced in size over a number of years. Attendances at Annual Camps and at unit training fluctuate considerably from unit to unit, and from year to year. For the proponents of CMT, it is tempting to speculate that falling roles and poor attendances could be overcome by a steady infusion of recruits from the CMT depots. It is not recommended that this policy be adopted however because it is felt that in doing so, a significant element of goodwill which exists toward the Army would be eroded. Those TF soldiers who do attend training on a regular basis are highly motivated individuals who enjoy soldiering and who are willing to give up their spare time because they share a common defence ethos and enjoy the challenge. They are also trained in military skills to achieve military ends. They are not underachievers referred to the Army from the Labour Department. Better a small, well motivated force than a larger conscripted one, in being to serve Social Welfare needs.

Summary

Nearly three quarters of those who made submissions to the Defence Committee of Enquiry viewed CMT as a means of combating the anti-social behaviour which is a function of unemployment, poor self esteem, lack of parental guidance, and poor social attitudes. Had the public demanded a re-introduction of CMT to support strictly military requirements, then the Army's response could have been clear and unequivocal. Because so many people wanted a training regime based on social studies and trade skills, the case for Army involvement becomes more difficult to justify. The Army is presently structured to meet traditional defence needs. Although it can accept wider responsibilities in terms of community assistance projects, (indeed it already does through the LSV scheme), any increased participation can presently only be achieved at the expense of other tasks.

COMMUNITY ASSISTANCE PROJECTS

The Basis of Involvement

The attractiveness of Army involvement in the community is its pool of disciplined, highly trained personnel. It has sufficient communications, transport and material resources to sustain itself anywhere in New Zealand for protracted periods, either in support of the community, or in accordance with training commitments. For a number of years, the Army has been involved in community assistance projects which have some training or Public Relations value. Because the Army has traditionally drawn its recruits from the broad cross-section of society, it has become adept at providing training to people from widely disparate educational and socio-economic backgrounds. In 1983,

Army agreed to extend these training skills farther into the community by participating in the LSV scheme.

The LSV Scheme

The emphasis on training LSVs has throughout been on producing better citizens rather than good soldiers. The objectives of the scheme are to:

- a. increase the fitness; confidence, self-esteem and self-discipline of each individual;
- b. develop or improve limited work skills within various trade groups; and
- c. foster improved team-work and co-operation within the workforce.⁶

In order to achieve this LSVs undergo a period of four weeks basic training, (during which time trainees are introduced to Army life), followed by a 16 weeks trade training phase. There is no compulsion for LSVs to remain within the scheme but they are encouraged to do so until they have found permanent employment, or have completed the 20 weeks training.

Two intakes are run annually, (at Papakura, Linton and Burnham), for a total Army-sponsored output of 300 trainees.

Map reading, watermanship, bushcraft and first aid are interspersed with periods of team sports, common law, personal goal setting and New Zealand history. As the LSVs progress into their trade training cycle, so driving, typing, clerking, storekeeping and stewarding skills are acquired. In all, tuition in some 20 different trades can be provided.

Current Costs and Benefits

So far, the cost of producing better citizens has been relatively minor because:

- a. actual operating costs, (LSV pay, travel, rations, and some stores items), are recoverable from the Labour Department;
- b. the number of Army-sponsored LSVs undergoing training is low, (285-300 annually);
- c. new standing accommodation has not been needed; and
- d. the number of RF staff committed full time to the scheme is not great.

⁶ Gordon K.M. Brig.

LSV Implementation Directive.
Defence HQ, 2 Feb 84, P2.

It should be noted too that throughout the trade training cycle, units and camps make use of LSVs as unskilled, or semi-skilled workers.

The Richards' Report, (compiled on behalf of the Labour Department), assesses the scheme as 'an effective trainer of young, unemployed people' and records that the LSVs 'spoke highly of the value of the discipline, comradeship, and team spirit'⁷ as preparation for the workforce.

Apart from the positive public relations benefit which the Army derives from the scheme, its junior NCOs also gain valuable instructional experience. Perhaps most importantly of all, the public is able to note that part of the \$750M spent annually on defence is directed at solving some of society's problems.

The Need for Change

Successful though the LSV scheme may be, it fails to adequately address two key issues. The first of these is that the public does want some form of CMT. Nearly three quarters of those interviewed spoke positively about the need for, and benefits of CMT/National Service. Questions of curriculum, target population, length of service and role were closely related to factors of age, sex, and party affiliation. The most preferred options envisaged a period of compulsory training geared towards community service projects and the development of trade skills. The present LSV scheme is not compulsory, and provides training for only 300 LSVs annually.

The second key issue is that the LSV scheme functions within an implied confusion of roles.

At the moment, NCOs are required to teach non-military subjects to 'civilians in uniform' in a military environment. (It is accepted that the skills taught do have a military application; however, the emphasis is on 'trade' rather than 'military application').

Studies conducted by HQ Force Maintenance Group indicate that the LSV scheme is unpopular with staff because:

- a. the absence of any compulsion to remain within the scheme, coupled with poor vetting of candidates by the Labour Department, results in an unnecessarily high drop-out rate;
- b. it is felt that the task of producing better citizens is being achieved at the expense of military duties; and
- c. most officers and NCO's are required to 'double-hat' in order to complete normal tasks as well as administer LSVs.

⁷ Corner F. CMG.

Defence and Security: What New Zealanders Want.
Wellington 1986, P51.

Many of the above problems can be overcome with greater support from other government departments. The Labour Department already conducts Training Assistance Programmes (TAP) in a wide variety of subjects for unemployed youths. Instructional staff are drawn from the country's Technical Institutes. If the Labour Department were to provide this facility for LSVs during their trade training cycle, NCOs would be free to conduct routine administration and training. It would also provide for a clearer division of responsibility for instruction in military and non-military subjects.

Summary

The Army provides assistance to the community by supporting projects which have some training or public relations value. This has been extended through participation in the LSV scheme. This scheme is unpopular with instructors however, because it is felt that they are functioning within an implied confusion of roles. This can be overcome with greater assistance from other government departments. Currently, the Army trains only 285-300 LSVs each year. There is no direct military gain.

'WHAT NEW ZEALANDERS WANT'

General

As has been emphasised, respondents to the Committee of Enquiry preferred a training regime that was:

- a. compulsory;
- b. provided skills training in a wide variety of subjects;
- c. satisfied defence and security needs; and
- d. imbued the younger generation with a sense of personal pride, self-discipline, community spirit and self worth.⁸

A review of the objectives of the LSV scheme indicates that it satisfies only two of the above criteria. It in no way fulfills a defence need, nor is it compulsory. It also adopts a 'drop in the ocean' approach by training only 300 LSVs per year. (There are currently 79,786 people registered as unemployed).

In deciding whether or not to extend the scope of the LSV scheme to take account of all of the above criteria, two additional questions must be addressed. They are:

- a. Target Population, (and selection criteria), and
- b. The Scope of Training.

⁸ Corner F. CMG

Ibid.

Target Population and Selection Criteria

The overwhelming majority of submissions to the Corner Committee contained references to the 'youth' of New Zealand:

'We ... have a grave internal, and ever increasing problem of law and order breakdown, particularly amongst our young people'⁹; and

'At present, these qualities of self worth and self discipline seem to be lacking in much of today's youth'¹⁰.

That the Government has already considered a possible target population is clear from Parliamentary debate on the subject. In answer to the question 'How much would it cost to re-introduce CMT for all 18-24 year olds', the Rt. Hon. Frank O'Flynn informed Parliament on 9 Dec 86 that it would cost \$200M to establish suitable facilities, and that there would be ongoing support costs in the order of \$30-50M annually. It is difficult to imagine that in a period of financial belt-tightening, the government would be willing to incur expenses of this magnitude in order to socialise the nations young.

However enthusiastic the public may be about utilising the Army in a socialising role, it is doubtful whether they would support any significant increase in GST to finance it.

Statistics supplied by the Palmerston North office of the Labour Department indicate that, as at 1 Oct 86, there were 14996 unemployed youths (nationally) in the 'socially at risk' under 26 year old category. Unfortunately, establishing accommodation, training and manpower facilities for this number of people during a 'no threat' period would be prohibitive. Of the 14996 who were registered as unemployed, only 3002 were between the ages of 17½ and 19 years old, and it is felt that this group presents a more viable target population. Currently, there is little compulsion for unemployed people to accept work offered by the Labour Department and it is theoretically possible to receive an unemployment benefit for an indefinite period. If receipt of dole payments for all 17½-19 year olds were coupled to a period of CMT, then abuses of this nature could be curtailed. In order that more capable candidates should not be unfairly penalised, CMT could be made contingent upon a 'qualifying period' of being unemployed, (eg if after 6 months, the potential trainee had not found permanent employment, then receipt of future dole payments would be linked to having undergone a period of CMT). Referrals to Army would continue to come from the Labour Department.

⁹ Corner F. CMG

Ibid.

¹⁰ Morris A.J.

FMG Comment on Community Service Proposal.
Linton, 8 Feb 86.

Referrals from the Justice Department

It is not considered appropriate that miscreants be given the option of undergoing a period of detention, or joining the Army. As emphasised already, the service is not a corrective establishment and every effort should be made to ensure that the morale of its members is not affected by inappropriate stigma.

It can reasonably be argued that recruits referred to Army by the Justice Department would view training as a form of penance. Their attitudes could well affect other, better motivated recruits.

Volunteers

Although there is nothing inherently wrong with accepting volunteers, it must always be remembered that the RF and TF need intelligent, well-motivated soldiers, and volunteers should be steered in that direction. Personnel volunteering to undergo periods of CMT as a 'trial' for future army careers may well get the wrong impression about Service life. This situation already occurs.

Scope of Training

There are two issues to be considered in formulating a curriculum for CMT and, to some extent they are contradictory. If the training regime is to be based purely on 'What New Zealanders Want', then the emphasis must be on developing an improved LSV scheme whereby the Army provides accommodation, supervision, and some instruction. On the other hand, consideration needs to be given to the Army's requirements, and herein lies the difficulty.

Given that the Army is suitably structured to meet our present defence needs, the basis for any wider Army participation in an LSV/CMT scheme should be the development of a broad reserve capacity. To some extent, the TF already achieves this. However, a population educated in the rudiments of soldiering, used to discipline and acting in a cohesive manner would be useful in the event of a general mobilisation or CD emergency. In order to cater for the requirements of both the civil and military communities, a CMT/LSV regime might adopt the following format:

- a. a six week basic indoctrination phase during which time recruits are introduced to Army life and training is primarily military; and
- b. an 18 week trade training phase during which time recruits undertake TAP projects sponsored by the Labour Department. This latter period would include trade training and tuition in CD, first aid, communications skills and those subjects already covered by the current LSV scheme. There would still need to be some Army input into training where service expertise is pronounced (eg. communications and driving).

Throughout the entire period of training, recruits would be subject to military law and would wear uniform.

The advantages of this regimen are that:

- a. there is a clear division of responsibility for instruction in military and non-military subjects (obviating the 'confusion of roles' inherent with the current scheme);
- b. attendance is compulsory and trainees are subject to military law throughout, (thereby eliminating the unnecessarily high drop-out rate);
- c. staff are largely free to conduct routine administration and training during the (longer) trade training cycle;
- d. the public is getting what it wants - but so too is the Army; and
- e. in-being structures, (such as the TF), do not need to be dis-established or re-rolled.

It should be noted too that instruction in non-military topics would largely be undertaken during the trade training phase. Where the Labour Department is unable to provide tuition, the Army should continue to assist to the extent that it presently does.

The principal disadvantage of this regime is that training conducted under the auspices of the Labour Department might have to be carried out within reasonable distance of a Technical Institute or major population centre. This would rule out Waiouru as a venue for training. (This might actually be viewed with some relief in ATG, whose resources are already well stretched).

Recruits, having completed training, could then be given a reserve liability option of joining the Army (during a period of general mobilisation), or joining a CD organisation.

Summary

For training to be worthwhile, it should take account of the broader requirements of the Army (ie, the development of a reserve capacity). The overall aim must be geared towards assisting the community in producing better citizens. This is particularly important as far as the youth of New Zealand is concerned. It is unlikely that the country could sustain the costs of introducing a form of universal CMT; however, by restricting the recruiting net to all unemployed 17½-19 year olds, the financial and training costs could be kept to manageable proportions. The training cycle should consist of a six week basic induction phase, during which time the training emphasis is purely military, followed by an 18 week trade training phase with maximum input from the Labour and other Government Departments.

Costs

In assessing the costs of a revised LSV/CMT scheme, there are an infinite number of permutations complicating the production of accurate data. How permanent does the scheme need to be? Building costs vary considerably based on such factors as materials and fittings; location; transportation costs; the degree to which existing facilities are used; proximity to established reticulation; and the availability of RNZE support. The projected cost estimate, based on two 24 week intakes, each of 1500 trainees, is estimated at \$137M. Building and maintenance costs are assessed against the need to establish facilities for 500 recruits in Papakura, Linton and Burnham Camps. Contracts recently completed in Linton and Trentham were used to provide base data. Ammunition expenditure is assessed against the need to have trainees complete Practice 2 of the NZ P99. Significant savings could be made if trainees were issued the SLR 7.62mm or ColtM 16s, (as opposed to issuing new Steyr 5.56mm Individual Weapons). A summary of major costs is listed as follows:

| | <u>\$M</u> |
|---|------------------------------------|
| a. Staff Salaries | \$ 13.08M |
| b. Recruit Salaries | \$ 6.77M |
| c. Staff Accommodation | \$ 14.00M |
| d. Barrack Accommodation | \$ 40.00M |
| e. Administration Buildings/Sports Facilities/ Armouries/Lecture Rooms etc | \$ 6.50M |
| f. Training Support Costs (Rifle Ranges, Training Aids, Weapons etc) | \$ 6.31M |
| | <u>\$ 86.66M</u> |
| | +10% GST = \$ 95.26M |
| | + 5% Contingency Costs = \$100.02M |

In addition, there would be annual recurring costs as follows:

| | <u>\$M</u> |
|----------------------------|----------------------|
| a. Staff Salaries | \$ 13.08M |
| b. Recruit Salaries | \$ 6.77M |
| c. Ammunition | \$ 90,450 |
| d. FOL | \$500,000 |
| e. Heating and Maintenance | \$ 3M |
| f. Rations | \$ 8.04M |
| g. Travel | \$300,000 |
| h. Clothing | \$ 1.7M |
| Stationery | \$100,000 |
| | <u>\$ 33.58M</u> |
| | +10% GST = \$ 36.93M |

The Cost of establishing facilities is approximately \$100M, with ongoing support costs in the order of \$37M.

Benefits

Except in times of crisis, (when everyone either wears a uniform or contributes to the defence effort in some other way), the Army exists more or less in isolation to the community it serves. It trains away from population centres; lives in clearly defined areas; its' members wear uniforms which distinguish them from the community, and it has its' own professional language. Participation in a revised CMT scheme would help break down these barriers and lead to a better understanding between civilian and military personnel. The degree of co-operation required from other Government Departments would serve this same purpose.

One of the most significant benefits would be the public relations coup. The Army would be seen to involve itself in the community in a way that directly benefited society. (At the moment, the Services are viewed as a non profit-making organisation costing in excess of \$750M annually, from which few direct benefits are received).

The 'graduates' of a revised CMT scheme would re-enter society as disciplined people, used to functioning within a group, and imbued with a sense of personal pride and self esteem. It was the absence of these characteristics that prompted calls for a re-introduction of CMT. People who are self reliant, are disciplined and have a sense of self worth are less likely to become involved with anti-social activities (such as crime). This can only be to the benefit of society.

At the moment, the LSV scheme produces a steady stream of potential RF and TF recruits. The much wider community involvement required of the CMT scheme, and the larger numbers involved, should further stimulate recruiting. This is especially important as far as the TF is concerned.

By equipping trainees with the essentials of trade knowledge, and by instilling in them a sense of accomplishment and confidence, recruits should be better placed to 'sell' themselves on the open market. This already occurs with LSVs.

DISADVANTAGES OF PARTICIPATING IN A REVISED LSV/CMT SCHEME

The most significant factor mitigating against Army involvement in a revised CMT scheme is the cost. Provided that the Government is prepared to increase the Defence Vote to cover costs however, there is nothing inherently wrong with greater Army participation.

Against the cost of establishing and maintaining the scheme must be weighed the penalty costs of doing nothing. This cannot be accurately measured but can be gauged in terms of increased social disruption and the further alienation of youth.

CONCLUSION

The Army can assist the community in producing better citizens by virtue of its expertise in providing sound leadership, and training in discipline, self-reliance, communal living and trade skills. Any widening of the scope of training beyond that already provided in the LSV scheme must involve other government departments. To be truly effective, training must balance the community's need for better citizens, with the Army's need for a broadly based reserve capacity. The public relations value accruing to Army as the result of this participation will assist in developing a better understanding between the civil and military communities.

BOOK REVIEWTHE NEW ZEALAND WARSBYJAMES BELICHREVIEWED BY CAPTAIN R.S. CAMPBELL, RNZIR

It is all too easy to sit here in the Twentieth Century and reminisce on the Maori-Pakeha wars of last century as just a series of chivalrous, hard fought conflicts which were never in doubt from the outset; having little, if any, consequence in both a military and historical sense. To most, set in concrete, is the everlasting respect gained by the European for the primitive Maori as a fighting warrior gained as a result of indulging the supposedly superior fighting forces of the British Empire.

In his book, *The New Zealand Wars*, James Belich challenges these widely held views and beliefs as well as analysing both written Victorian accounts and Maori versions of the wars. The Victorian British as the prime recorders of these times, come under close scrutiny and suffer under Belich's examination of the facts. More importantly Belich identifies that the Victorian interpretation of events was often blinded by self confidence as an all conquering people and empire. The thought of primitive aborigines defeating Imperial troops was incomprehensible. Of considerable interest is the Victorian interpretation of defeat which fails to recognise superior Maori military ability: rather, British incompetence is cited as the prime reason for defeat.

According to Belich the truth of the matter is that on a number of occasions during the wars the British were comprehensibly beaten. The Maoris came to the realisation very early that they could not match the British on their terms, ie over open ground. From this realisation came the development of strategy and tactics which enabled the Maori to win (the majority of battles fought) against the major European power of the time.

Belich discusses in some detail the tactics, strategies and sequence of events which lead to these remarkable occurrences. This is followed up by analysis of both Victorian and Maori reaction to each of the battles and wars.

For the pure militarist the book lacks the detail usually associated with war history. I refer particularly to the absence of drawings and battle maps which may have augmented the written word. This aside, however, the book is an extremely readable analysis of both tactics and strategies used by both antagonists throughout the campaigns. 'The New Zealand Wars' explores all the battles from Ohaewai (the Maoris' first defeat of the British under Heke and Kawiti) in 1845 to the last shot fired at Te Kooti fleeing from his Arawa pursuers in 1872: the last effective act of the New Zealand Wars some twenty seven years later.

For the reader, the excitement of discovering the 'Modern Pa' system (created by the Maori to combat the European held advantages); the rise of

Maori nationalism through the Kingitie movement; the classic Maori victories of Ruapekapeka and Gate Pa; the calamity of Okakau (popularly known as Rewi's Last Stand); the total farce of Waireka and the near total victory gained by the most capable Maori general, Titokawaru, make this more than just another historical read. In fact, a home grown adventure comparable to the American Civil War and all the other British colonial wars of the Nineteenth Century.

Whether from just a pure historical point of view or from the military history perspective this is a book worth reading.

Editor's Note:

The syllabus for the 1988 Military History Examination covers the New Zealand Wars. This book is recommended as background reading.

KNOW WHERE YOU FIT

Officers are to be placed in four categories:

- *the Brilliant-Lazy who will be assigned to field command*
- *the Brilliant-Ambitious who will serve on commanders' staffs*
- *the Stupid-Lazy who will be put to routine duties under close supervision*
- *the Stupid-Ambitious who will be sacked'.*

Prussian Military General Staff

