By Mr M. Brewer
To many the 2003 Gulf War would appear to be a military continuation of the 1991 conflict.[1] Even prominent British military historian and defence reporter John Keegan commented on history repeating and noted ‘an almost eerie impression of events replicating themselves’.[2] However, as the 2003 conflict unfolded it would be the ‘differences rather than the similarities which commanded attention and demanded explanation’.[3] This essay compares and contrasts the Gulf Wars of 1991 and 2003, demonstrating that it is the differences, not the similarities that define the two.
The 1991 and 2003 Gulf Wars are inter-related and at first glance appear similar. The 1991 invasion of Kuwait was partly a product of the debt incurred by Iraq in its exhausting war with Iran.[4] The 2003 Gulf War would be an echo of the first, due to growing American displeasure with the outcomes of the 1991 cease-fire.[5] Both conflicts were preceded by United Nations ultimatums, international diplomatic efforts and Iraqi brinkmanship.[6] They were each initiated by large air and cruise missile assaults, and ultimately ended with quick ‘maneuverist’ ground victories.[7] Once concluded they would both define high spectrum technological warfare within their respective decades.[8] However, the two conflicts also differ greatly in their level of international support, force ratios and technological military capabilities.
Limited and internationally agreed strategic objectives ensured general support for the expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait in 1991. The conflict set new standards of international co-operation within a hastily gathered coalition force comprising 40 traditionally non-aligned nations.[9] Initial reaction to the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait was containment on the Saudi border through speedy mobilisation of military forces.[10] Subsequent United Nations mandated military operations received unprecedented support and coalition commanders operated within limited objectives to liberate Kuwait, while ensuring destruction of Saddam’s offensive capability.[11] By contrast the 2003 Gulf conflict would take place in a totally different Geo-political climate.
The controversial strategic objectives of 2003 were more political than geographical, and resulted in a much reduced military coalition. Post 9/11 the President of the United States (US) adopted a policy of pre-emptive attack, instead of the ongoing containment of Iraq.[12] This decision was based on contentious evidence of Iraqi Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) capabilities and intentions.[13] Utilising pre-positioned forces and equipment, the US lead alliance operated without a clear UN mandate and against international pressure, to achieve broad objectives of regime change, regional stabilisation and security of Iraqi oil infrastructure.[14] Despite these apparent constraints, the small four nation military coalition would demonstrate greater integration and more expansive use of new military technologies than in the previous campaign.
The 1991 Gulf War was characterised by a protracted 40 day air campaign prior to the commitment of ground forces. Coalition aircraft would initially target Iraqi offensive and defensive air capabilities before focusing on the enemy’s centres of gravity (command and control, WMD and the Republican Guard) in order to isolate the battlefield and attrit Iraqi forces.[15] The air campaign maintained an incredibly high tempo, with a predominant focus on strategic targeting through pre-takeoff air tasking.[16] Guided weapon accuracy was impressive, but 90 percent of ordnance would remain unguided due to limitations in technology, aircraft capability and aircrew training.[17] This outcome was aided by the grouped and isolated nature of Iraqi army targets, which allowed engagement by blanket bombing with low ‘collateral effect’.[18] Although successful, key lessons learned from this campaign would enhance future air power capability.
The 2003 air campaign demonstrated greater accuracy, brevity, efficiency, and support to the ground scheme of manoeuvre than its 1991 predecessor. Commencement of the short strategic air campaign coincided with the initial ground attack and Iraqi air defences proved inconsequential due to pre-war attrition.[19] Coalition aircraft employed an ‘effects based’ strategy to target Saddam Hussein’s regime as the centre of gravity, and then concentrated on the provision of close air support to ground forces.[20] In 2003 Iraqi ground targets were more widely dispersed and inviting of collateral damage than in 1991, necessitating greater use of guided weapons (70 percent of total ordnance).[21] Also, use of new sensors and information networks allowed for the majority of air tasking to occur after takeoff, and previously sequential air tasks became simultaneous, requiring less than 40 percent of the sorties needed in 1991.[22] This success owed much to the air contingent’s adoption of the manoeuvrist approach, used so effectively by ground forces during the 1991 Gulf War.[23]
The 1991 expulsion of the Iraqi Army from Kuwait in a high tempo 100 hour ground war, demonstrated the successful application of manoeuvrist US AirLand Battle doctrine.[24] The coalition two Corps plan, combined deception and a small force to attack Kuwait directly, whilst a larger force performed a wheeling manoeuvre around Iraqi defences to fix and destroy the enemy in Kuwaiti.[25] Ground forces focused on the destruction of the enemy’s centre of gravity, the Republican Guard, and other Iraqi forces already attrited by Air Power, as part of the AirLand Battle doctrine’s foundation of fighting in depth to defeat follow-on echelons.[26] The Iraqi army had surrendered mobility by entrenching its forces, but stood and fought until its cohesion was broken, resulting in a large number of casualties and prisoners of war.[27] Offensive use of Special Forces occurred begrudgingly, but assisted in countering the Scud missile attacks that threatened to bring Israel into the war and split the coalition.[28] Much would change in the later conflict.
The 2003 conflict pitted a numerically smaller but more agile, sophisticated and technologically capable coalition force against a much depleted Iraqi Army. Utilising a new doctrine of ‘rapid dominance’—based on application of mass simultaneously instead of a broad slow conventional advance—coalition forces made a high speed thrust to Baghdad.[29] Unfortunately, the ground war was constrained by the narrow point of entry, limitations on logistics support, and a theatre reserve still mobilising into theatre.[30] Extensive use was made of Special Forces to fix Iraqi divisions north of Baghdad, secure ‘scud pans’ in the West, and in conjunction with air assets target Saddam Hussein’s regime as the centre of gravity.[31] Instead of confronting regular Iraqi forces, where possible they were bypassed.[32] Consequently, the 2003 conflict demonstrated a higher degree of jointness than the 1991 war, with greater synchronisation, integration of firepower and extensive use of air and precision fires in the ground scheme of manoeuvre.[33]
In 2003, operational tempo, technological capability, enemy tactics, and the post hostility environment would differ greatly from that of the previous conflict. The 21 day ground war would be the ‘highest tempo piece of armoured warfare that we have ever seen’, enabled by massive firepower, advanced night fighting capability and common situational awareness—with information exchange through digital networks as its linchpin.[34] It was fought in an ambiguous and non-linear battlespace where conventional Iraqi forces largely melted away, replaced by irregular fedayeen fighting in urban areas, where long lines of communication were susceptible to unconventional attacks.[35] While Rumsfeld’s doctrine of using a small but technologically superior coalition force structure proved effective during the invasion, its limitations provided opportunity for a post conflict insurgency.[36] The 2003 conflict ended in a lengthy ‘nation building’ phase where combat, peacekeeping, reconstruction and humanitarian aid distribution could often occur in the same small area.[37] This outcome was far different from the victorious end to the 1991 Gulf conflict.
While outwardly similar, the 1991 and 2003 Gulf Wars were fought in different geo-political environments, with divergent levels of international support and were aligned to opposing strategic objectives. The 1991 campaign used fledgling tactics and technologies that set the standard for post-cold war conventional warfare. The 2003 invasion of Iraq fielded a smaller but more sophisticated force, in a high intensity conflict against largely unconventional forces, and employed an advanced tactical doctrine. The latter conflict also demonstrated greater tempo, agility, jointness, connectivity, firepower, precision, application of force and technological capability than its predecessor. Unfortunately, within contemporary society it is not the doctrinal advances, but the outward differences that define the two. The 1991 Gulf war as a stunning victory against a defiant invader and the 2003 conflict as a controversial, yet astonishing feat of arms that resulted in a bloody on-going insurgency.
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[1] Michael R. Gordon & General Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq, New York: Pantheon Books, 2006, p.498.
[2] John Keegan, The Iraq War, London: Hutchinson, 2004, p.127.
[3] Keegan, p.127.
[4] Frederick Stanwood, Patrick Allen & Lindsay Peacock, Gulf War: A Day by Day Chronicle, London: Heinemann, 1991, p.5.
[5] Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack, New York: Simon and Schuter, 2004, pp.9-10.
[6] Peter David, Triumph in the Desert: The Definitive Illustrated History of the Gulf War, London: Random House, 1991, pp.52-67; Hans Blix, Disarming Iraq: The search for weapons of mass destruction, London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2004, pp.237-249.
[7] Keegan, pp.78-83; Bing West, ‘Maneuver Warfare: It worked in Iraq’, Proceedings US Naval Institute, 130:2 (2004), 36-41.
[8] Black, Jeremy, Introduction to Global Military History: 1775 to the present day, London: Routledge, 2005, p.236; Anthony H. Cordesman, The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons, Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2003, p.174.
[9] David, p.64; Brigadier General Robert H. Scales, Jr., ed., Certain Victory: United States Army in the Gulf War, Washington: Office of the Chief of Staff United States Army, 1993, pp.60-65.
[10] Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr, A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War, New York: Dell Publishing, 1992, p.173.
[11] Stanwood et al, p.11; Summers, pp.162-176; General Sir Peter de la Billière, Storm Command: A Personal Account of the Gulf War, London: Harper Collins, 1992, pp.304-305.
[12] Woodward, pp.132-133.
[13] Blix, 274; Woodward, p.293;Scott Ritter & William Rivers Pitt, War on Iraq: What Team Bush Doesn’t Want You To Know, London: Profile Books, 2002, pp.4-5; Shyam Bhatia & Daniel McGrory, Saddam’s Bomb: The Iraqi race for Nuclear Weapons, 2nd ed., London: Time Warner, 2002, p. 294; Tim Trevan, Saddam’s Secrets: The Hunt for Iraq’s Hidden Weapons, London: Harper Collins, 1999, p.374; Laurie Mylroie, The War against America: Saddam Hussein and the World Trade Center Attacks – A study of revenge, 2nd ed., New York: Harper Collins, 2001, p.251; General Georges Sada, Saddam’s Secrets: How an Iraqi General defied and survived Saddam Hussein, Brentwood: Integrity Publishers, 2006, p.207.
[14] Marvin Leibstone, ‘The US-Led Anti-Iraq War and Naval Combat Issues’, Naval Forces, 24:3 (2003), 25-27; Woodward, pp.346-370; Milan Vego, ‘Learning from Victory’, Proceedings US Naval Institute, 129:8 (2003), 32-36.
[15] Watson, pp.64-66; Black, 237; Scales, p.314 (C2 as the focal point of ‘Walden’s Rings’ enemy centre of gravity for the air campaign, WMD at the strategic level after Iraqi use of Scud missiles against Israel, and the Republican Guard as enemy centre of gravity for the ground offensive).
[16] Watson, p.70; Keegan, p.141.
[17] Francis Tusa, ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom: Making sense of the figures’, Asian Military Review, 11:5 (2003), 59-61; Black, p.237.
[18] Keegan, p.141.
[19] Keegan, pp. 141-142; Tusa, p.60.
[20] Air Chief Marshal Sir Brian Burridge, Iraq 2003: Air Power pointers for the future -closing address, The Royal Air Force Air Power Review, 7:3 (2004), 1-15; Andrew Brookes, ‘The air campaign against Iraq: How did it really go?’, Air International, 66:2 (2004), 40-44; Cordesman, p.218.
[21] Keegan, pp.141-143; Tusa, p.60; Cordesman, p.218; Vego, p.34.
[22] Joris Janssen Lok, ‘Communication weaknesses endanger allied integration in US-led air campaigns’, International Defense Review, 37:3 (2004), 4-5; Brookes, p.44; Burridge, pp.1-8; Tusa, pp.60-61.
[23] Burridge, pp.1-8.
[24] Summers, p.157.
[25] Summers, p.96; Keegan, pp.80-81.
[26] Scales, p.112; Tom Clancy with General Fred Franks, Jr., Into the Storm: A Study in Command, New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1997, p.138; Summers, p.142.
[27] Black, p.237.
[28] de la Billière, p.191; Watson, p.74; Scales, p.186.
[29] Glyn Harper, ‘Warfare since 1945’, An Introduction to the History of Modern Warfare: Course Material, Palmerston North: Centre for Defence Studies, Massey University, 2007, p.4; General Tommy Franks, American Soldier, New York: Harper Collins, 2004, pp.395-396; Black, p.258.
[30] Keegan, pp.135-137; Bing West & Major General Ray L. Smith, The March Up: Taking Baghdad with the 1st Marine Division, London: Pimlico, 2003, p.102; Burridge, p.13; Vego, pp.33-34.
[31] Franks, pp.396-397; Keegan, p.163.
[32] Harper, p.5.
[33] Cordesman, pp.180-182.
[34] Burridge, p.2; Leibstone, p.27; Cordesman, p.183.
[35] Burridge, pp.1-8; West & Smith, p.74; Gordon & Trainor, pp.498-499.
[36] Cordesman, pp.159-165; Gordon & Trainor, pp.497-499.
[37] Burridge, p.3; Woodward, p.413; Sada, pp.243-291; Cordesman, p.144;
