The Dismounted Soldiers Load: An Enduring Problem

By Mr K. Williams

 

The purpose of this article is to draw on a number of excellent international articles and documents that address the notion of a minimum effective combat load for dismounted soldiers, and put it into a New Zealand context, looking at how we can reduce the dismounted soldier’s combat load, and how we train to carry combat loads[i].

Figure 1 illustrates the estimated combat loads carried by dismounted soldiers throughout history, where JRTC is the Joint Readiness Training Centre (Fort Chaffee, Arkansas) and OEF is US troops in Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan)[ii]. Interesting to note on this figure is that prior to World War One a portion of the dismounted soldiers load was transported by other means.

It is a well-documented fact that the dismounted soldier’s combat load has increased throughout history, and most significantly in the last 150 years, with the average weight of patrol equipment for the British soldier in 2013 being 58kg[iii]. Preliminary evidence from a Defence Technology Agency (DTA) study on combat loads within 1 Battalion, Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment, has found that the average weight carried for a rifleman on 72 hour operations with no resupply was 64kg[iv]. The increased combat load carried by dismounted soldiers globally has led to numerous studies on how to reverse this trend, and what the optimal load for a dismounted soldier is. A number of European studies since the Crimean War reported that the optimum load for a soldier to carry is between 18-22kg, and American studies since World War Two have generally agreed with the European findings. In 1950 the US Army Field Board No.3 (Fort Benning, Ga) recommended that a rifleman should carry a maximum of 18kg in the worst conditions, and 25kg as the maximum march load[v]. The combat load carried by soldiers does not only affect mobility – many studies have found that it also affects the fighting ability of the soldier[vi]. The US Army have identified that ‘fighting in complex, urban, and subterranean environments, requires platoons to be smart, fast, lethal and precise’[vii]. This is a lofty aspiration, and is followed up by the statement that everything introduced into service (including Tactics, Techniques and Procedures) for the future dismounted soldier must enable that soldier to be smart, fast, lethal and precise.

The reality, in modern warfare, is that with body armour and other modern technologies (enhanced lethality, protection, C4I, mobility and sustainment) carried by the soldier, limiting the combat load to around 20 kg is not readily achievable. It has been suggested in Britain that studies should be conducted to identify the irreducible minimum combat load that dismounted soldiers could realistically fight in, when effectively supported[viii]. Once that standard has been determined we can then develop the Combat Service Support (CSS) and scalable loads from that commonly understood baseline. It is then a Commander’s responsibility to minimise loads carried by soldiers to mission essential items only (i.e. enforce configuration control to operate smarter) and steer away from the current mind-set of the weight carried being like a badge of honour.

The uncertainty of the contemporary environment that we operate in is an argument towards soldiers carrying increasingly heavier loads to deal with the unexpected, and enable them to operate independently. The asymmetric environment is not a new one, however, and we do not need to look far to find historic examples. During the New Zealand Land Wars one of the preferred methods of the Maori was ambushing troop movement and supply columns, and targeting the European settlers[ix]. One of the successful techniques utilised to combat this method was ‘bush scouring’ or guerrilla warfare conducted by the Bush Rangers[x]. The Bush Rangers fought light, in order to maintain agility and react to local enemy movement effectively. It should be noted that there is a fine balance between agility and protection and finding an optimum level for both remains an enduring problem for most nations.

As part of Land Worthiness we are required to conduct risk analyses and complete a risk matrix. This idea is not a new one, and an article in a US Infantry magazine identified this need almost 30 years ago. It suggests that once a platoon commander has conducted mission analyses based on Mission, Enemy, Troops, Terrain, and Time (METT-T) they should then conduct a risk analysis on what equipment is not required to be carried by the dismounted soldier in order to stay within maximum weights prescribed by the battalion commander[xi]. The battalion commander must then support the junior commander by ensuring that the CSS is available to mitigate these risks. The article goes on to state the truism that “training light means practicing risk analysis, not risk aversion”.

As part of the commander’s decision on how to minimise loads, science needs to be applied as to why we carry certain weapon systems and ammunition loads. If we improve the resupply, maximise the effect of weapon systems available, apply accurate fire, apply good fire discipline and better redistribute ammunition during enemy contact there should be ample opportunity to greatly reduce the amount of ammunition (and heavier weapon systems) carried by the dismounted soldier. In New Zealand we have the DTA that can provide the science to assist with rewriting SOPs/TTPs and inform decisions on changing the way dismounted soldiers carry combat loads.

The United States Army has a scalable load for dismounted soldiers that consist of a Fighting Load, an Approach March, and an Emergency Approach March Load. The Fighting Load includes only PPE, weapon, a reduced amount of ammunition, and should be limited to a maximum 21.7kg. The Approach March Load includes a small assault pack, should carry enough equipment for fighting and individual needs until resupply, and should not exceed 32.7kg. The Emergency Approach March Load requires larger rucksacks to carry loads heavier than 32.7kg, and is only required when transportation is unavailable e.g. through terrain impassable to vehicles, and should only be utilised when absolutely necessary to achieve a specific mission, and in areas where enemy contact can be avoided[xii]. If these weight limitations are strictly applied, and a risk analysis is conducted by commanders to determine how to remain below these weights for each mission it should be possible to avoid the soldier becoming overburdened.

An important component of minimising combat loads carried by dismounted soldiers is to improve CSS agility through more effective use of the Company Quarter Master and the echelon system to resupply/equip for changing scenarios in a timely manner. A United States Army report on combat loads in Afghanistan suggested that the weight of the combat load carried by the dismounted soldier can only be reduced through a combination of providing the soldiers with lighter systems while also off loading any equipment that is not immediately needed in a firefight, to alternate forms of transportation[xiii]. This is not currently done well in the NZ Army, with the teaching of A1 Echelon methods of tactical resupply only briefly covered as part of the ‘introduction to echelon operations’ 60 minute theory lesson on the NZ Army Logistics Platoon Commander course, and briefly covered at a doctrinal level on the Intermediate Logistics Operations course. An article in the US Marine Corps Gazette states that commanders who control the means for mobile logistics must provide the push for lightening the combat load on dismounted soldiers[xiv]. The British Army ‘Fight Light’ Tactical Doctrine Note (TDN) goes into detail on how the logistical agility can be improved to reduce the combat load on the dismounted soldier. A Light Tactical Mobility Platform (LTMP), such as the Polaris ATV, commanded by platoon sergeants and CSMs was identified as a means to further close the gap between the A1 Echelon and the F Echelon[xv]. Experimentation within the NZ Army has been conducted on the employment of Ultra-light Tactical Vehicles (UTV) within a tactical Combat Team environment[xvi]. While the Battlelab focused on the employability of UTV within a Fire Support Group role, load carriage was also investigated[xvii]. Initial findings found that in this role the UTV provided an “agile, fast method of ferrying ammo to the gun lines”. Other UTV experimentation is currently being conducted within the NZ Army, including experimentation by 2 Engineer Regiment. There are some obvious limitations to utilising UTVs, particularly in close country, but porters, helicopters, and/or tactical resupply SOPs could help to achieve these same efficiencies. The British TDN lists a number of planning considerations and suggestions to reduce the combat load of the dismounted soldier.

An important aspect of NZDF 2020 Ready is ‘A Stronger You – A Stronger Force For New Zealand’ which talks about the right kit – ‘integrated soldier systems’, a better way – ‘practical differences to the way we do things everyday’, and resilience training. Through a change in the way we operate, all these things can be achieved to create enhanced combat capability. A recent NZDF publication asked members what enhanced combat capability meant to them. Some of the answers included “being equipped and trained to perform exceptionally”, “fully realising and maximising our capabilities” and “being prepared to take action”[xviii]. Commanders should concentrate their efforts on those areas in which they can exert influence – planning mission specific loads and the physical training approach. A robust review of SOPs and TTPs for dismounted operations and support to dismounted operations need to occur, to minimise the combat load. While this is an inexpensive task in financial terms, it will need to be command driven and assigned high priority to be successfully implemented.

Once the soldier’s load has been minimised as much as realistically/operationally possible, we need to then mitigate the load that soldiers are required to carry in order to remain effective. This is best achieved through appropriate physical conditioning, and this has been practised to some extent across all armies for centuries. Modern science allows this physical conditioning to be better targeted, and more efficient in its application. For example, recent studies have suggested that specific load carriage conditioning should be conducted 2-4 times per month in order to provide optimal training benefit, while also avoiding injuries induced by load carriage[xix]. Studies on physical conditioning of soldiers to carry heavy loads over 3.2km found that the best results were obtained when the Physical Training program includes a balance of total body resistance sessions and aerobic sessions[xx]. It is important that physical conditioning is an ongoing part of a units Physical Training program, because once Pre Deployment Training for a specific operation begins there is unlikely to be enough time to fully condition the soldier for the operational tasks that they may be required to perform. Certainly, during operations the ability to remain conditioned becomes more problematic[xxi]. Further to this, it is important that tasks at the completion of load carriage exercises are incorporated into the training program to reflect operational conditions. These activities need to be varied and in different environments to provide maximum benefit, so should not be restricted to only range shoots following a pack walk. The current Land Combat Fitness Test was developed to be an operational fitness test that confirms an individual’s physical readiness or otherwise to perform the required tasks at D-LOC (Directed Level of Operational Capability)[xxii] and for this reason is an improvement on the previous Battle Efficiency Test.

The LCFT is a minimum standard for all roles within the NZ Army, and includes lifting, fire and manoeuvre, carrying and  tactical manoeuvre components while wearing body armour, webbing and weapon with a combined weight of 20kg to reflect a ‘minimum, mission appropriate fighting order load’[xxiii]. Although the standard clearly states the 4 km tactical manoeuvre is to be completed ‘in less than 32 minutes but no less than 30 minutes’ so that the lifting, fire and manoeuvre and carrying components could be performed, this is not enforced[xxiv]. The reality is that most soldiers tested aim to complete the tactical manoeuvre as fast as possible, (with some soldiers achieving it in less than 20 minutes). Several studies have shown that soldiers performance (ability to fight) immediately following tasks involving load carriage decreases significantly[xxv]. Because of this, testing of a soldier’s ability to conduct activities as part of the LCFT should be conducted at the conclusion of the run, although the run should not be conducted as part of a squad due to the LCFT being an individual test. NATO studies concluded that load carriage assessments should assess the ability of soldiers to complete essential soldiering tasks at the end of the march[xxvi]. Although the exercises would be better suited to being conducted at the end of the run, it was decided to conduct them first as part of the LCFT due to the time spent waiting for all pers to complete the run[xxvii]. This is no different to the Required Fitness Level test, however, where people must wait for all to complete the run before conducting the press-up and sit up components of the test. If the 30-32 minute time is enforced (i.e. fail if outside this window) and the exercises were conducted following the individual run, this would be a much better test of a soldiers ability to get to the fight, and then conduct the fight.

It is also important to look at the ‘Integrated Soldier Systems’ from a ‘need to have’ and weight minimising point of view through the PRICIE construct (Personnel; Research & development; Infrastructure & organisation; Concepts, doctrine and collective training; Information management; Equipment, supplies and services). The NZDF Future 35 strategy talks about applying foresight to capability development, and integration of personnel, equipment and training to deliver more flexible and relevant future capabilities[xxviii]. The integration of soldier systems is of high importance, and while many armies have created teams to address equipment integration, they are often not involved in personnel equipment acquisition or provided with support to ensure that modern soldier systems are well integrated (e.g. wearing of pack with body armour)[xxix]. What are often not considered as part of integrating soldier systems are the additional items that the soldier may have to carry, above the standard issue. Every introduction into service of equipment needs to pass the test ‘does the soldier really need this, does it integrate with the other equipment and does it make the soldier’s load lighter?’

A good example is the change of the Light Support Weapon (LSW) from 5.56mm to 7.62mm – the weight difference between the two weapons is a weight gain of approximately 2kg. The biggest impact is the weight difference of the ammunition, which has more than doubled. The first line of ammunition carried within the rifle section has not changed, so this will have a significant impact on the combat load of the section. It is encouraging to see the new LMT MARS-L rifle weighs 300grams less than the Steyr, but we must resist the temptation to add attachments to all the picatinny rails, unnecessarily increasing the weight. If the rifle does require additional accessories, then these accessories should be only attached to the rifle when the mission dictates, and ideally carried by the CSS chain when not needed. At the least they should be carried on the soldier when not required and not on the weapon. Studies have looked at where loads are most efficiently carried, and determined that carrying loads in the hands (i.e. adding weight to weapons) is less efficient than when carried on the torso[xxx]. The Defence Technology Agency (DTA) Human Systems Group currently provides scientific support to assist with capability acquisition decisions and the integration of soldier systems, and maintains a close working relationship with the Soldiers Systems team on all projects.

The US Army have determined that they must resist the urge to burden the dismounted soldier with additional equipment that continue to increase size, weight, and power (SWaP) demands without first considering what equipment must be removed[xxxi]. Failure to do so only increases physical demand on the soldier, increasing fatigue and reducing agility and lethality. A US study deems weight reduction of the combat load is so important that it recommended a ‘Weight Czar’ answerable to the senior levels of army is appointed to drive the reduction in weight and bulk of soldier systems. The study also recommended integrating Key Performance Parameters into all new soldier system acquisitions[xxxii]. The US Army have not shied away from utilising new technologies, but (for example) have identified that placing unmanned systems down to an infantry platoon increases the burden on the platoon. “The infantry rifle platoon and below need to operate as consumers of these unmanned capabilities, but not be burdened with operating, maintaining, and sustaining these unmanned systems”[xxxiii].

Under the Networked Enabled Army (NEA) Program it is encouraging to see that the PRICIE construct and SWaP demands are playing an important role in what is being considered at the dismounted combat soldier level. Two important themes of the project include ‘right information – right place – right time’, and ‘simplicity at the edge and complexity at the centre’ which both focus on providing the tactical commander with only what is required to ensure mission success, without the added burden of extra equipment or information. The network will be designed and configured to have the support personnel and complex equipment held back from the edge to reduce the burden on the dismounted soldier.[xxxiv]

Figure 2 illustrates the indicative scalable soldier C4 system, with the most basic configuration of headset and soldier radio being comparable in size/weight to the current in service Personal Role Radio (PRR), but having a greatly enhanced capability. The battery pack and communication hub is to allow the connectivity of the additional equipment (such as the Personal Display Device) when required.[xxxv] The NEA Program will provide an enhanced capability to the dismounted soldier, and should also reduce the load carried (when only mission essential equipment is carried). This equipment will need to undergo integration analysis prior to introduction, however, to ensure that we do not bring into service equipment that is not compatible with other system upgrades or introduction. To miss this important step may unnecessarily add weight to the combat load of the dismounted soldier by having to duplicate equipment (such as power supply) that is not able to fully integrate into the ‘soldier system’.

The framework for current soldier system development of lethality, protection, situational awareness, mobility and support[xxxvi] needs to be carefully balanced. If too much emphasis is placed on increasing firepower through extending the range of platoon weapon systems, increasing personnel body armour protection, increasing the amount of situational awareness equipment carried by the soldier, and other items such as section water treatment systems – without improving soldier mobility through weight reduction of the combat load and support provided by a more agile CSS chain, then the most important aspect of a combat soldier, his lethality, will be greatly compromised. There is no point having the best equipped soldier in the world if that soldier cannot get from point A to point B, and then complete the mission task.

This article has explored ways to reduce the dismounted soldier’s combat load, and how training to carry combat loads can be more effective. Key recommendations are as follows:

1. Every aspect of the current combat load of the dismounted soldier is critically analysed to ensure the absolute minimum load can be achieved;
2. Unit commanders set a maximum allowable combat load carriage for dismounted operations, to be adjusted based on task/environment, and ensure CSS is resourced to provide agile support to the F Echelon;
3. The recommendations of the Ultra-light Tactical Vehicle Battlelab are implemented as a way to improve CSS agility in support of dismounted soldiers;
4. Physical training of soldiers is focused on conditioning soldiers to fight in dismounted operations, which is reflected by the testing regime;
5. A robust review of SOPs and TTPs for dismounted operations and support to dismounted operations is undertaken, with the goal of minimising the combat load; and
6. the ‘Integrated Soldier Systems’ team are appropriately resourced to ensure all new items of equipment undergo weight minimising and integration analysis prior to introduction into service, and are measured against weight minimisation initiatives for the dismounted soldier.

The implementation of these recommendations will enable the NZ Army to make significant progress towards ‘enhanced combat capability 2020’ through creating a much more agile and responsive force.

Those interested in further reading on this topic should read The Irreducible Minimum Fighting Load in the British Army Review, Load Carriage and its Force Impact in the Australian Defence Journal and Lightening the Combat Load in the US Marine Corps Gazette. Some of the more recent military documents that address this topic include the US Army study Load Carriage in Military Operations: A Review of Historical, Physiological, Biomechanical, and Medical Aspects and the UK Army Tactical Doctrine Note Dismounted Close Combat (DCC) Load Carriage – ‘Fight Light’.

I would like to acknowledge and thank all the people that assisted me with the research conducted for this article, including Professor Joseph Knapik of the US Army Research Institute of Environmental Medicine for the use of the

1 It is acknowledged that soldier burden as a concept is broader than load mass and includes physiological, biomechanical and psychological elements (the relative contribution of which will change dependent on the role / task). However, the focus of this article is on load mass.

[ii] Knapik, J. & Reynolds, K. (2010). Load Carriage in Military Operations: A Review of Historical, Physiological, Biomechanical, and Medical Aspects.

[iii] UK Army Tactical Doctrine Note. Dismounted Close Combat (DCC) Load Carriage – ‘Fight Light’ Tactical Doctrine Note (TDN).

[iv] Fordy, G. (2015). Soldier Systems Capability Baseline.

[v] Knapik, J. & Reynolds, K. (2010). Load Carriage in Military Operations: A Review of Historical, Physiological, Biomechanical, and Medical Aspects.

[vi] Lt Orr, R (2011). Load Carriage and its Force Impact. Printed in Australian Defence Force Journal Issue No. 185, 2011.

[vii] United States Army Infantry School, Maneuver Centre of Excellence (26 Jun 2015) The Infantry Rifle Platoon – Where Decisive Action Starts and Ends.

[viii] Lt Col Evans, T (2015). The Irreducible Minimum Fighting Load. Printed in The British Army Review 163: Spring/Summer 2015.

[ix] Stowers R. (1996). Forest Rangers – A History of the Forest Rangers During the New Zealand Wars.

[x] Belich J. (1986). The New Zealand Wars.

[xi] Capt Mayville, W. (1987). A Soldier’s Load. Printed in United States INFANTRY magazine, January-February 1987.

[xii] NATO Research and Technology Organisation (Jan 2009).Optimizing Operational Physical Fitness.

[xiii] US Army Center for Army Lessons Learned, Task Force Devil Combined Arms Assessment Team (2004). The Modern Warrior’s Combat Load – Dismounted Operations in Afghanistan April-May 2003.

[xiv] Maj Inghram, D. (1987). Lightening the Combat Load. Printed in US Marine Corps Gazette, March 1987.

[xv] UK Army Tactical Doctrine Note. Dismounted Close Combat (DCC) Load Carriage – ‘Fight Light’ Tactical Doctrine Note (TDN).

[xvi] UTV Programme of Work, dated Jul 2014.

[xvii] Progress Report: Polaris MRZR4 Ultra Light Tactical Vehicle Battle Lab, dated Jul 2014.

[xviii] FORCE4NZ Oct 2015, Issue No.4.

[xix] Lt Orr, R (2011). Load Carriage and its Force Impact. Printed in Australian Defence Force Journal Issue No. 185, 2011.

[xx] Knapik, J., Harman, E., Steelman, R., & Graham, B. (2012). Systematic Review of the Effects of Physical Training on Load Carriage Performance. Journal of Strength & Conditioning Research. 26 (2).

[xxi] It should be noted that documents such as the British Army FOB Fitness and Patrol Base

Conditioning Guide have attempted to provide guidance to manage this problem.

[xxii] Kilding, K. & Fordy G (2014). Development of a Land Combat Fitness Test for the New Zealand Army. DTA Report 388.

[xxiii] CA Directive 10/14: Land Combat Fitness Test dated 15 Dec 2014.

[xxiv] 1 (NZ) Brigade NZ Army Land Combat Fitness Test protocols dated 14 May 2014.

[xxv] Lt Orr, R (2011). Load Carriage and its Force Impact. Printed in Australian Defence Force Journal Issue No. 185, 2011.

[xxvi] NATO Research and Technology Organisation (Jan 2009).Optimizing Operational Physical Fitness

[xxvii] CA Directive 10/14: Land Combat Fitness Test dated 15 Dec 2014.

[xxviii] New Zealand Defence Force (2010). Future 35 – Our Strategy to 2035.

[xxix] Lt Orr, R (2011). Load Carriage and its Force Impact. Printed in Australian Defence Force Journal Issue No. 185, 2011.

[xxx] Knapik, J. & Reynolds, K. (2010). Load Carriage in Military Operations: A Review of Historical, Physiological, Biomechanical, and Medical Aspects.

[xxxi] United States Army Infantry School, Maneuver Centre of Excellence (26 Jun 2015) The Infantry Rifle Platoon – Where Decisive Action Starts and Ends.

[xxxii] US Army Center for Army Lessons Learned, Task Force Devil Combined Arms Assessment Team (2004). The Modern Warrior’s Combat Load – Dismounted Operations in Afghanistan April-May 2003.

[xxxiii] United States Army Infantry School, Maneuver Centre of Excellence (26 Jun 2015) The Infantry Rifle Platoon – Where Decisive Action Starts and Ends.

[xxxiv] Maj Mortiboy, C.G. (March 2015) Network Enabled Army Land Tactical Information Network Technical Handbook

[xxxv] Maj Mortiboy, C.G. (March 2015) Network Enabled Army Land Tactical Information Network Technical Handbook

[xxxvi] Lt Col Bennett, V. (2011) Soldier Systems Development in New Zealand – Preparing to Meet a Range of Missions and Tasks. Presented at Soldier Modernisation India Conference 4-5 Oct 2011.